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VOLUME IV

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LAURENCE M. LARSON

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VOL. IV. NO. I

MARCH, 1915

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The Illinois Whigs Before 1846

BY

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PRICE 95 CENTS

PUBLISHED UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

PREFACE.

This study is intended to be but preliminary to a history of the Illinois Whigs, which will consider not only the origin and development, but also the decline and decay of that party. It has seemed advisable, therefore, to defer the slavery agitations of the thirties and early forties to the more complete discussion.

Occasionally the history of the Whig party, and even the political narrative itself, gives way to discussions of a purely social or economic nature. Such a procedure is the result of a conscious attempt to examine the social and economic environment of a minority party within a limited geographical area, to make accessible hitherto unpublished information on the political affiliations of hundreds of Illinois office holders, and to show some of the relations between the politics of the state and the politics of the nation.

To the county and state officers who have opened their respective archives and rendered whatever aid they could to facilitate research, I wish at this point to express my thanks; likewise to the officials and attendants of the Chicago Historical Library, of the Indiana State Library, of the Illinois State Historical Library, of the Mercantile Library, St. Louis, and of the Library of the University of Illinois. I am particularly indebted to Professor Solon J. Buck of the University of Minnesota, for advice during the early stages of investigation; to Professor Evarts B. Greene for kind and helpful criticisms, and above all to Professor Clarence W. Alvord whose advice and oversight have made the study possible.

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CHAPTER I.

GENESIS OF THE ILLINOIS WHIGS.

1809-1834.

Throughout the territorial period, and even before, political factions and cliques existed in Illinois. Local rather than national issues determined the lines of cleavage; and the location of these lines usually depended on personal adherences. Prior to about 1817, the bone of contention was the judiciary; one party supported, another opposed, the system as it existed. Just before the government was changed from territorial to state, the slave question began to assume large proportions. Without any known reason the party that favored the judiciary favored the extension of slavery, and the anti-judiciary party became anti-extensionist. The struggle over the admission of Missouri and the subsequent contest over the proposition to legalize slavery in Illinois, served to make the line of party cleavage more distinct and to crystalize parties and factions. These parties and factions, with variations, persisted down to the time when the Whig party emerged in 1834.¹

Ninian Edwards, governor of Illinois Territory from 1809 to 1818, was the leader of one of the territorial factions, and he continued until the time of his death in 1833 to be one of the prominent figures in Illinois politics. The leader of the faction opposed to Edwards was Shadrach Bond, who was the first territorial delegate in Congress from Illinois.

Edwards had two able lieutenants in Nathaniel Pope and Daniel Pope Cook, both of whom held appointive offices in the territory. Pope was the first territorial secretary, holding that position until 1816, when he was elected delegate to Congress. Cook came to the territory in 1815, became auditor of public accounts the next year, served as clerk of the territorial house of representatives from 1816 to 1818, and in the latter year was

¹The study of Illinois politics from 1809 to about 1822 has been unsatisfactory. As far as the writer has been able to ascertain there is little contemporary evidence on the subject. See, however, Washburne, *Edwards*, 110, 149, 150, 154, 159, 160; Churchill-Lippincott, (*Third Paper*); *Western Intelligencer*, August 21, 1816; *Edwardsville Spectator*, December 4, 1821; W. H. Brown in *Chicago American*, December 22, 1840.

elevated to the judiciary. Associated with Edwards, Pope and Cook were Thomas C. Browne and Pierre Menard, two men whose abilities, although of a different order, were only a little less than those of the leaders. Both served in the territorial legislature, the latter being president of the council during its entire existence from 1812 to 1818. Among the close political friends of Bond were Elias Kent Kane, John McLean, Jesse Burgess Thomas, and Michael Jones. Kane and Thomas were territorial judges and kept up a continuous controversy with Edwards over the functions of the judiciary;² McLean was a political free lance, while Jones appears to have opposed Edwards on personal grounds. Of the five prominent members of the Edwards faction, Pope, Cook and Browne were natives of Kentucky, Menard of Canada, and Edwards of Maryland.³ The nativity of the members of the other faction differed somewhat: Bond and Thomas were born in Maryland; Kane in New York; McLean in North Carolina; and Jones in Pennsylvania. With one or two exceptions all the ten leaders were lawyers, and at least three had had college training: Kane at Yale, Edwards at Dickinson, and Pope at Transylvania.

Around Edwards were grouped his appointees, their friends, and all those who felt that adherence to him would further their own interests; opposed were disappointed office-seekers, their friends, those hostile to authority from a centralized source, and finally that frontier element which confounded liberty with license, and hence hated legal restraint. Between the political poles stood the great majority of the people. The division among this great majority was transitory, depending very much upon personal predilections and temporary issues.

²*Western Intelligencer*, August 21, 1816.

³To avoid being tedious, references in this work to such statements as nativity are omitted unless controverted and necessary for proof. Besides consulting the standard biographies and other works on Illinois history, members of the family have been appealed to, and on some occasions the inscriptions on grave stones have been used. Newspaper advertisements, and a consultation of circuit court records in the county archives may be depended upon for a determination of profession in many cases. Likewise in cases where there are disputes as to the spelling of proper names, the spelling found in contemporary public documents has been followed. E.g. T. C. Browne's name is usually spelled "Brown", but examination of the Eddy MSS. and court records shows that he spelled it with an "e".

The intensity of the political strife between the factions usually depended on the personal feelings of the leaders of one faction toward those of the other, and not upon vital issues; and a cessation of hostilities oftentimes merely indicated a friendly understanding among the leaders. At the beginning of Edwards' administration as territorial governor, he and Bond are said to have been personal and political friends, and as early as June, 1813, the latter wrote to Edwards saying, "I agree with you that each one shall enjoy his own opinion, and rest assured that I shall act with candor and sincerity toward you."⁴ Early in 1814, Bond complained that certain people in the territory were endeavoring to cause a rupture of good relationship between him and the governor.⁵ Bond's resignation from Congress in October, 1814, to accept the position of receiver of public moneys would indicate at least that Edwards' superiors at Washington were not particularly hostile to him at that time.

During the next few years there appears to have been a lull in political activities, but in 1818 Bond announced his candidacy for territorial delegate to Congress in opposition to that of his old political rival, Nathaniel Pope. Before the end of the summer, however, Bond withdrew as a candidate for delegate, and entered the race for governor.⁶ For this office he had no opposition.⁷ Menard, one of four candidates, was elected lieutenant-governor.⁸ It is interesting to see how the other offices were distributed: Bond appointed Kane to be secretary of state; the General Assembly elected Edwards and Thomas United States senators, Cook attorney general, Browne and Phillips State Supreme judges; Pope was made a federal judge, McLean was elected to Congress; while Jones was at the time in the state senate.

Thus all the leaders of the old territorial factions received office. It is too much to say in the absence of positive proof, that there was any sort of a deal whereby the offices were distributed between the old factions, but when the unanimity with which the various officers were chosen is considered, one is led

⁴Washburne, *Edwards*, 101.

⁵Washburne, *Edwards*, 110.

⁶*Illinois Intelligencer*, June 17, August 19, 1818.

⁷*Ibid.* October 7, 1818.

⁸The candidates for lieutenant-governor were: Edward N. Cullom, Joseph Kitchell, P. Menard, and William L. Reynolds.—*Illinois Intelligencer*, September 2, 1818.

to believe that at least a temporary truce had been declared. Such a conclusion is the more valid in the light of subsequent events. The elections were scarcely over before the struggle reopened with increased vigor.

The only real contest during the first year of statehood was for the sole seat in the lower house of Congress. The two candidates were John McLean and Daniel Pope Cook. The former was a resident of Gallatin, the latter of Randolph County. Although the results of the election were determined largely on the basis of the personal popularity of the candidates, of their recognized adherence to the old parties, and of the geographical location of their homes, the contest was characterized by the introduction of a real national issue, the influence of which must have affected the campaign. The Missouri question had by this time assumed an importance that justified its discussion from the stump. Cook took what may for convenience be called an anti-slavery attitude, in which in a general way he opposed the extension of the slavery system.⁹ McLean took the opposite view, laying stress not only upon the right of the state to regulate its domestic affairs independent of the national government, but also upon the desirability and value of slaves in any community where they could be worked with profit. Cook was beaten by the slender majority of fourteen, but that campaign laid the foundation for a successful political career beginning the next year.

Scarcely less important politically was Edwards' re-election to the Senate, in 1819, and Bond's hesitancy in coming out openly for or against him. In drawing for terms of service in the United States Senate, Edwards had drawn the shorter, which ended March 4, 1819, scarcely four months after his election. As soon as this fact became known, opposition to his re-election arose, and his enemies united upon Michael Jones, who was an adherent of the old anti-Edwards faction. Feeling that the Edwards party was the stronger, a scheme was put on foot to eliminate Edwards from the race by dividing the state into two senatorial districts so arranged that Edwards and Thomas would reside in the same district.¹⁰ The friends of the

⁹*Illinois Intelligencer*, July 29, 1818. "I shall in this county [Pope] get a large vote, about one-half, some say more. I made a speech and excited warm opposition from *slavemen*, but still warmer support from *freemen*." Cook to Edwards, August 3, 1818. Washburne, *Edwards*, 145.

¹⁰Washburne, *Edwards*, 149.

retiring senator were able to defeat the measure in the house; and a little later Edwards was re-elected for a term of six years, receiving twenty-three votes to sixteen for Jones.¹¹ During this contest Edwards remained at his post at Washington. He seems to have believed that Bond was supporting him, but Cook, who was at Kaskaskia watching affairs, knew better and so informed his chief.¹² The truth seems to be that Bond was influenced by his old political allies to abandon Edwards and assist in the rehabilitation of the territorial faction formerly opposed to Edwards.¹³ Bond wavered, however, in his decision as to whether or not he would support Edwards, and by so doing he allowed the leadership of the anti-Edwards party to pass into the hands of McLean, Kane, and Thomas.¹⁴ Associated with them were William Kinney, Dr. Alexander, Willis Hargrave, Adolphus Hubbard, Robert K. McLaughlin and Michael Jones, all of whom afterwards played important rôles in the political history of the state.¹⁵

The congressional campaign of 1819 re-opened the slavery question and started anew the discussion of Missouri's admission into the union. As in 1818 the candidates were Cook and McLean. Since the campaign of the year before, the Missouri question had become more acute; and in Illinois the people followed with intense interest the congressional debates and newspaper editorials on the admission of Missouri. They took this attitude toward the question, not because they had any particular interest in the well-being of their neighbors across the river, but rather because their sympathies for and against the admission of Missouri with or without slavery, reflected their convictions on the extension of slavery, on discrimination against free negroes, and on the sovereign rights of a state. As in 1818, McLean took a pro-slavery position, and Cook the opposite.

¹¹*Senate Journal*, 1818-19, p. 80.

¹²Washburne, *Edwards*, 150.

¹³Washburne, *Edwards*, 153.

¹⁴Kane was apparently the only one of the three to remain in opposition to Edwards. McLean and Edwards seem to have come to some sort of an understanding, for in 1828 they are in confidential communication. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 343, *passim*. In 1826, Thomas is said to have supported Cook and been friendly to Edwards. See *Edwardsville Spectator*, September 15, 1826. As late as 1830 Kane and Edwards were carrying on a bitter newspaper war. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 496, *passim*.

¹⁵Washburne, *Edwards*, 149, 150, 154, 159, 160.

After an exciting campaign in which the slavery question played a prominent part, Cook was elected by a substantial majority. Cook was certainly not an abolitionist as the term came to be used, nor does the result of the election show conclusively the feeling of the people on the extension of slavery; yet in the light of the well known attitude of each candidate on the question of slavery, it may safely be assumed that of the voters who put measures before men, those opposed to slavery voted for Cook, while the conscious friends of the system supported McLean.

The intrusion of the slavery question into the congressional elections of 1818 and 1819 served to crystalize parties. Cook found in the ranks of the opposition not only a great many of the members of the anti-Edwards party, but also those who were inclined to resent any kind of interference with the so-called Black laws in the states, and the institution of slavery in both states and territories. On the other hand, his frank denunciation of "slavemen" brought to his support all classes to which slavery in any form was repugnant. Thus the old territorial parties were being gradually reshaped. Cook's warm opposition to slavery alienated from him the ultra pro-slavery members of the Edwards party, while their places were taken in part by anti-slavery members of the anti-Edwards forces. Against Cook are found practically all the leaders favoring a call for a constitutional convention three years later, but the men that were to make themselves famous for their sturdy opposition to the introduction of slavery in 1822-4, had not yet entered the political lists; Birkbeck, Warren, Lippincott, and Peck were at this time wielding an effective influence against slavery, but it was from the pulpit or editorial office, not from the stump.¹⁶

Although there is nothing to indicate any opposition to the re-election of President Monroe in 1820, there appear to have been in each of the three districts, electoral tickets representing the two parties or factions.¹⁷ It would appear that each

¹⁶This is illustrated by a contemporary account. "The subject of slavery was discussed in the court yards, sometimes in the pulpits, and at all gatherings of the people, as well as in the presses, and on the stump throughout the state." Reynolds, *My Own Times*, 229.

¹⁷Two candidates in each district receiving the largest vote were:

1st., James B. Moore—250; William Kinney—191.

2nd., Michael Jones—441; Peter Kimmell—90.

3rd., Adolphus F. Hubbard—238; Charles Campbell—47.

MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

faction had a desire to honor one of its members in each district by choosing him to be presidential elector, but to what extent the factions divided over the issue it is impossible to say.¹⁸ The election resulted in the choice of two electors of the anti-Edwards party, Adolphus F. Hubbard and Michael Jones, and one of the Edwards party, James B. Moore.

At the preceding August election the anti-Edwards party had supported Kane for Congress, while Cook sought re-election.¹⁹ Cook exhibited his record in Congress as a basis for his candidacy, and at the same time declared his intention to vote for the Missouri Compromise. The result of the election surprised even the most optimistic Edwards men; Kane was badly beaten, carrying but four counties.²⁰

When the troublesome question of admitting Missouri into the Union had been settled, it was found, much to the chagrin of Cook's pro-slavery supporters, that he had voted against the Compromise. His political enemies planned immediately to take advantage of what seemed to them to be a very unpopular act. Accordingly, in 1822, they supported McLean in an effort to beat Cook, and incidentally to lessen the power of Senator Edwards, who was looming large in national politics. In spite of the defection of many of his pro-slavery supporters of two years before, Cook was re-elected.²¹ In the meantime the opponents of the Missouri Compromise introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling upon Edwards and Thomas to resign their seats in the United States Senate, because, as the

¹⁸In the presidential election held November 6, 1820, the electors were chosen by districts designated by the governor on September 4, 1820. See *Laws of Illinois*, 1819, p. 101.

¹⁹Senator Thomas was declared to be the head of the anti-Edwards party in 1820. See *Edwardsville Spectator*, August 29, 1820. It was during this campaign that an acrimonious press dispute took place between Kane and Edwards. The former charged that the latter inspired the editorial writings of Warren. To this charge Edwards replied with denials. Warren took up the controversy and denied that Edwards owned the *Edwardsville Spectator*. See issues of the *Spectator*, July 25, August 29, 1820.

²⁰Result of election:

Cook, 3568; Kane, 2242; scattering, 7. The four counties carried by Kane were Wayne, Alexander, Crawford, Edwards. *MSS. Election Returns*. (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

²¹*Ibid.*

resolution stated, their votes "against the restriction of slavery in Missouri" did not represent the known opinion of the "people of the state of Illinois."²² The resolution was voted down by a small majority, but its introduction and support indicate at least that a strong element in the state was prepared to refuse to follow the leadership of men who held materially different opinions. Edwards came in for greater criticism at the hands of the anti-slavery people than did Thomas, for he was known to have supported Cook against the pro-slavery crowd, and it was naturally a great disappointment to the anti-slavery men to see him favoring slavery.²³

The continued agitation of the Missouri Question impressed the people with the growing importance of slavery as a political issue. The "friends of freedom" were repeatedly warned by Hooper Warren, editor of the *Edwardsville Spectator*, that plans were under way to repeal the anti-slavery clause of the state constitution.²⁴ A similar warning was given by the *Missouri Republican*.²⁵ The people of northern Illinois appear to have regarded the matter much more seriously than did their neighbors in the southern counties. The former section opposed very generally the system wherever found, while the latter did not become aroused until slavery threatened to encroach upon its own limits.

In the midst of the slavery controversy, occurred the gubernatorial campaign and election of 1822. Four candidates offered themselves for governor; they were Edward Coles of Madison

²²*House Journal*, 1820-21, pp. 134-5.

²³In a written communication the following charges were made against Edwards:

1. Supporting Missouri Compromise.
2. Declaring in public that he approved of slavery.
3. Knowing that a majority of people of Illinois opposed slavery.
4. Holding twenty-two negroes in Missouri.

Edwardsville Spectator, July 4, 1820.

²⁴Warren specified his charge under four heads: (1) Kane to be brought out by the pro-slavery crowd for governor in 1822; (2) Hall had bought Kimmell's interest in the Shawneetown paper; (3) a newspaper favorable to slavery was to be established in Edwardsville by Mr. Street; (4) *Illinois Intelligencer* had been persuaded to remain neutral. See *Edwardsville Spectator*, July 11, 1820.

²⁵Issue of January 2, 1823.

County, Joseph Phillips of Randolph, James B. Moore of Monroe, and Thomas C. Browne of Gallatin.²⁶

Coles was an outsider even in a country where precedent had little influence. The very fact that he had come to Illinois only a few years before he announced himself for governor was against him. Moreover he had come in the rôle of a federal office holder. Coles was the first to announce his candidacy, and the fact was not disguised that he stood forth as an opponent of slavery. The saving grace of his candidacy was that he held no connection with either of the old parties and hence had the enmity of neither. Besides he was in a position to build up a following among the newer settlers in the northern counties, who knew little and cared less for the squabbles of the old factions. A correspondent in speaking of his candidacy said: "He may not have received any pledge of support from either of the old parties, which have so long divided this state," while another pointed out that such a circumstance was greatly in his favor.²⁷ Although the columns of the *Edwardsville Spectator* were thrown open to Coles and his friends, its editor, Hooper Warren,

²⁶The idea has generally been accepted that Coles and Moore polled the anti-slavery vote, while Phillips and Browne were the out and out slavery candidates. Upon this belief as an hypothesis the natural conclusion has been drawn that a great majority of the people in Illinois in the year 1822 was favorable to slavery for the simple reason that Coles' and Moore's combined vote was less by some 2000 than the combined vote of Phillips and Browne. In the light of such a supposition and the large majority polled against slavery in 1824, the inference has been made that the pro-slavery strength of 1822 was more than offset by the anti-slavery immigration that came into the northern counties during those two years. It cannot be denied that the northern counties did receive a considerable anti-slavery immigration between 1822 and 1824, nor can it be reasonably doubted that Coles' vote was largely anti-slavery; the error arises in supposing that the vote for Phillips and Browne represented the pro-slavery strength. The lines dividing the anti-slavery and pro-slavery parties were cut and recut by other party lines, many of which were too rigid to give way under the stress of the slavery agitation of 1822. On account of such conditions the issue has remained clouded, and not until the political alignments are clearly understood can any definite determinations be made. Warren gives a good view of the situation in *Edwardsville Spectator*, February 6, 1821.

²⁷*Edwardsville Spectator*, December 5, 1821.

opposed his candidacy.²⁸ Here is seen the spectacle of two of the leading anti-slavery leaders out of harmony at a time when both professed to believe that the pro-slavery forces were plotting the disgrace of the state; and in refusing to sink their differences they almost brought about the very thing they were trying to prevent.

The second candidate in point of time was Joseph Phillips, chief justice of the state supreme court. Warren attacked his candidacy with great bitterness, charged him with being the leader of the pro-slavery forces, and declared that he had made an unholy alliance with the "ministerial officers of the state."²⁹ The pro-slavery press called on the "Friends of Liberal Principles" to support Phillips for governor.³⁰ In the light of public utterances of both parties there can be no reasonable doubt that Phillips was friendly to the introduction of slavery.

The third candidate was James B. Moore, who was an old soldier, having served with the "rangers" during the War of 1812. So far as an examination of contemporary newspapers discloses he had no other platform than a desire to obtain the highest office in the state. His neighbors claimed that the next governor ought to come from Monroe County, and because of this feeling they supported his candidacy.³¹

The fourth candidate to offer himself was Browne, who at the time was associated on the state supreme bench with Judge Phillips. Browne was a close friend of Edwards, and used Warren's paper to put his candidacy before the people.³² It would be true to say that Browne was ambitious for office at this time as he was all through life, yet the fact that he used a paper supported by Edwards and edited by Warren as a means for getting political support is something more than a coincidence. None of the three other candidates was acceptable to Edwards and Warren, hence the bringing out of Browne by the Edwards party. With this fact established there remains to be examined the relation between Browne's candidacy and the slavery question. Just what his personal attitude was has

²⁸W. H. Brown in *Chicago American*, December 22, 1840; *Edwardsville Spectator*, October 30, December 4, 1821.

²⁹*Edwardsville Spectator*, April 17, 1821.

³⁰*Illinois Intelligencer*, July 3, 1821.

³¹*Edwardsville Spectator*, October 24, 1820.

³²See *Edwardsville Spectator*, July 22, 1822.

failed to be recorded.³³ Yet it would have been the height of inconsistency for Warren not to have attacked Browne's candidacy, had it been brought forward to secure the election of Phillips, as some have said,³⁴ or to further the slavery interests in any way whatever. If Warren had supported a candidate who stood for slavery, he was either a knave or a fool; yet he was neither. Browne is known to have favored a canal from the lakes to the Mississippi, and this project was being opposed by the pro-slavery party. In taking this attitude Browne was

³³On account of Browne's candidacy being the disturbing element in this campaign, his platform is well worth preservation, and is given below. Fellow Citizens:

It is a very common thing for candidates for the suffrage of the people to make the tender of their services with an apology of having been induced thereto by the solicitation of numerous friends and acquaintances, and to gratify the wish of a large proportion of the people. I am not going to make this apology or that such preference was made with reference to my candidacy, for in most cases their choice is their own, but candor, I think, is best at all times. I am free to confess the plain honest truth that in becoming a candidate for governor that I have been influenced mainly by my own desire to fill that important position and to acquire the honorable reputation by discharging these duties with impartial fidelity and usefulness. It has, I am informed, been objected to me that I am opposed to a canal for connecting the waters of Lake Michigan and Illinois River. Nothing could be less true I assure you. A friend to internal improvements and to the most direct and easy intercommunication between the different parts of our happy nation, I consider the connection of the northern lakes with our own waters not only calculated to produce great political and commercial advantages, but also to promote immigration to our own state, a hope which no true friend to it can regard with indifference. In conclusion fellow citizens I have only to remark that should I be elected (which by the kind efforts of the people I believe I will) it shall be my constant endeavor by every effort in my power to advance our agricultural, commercial and manufacturing interests; to promote education throughout the state with equal regard to the just claims of each respective community, and to protect the political, civil and just rights of all and each one of my fellow citizens with equal right impartially.—*Edwardsville Spectator*, July 22, 1822.

³⁴See Washburne, *Colts*, 59. Phillips expressed the opinion in a private letter that the coming out of other candidates was not to assist his candidacy but to hurt it. He was apparently speaking of Browne's candidacy. See *Sloo Correspondence*, 51.

in full accord with the principles advanced and supported by Edwards and his party.³⁵

It was considered by one who participated in the slavery struggle of 1824 that the real contest lay between Phillips and Browne.³⁶ In fighting each other the leaders of the old factions failed to take into consideration the new vote in the northern part of the state. Unlike their neighbors in the southern counties the northern settlers regarded the slavery question with great seriousness. To them the struggle of the old parties appeared secondary to the more important one against slavery. Thus these people were very much in earnest in their opposition to any candidate whose public record or utterances from the stump stamped him as friendly to slavery; and they formed a third party, which was strikingly sectional.³⁷ This section comprised the northern and central counties, only one of which McLean, the pro-slavery candidate for Congress, was able to carry.

The indifference to the question of slavery as manifested by the supporters of Browne and Phillips in the southern counties offers a striking contrast to the above. At the same election Cook, the anti-slavery candidate for Congress, carried seventeen counties, of which five gave majorities or pluralities for Phillips and three for Browne. Cutting across all party and factional lines and adding confusion to the situation, was the large vote polled by the respective candidates in their own neighborhoods. Thus McLean and Browne, both of whom were from the eastern side of the state, were favorites in that section; while Cook and Phillips received the support of their neighbors in the western counties.

³⁵See *Illinois Intelligencer*, July 21, 1824. In a communication apparently intended for publication, Edwards states clearly that the pro-slavery people had opposed the canal. See N. Edwards, Communication, August Election, 1828. (Eddy MSS.) Before Browne became a candidate Edwards was urged to offer himself for governor. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 190. Edwards' opposition to Coles may have been due to his opposition to Crawford. Edwards was a zealous Calhoun man, and supported that statesman for years. See Sloo, *Correspondence*, 77.

³⁶W. H. Brown in *Chicago American*, December 22, 1840.

³⁷See *Edwardsville Spectator*, December 4, 1821.

Coles was elected, but by a plurality vote; he received less than one-third of all the votes cast at the election.³⁸ The original election schedules with a few exceptions have been lost or destroyed. Those remaining offer an opportunity for partial reconstruction of parties and tickets. Of the 147 voters supporting Coles in Springfield Township, Sangamon County, but 34 supported McLean for Congress. The 86 votes for Phillips and the 14 for Browne, were distributed in each case between the candidates for Congress, Cook and McLean, in the ratio of 8 to 6.³⁹ In Vandalia, the state capital, those voting for Coles very generally voted for Cook. In East Fork Township of the same county, Coles, Phillips and Browne each received 8 votes; Cook received 6 of the Coles votes, 4 of the Phillips votes, and 2 of the Browne votes. Bankson Township of the same county offers an extreme illustration of political vagary. In that township Coles received 16 votes, Phillips 17, Moore 1, and Browne 2; and every one of the 36 voted for Cook.⁴⁰ In a way these few cases are typical.⁴¹ Coles and Cook very generally received the support of the same voters, while those supporting Browne and Phillips divided their votes between McLean and Cook, their individual preferences resting upon factional adherence, personal following, sectional pride, and in some cases upon national issues.

The result of the election was not so much a victory for freedom as it was one for the new party in the northern counties. It demonstrated the fact that thenceforth this new element in the state must be considered in political contests. More than that

³⁸The vote for governor was distributed among the candidates as follows: Coles, 2854; Phillips, 2687; Browne, 2443; Moore, 622.

MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois).

Coles should be credited with one vote more than shown in the returns in the secretary of state's office owing to a mistake in making up the totals in Fayette County.

³⁹*MSS.* Election Returns (Sangamon County Court House, Springfield, Illinois.)

⁴⁰*MSS.* Election Returns (Fayette County Court House, Vandalia, Illinois.)

⁴¹The election returns for Edwards County, which are only fragmentary, illustrate sectional loyalty. Browne, who held court in that county, was very generally supported by the voters of Albion, the county seat.

it brought to the front new men, and paved the way for new political alignments; it showed that the political center of gravity had moved northward since the organization of the state; in a word it brought prominently to the front the importance of issues and principles, and tended to subordinate personality as a political force.

During the campaign of 1822 there arose a respectable demand for calling a convention to change the state constitution. The friends of slavery very generally favored the convention proposition, and justified their position by pointing out the advisability of changing the constitutional provision regulating the judiciary. They emphasized the fact that the constitution of 1818 had never been formally accepted by the people at the polls, and some even questioned its legality. All this the anti-slavery leaders professed to believe was a subterfuge for legalizing slavery by a constitutional amendment. The introduction of open-and-above-board slavery could be brought about only by an amendment to the constitution, for that instrument forbade slavery except in a few special and relatively unimportant cases;⁴² and amending the constitution was possible only by means of a constitutional convention, the calling of which depended upon the recommendation of "two-thirds of the General Assembly," and finally by a majority vote of the people.⁴³

The anti-slavery forces very generally opposed all agitation on the question of changing the constitution, and in fact any discussion that might lead to a demand for such a change. Gov-

⁴²There has been considerable speculation about the slavery clause in the constitution of 1818. The *Illinois Republican*, June 30, 1824, states that the constitutional convention of 1818 was made up of 21 anti-slavery and 12 pro-slavery members. (Quoted in Churchill-Lippincott, Ninth Paper.) It is certain that the question of slavery was discussed at the convention. The opinion got abroad that slavery was to be legalized by the constitution, and as a result an address against the system was sent to the convention. Because of the prominence of some of its signers in politics at a later date, their names are here given: from St. Clair County, Risdon Moore, Benj. Waits, Jacob Ogle, Joshua Oglesby, William Scott, Sr., William Biggs, George Blair, Charles R. Matheny, James Garretson, William Kinney; from Madison County, William B. Whiteside; from Monroe County, James Lemon, Sr.; from Washington County, W. H. Bradsby.—*Illinois Intelligencer*, August 5, 1818. Kane was said to have been in favor of legalizing slavery, but in 1820 he denied that such was the case. See *Edwardsville Spectator*, July 25, 1820.

⁴³*Constitution*, 1818, Art. VII., par. 1.

ernor Coles, however, seems not to have taken this attitude. In his inaugural address delivered before the joint session of the two houses, he boldly and perhaps unexpectedly to all parties, urged the advisability of radical legislation regarding negroes both free and slave.⁴⁴ It was his expressed desire not only to remove all legal restrictions imposed upon free negroes, but what was more important, to set in motion legislation that would make Illinois a free state in fact as well as in name. In both branches of the General Assembly the pro-slavery element was in the majority, yet that part of the governor's message relating to negroes was received with apparent approval.

The General Assembly hearkened to Coles' admonitions but hardly in the way he expected. A committee on "abrogation of slavery and the kidnapping of free negroes" was selected in each house, and on both committees friends of the proposition to make Illinois a slave state predominated.⁴⁵ The temper of the conventionists, a term usually applied to those favoring a convention to amend the constitution, is expressed in the report of the senate select committee: "Illinois was admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever; and . . . the people of Illinois have now the same right to alter their constitution as the people of the state of Virginia, or any of the original states."⁴⁶ Thus the pioneer lawmakers of Illinois struck at the very root of the question when they challenged the validity of the Ordinance of 1787. There were able arguments for and against the position taken by the committee, and a majority of the members of the General Assembly accepted the doctrine as sound.

"In a letter to Nicholas Biddle, Coles gives the reason for his unexpected move against slavery. "Knowing that this measure would be strenuously urged during the late session of the Legislature, and that many who professed to be hostile to the further introduction of Slavery, would advocate it, and believing that it would have a salutary effect to furnish them an opportunity of evincing the sincerity of their professions . . . I called the attention of the Legislature to the existence of Slavery in the State, in violation of the great fundamental principles of the ordinance, and recommended that just and equitable provision be made for its abrogation." Washburne, *Coles*, 147-8.

⁴⁵The personnel of the senate committee is significant in the light of future politics: Boon, Ladd, Kinney and Beard.—*Senate Journal*, 1822-3, p. 33.

⁴⁶*Senate Journal*, 1822-3, p. 16 *passim*.

The struggle in the General Assembly over the proposition to recommend to the voters the calling of a constitutional convention was extremely bitter and served to divide the slavery men from the anti-slavery men. Hitherto many had held an uncertain position, but with the realization that the legislative journals would bear evidence of their position, those wavering took definite positions for or against slavery. The friends of slavery were not only in the majority, but they were led by more able leaders than were their opponents.⁴⁷ After considerable manoeuvring on the part of the conventionists the question came to a vote and fell short of the necessary two-thirds by one vote. Finally the measure passed the senate by a vote of twelve to six, and the single vote in the house necessary to make the required two-thirds majority was secured by reopening an earlier election contest, and unseating Hansen of Pike County, who had voted in the negative. The next day, February 12, 1823, the measure passed the house by a vote of twenty-four to twelve, and the question of a constitutional convention was legally submitted to the people for their consideration, with the tacit understanding that a convention meant the introduction of slavery into the state.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Perhaps the most prominent pro-slavery leader was Alexander Pope Field, Jackson man in 1824, anti-Van Buren in 1836, Whig in 1840 and afterwards, and later a Unionist in Louisiana.

⁴⁸*Senate Journal*, 1822-3, p. 161 ff.; *House Journal*, 1822-3, p. 200 *passim*. So much has been said about the real feeling of the people on the question of slavery, that it seems worth while at this place to examine the relation of the members of the General Assembly to their respective constituencies. Upon the basis of the vote for and against a convention in 1824, the following conclusions and facts are presented:

1. With the exception of Emmett (White) and Mather (Randolph) all the anti-conventionists really represented their respective constituencies.

2. Of the twenty-four conventionists, thirteen were from convention counties (i.e., those giving a majority vote in favor of calling a convention), ten from anti-convention counties, and one from a county (Johnson) that was evenly divided for and against a convention.

In the election of members of the General Assembly in 1824, three anti-convention candidates were defeated in anti-convention counties as follows:

1. Lowery was beaten in Clark and Edgar by Archer, another

The year and a half convention campaign (February 12, 1823-August 3, 1824) was long drawn out and hard fought. Leadership was recruited from every available source. Many prominent men, particularly those who had come to the state since 1818, had hitherto interested themselves very little in the personal and political struggles between Edwards and his enemies; but with the coming to the front of the slavery question they threw off their indifference and assumed the rôle of leaders. During the discussion of the Missouri question these same men had been content to denounce the system of slavery in generalities, but with its threatened encroachment upon their homes they went seriously to the task of exposing the evils incident to it by the use of specific arguments. Pressure was brought to bear upon all the newspapers in the state to compel them to take sides in the controversy, and their scathing and acrimonious editorials and signed articles brought forth bitter replies.⁴⁹ Counties, towns, neighborhoods, and even families were divided,⁵⁰ and personal encounters between over-zealous partisans were not at all uncommon. The conventionists threatened to import voters from the old slave states, and to prevent this the anti-conventionists organized themselves into societies and appointed vigilance committees.⁵¹ The anti-conventionists

anti-convention man.

2. McGahey was beaten in Crawford, where there were five candidates, he being second and having fifty-five votes less than the successful candidate.

3. G. T. Pell was beaten in Edwards.

Mather, anti-conventionist, was re-elected in a convention county. In this election, five conventionists were beaten as follows:

1. Alexander in Monroe, anti-convention county.
2. Campbell in Wayne, convention county.
3. Field in Union, anti-convention county.
4. Shaw in Pike, anti-convention county.
5. West in Madison, anti-convention county.

MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois).

⁴⁹E.g. see *Illinois Intelligencer*, February 15, 1823; Scott, *Illinois Newspapers*, 340.

⁵⁰"With us the Convention is the most interesting subject. It is a dish which is daily, nay hourly served up. . . . Party feeling is carried further here than it ever was in Massachusetts."—*Portfolio*, XVII., 524.

⁵¹W. Kinkade to A. Williams, September 15, 1823. (Williams-Woodbury MSS.)

based their arguments against a convention on purely anti-slavery principles. They contended that the introduction of slavery was morally wrong and economically unwise.⁵² The conventionists argued in some quarters that the constitution needed revising and denied that it was their intention to bring up the question of slavery. In other quarters they came out boldly for the introduction of slavery, and pointed out the necessity for such action if the Yankees were to be kept from the state.⁵³

An examination of the personnel of the two parties is worth while, in that it offers the opportunity for a study of section-alism and later political affiliations. Of the thirty leading anti-conventionists, fifteen appear to have been born in the North, fourteen in the South, and one in England; and aside from that distinctive group of newcomers represented by such men as Hooper Warren, George Churchill, and Governor Coles, the principal element in the make-up of this leadership owed nominal allegiance to the Edwards party. If from the conventionist forces, fifty of the most prominent leaders be chosen, it is found that some twenty-eight or thirty were natives of the South, about fifteen of the North, five of Europe, and one of Illinois.⁵⁴ On account of the large percentage of northerners found in the leadership of both parties, two very important questions are raised: Was the strength of the northern element in Illinois at that time greater than has generally been suspected, or did the members of that element hold office and assume

⁵²In a letter to Governor Coles, Robert Vaux lays bare the arguments of the anti-conventionists: "One of these tracts is designed to show the impolicy and unprofitableness of slave labor. . . . Another essay exhibits a succinct account of the cruelties of the slave trade. . . ; and a third pamphlet is intended to show that the interminable bondage of any portion of the human race is, on the part of the oppressors, a flagrant violation of natural and Divine Justice, and utterly inconsistent with the doctrines of our Holy Redeemer."—Washburne, *Coles*, 158-9.

⁵³*Illinois Republican*, July 21, 1824.

⁵⁴To avoid any criticism that might arise from taking a selected group of leaders of either party, every member of the General Assembly of 1822-3, and all others listed by contemporary accounts as conventionists or anti-conventionists have been included in the above list. It is impossible to give all references to data of nativity, but the most helpful sources have been Washburne, *Coles*, 106 ff.; *Illinois Intelligencer*, January 11, 1823; *Missouri Republican*, January 29, 1823.

leadership out of all proportion to its voting strength? When more thorough investigations have been made it is likely that both questions will be answered in the affirmative.⁵⁵

The election of 1824 (August 3) resulted in a complete victory for the anti-slavery forces. Not only was the convention proposition defeated by a large majority, but Cook, against whom the convention forces had pitted Governor Bond, was re-elected to Congress. The counties that had supported Coles for governor in 1822, declared very generally against the proposition to call a convention, but the anti-convention vote in these counties would have been of no avail without the assistance of the anti-convention elements in the southern parts of the state. Although Coles had received but four per cent. of the entire vote cast in Alexander County in 1822, the convention forces were able to carry that county by only a small majority; and the election returns of Gallatin, Johnson, Franklin, Wayne, Randolph and Jefferson counties show that hundreds who voted for Browne or Phillips in 1822, voted against the convention two years later. In none of the counties mentioned had the Coles vote been greater than fifteen per cent., yet the vote against a convention varied from eighteen per cent. in Gallatin to forty-five per cent. in Randolph County. Although Coles had received a little more than seventeen per cent. of the entire vote in Lawrence and Union counties, less than two-fifths of the voters in those counties gave their support to the convention proposition.

On account of the all-absorbing slavery question, the presidential election of 1824 received scant attention at the hands of the voters, and contemporary accounts differ as to the relation between the conventionists and anti-conventionists on the one hand, and the presidential candidates on the other. The election returns indicate that Adams' greater strength was in the counties in which the anti-conventionists were in the majority; in fact every county carried by Adams gave a majority against the convention. Yet his strength in the convention counties

⁵⁵An examination of the *Edwardsville Spectator* for the years 1820-6, and the *Missouri Republican* for the same period throws light on this question. In the notice of deaths one is struck by the fact that in those notices in which the nativity of the deceased is given, a majority is from free states. S. J. Buck, *The New England Element in Illinois Politics before 1833*. (Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1912-13, p. 49. ff.)

along the Mississippi River was very respectable. Of the twelve counties carried by Jackson, nine gave majorities for, and two against, the convention, and in the twelfth county the vote was a tie. Clay was the choice of three counties only, all of which opposed calling a convention, but in four Adams counties the Clay vote was considerable. An examination of election returns shows that on the whole the Adams and Jackson strength ran to extremes, while Clay was held as a second choice. Among the leaders, however, a slightly different situation arose. Crawford was the natural choice of the leaders of the anti-Edwards party,⁵⁶ but because his candidacy had never created any enthusiasm in Illinois these leaders were constrained to support a more popular candidate; and in this case the candidate supported was Jackson.⁵⁷ Edwards and his close political friends were Calhoun men and bitterly opposed to Crawford,⁵⁸ but they appear to have been unable to unite on any one of the other three candidates. For instance, Cook was for Adams,⁵⁹ and Eddy for Jackson;⁶⁰ while Edwards himself was non-committal with a leaning toward Adams.⁶¹

Both parties in the convention contest appear to have accepted the results of the election as final,⁶² and never afterwards were the people of Illinois asked to vote for and against

⁵⁶Senator Thomas was a member of the Congressional Caucus that nominated Crawford in February, 1824. Thomas' appointment as bank examiner in Illinois by Crawford was severely criticized by the friends of Edwards. See *Illinois Intelligencer*, February 15, 1823. Kane, McLean, Smith, West, and Kinney, all anti-Edwards men acknowledged that they had been Crawford supporters. See *Illinois Intelligencer*, May 8, 1830.

⁵⁷Dr. Todd (conventionist) was candidate as Clay elector; A. P. Field (conventionist) was elected as Jackson elector.

⁵⁸As long as Calhoun was a candidate for president, Edwards supported him. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 216, *passim*.

⁵⁹See D. P. Cook to H. Eddy, April 24, 1824, May 19, 1825. (Eddy MSS.)

⁶⁰Eddy was Jackson elector in 1824.

⁶¹G. Forquer to H. Eddy, December 15, 1827. (Eddy MSS.)

⁶²"That question [slavery] is supposed to be forever set at rest, and the hardy sons of New England may continue to migrate to this fertile region, whither so many of their countrymen have gone before them."—*Portfolio*, XVIII., 506. "In six months after the question was settled, a politician who was in favor of the introduction of slavery in the state, was a *rara avis*."—*Western Annals*, 793.

the introduction of slavery into the state. Although five-sixths of the members of the Fourth General Assembly had been chosen at the same election at which the convention proposition had been defeated by a decisive majority, that body elected to the United States Senate two of the ablest and most zealous advocates of the proposition to introduce slavery, namely, John McLean and Elias Kent Kane. A writer on this period has said concerning this election that "there is nothing stranger than this in our political history."⁴³ The explanation for such a political paradox rests not upon a study of the convention parties, but rather upon older political alignments. The majority of the General Assembly of 1824-5 was not necessarily pro-slavery and pro-convention because it elected men of that belief to office; the issue of slavery and convention ceased to have active life after the election of 1824. The majority owed political allegiance to the enemies of Mr. Edwards, and nothing was more natural than that this majority should honor two of its leaders by electing them to the United States Senate,—one to fill out a vacancy and the other to succeed him. Thus the three leaders of the anti-Edwards party, Thomas, McLean and Kane, were members or members-elect of the United States Senate.

The failure of any one of the four presidential candidates to receive a majority of the electoral votes complicated political matters in the state, and made a lasting impress upon its parties and official personnel. When the presidential election devolved upon the House of Representatives, Daniel Pope Cook, sole representative from Illinois, was forced to choose among the three candidates, Jackson, Adams and Crawford. When there seemed a possibility before the presidential election of 1824, that there would be no choice at the polls, Cook announced that his official vote in the House, should such a contingency arise, would be guided by the wish of a majority of his constituents.⁴⁴ In the election Jackson had carried two of the three districts in the state, but no one of the candidates had received a majority of the popular vote.⁴⁵ Because of the doubtful lines that divided the

⁴³Washburne, *Coles*, 194.

⁴⁴*Illinois Republican*, July 24, 1824; Edwards, *Edwards*, 261-2; D. P. Cook to H. Eddy, April 24, 1824, May 19, 1825. (Eddy MSS.)

⁴⁵Voting for presidential electors was by districts. An echo of the meeting of the electors came in the year 1828. When the electors met at Vandalia Harrison and Field each wished to carry the results to

candidates Cook had no guide other than a rough estimate of who would have carried the state had Adams and Jackson been the only candidates.⁶⁶ Under these circumstances he seems to have come to the conclusion that a majority of the people preferred Adams, and cast his vote accordingly. In the absence of a clear mandate from his constituents he justified his act on the ground that Adams was better fitted for the presidency than was Jackson or Crawford.

The election of Adams, or better the defeat of Jackson, determined very largely the political alignments in the United States for the next twenty years, and because of Cook's vote this statement is particularly true of conditions in Illinois. As soon as the people learned through the medium of Jackson's astute managers that "the old hero had been cheated out of his rights," and that the "will of the people had been thwarted by a corrupt bargain" entered into by Adams and Clay, they rallied to the Jackson standard. Cook's close affiliation with the anti-convention party had the effect of throwing headlong into the Jackson camp his opponents, who had been on the whole pro-conventionists and adherents of the Thomas-Kane-McLean party. The northern, anti-convention, or Coles party, had very generally voted for Adams, and his selection by the House of Representatives met with the approbation of that party. The great bulk of the old Edwards party appears to have espoused the Jackson cause after Adams' election. Thus growing out of the

Washington. Eddy, the third elector, did not believe that an elector was qualified to perform such a task. Harrison was chosen, and when Field was a congressional candidate in 1836 it was urged that he was not a good Jackson man because he had allowed Harrison to carry the vote. Eddy was appealed to in the matter to prove that Field had been a good Jackson man. See H. Eddy to A. P. Field, June 11, 1828. (Eddy MSS.)

⁶⁶It is probable that Cook felt that the vote for Clay, who was not a candidate before the House, would have been given very generally under other circumstances for Adams. There was one circumstance upon which the friends of Cook have based a very ingenious argument. In one of the districts there was in addition to the regular Clay, Adams, and Jackson tickets, a fourth going under the name "Jackson and Clay." It has been charged that the supporters of this ticket, several hundreds in number, were Crawford men, who preferred not to come out openly for their champion. All this, in the absence of positive proof, is conjecture: See Edwards, *Edwards*, 260, *passim*.

convention contest of 1824, and the presidential election of 1824-5, were three more or less distinct parties: the ultra, or, as it was more familiarly called, the "whole hog" Jackson party;⁶⁷ a party favoring Jackson, the members of which were called "milk and cider" Jackson men; and finally the anti-Jackson party, which was confined principally to the northern counties, and made up on the whole of the more radical anti-slavery elements.⁶⁸ As we shall see presently the first formed the nucleus of the Democratic party, the last, the National Republican and later the Whig party, while the second broke up, one part going to the Whigs, another part to the Democrats.

In 1826, the two leading gubernatorial candidates were Ninian Edwards and Thomas Sloo Jr., both of whom were professed Jackson men but of a different type. Sloo seems to have been the candidate of the "whole hog" Jackson element,⁶⁹ while Edwards received the support of the more temperate Jackson men: and an examination of the election returns indicates that the anti-Jackson vote was divided between them, the larger part going to Edwards. A third candidate was Adolphus F. Hubbard, who was more radical in his support of Jackson than was Sloo. Edwards was elected, but by a plurality vote, the combined strength of his opponents exceeding his by nearly two

⁶⁷One definition of a "whole hog" Jackson man: "A fiery tempered person, who has no opinion of his own, but votes, and praises, and censures, and turns, just as he is bid by the county caucus."—*Cincinnati American*, September 20, 1830.

⁶⁸Similar divisions in the Jackson ranks are to be found in other states. In Ohio such divisions appear, but to them more polite terms were applied than was the case in Illinois. There the "whole hog" faction bore the name "dyed in the wool."—*Ohio State Journal*, October 28, 1830; *Scioto Gazette*, April 24, November 3, 1830.

⁶⁹Reynolds, *My Own Times*, 262. "He, Edwards, was opposed by all the old members of the legislature, who had supported the many unwise measures of finance, and by the whole bank influence, from the President down to the lowest agents, who had in any wise cause to fear an investigation." Ford, *History of Illinois*, 64. This evidence may be biased, as Ford and Edwards were confidential friends about this time. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 438. In a letter to Henry Clay, Edwards says: "As to myself, I had to encounter all the opposition of the great body of the Jackson interest, and to tell you the truth (for I feel no motive to conceal anything of the kind) I used all the policy in my power, and freely subjected myself to great risk, to force all my opponents to come out on that side of the question." Washburne, *Edwards*, 261.

hundred votes.⁷⁰ On account of the political unrest of the time, and the shifting of population due to immigration and the tendency of the people of the southern counties to move northward, the election lacks that sectional aspect which is so characteristic of early Illinois politics. Edwards' strength lay in the extreme southern counties, in the northern and west central counties, and in a few counties adjacent to the Indiana line.⁷¹

For the sixth time Cook offered himself in 1826 as a candidate for Congress. Since his vote for Adams the year before, the tide had turned against him, and each day saw it running higher. Despite the feeling on the part of some of the Jackson leaders that the election of Adams was not the result of a bargain between Adams and Clay,⁷² the charge made by Jackson's managers that such was the case seems to have been believed very generally in Illinois; and those so believing naturally opposed Cook. It would be safe to say that Cook's vote for Adams in 1825 brought about his political downfall, although his closest friend denied that such was the case.⁷³ Cook's opponent was Joseph Duncan. Young Duncan was no campaigner, lacked the magnetism of his adversary, and cut a sorry figure in comparison with the brilliant Cook. Yet he was elected in spite of this handicap, for Cook carried still greater handi-

⁷⁰The vote for governor was distributed among the candidates as follows: Edwards, 6280; Sloo, 5833; Hubbard, 580.

MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois).

⁷¹In his campaign for governor Edwards made capital of his trouble with Crawford. It was his belief that the "A.B." affair was a strength to his candidacy. See N. Edwards to H. Eddy, February 2, 1825; J. McLean to H. Eddy, February 3, 1825; N. Edwards to J. Marshall, June 29, 1826. (Eddy MSS.)

⁷²"No man I think believes that there is the least foundation for the accusation against Mr. Clay and no man effects to credit it but Mr. Kremer." J. McLean to H. Eddy, February 3, 1825. (Eddy MSS.) For further views on the subject of the alleged bargain see, Colton, *Clay*, IV., 109 ff, V., 299, 341; Benton, *View*, I., 48; Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 483; Edwards, *Edwards*, 479; Tyler, *Tyler*, I, 259 ff.; Calhoun, *Correspondence*, II., 230-1, 249; *Nile's Register*, XXIII., 203-8, XXVIII., 355.

⁷³In a letter to Henry Clay written after the election Edwards contends that Cook's defeat was due to his overconfidence. Washburne, *Edwards*, 261.

caps: his vote for Adams,⁷⁴ his long official service, and his relationship to Edwards. If the returns of the congressional elections for the years 1824 and 1826 be compared, it will be seen that the defection from Cook in the latter year was general throughout the state. A county here and there gave him a larger percent. of its entire vote than it had in 1824, but this increase was more than offset by sharp decreases in other counties. In most of the counties, however, the decrease was small and strikingly uniform, a condition that seems to indicate that his vote for Adams was unpopular among certain classes all over the state. A similar defection is shown by comparing the congressional election returns with those for governor. Cook uniformly ran behind Edwards, except in those counties where his personal popularity was very great, or where his vote for Adams was approved.

Events during the next two years caused a radical shifting of party alignments. Edwards' attack on the president and directors of the Bank at Edwardsville aroused his old political enemies and made many new ones.⁷⁵ After Crawford's chances for the presidency were seen to have been lost, Thomas was inclined to support Adams and Cook, and he is said to have desired to be friendly with Edwards.⁷⁶ McLean wavered in his opposition to Edwards,⁷⁷ while Kane, who had been elected to the United States Senate in 1825, ceased almost entirely to take an interest in state affairs. The leadership of the anti-Edwards party then passed into the hands of William Kinney and T. W. Smith.⁷⁸

⁷⁴Cook had married a daughter of Edwards. In a great many quarters dissatisfaction had arisen because two members of the same family were continually in office. Cook's opponents took up the cry "let us have rotation in office," and it cannot be denied that such a slogan had its effect on the election. Washburne, *Edwards*, 501. There was a certain discredit given to Cook's vote for Adams, and the charge against him was not dissimilar to that against Adams and Clay. Early in 1824 it was charged that Edwards' appointment as minister to Mexico was the result of a bargain whereby Cook was to support the choice of the Monroe administration for president. See D. P. Cook to H. Eddy, April 24, 1824. (Eddy MSS.)

⁷⁵Ford, *History of Illinois*, 65 ff.; Washburne, *Edwards*, 270, *passim*.

⁷⁶*Edwardsville Spectator*, September 15, 1826.

⁷⁷Washburne, *Edwards*, 355, *passim*.

⁷⁸A contemporary politician divides the politicians into yet smaller groups as follows: 1. Smith, Kinney and West. 2. John and Thomas

As a result of the shifting of political lines in local affairs, new alignments in national politics were likewise necessary. Some of the Clay and Calhoun leaders went over for the time being to Adams,⁷⁹ but it is certain that a majority of them adhered to Jackson after Adams' election in 1825. The Crawford element went over to Jackson.⁸⁰ By 1827 two factions appeared in the Adams ranks. One group supported Adams and Edwards; the other supported Adams but opposed Edwards.⁸¹ There was dissatisfaction in some quarters with the administration because of Adams' disinclination to build up a political machine by removing his enemies from office and appointing his friends,⁸² yet the Adams cause was injured much more by the feeling that the president held his office as the result of intrigue, and that he was out of sympathy with western ideals. As yet, however, many of the men that were to take the lead as Jackson men, and later as Democrats, were followers of Adams.⁸³ Edwards and his friends opposed Duncan's re-election in August, 1828, supporting George Forquer for the place.⁸⁴ Forquer was an adherent of the national administration, and while this fact seems to have been very generally known, his friends made every attempt to keep the issues of the election local. Duncan's supporters pretended to do the same, but it is well known that Jacksonianism became an issue before the close of the campaign. Under such circumstances there could be but one outcome: Duncan was re-elected, and the results in Illinois of the presidential campaign of a few months later were accurately forecasted.

Reynolds. 3. Jesse B. Thomas. 4. John McLean. 5. Edwards & Co. See Sloo *Correspondence*, 81-2. The last four groups were combined against the first in a great many cases.

⁷⁹See *Edwardsville Spectator*, September 15, 1825; *Illinois Intelligencer*, July 10, 1830.

⁸⁰W. Orr to H. Eddy, February 21, 1827, (Eddy MSS.); *Illinois Intelligencer*, May 8, 1830. In a communication to Edwards written in 1827, J. M. Street states that the Crawford men in Gallatin County were very generally supporting the national administration. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 285.

⁸¹G. Forquer to H. Eddy, December 15, 1827. (Eddy MSS.)

⁸²Washburne, *Edwards*, 263.

⁸³E.g. Thomas Ford, George Forquer, Sidney Breese.

⁸⁴N. Edwards (Communication), August election, 1828. (Eddy MSS.) Washburne, *Edwards*, 343, *passim*.

Jackson's majority in 1828, of almost five thousand out of a total vote of less than fifteen thousand indicated a temporary union of the two factions of the Jackson party.⁸⁵ "Milk and cider" Jackson men were no less desirous than their more radical neighbors to elect Jackson. The General Assembly was made up largely of Jackson men, the "whole hog" element predominating; while from the northern counties came several Adams supporters. The latter were apparently in sympathy with Edwards and his policies. They united at the request of Edwards, however, in electing John McLean to the United States Senate⁸⁶ by a unanimous vote. McLean succeeded Thomas, who at the time was on the eve of leaving the Jackson party.

The lines for and against Jackson had not been so tightly drawn that they could not be crossed with ease. After the election of 1828, Edwards was advised by his brother-in-law, Duff Green, to prove to Jackson that he was his friend, and there are reasons for believing that Edwards followed the advice and made overtures in that direction.⁸⁷ Because of unsettled political conditions, those federal office holders in the state who were friendly to the outgoing administration in 1829, made an effort to hold their places by moving toward the Jackson ranks without actually joining them. To such a movement the Jackson administration refused to become a party; and a direct demand was made that the Jackson party in Illinois should not join in any way with the "coalition."⁸⁸ Such a proposal merely indicates the chaotic condition of national politics, and the refusal of the administration to join with the old friends of Adams

⁸⁵The vote for president was distributed between the candidates as follows: Jackson, 9582; Adams, 4662.

MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois).

⁸⁶Light is thrown on Edwards' attitude toward McLean's candidacy in his letters to McLean. See Washburne, *Edwards*, 343 ff.

⁸⁷"Relax not in your efforts. Prove that your support of the President is sincere. Write to *him* in *confidence*, and all that has transpired will tend to increase instead of diminish your future influence." D. Green to N. Edwards, August 19, 1829. Washburne, *Edwards*, 429. Again Green writes, "If the *new* friends of the President have been more successful it is because they have sustained themselves and made a stronger case." *Ibid.* 447.

⁸⁸S. D. Ingham to S. H. Kimmell, August 1, 1829. (Eddy MSS.)

clarified the situation. It did more than that; it drew a line between the two factions of the Jackson party, and thenceforth "whole hog" and "milk and cider" were terms with a definite meaning.

The next gubernatorial campaign was begun more than twelve months before the election in August, 1830. The candidates were William Kinney and John Reynolds. The former was an out and out Jackson man of the "whole hog" variety, and every effort was made by him and his friends to keep the question of Jacksonianism to the front.⁸⁹ Edwards favored Reynolds, despite a serious misunderstanding that had arisen between them during the Winnebago scare in 1828.⁹⁰ Reynolds has said since that he was a "milk and cider" Jackson man,⁹¹ and his correspondence would indicate that he was, yet he made an appeal for the support of the anti-Jackson party.⁹² Kinney was charged with opposing a canal,⁹³ with a desire to turn every body out of office,⁹⁴ and with being the tool of Senator Benton.⁹⁵ Reynolds with all his faults was a better politician than his opponent; he secured a large vote from the Adams counties without alienating from him enough Jackson votes to cause his own defeat.⁹⁶ Such a procedure was called "playing for all

⁸⁹Washburne, *Edwards*, 432.

⁹⁰N. Edwards to Editors, *Illinois Intelligencer*, July 22, 1830. N. Edwards to A. F. Grant, September 17, 1832. (Eddy MSS.)

⁹¹Reynolds was nominated at a Jackson meeting in Union County, October 9, 1829. See *Illinois Intelligencer*, October 31, 1829.

⁹²Washburne, *Edwards*, 433; J. Reynolds to S. H. Kimmell, December 10, 1829; S. H. Kimmell to A. F. Grant, October 29, 1829. (Eddy MSS.)

⁹³Washburne, *Edwards*, 470.

⁹⁴D. Prickett to A. F. Grant, July 1, 1830. (Eddy MSS.)

⁹⁵*Western Democrat*, December 2, 1829; *Missouri Republican*, January 5, 1830.

⁹⁶Reynolds was said to have been elected by friends of the American System. See *Cincinnati American*, December 27, 1830. By some papers the election of Reynolds was taken as defeat for the Jackson party in Illinois. See *Ibid.* August 23, 1830; *Louisville Advertiser*, August 11, 1830.

There must necessarily remain considerable speculation as to the real issues in the campaign. A claim was made after the election that Kinney had been defeated because of his endorsement of Jackson's proscription policy. See *Kaskaskia Democrat*, August 18, 1830. This was denied. Friends of Reynolds urged his claims on the ground that he

the pockets,"⁹⁷ and Reynolds was an adept at the game. Reynolds's strength was principally in the extreme southern, northern, and western parts of the state, and in the counties of Sangamon, Morgan and Macon.⁹⁸ At the same election Duncan defeated Sidney Breese and Edward Coles for Congress.

Although the ultra-Jackson men lost the governorship, they returned a large majority to the General Assembly. Senator McLean having died October 14, 1830, Governor Edwards appointed David J. Baker of Kaskaskia as his successor for the time being. The General Assembly refused to elect Edwards' choice, selecting in his stead John M. Robinson of White County, who was known to be an ultra Jackson man. Robinson was opposed by Thomas Mather, a well-known anti-conventionist of a few years before, a friend of Edwards, and later a leading Whig. At the same session Kane was re-elected to the senate for the term beginning March 4, 1831. There was certainly an Edwards party at this time,⁹⁹ and in the gubernatorial campaign of 1830 its opponents repeatedly went out of their way to assail Edwards instead of Reynolds. The former was recognized as the force behind Reynolds's candidacy. Thus the anti-Edwards members of the General Assembly showed their hostility to Edwards by selecting two of Edwards' ablest opponents for the United States Senate.

On January 3, 1831, the General Assembly nominated Jackson for re-election by a large majority.¹⁰¹ But nine votes were cast against the nominating resolution, three in the senate and six in the house. Although the opposition to the nomination was weak numerically, it stubbornly resisted the passage of the

was a "zealous advocate of the measures of the present administration, and of State Rights." See *The Crisis*, September 9, 1830. The report was widely circulated that the charge against Reynolds that he was friendly to Clay gave him the support of the anti-Jackson party, and hence elected him. See *Illinois Intelligencer*, September 4, 1830; *Cincinnati American*, September 20, 1830. Others would have it that Reynolds was elected because he favored the appropriation of money by Congress for internal improvements. See *Scioto Gazette*, September 22, 1830.

⁹⁷N. Pope to H. Eddy, September 23, 1834. (Eddy MSS.)

⁹⁸MSS. Election Returns (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois).

⁹⁹*Illinois Intelligencer*, July 24, 1830; Washburne, *Edwards*, 513.

¹⁰⁰Washburne, *Edwards*, 461.

¹⁰¹For the resolutions see *Senate Journal*, 1830-1, p. 170 ff.

resolution and in the end the dissenting members of the house recorded their protest upon their *Journal*.¹⁰² Nor was the opposition to the nomination sectional, for the nine members voting in the negative represented seven widely separated counties, namely, Pike in the north, Madison and Greene in the west, Randolph and Gallatin in the south, and Wabash and Clark in the east.

The presidential campaign of 1832 caused a further shifting of political lines. The contest in 1831 and 1832 between Martin Van Buren and Richard M. Johnson for the nomination for vice-president on the Jackson ticket, is significant politically, for with Van Buren's selection in 1832, begins a split in the Jackson ranks that assumed large proportions in 1836, when Van Buren became the recognized choice of his chief for the presidency. Extremely radical Jackson men, such as A. P. Field, John Dement, Zadok Casey and Joseph Duncan, supported Johnson, while Van Buren's interests were in the hands of W. L. D. Ewing, Samuel McRoberts and other "whole hog" Jacksonites. This division of opinion was carried to the National Convention at Baltimore, where the Illinois delegation divided its vote between Van Buren and Johnson. Upon the nomination of the former, however, a great majority of the friends and supporters of Johnson gracefully accepted defeat and unqualifiedly supported the regularly nominated ticket: Jackson for president, Van Buren for vice-president.¹⁰³ Clay's candidacy received on the whole the regular anti-Jackson party strength.¹⁰⁴ There was an increase in the total number of votes cast in the presidential election of 1832 over the election of 1828, but this increase barely kept pace with the increase in population, and the distribution of the increased vote affected Jackson's relative strength in the state only a little more than one per cent. This

¹⁰²For protest see *House Journal*, 1830-1, p. 232 ff.

¹⁰³Field, for instance, voted, for Jackson and Van Buren. See *MSS. Election Returns*. (Court House, Vandalia.)

¹⁰⁴For accounts of Clay meetings see *Sangamo Journal*, August 2, 18, September 1, 8, 15, 22, 1832. There seem to have been no delegates from Illinois to the National-Republican Convention of 1831. See *Niles Register*, XLI., 301-7; *Cincinnati American*, December 23, 1830.

Despite Edwards' and Cook's support of Clay's American Policy in the twenties, Edwards refused to support Clay in 1832. He expressed a preference for McLean or Wirt. See Benton, *View*, I., 32; A. Cowles to J. Marshall, August 25, 1835. (Eddy *MSS.*)

lack of relative change in the position of the two parties seems to indicate one of two conditions: either there was a marked stability in the relative strength of the two parties, or the immigration into the northern counties offset the defection in the southern counties from the Adams-Clay forces.

Between 1832 and 1834 events moved rapidly. Jackson's hostile attitude toward the United States Bank, his insistence on Van Buren as his successor, and the extravagances of his advisers in demanding support for the president drove many of his old supporters into the ranks of the opposition. On the other hand, there were accessions to the Jackson ranks from the Adams-Clay elements. After repeated attempts to get office as opponents of Jackson, or at least as luke-warm supporters, more than one ambitious politician took up Jacksonianism in the most extreme form. On account of Jackson's popularity it became dangerous except in limited areas to denounce his policies. Men with ambition for office preferred to tolerate the Jackson administration,—kitchen cabinet and all,—rather than to risk their political success by speaking their mind.

During these two years the political alignments in Illinois underwent radical changes. The position occupied by the "milk and cider" Jackson element was not only illogical but untenable, and its ability to maintain itself as an organization depended entirely upon its coalition with the anti-Jackson forces. Its midway position between the radical Jackson faction on the one hand, and the anti-Jackson party on the other, made it a convenient and fruitful recruiting ground for the other factions and parties. The election of Jackson for a second term, which was a complete vindication for the affront offered him in 1825, served to cool the ardor of the more extreme supporters of the president, and bring them into more complete harmony with the members of the moderate Jackson faction. The intrusion of Van Burenism into national politics, and the dogmatic distribution of federal offices in the state by the administration, tended to force the luke-warm supporters of Jackson into the ranks of the opposition. During the period state issues grew in importance. The question of state banks and internal improvements engrossed the minds of the people to the exclusion of personal and national issues, and the scramble of party leaders to anticipate public opinion on these local issues, resulted in new and strange political alliances.

Other political forces were at work to change the old order of things. Before 1834, Edwards, Bond, Cook, and McLean were dead; Thomas, Phillips, and Sloo had removed from the state; Browne, Pope, and Smith were on the bench; and their places were filled partially by their lieutenants, partially by a younger and newer element that had little interest in keeping alive the factional disputes of an earlier period. A factor in causing a change was the constant shifting of the center of population northward. In time the representation of the southern counties, where the early struggles had been carried on, decreased; and with this decrease of relative strength in those sections and a corresponding increase in the northern counties where the newer elements were to be found, came a change in the nature of the politics of the state. With improved means of communication, diffusion of knowledge through the agency of schools, colleges, churches, and newspapers, a higher standard of living resulting from increased trade and diversity of labor, came a corresponding change in the political activities and ideals of the people.

These changes, however, caused new problems to arise. With the settlement of the northern counties there appeared a certain form of sectionalism based not so much upon a difference in birth and economic activities, as upon a lack of understanding between the sections. Prejudices were appealed to in both sections by unscrupulous leaders. The older settlers in the south were inclined to regard all the people of the northern counties as Yankees, and what they knew about Yankees was based generally upon what they had heard from the lips of political speakers. The northerners on their part, were prone to regard those in the southern sections as uncouth, illiterate, and lazy.

Despite the death of so many of the leaders of the struggles during the twenties, the changes due to economic and social causes, the shifting of the center of population northward, and the acute sectionalism that occurred, there is a marked continuity of political lines from the days of the territory down to and through the period when the Whig party contested with the Democrats for political supremacy. The anti-conventionists were on the whole made up of the Edwards faction plus the new comers in the northern counties, while their opponents in the slavery struggle were led at least by the leaders of the anti-Edwards faction. The bulk of the former supported Adams; of the latter, Crawford. After the elections of 1824, there appeared three distinct elements. One opposed Jackson's preten-

sions for the presidency; a second favored Jackson, but was unwilling to go to the length to which Jackson's managers desired; the third manifested a willingness to go to any extreme for Jackson. To the first element belonged very distinctly the new settlers in the northern counties, and many from the ranks of the Edwards faction; the second consisted of men possessing unsettled political convictions, made up in large part of members of the Edwards party; the ultra Jackson element coincided roughly with the old convention party. In time the position of the moderate Jackson element became untenable, and it was broken up, a part going into the ranks of the National Republican party, another part joining itself to the more ultra Jackson wing. This transition affected politics materially. The coalescing of the Jackson wings tended to render the ultras more moderate, while those Jackson men who went into the opposition ranks became radical anti-Jackson men.

Thus, beginning with the opposition to Van Buren in 1831, the anti-Jackson party received a constant stream of recruits from the Jacksonian ranks. Some of them were friends of the United States Bank, others were disappointed office seekers, and still others were radical opponents of Van Buren.

CHAPTER II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WHIG PARTY.

1834-1839.

The fourth decade of the nineteenth century marks a turning point in the economic, social, and political life of the people of Illinois. During these ten years an enormous public debt was saddled upon the state in an unsuccessful attempt to create a vast system of internal improvements; the increase in population was three fold, made up in great part of immigrants from New England and New York, who brought in ideals of life differing somewhat from those which guided a majority of the older settlers; and, what is not less important, there gradually emerged from the clashing factions two distinct political parties that continued to divide the people for twenty years.

Coincident with this emergence came a state wide demand for internal improvements and state banks; and the unanimity of this demand partially hid political cleavages, and retarded for a time unqualified adherence on the part of individuals to one or the other political party. The people, in common with those in the older settled sections of the East and South, were vitally interested in national issues, but their struggle for economic and social freedom demanded and received the major share of their attention. Sectional differences, which were held in check during the boom days of the middle thirties, broke out later with increased fury when attempts were made to place responsibility for the failure of the banking and internal improvements schemes.

The Whig party solidified much more slowly than did its great rival. The various anti-administration elements that combined rather loosely during the first few years after the term "Whig" became a party appellation, had but one thing in common,—opposition to Van Buren. They differed over the tariff, the United States Bank, and national aid for internal improvements. One faction was enthusiastic for Clay, another opposed him with great determination, while yet another faction looked to Adams or Webster for political guidance. Fortunately for the

Whigs during these years, their opponents, who were in the majority, did not always agree among themselves; and by taking advantage of the divisions arising from these disagreements, the Whigs were able many times to guide legislation and give moral support to the party in the nation.

Throughout the years 1833 and 1834, Illinois politics were in a chaotic condition, due in part to disorganization among the anti-Jackson men, in part to the rapid disintegration of the "milk and cider" Jackson faction, and in part to mutual jealousies among the ultra-Jackson leaders. Jackson's veto of the bank bill, his order to withdraw the deposits, his opposition to federal aid for internal improvements, and his efforts to name Van Buren as his successor to the presidency caused a considerable defection from the Democratic ranks. These rapid and many sided transitions threw together voters that were but lately bitter political antagonists, and as was to be expected, there was a lack of mutual confidence and happy co-operation among them. Moreover, there were many minor differences that kept these heterogeneous elements from coalescing completely, while the principal, if not the only force, binding them together was a sort of common but ill-defined opposition to the national administration in general and to Van Buren in particular. There were to be found enrolled in the ranks of those opposed to the national administration, former ultra-Jackson men who had failed to secure what they considered adequate recognition in the distribution of offices, others who refused to support Van Buren, claiming that their allegiance to Jackson had ceased with his re-election in 1832, yet others who had become disgusted with the abuses and excesses of Jackson's advisers, and finally that large element which had been in opposition since the days of the presidential struggle of 1824 and 1825. Because of the personnel of the opposition, no one could estimate with any degree of certainty the strength of either the Jackson or the anti-Jackson party, and the leaders of the latter party moved cautiously and slowly, awaiting some test whereby the strength of their following might be ascertained.

During this period of political unrest occurred the gubernatorial campaign and election of 1834. For more than a year before the election, candidates for governor were being groomed by many newspapers and localities, each endeavoring to convince the others that its choice was the logical one. There was, however, a widespread demand that General James D. Henry offer

himself for the office,¹ but because of ill health resulting from exposure in Indian warfare, he declined the honor. After considerable manouvering on the part of prospective candidates and their respective friends, the field narrowed to four contestants: William Kinney of St. Clair County, Robert K. McLaughlin of Fayette, Joseph Duncan of Morgan, and James Adams of Sangamon.

Mr. Kinney was widely known throughout the state, having been lieutenant governor during the Edwards administration from 1826 to 1830, and an unsuccessful candidate for governor against John Reynolds in 1830. Early in 1834, Kinney was chosen as a candidate for governor in a convention held at Belleville, and immediately afterward he issued a long address "To the Independent Voters of the State of Illinois."² A few months later McLaughlin, familiarly known as "Uncle Mac," was named by a convention held at Vandalia.³ While McLaughlin was not so well known to the people as was Kinney, he was no stranger, for besides being state treasurer from 1819 to 1823 he had been prominent as a citizen of the state capital and a member of the General Assembly, and his relation to Duncan and Governor Bond added to his prestige. Duncan, who had been continuously in the National House of Representatives since 1827, was the choice of newspapers and politicians located in every part of the state, and from the very beginning of his active candidacy in 1833, his chances of success appeared to be better than those of his opponents. Little is known of Adams. He was a candidate for office both before and after this time and appears to have been uniformly unsuccessful. Of the four candidates, Kinney and McLaughlin were "whole hog" Jackson men, Duncan an "unreliable" Jackson man, and Adams an ultra anti-Jackson man.⁴

So far as the supporters of Kinney and McLaughlin were concerned, the term "unreliable" fitted Duncan's political affiliations exactly. They were thoroughly convinced that he was not a supporter of the national administration, even though he had been repeatedly elected to Congress as a Jackson man. At

¹*Alton Spectator*, March 18, 1834.

²*Alton American*, January 17, 1834.

³*Ibid.*, May 12, 1834.

⁴*Chicago Democrat*, July 23, 1834; see also *Alton Spectator*, May 8, 1834.

the beginning of his career in national affairs in 1827, Duncan was undeniably a radical Jackson man at Washington, and a loyal member of the "whole hog" Jackson faction in Illinois; but even as early as 1831, rumors of his defection from the party were rife; and by 1833 it was well known in many quarters that he was completely out of harmony with the administration, and especially with the president's unofficial advisers. This opposition to the administration is the crux of the entire controversy about Duncan's alleged defection from the Democratic party. The truth about the matter is that he never considered for a moment that he had changed his political position in the least, but rather did he consider that Van Buren and others had influenced Jackson to take a course contrary to that which he had entered upon at the beginning of his presidential career in 1829. Duncan had no quarrel with Jackson the man, and very little if any with Jackson the president; for the men around the president he had a mixed feeling of suspicion and contempt. True, Jackson had vetoed the bank bill, and had ordered the withdrawal of the deposits, but in either case Duncan was willing to believe that the responsibility for his act rested morally upon the president's official and unofficial advisers and not upon the president himself. Duncan's hostile attitude was very generally known in the better informed communities of the state, and in a surprisingly large number of cases it was endorsed by ultra Jackson men.⁵ Throughout the campaign Duncan remained in the East, sending from time to time, letters and addresses to the newspapers favorable to his candidacy,⁶ thus depending not upon a personal appeal to the voters but rather upon his congressional record and personal popularity.⁷

⁵Just how well Duncan's attitude was understood must necessarily remain conjectural. Different newspapers and localities regarded it differently. The generalization made here is based upon the following sources: *Vandalia Whig and Illinois Intelligencer*, April 3, 1834; *Sangamo Journal*, October 4, December 6, 1834; *The Western Hemisphere*, August 27, October 1, 1834; *Alton Spectator*, May 8, 1834; *Chicago Democrat*, July 23, August 27, 1834; *Chicago American*, July 23, 1834; A. F. Grant to J. Dement, June 26, 1833; J. Reynolds to A. F. Grant, February 17, 1834. (Eddy MSS.)

⁶*Alton Spectator*, March 4, 1834; *Chicago American*, July 23, 1834.

⁷See *Chicago American*, July 23, 1834; *Chicago Democrat*, September 17, 1834.

Duncan was elected by a substantial majority, being supported very generally by the anti-Jackson party, which gave surprisingly slender support to Adams; by the remnant of the "milk and cider" Jackson faction, most of whom were out of sympathy with Kinney and McLaughlin; and finally by a large number of the rank and file of the ultra Jackson faction, some because they had voted for Duncan for years and thus acquired the habit, others because of his clean public and brilliant military record, yet others because they did not know or did not believe the stories about his hostility toward the Jackson administration.⁸ The governor-elect carried, by a majority vote, all the counties north and east of the mouth of the Illinois River,—Macoupin, Sangamon, Montgomery, Coles and Shelby excepted,—the counties of Lawrence, Wabash, Edwards, White and Gallatin in the southeast, Alexander and Pope in the extreme southern part of the state, and Madison and Jackson in the southwest. In addition he carried by a plurality vote, Crawford, St. Clair, Coles and Sangamon counties. Although the Kinney strength was confined to southern Illinois, it was less sectional than that given Adams or McLaughlin. Adams' strength lay almost entirely within the counties of Sangamon and Tazewell, neither of which was he able to carry; McLaughlin's support was confined on the whole to Fayette and adjoining counties, and to the territory west of the Illinois River.⁹ Duncan's strength in such

⁸This generalization is based upon a careful study of election returns from typical counties, upon private correspondence of public men, and upon newspaper accounts. See MSS. Election Returns in Coles, Sangamon, Edwards, Macoupin, Fayette counties, Eddy MSS.; and the following newspapers for the years 1833 and 1834: *Alton Spectator*, *Alton American*, *Chicago Democrat*, *Chicago American*, *Vandalia Whig* and *Illinois Intelligencer*, *Illinois Advocate*, and *State Register*.

⁹The political nature of the McLaughlin support is not entirely clear. In Springfield the nine McLaughlin votes were divided among the other candidates as follows: For Congressman—Mills, 6; May, 3; for Lieutenant-governor—Archer, 6; Jenkins, 2; Evans, 1. MSS. Election Returns, Springfield (Court House). (Note: Speaking generally, May, Jenkins, and Evans were Democrats, and Archer and Mills were Whigs.) The same general distribution of McLaughlin votes occurred in Macoupin and other counties. See MSS. Election Returns in respective counties.

The confusion of this election is further illustrated by an examination of the votes of several men then prominent politically: S. Francis, editor of *Sangamo Journal*, voted for McLaughlin, Archer, and Mills;

anti-Jackson counties as Sangamon, Edwards, Coles, Morgan and Vermilion, indicates that the anti-Jackson people believed that Duncan was in sympathy with their cause. In the light of this election and Duncan's subsequent actions and utterances, one can say with a reasonable degree of assurance that Duncan was a Whig in principle at the time of his election as governor in August, 1834.¹⁰

The Jackson-Van Buren forces, however, were very generally successful in the election of 1834. Besides the lieutenant-governor and the entire congressional delegation, they elected a majority of the members of the General Assembly. Such results indicate conclusively that Illinois was still loyal to the president in spite of his insistence that Van Buren should be his successor, and of his hostile attitude toward federal aid for internal improvements and toward the United States Bank.¹¹

The Ninth General Assembly, which convened for its first session December 1, 1834, was composed of eighty-one members, of which number ten senators and eighteen representatives were unmistakably anti-Jackson men.¹² The retiring executive was a

Job Fletcher, for Duncan, Archer, and Mills; A. G. Herndon, for Kinney, Evans, and May; Peter Cartwright, for Adams, Jenkins and May; N. W. Edwards, for Duncan, Jenkins, and Mills; Bowling Green, for Kinney, Archer, and Mills. All the votes except that of Bowling Green may be found in Sangamon County Court House; that of Green in State Historical Library.

¹⁰It has seemed to the writer for some little time that Duncan ought to be classed in the *Illinois Blue Book* and other public documents as a Whig. Criticism of classification may be carried still further. It is the custom to class all the early state officers as Democrats in spite of the fact that many of them supported Adams in 1828 and Clay in 1832. The use of terminology has been abused in places where one would expect better scholarship to prevail. Thus newspapers have been called Whig as early as 1828 when the idea intended to be conveyed was that they were anti-Jackson.

¹¹William B. Archer, candidate for lieutenant-governor, came out squarely on a platform favoring the United States Bank, and the 8573 votes polled for him represent perhaps the approximate strength of the Whigs in Illinois at that time. M.S.S. Election Returns, (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois); *Sangamon Journal*, August 2, 1834.

¹²First session: Senate—9 Whigs, 1 anti-bank Whig, 14 Democrats, 2 anti-Van Buren Democrats; House—14 Whigs, 4 anti-bank Whigs, 35 Democrats, 1 anti-Van Buren Democrat, 1 Bank Democrat. Second Session: Senate—9 Whigs, 1 Anti-Bank Whig, 13 Democrats, 3 anti-Van

Jackson adherent, less radical in his support of the president than were many of his colleagues but a true out and out Jackson man. He took the opportunity in what was his first as well as his last message to the General Assembly to denounce the United States Bank in no uncertain terms. He declared "That it has produced all the real and unreal disasters complained of in the commercial community—that it has interfered in the political elections of our country—corrupted the public press, and prostrated its legitimate purposes—thrown the gauntlets of defiance at the people of the nation—insulted them in the person of their venerable Chief Magistrate—perpetrated acts of bold and daring usurpation—violated the provisions of its charter—. . . That the exasperated managers of this institution are the authors of all the partizan strife and excitement which now convulse the country—. . ."¹³

Governor Duncan's attitude toward national affairs was much less radical than that which Ewing had taken. Without expressing any opinion whatever on the merits of the controversy between the United States Bank and the president, the governor-elect contented himself with merely analysing the functions of banking. For the president's disapproval of the bill for improving the Wabash River, Duncan had no words of censure. He believed that Jackson's opinions had been hastily formed, and that upon a more mature deliberation he would sign such a bill if the opportunity should offer.¹⁴ These references to national affairs by both governors are of the greatest political importance. While Duncan's utterances are rather colorless, those of Ewing reflected exactly the feeling of the party that was supporting Jackson and Van Buren. Besides, discussions of these utterances gave the General Assembly an opportunity to go on record for or against the national administration, and this record is the principal basis upon which a determination of political affiliations of this period must be made.

Büren Democrats; House—13 Whigs, 4 anti-bank Whigs, 36 Democrats, 1 anti-Van Buren Democrat, 1 Bank Democrat.

NOTE. It is impossible to give references to show the political affiliation of each member of this or other General Assemblies. To determine this point, newspapers, local histories, election returns, votes in the General Assembly on political issues have been used. See Appendix.

¹³*Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 13; *House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 14.

¹⁴Duncan's message to General Assembly is found in *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 21 ff.; *House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 25 ff.

A striking political characteristic of the early days of this session of the General Assembly, was the utter impossibility on the part of the leaders to determine the exact political affiliation of many of their colleagues. It is well known now that a majority in each house favored the national administration, yet on many of the most important legislative committees this majority had but a minority representation.¹⁵ Among the rank and file of the Assembly there was considerable uncertainty as to whom they should support for the United States Senate. Mr. Archer, who two years before had opposed resolutions upholding Jackson in his struggle with nullification, was supported by a mere handful of the more radical anti-Jackson men; the less radical divided their votes between John M. Robinson and Richard M. Young, both supporters of Jackson. Lincoln supported the latter, and ten years later in a warning to his party not to divide its strength by supporting its less objectionable foes alluded with a considerable feeling of regret to this support.¹⁶

Despite a failure of the minority in the General Assembly to unite on a candidate for the United States Senate, it was generally a unit on political issues; in fact the introduction of political issues, particularly those concerning national affairs, had a tremendous influence in crystallizing parties. When the majority attempted to put through a resolution endorsing Jackson's attitude toward the bank, the minority opposed its passage at every step.¹⁷ Even after the resolution was passed a counter one was introduced and supported to a man by the anti-Jackson members. Although unsuccessful in their attempt to put the General Assembly on record as favoring the continuation of the United States Bank, the anti-Jackson forces in the house succeeded in having passed a resolution which gave it as the opinion of that body that, "the establishment of a National Bank, with a branch in each state, by the consent or request of its Legislature, properly restricted and guarded in its operations, is neces-

¹⁵E. g. Senate Committees: Finance—Snyder, Taylor (Dem.); Mather, Mills, Bond (Whig). Judiciary—Ewing (Dem.); Edwards, Gatewood, Williams, Thomas (Whig).

House Committees: Finance—Whiteside, Hackelton, Link (Dem.); Ross, Moore, Webb, Blackwell (Whig).

¹⁶*Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 179; *House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 142 ff.; *Alton Telegraph*, March 25, 1843.

¹⁷*House Journal*, 1834-5, pp. 214-17, 258-63. For vote on similar resolution in the senate, see *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 208 ff.

sary to establish a sound and uniform currency in the United States; and also to afford the necessary facilities to the General Government in transporting its funds."¹⁸ While the friends of the national administration as a party were naturally hostile to any kind of a national bank, a sufficient number in the house recognized the necessities expressed in the resolution and voted for it.

The two important state policies discussed and passed upon during this session were the creation of two banks, and provisions for securing money for a canal.¹⁹ In neither case was the vote on political lines. Of the twenty-seven members of the minority voting on the bank bill, thirteen voted for and fourteen against it. The support of the canal was not less general, and many of the most enthusiastic friends of that measure were from the southern part of the state.

On account of deaths and resignations the personnel of the second session of the ninth General Assembly, which convened December 7, 1835, was somewhat changed, but the ratio of the number of either party to the whole number of members remained practically the same.²⁰ On the third day of the session a resolu-

¹⁸*House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 356; *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 315 ff.

¹⁹For notice of internal improvements see *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 228 ff., 360 ff., 1835-6, p. 7; *House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 225 ff., 378 ff. (Note.—House proceedings for February 4, 5, and 6, and for parts of February 3 and 7, 1835, are not printed in the *House Journal* of 1834-5. They are bound in *House Journal*, 1835-6, pages 373-414). 1835-6, p. 8; *Laws of Illinois*, 1834-5, p. 222, 1835-6, p. 145 ff.; Putnam, *Economic History of the Illinois-Michigan Canal*, 274-5; Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II, lxii ff.; Davidson and Stuvé, *History of Illinois*, 1673-1884, p. 478 ff.; *Chicago Democrat*, March 25, 1835, January 20, 1836, *passim*; Douglas, *Autobiography* (Journal Ill. State Hist. Society), October, 1912, p. 341.

For a notice of state bank legislation see *Laws of Illinois*, 1834-5, p. 7 ff.; *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 360; *House Journal*, 1834-5, p. 512; Davidson and Stuvé, *History of Illinois*, 416 ff.; Knox, *A History of Banking in the United States*, 65; Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II, xii; *Annals of the West*, 779 ff.; *Chicago Democrat*, December 7, 1836; Dowrie, *Development of Banking in Illinois*, 59 ff.

²⁰Changes in Second Session: Senate—Fletcher (W) *vice* Taylor (D); Herndon (anti-Van B.) *vice* Forquer (D); Parrish (D) *vice* Will (D); Servant (W) *vice* Mather (W); Strode (D) *vice* Stephenson (D); Weatherford (D) *vice* Jones (W). House—Blackford (D) *vice* McHenry (D); Buckmaster (D) *vice* Thomas (D); Craig (D) *vice* Dough-

tion was introduced in the senate directing the United States senators from Illinois to use their influence in having expunged from the senate records the vote of censure against President Jackson for ordering the withdrawal of deposits from the United States Bank.²¹ In voting upon this resolution the Whigs did not hesitate to oppose Jackson and his bank policy; they voted ineffectually but solidly in the negative, not because of their great sympathy for the bank and the principles for which it stood, but rather to lessen Jackson's influence in general, and to minimize the influence of his endorsement of Van Buren in particular.²²

The most important political acts of this session were the seconding of presidential nominations, and the contest over party names. A senate resolution endorsing White for the presidency, and condemning the Van Buren party for assuming to deny to the Whigs the use of the name "Democracy" was introduced by

erty (D); Pace (D) *vice* Anderson (D); Porter (D) *vice* McGahey (D); Smith (D) *vice* Ficklin (W); Turney (D) *vice* Link (D); Wood (D) *vice* Rowan (D).

²¹For comment from western standpoint, see *Western Hemisphere*, May 21, 1834.

²²*Senate Journal*, 1835-6, p. 12, *passim*; *House Journal*, 1835-6, p. 62 ff. The transmission of these resolutions to the senators from Illinois—Robinson and Kane—gave Governor Duncan the opportunity of putting himself on record against the administration. How well he improved this opportunity is shown by his letter of transmittal: "This contest between the president and the senate, as a party measure, to my mind, is assuming the most alarming aspect; the one possessing all power, the fount of all honor, the dispenser of all favor, holding the absolute power over the will of one hundred thousand dependents, whose patronage makes him the idol of all the ambitious hungry office seekers in the land; the other having no benefits to bestow, no mercenary dependents wielding the press or the bludgeon in the defense, and required by the constitution to perform the odious duties of rejecting bad men from office, and resisting executive enroachment—in such a contest, unless the people rally to the defense of the senate who can doubt that the result will be total prostration." For Duncan's entire letter, see *Niles' Register*, L., 128; *Alton Telegraph*, March 9, 1836. It was during the debates over this resolution that the well known term "slasher gaff" originated. John S. Hacker, state senator from Alexander and Union counties, used the expression to indicate the extremes to which many of the followers of Jackson were willing to go in his support. See *Alton Telegraph*, December 14, 1836.

Mr. Davidson of White County. Its passage was by a bare majority, thirteen to twelve, all the Whigs voting in the affirmative.²³ The House, not to be outdone by the upper chamber, resolved that, "the false and arrogant claims of the Webster, White, and Harrison party, to the exclusive use of the ancient and honorable name of *Whig* was grossly unjust." The same resolution endorsed Van Buren's candidacy for the presidency. Being in a hopeless minority in the house the Whigs resorted to underhand parliamentary tactics. Attempts to make the resolution odious by saddling it with an amendment endorsing the convention system failed by a single vote. More drastic measures were then resorted to under the leadership of Webb and Lincoln; amendments, and amendments to amendments, dealing with the franchise, negroes, and pre-emption were offered; unsuccessful attempts to adjourn were made; impossible divisions of the question were demanded; and appeals from the decision of the chair were taken to the house. But the resolutions were passed despite such tactics, every Whig present except one voting against them.²⁴

In the appointment of directors for the State Bank of Illinois, and commissioners for the canal, party lines were rather strictly adhered to. Both banks had directorates almost unanimously Whig.²⁵ On the first canal board the Whigs were in the majority, and upon the re-organization of this board following the supplementary canal act of 1836 all its members were Whig. Opposition to the confirmation of several of these Whig appointees by Democratic members of the state senate, indicates that there was a feeling that the governor was partial to his political friends in making appointments. This, however, is but one instance of many, where the Whigs by the very force of enthusiasm and unity in the ranks and of ability in leadership, were able, although in the minority, to outvote their opponents by taking advantage of division in their ranks. This is well illustrated in the strenuous opposition in the house to the Van Buren resolutions already mentioned. It contrasts sharply to the indifference and demoralization of the Democrats in the senate when the anti-Van Buren resolutions were carried in that body

²³*Senate Journal*, 1835-6, p. 76 ff. For protest against resolution, see *Ibid.*, 355 ff.

²⁴*House Journal*, 1835-6, pp. 231-12, 233-40; *Senate Journal*, 1835-6, p. 175 ff.

²⁵*Reports of Committees (U. S.)*, 1836-37, III, 605 *passim*.

in the face of a Democratic majority of almost two to one. The explanation for such disorganization in the Democratic ranks between the years 1832 and 1836 is to be found in the opposition in that party to Van Buren.

The endorsement of White's candidacy by the Illinois senate in 1835, made him the logical candidate in that state of all the parties and factions opposed to the Van Buren candidacy. After the adjournment of the General Assembly, prominent anti-Van Buren men met at Springfield and formally nominated White for the presidency.²⁶ The same body appointed a committee to prepare an address to the voters of the state, and a little later Whig papers began to declare their adherence to the White cause by carrying at the head of their political columns the names of the five White electors, all of whom were anti-Van Buren Jackson men. Without a single notable exception all the Democratic papers of the state opposed White, declaring, as did many of the papers in Tennessee, that he had ceased to be an orthodox party man by his opposition to Jackson's choice for the presidency.²⁷ For the sake of consistency the anti-Van Buren Democrats, who refused to come out openly as Whigs even after White had been read out of the party by the papers of his own state, declared that he was no less a Democrat and Jackson man than was Van Buren, and that their support of the Tennessean against the "Little Wizard" was in no manner an indication that they were not true and orthodox Democrats.²⁸

For a year or more the campaign went on with the Van Buren Democrats opposed by a coalition of Whigs and White Democrats.²⁹ Murmurs of dissatisfaction arose after a time in

²⁶*Sangamo Journal*, June 20, 1835.

²⁷*Nashville Union*, May 17, September 15, 1836.

²⁸A. G. Herndon in *State Register*, June 19, 1840.

²⁹This opposition was called by the Democratic press, "piebald party." See *State Register*, October 14, 1836. The *Sangamo Journal*, mouthpiece of the Springfield "Junto," did not consider Harrison to be a candidate as late as May, 1836. "The attempt to cover up the political deformities of Van Buren with the cloak of General Jackson, is done with the sole and only purpose of taking advantage of the feelings of the old friends of General Jackson, who do not discover the trick played off on them. The contest is between Martin Van Buren, the northern candidate—and Hugh L. White, the Western candidate." Issue of May 1, 1836. Whigs looked with favor upon the split in the ranks of the Democratic party over Van Buren. It was expected that each faction would bid for the

the northwestern counties, which on the whole were Whig strongholds. These murmurs were for a time stilled by taking the name of Bowling Green from the White electoral ticket, substituting in its place that of A. G. S. Wight of Jo Daviess County.³⁰ Despite the good understanding among the various anti-Van Buren elements, there finally grew up a considerable Harrison sentiment among the Whigs that either refused to consider White as other than a Democrat, or failed to understand the significance of some sort of an agreement between their leaders on the one hand and those of the anti-Van Buren Democrats on the other. The culmination of this agitation for Harrison's candidacy was a Whig meeting held at Edwardsville in September, 1836. Not wishing "to distract the opposition to Van Buren" the meeting nominated "to the people of Illinois, the gentlemen named as electors of Judge White, relying upon them in the event of General Harrison receiving more votes in other states than Judge White, they will give the vote of this State to Harrison."³¹ At least three of the White electors—Bond, White and Wight—agreed to this proposition, and thereafter the White electoral ticket became generally known as the "Union anti-Van Buren Electoral Ticket."³² Governor Duncan's paper, the *Jacksonville Patriot*, suggested that each voter for the union

Whig vote. There seems to have been no widespread feeling in the ranks of the leaders that it would be advisable to support an out and out Whig candidate. See N. Pope to H. Eddy, February 16, 1835. (Eddy MSS.)

³⁰*Sangamo Journal*, April 9, 16, 1836; *Alton Telegraph*, April 13, 20, 1836.

³¹*Alton Telegraph*, September 7, 1836; *State Register*, September 2, 15, 1836. During the months of September and October, 1836, numerous Harrison meetings were held throughout the state and the White Electoral Ticket (now called Union Ticket) was endorsed. See *Alton Telegraph*, October 12, 1836, *passim*. In the western part of the state south of the mouth of the Illinois River there was a strong Harrison sentiment in July and August. See *Ibid.*, August 24, 1836, *passim*.

³²*Sangamo Journal*, October 1, 15, 1836; *State Register*, October 7, 1836. There was little uniformity in ticket headings. The following forms appear in a single issue of one Whig paper: "Union Electoral Ticket," "White and Harrison Electoral Ticket," "Union anti-Van Buren Electoral Ticket."—*Sangamo Journal*, October 29, 1836.

A similar union between White and Harrison was effected in other states. See *State Register*, September 15, 1836; *Alton Telegraph*, September 14, 1836.

ticket should designate his choice between Harrison and White, and that the union electors, if elected, should cast their votes for the candidate having the greater number of votes in the state.³³

The various suggestions by the newspapers and conventions as to methods of voting, and the absence of detailed election laws, combined to create confusion among voters, among election officials, and among the leaders of the anti-Van Buren party, so much so that the exact vote for Harrison, or White, in Illinois can never be known. There was no uniformity in voting for presidential electors. In some precincts voters declared for president and vice president without the intermediary of the electoral ticket; not infrequently a voter chose a presidential candidate from one ticket and a vice-presidential candidate from another,—an impossibility under the present law. As many as four ways of voting may be found in a single county, but if such lack of uniformity caused any comment or astonishment, it seems not to have been recorded.³⁴ Generally speaking there were three presidential tickets in the field: Van Buren and Johnson; Harrison and Tyler; White and Tyler. The last two tickets had the same set of electors. Despite the lateness of beginning the Harrison candidacy in Illinois, he was considered the principal candidate of the anti-Van Buren forces on the eve of the election, and was supported accordingly.

From newspaper comment, one is led to believe that the insistence of the Whigs on an open declaration for Harrison favored the Van Buren party. That Harrison was stronger than White outside the state, seems to have been the general idea in

³³*State Register*, September 15, 1836.

³⁴E. g., Macoupin County.

- (1) Woodriver precinct: Van Buren-Johnson; Harrison-Tyler.
- (2) Fork precinct: Van Buren electors; John Henry.
- (3) Otter Creek precinct: Wm. H. Harrison-John Tyler; H. L. White-John Tyler (same electors); M. Van Buren-R. M. Johnson.
- (4) Carlinville precinct: Two sets of electors, with nothing to indicate for whom they stood.

MSS. Election Returns, Carlinville (Court House). There was a similar confusion in almost all the counties. See *MSS.* Election Returns, in Sangamon, Fayette, Edwards, and Menard counties. There was even more confusion in Coles than in Macoupin County. See *MSS.* Election Returns for that county.

Illinois, and on account of this feeling many original White men supported Van Buren rather than risk electing Harrison by voting the union ticket. On the part of the Whigs and their allies the battle cry was, anything to beat Van Buren, and had the Whigs been willing to give their united support to White, it is not at all improbable that Illinois would have declared against Van Buren in 1836.³⁵

Among the Whigs there was as yet little hero worship; the enthusiasm displayed in the campaign of 1840 was lacking in the Harrison-White-Van Buren contest of 1836. Instead of carrying on a brilliant offensive contest in which the opposition could be carried off its feet by the force of enthusiasm, the Whigs took the defensive, trusting for success to the lack of harmony among the Democrats. But despite the schism in the Democratic ranks the Whigs suffered general defeat in Illinois. The White-Harrison electoral ticket was beaten by a small majority. The Democrats had elected their Congressional candidates and a majority of each branch of the General Assembly.³⁶ For the Whigs, the one encouraging feature of the campaign and election was the generally good understanding among them about the selection of candidates for office. Hitherto the absence of any central authority, such as conventions, central committees, and correspondence committees, had resulted in a dissipation of party strength; but in the face of a situation in which division meant defeat, personal animosities and individual ambitions were very generally sacrificed for the good of the party. This tendency toward concentration of strength was real and encouraging, but it was being constantly opposed by a Whig characteristic that had a habit of cropping out inopportunely, namely, opposition to central authority. Such a characteristic, as we shall see later, was detrimental to the success of the party, and was strenuously opposed by Mr. Lincoln, who favored a convention system of some sort. The Whigs very generally professed to believe that

³⁵For charges made against Van Buren in this campaign as well as that of 1840, see post, 0000.

³⁶Political personnel of the Tenth General Assembly: First Session: Senate—18 Whigs, 20 Democrats, 2 anti-Van Buren Democrats; House—26 Whigs, 63 Democrats, 2 (Graham and Joseph Green) unknown. Second Session: Senate—17 Whigs, 20 Democrats, 3 anti-Van Buren Democrats; House—30 Whigs, 60 Democrats, 1 (Green) unknown.

Note—Gatewood changed from Whig to Democrat between sessions. See Appendix.

the convention was a Democratic device by means of which the leaders of that party were able to dictate to candidates and voters alike. Although they were divided upon the convention question, opposition to it became weaker as time went on until by 1842 it was a settled fact that the Whigs were wedded to the system in all its ramifications.³⁷

The Tenth General Assembly, which convened December 5, 1836, has since become famous for the political prominence which many of its members attained. Among the Whigs the best known figure was Abraham Lincoln. Less well known were Edwin B. Webb, Whig candidate for governor in 1852, Orville H. Browning, first Republican Senator from Illinois, Cyrus Edwards, brother of Governor Ninian Edwards and Whig candidate for governor in 1838, Richard N. Cullom, father of Senator Shelby M. Cullom, and Ninian W. Edwards, son of Governor Ninian Edwards, afterwards appointed state superintendent of public instruction by a Democratic governor. Opposed politically to this group were, Stephen A. Douglas, Augustus C. French, Democratic governor from 1846 to 1853, James Shields, who afterwards represented three different states in the United States Senate, John A. McClernand, noted Civil War general, John Dougherty, supporter of Lincoln in 1858 and Republican lieutenant-governor from 1869 to 1873, and Usher F. Linder, who became a Whig in 1840, but subsequently returned to the Democratic ranks and canvassed the state for Douglas in 1858.

Despite the presence of so many actual and prospective politicians in the General Assembly, the political significance of the first session is slight as compared with the session of 1834-5. Local matters distracted the attention of the lawmakers from national politics. Besides the internal improvement bill, which was passed as a sectional rather than a political measure, the question of the location of the state capital engrossed the attention of both houses during a great part of the first session, and a close study of the various votes leaves the feeling that many of the most able members concerned themselves more in getting advantages for their local constituencies than in attempting either to legislate for the good of the state or to go on record

³⁷For an account of the attitude of the Illinois Whigs toward the nominating convention system, see Thompson, *Attitude of the Western Whigs toward the Convention System* (Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, V., 167 ff.).

concerning national issues. In the house, however, a resolution endorsing Jackson's administration was passed by a large majority, many of the Whigs voting for it. Early in the session a Whig had been elected speaker of the senate, through a coalition of Whigs and anti-Van Buren Democrats; and the dissatisfaction among the Democrats in the senate may account for the non-political activities of the same party in the house.

There was a short extra session of the General Assembly in July, 1837, called by the governor to consider the difficulties that the state was having to meet its financial obligations. The panic of that year gave Governor Duncan an opportunity to express his opinion of the financial policy of the national administration, which he did in no uncertain terms. "At the time the President of the United States assumed the responsibility of ordering the public money to be removed from their legal deposit in the Bank of the United States, for the purpose, as he avowed, of preventing the re-charter of that institution by Congress, there never was a sounder currency, or a more healthy state of things in any government in the world." After showing the inadvisability of establishing the state banks, the governor went on to say, "Before the public were aware of the ruin which this wild scheme portended, the Executive and a portion of his party seeing their error it would seem, endeavored to escape the consequence by amusing the people with the absurd and impractical project of an exclusive hard money currency. . . . There must be change, there must be reform. The Public Treasury must be again firmly placed in the custody of law; and all power and control must be repudiated. . . . The patronage of the Executive must be reduced, and his power to remove public officers so modified as to prevent his displacing a faithful and competent man, either to gratify party malice, or to intimidate him in the free and independent exercise of the election franchise. . . . That control over the public press, and Congress which has been so powerfully exercised by the appointment of newspaper editors, and members of the Senate and House of Representatives to high and lucrative offices by the executive, should as far as possible be obviated." This utterance reflected the attitude of the Whigs in general and the late anti-Van Buren Democrats in particular. They had no quarrel with Jackson, but they refused to support Van Buren or to approve the acts of the president, which they considered to have been inspired by unscrupulous advisers. The Democrats on their side took the

opposite view. They endorsed *in toto* the policies of both Jackson and Van Buren, and the endorsement of the latter made a cleavage that unmistakably divided the Whigs from the Democrats.

The state campaign of 1838 differed from the campaign of 1836 in that the opposition to Van Buren was less evident. The Whigs and their allies had accepted Van Burenism as a calamity, but they preferred to work along other lines than those of general opposition. As yet, however, they hesitated to use the term "Whig" so as to include all elements opposed to Van Buren, and contented themselves with calling the former White Democrats, Conservatives.³⁸ In order to bring the supporters of the national administration into disrepute, the Whig newspapers stigmatized the general Democratic ticket as "Office Holders Ticket," giving the name "Peoples Ticket" to their own.³⁹ Political lines were more closely drawn and more easily recognized in 1838, than they had been at any time before; but even at that time the sharp demarcation that appeared in 1840, could not yet be seen. The Democrats thought to make a master stroke by nominating for governor a candidate from the extreme northern part of the state. Accordingly Benjamin Stephenson of Jo Daviess County was named as Democratic standard bearer.⁴⁰ Stephenson was charged with being a defaulter to the national government, and as a consequence was forced to withdraw from the race. A hastily reassembled convention named in his place Thomas Carlin of Greene County. The Whigs chose Cyrus Edwards of Madison County as their candidate. Edwards was a brother of Governor Edwards, and one of the most prominent men of the state. Generally speaking the issue of the campaign was internal improve-

³⁸*Vandalia Free Press and Illinois Intelligencer*, July 27, 28, 1838.

³⁹*Ibid.* The term used in parts of central Illinois to designate the alliance was "Anti-sub Treasury Ticket." See *Sangamo Journal*, 1838, *passim*. In some localities there were local issues of considerable importance, e.g., the division of counties, location of county seats. What will appear later to be of significance was an "anti-Junto" Whig ticket in Sangamon County. See *Illinois Republican*, July 25, 1838.

⁴⁰For many years the demand for northern representation in public office had been growing in both parties. As early as 1834 an effort had been made to allow northern Illinois one of the United States Senators. Until Ford was nominated for governor in 1842, all the candidates for that office had come from the southern counties. See *Sangamo Journal*, November 23, 1834.

ments.⁴¹ As we have noticed already, the Whigs in 1837 had favored abandoning the system. Edwards did not oppose internal improvements, but advocated the building of railroads with private capital.⁴² Edwards had the support of the Whigs and Conservatives, but because of his activities in the Lovejoy riots he was very generally opposed by those who had any leaning whatever toward abolitionism.⁴³ The election resulted in a Democratic victory. Not only did that party elect its governor and lieutenant-governor, but also two of the three members of Congress and a majority of the members of the General Assembly.⁴⁴

The state administration changed on the first Monday of December when Duncan surrendered his place to Carlin, who was in no respects the equal of his predecessor. The General Assembly soon busied itself with national affairs. Owing to the political shrewdness of Lincoln, Fithian, Edwards, Baker, and Du Bois, both houses adopted resolutions condemning an independent treasury and a metallic currency. From this time on the Whigs may be considered as a distinct party with a purpose

⁴¹For contrary view, see T. C. Browne to H. Eddy, February 10, 1838 (Eddy MSS.). There were, however, certain fundamental principles of a radical nature claimed by the more zealous Whigs. "WHIG POLICY: To provide a sound circulation medium for the people, and in quantity, adequate to the want of the country. To equalize the exchange of the country, so that a dollar in Illinois will be equal to a dollar in New York or *new-any-place-else*. To practice economy in the administration of the Government. To foster enterprise and industry in all classes of community—and regard merits wherever found—and thus to arrest THE DESOLATING EFFECTS OF A POLICY WHICH IS PASSING WITH A HURRICANE VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND. The Whigs would have the farmer obtain \$10 a barrel for his Flour, and that in money, which would be received by the Government for lands and other dues—\$20 a 'head' for his cows and for *asses* heads just what they are worth." *Vandalia Free Press and Illinois Intelligencer*, July 27, 28, 1838. See also *Sangamo Journal*, March 23, September 27, 1839.

⁴²Gillespie, *Remembrances*, 23.

⁴³*Emancipator*, February 15, 1838.

⁴⁴Political personnel of Eleventh General Assembly: First Session: Senate—20 Whigs, 19 Democrats, 1 anti-sub Treasury Democrat; House—41 Whigs, 2 sub-Treasury Whigs, 45 Democrats, 3 anti-sub Treasury Democrats. Second Session: Senate—No change from First Session; House—42 Whigs, 2 sub-Treasury Whigs, 45 Democrats, 2 anti-sub Treasury Democrats.

more consistent than those held by any of the factions and parties of which it was composed. The most revolutionary measure brought up in either house was that introduced by Mr. Ficklin, in which the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were endorsed, and the dry bones of Federalism rattled once more. This resolution, however, was laid on the table, and seems never to have been taken up. All this activity was but preliminary to the presidential campaign of 1840, which really began in 1839, when the Whigs, assembled in convention, gave an exhibition of enthusiasm and solidarity never before seen in that party, and which carried them to victory in the national elections.

Politics in Illinois during the period of the emergence of the Whig party, 1834-1840, was characterized, as has been shown, by considerable political confusion, due in part to the efforts of the state to establish adequate banking facilities, and to build a comprehensive system of internal improvements; in part to the absence of definite policies on which the Whigs could unite; in part to dissensions among the Democrats; and in part to the impossibility of determining exactly the party affiliation of political leaders. The instability of party lines and the lack of definite knowledge about political alignments are illustrated by the character of Duncan's support for governor in 1834. Men of all shades of political belief voted for him, evidently believing that he represented their views regarding national issues. Two years later the same indecision, while not so pronounced, was evident. Then, Whigs that boasted of their party orthodoxy, united in supporting White against Van Buren for the presidency, until Harrison became an active candidate. Apparently their platform was based on personal,—anything to defeat Van Buren,—and not on political grounds. Naturally party measures crystallized, and in the first Whig state convention in 1839, the Whigs found common political ground upon which they could oppose the Democrats.

CHAPTER III.

HARRISON AND TYLER.

1839-1841.

The campaign of 1840 was carried on by the Illinois Whigs with a great show of enthusiasm. Even before a Whig standard bearer had been selected, the members of that party had pledged their support in convention assembled to the future nominee. Van Buren was never popular in Illinois, and on that account the pre-convention campaign of the Whigs was marked by their attacks upon the president. Whoever the candidate of their party might be, they realized the importance of weakening Van Buren's cause in the state and deliberately set about to do it. Harrison's nomination by the Harrisburg Convention was the signal for outbursts of great enthusiasm by the Whigs. His military reputation was a valuable stock in trade in a campaign against Van Buren. Thus there were combined on the part of the Whigs great enthusiasm for their own candidate and a dogged determination to defeat his opponent; and this combination, which was to a degree accidental, brought about a flood of enthusiasm that swept cold deliberations aside and served to characterize the campaign of 1840. Both candidates were abused and charged with being connected with every unpopular movement of the day; and before election day the campaign resolved itself into a "mud slinging" contest. Although the Democrats carried Illinois, Van Buren's defeat made them sour and vindictive. Hitherto they had often divided over non-essentials in the General Assembly, with the result that the Whigs had been able to carry out their own policies. The defeat of 1840 brought them to their senses. Under the stress of preserving their party integrity, minor differences were for the time forgotten, and a united front shown to the enemy. Because of this changed attitude of the Democratic party, the activities of the 1840-1 session of the General Assembly differed materially from those of former sessions.

As early as January, 1839, opponents of the national administration held local conventions and mass meetings. On the 26th of that month the "Whig Young Men" of Springfield and Sangamon County met at the court house "for the purpose of organizing and future operation." These young men struck the key note of the approaching presidential campaign when in a preamble to a set of resolutions they said, "Whereas, the present alarming and dangerous situation of our national affairs, arising from the daring contempt of law and order that has been manifested in various parts of our Union,—from the unexampled corruption of unprincipled men holding high and responsible offices, embezzling the public money, producing enormous defalcations, and wresting hard earned savings from the hands of the people to gratify their own cupidity,—from the rottenness which seems to have tainted the whole system of the present administration, and from the reiterated attempts of the Executive to palm upon the nation a scheme which ought to be reprobated by every honest man, and every disinterested patriot; call loudly upon every individual who possesses any regard for the welfare of his country, to use the most strenuous exertions to promote its interest and maintain its honor."¹ In order to create enthusiasm it was decided to hold similar meetings throughout the county. Nor was organization to stop at the county lines. A correspondence committee and a committee on address were appointed, the one to correspond with young Whigs all over the state with the ultimate object of holding a convention, the other to set forth the cardinal principles for which the young Whigs of Sangamon County stood.²

About a month later the Whig members of the General Assembly met to discuss ways and means of organizing the party forces and carrying on the approaching presidential campaign. Henry I. Mills of Edwards County presided. Mr. Lincoln explained the object of the meeting, after which O. H. Browning of Adams County offered a set of resolutions that condemned the Democratic party in general and President Van Buren in particular. Lincoln offered a resolution providing for a committee to prepare an address "setting forth the causes of our opposition to the present administration, and recommend-

¹For complete report of this meeting see *Sangamo Journal*, February 2, 1839.

²For address see *Sangamo Journal*, February 9, 1839.

ing all the opponents of the Misrule of the Government to unite upon the platform of union and compromise." The most significant utterances were those in which the "Great Whig and Conservative parties" were called upon to oust Van Buren from the presidency, and that of Lincoln when he referred to "union and compromise." Apparently these utterances were a direct bid for the support of the dissatisfied elements in the Democratic ranks. Whatever the object in view, such an invitation gave the opportunity to these elements to join with the Whigs without becoming an integral part of the party. As might be expected under the circumstances, the best known leaders of the party took part in the deliberations of this meeting. Among these were Lincoln, Hardin, Davidson, Gen. James B. Moore, Thornton, A. Williams, Servant, Archer, and Churchill.³

It was the opinion of this meeting that no convention for nominating delegates to the National Whig Convention was necessary. By the middle of the summer, however, the *Chicago American* proposed that there be held at Springfield on September 2, a convention made up of delegates, one delegate to be selected in each county in convention assembled. This proposal was endorsed by the Whig press with the modification that the number of delegates be increased and all Whigs be invited to attend the convention. This modified proposal was popular, and in a great many counties conventions are known to have been held,⁴ and in them enthusiasm ran high. Less reserved than their senators and representatives had been in their meeting at the state capital, the people very generally demanded that Clay be the party nominee, but promised their support to any candidate that might be named. Denunciation of the national administration in the most bitter terms was in order at these meetings. At Belleville it was resolved, "That it is our deliberate opinion, that the policy of the present administration is calculated to corrupt the morals of the people; and sooner or later to destroy the liberties of our country, and that the sal-

³For full account of meeting see *Sangamo Journal*, March 16, 1839.

⁴The Whigs are known to have held conventions in the following counties: Logan, St. Clair, Menard, Sangamon, Hancock, Adams, Bureau, Peoria, Clinton and Tazewell. No doubt there were many more. For proceedings of county meetings see *Sangamo Journal*, March 3, August 9, September 20, October 4, 1839.

vation of all we hold dear on earth depends upon the union of the Whigs at the next presidential election.”⁵

The movement for a convention, which was begun by the press, culminated in the holding of a Whig State Convention at Springfield, Illinois, October 7-9, 1839.⁶ At the beginning of the first session, delegates from twenty-two counties were present. Later, others appeared and took their seats until at least half of the counties in the state were represented. Following the recommendation of a nominating committee, William Moore of St. Clair County was made permanent chairman of the convention, while Joshua Beal of Wabash and Robert A. Glenn of Schuyler were chosen secretaries. Because the National Whig Convention had not yet met, and because they feared to commit themselves in advance of the choice of that body, nothing more in the way of suggesting presidential candidates was done than to express entire confidence in both “Harries of the West,”—William Henry Harrison and Henry Clay,—and pledge the Whig vote of Illinois to the candidate to be named.

In sharp contrast to the actions of the national body, which met two months later, the state convention adopted a clean cut platform that expressed unequivocal opinions on both national and state issues. Van Buren’s administration was bitterly denounced, and the adoption of the sub-treasury system was called a “daring and dangerous attempt to concentrate all power in the executive—to unite in his hand the purse and the sword—to create two species of currency, *gold* and *silver* for pampered office holders and *rags* for the people, the laborers, and producers of the country: and that it will fasten a swarm of sub-treasurers as leaches on the public monies, whose security to the government after they are glutted, will be like that of Price and Swartwout—*leg bail* in a foreign land.” The president himself was denounced as an “artful politician and a selfish experimenter on the resources, credit and prosperity of the people.”

Concerning state issues the convention was no less emphatic in its denunciation of Democratic measures and policies.

⁵*Sangamo Journal*, August 9, 1839.

⁶*Sangamo Journal*, October 11, 1839. In the preamble to a set of resolutions offered by John T. Stuart the statement was made that this was the “first State Convention of the Whig party in Illinois.”

Carlin's administration was declared to be a failure and unworthy the support of the people, because of the "vacillation of purpose" of the governor. The state's banking system received special attention at the hands of the convention, which declared it a complete failure. This system had been originally supported by Democrats and Whigs alike, but now the latter party "disclaimed its paternity," citing the fact that the General Assembly which had authorized the existence of the banks was Democratic. Thus in convention assembled the Whigs repudiated state banking as it then existed, and denied all responsibility for its establishment.

In addition to denouncing the Democratic administrations, both national and state, the delegates re-affirmed the Whig doctrines as laid down by Clay and Webster, and pledged the party in Illinois to support the nominee of the approaching National Whig Convention. They chose delegates and substitutes to that convention,⁷ and five electoral candidates, all of whom were well known for their orthodox whiggery and campaigning ability. They instructed the electoral candidates to "address in person the people in different portions of the state on the subjects to be involved in that great contest."⁸

An examination of the personnel of the first Whig State Convention reveals the fact that its members were drawn from every element opposed to Van Buren and his administration; and the charge made by the Democratic press that the Whig party was made up of Clay men, bank men, anti-Masons, Abolitionists, old Federalists, and Federal-Whigs, seems to be not far wrong.⁹ At times these divergent elements had little in

⁷The delegates to the Harrisburg Convention were: *George W. Ralph, St. Clair; *Ezra Baker, Wabash; *William B. Warren, Morgan; William A. Minshall, Schuyler; *Walter L. Newberry, Cook.

Substitutes (corresponding in order named to delegates) were: Junius Hall, Madison; Q. C. Alexander, Fayette; Richard F. Barrett, Sangamon; *Edward A. Whipple, Tazewell; Daniel G. Garnsey, Rock Island.

Those marked with * attended the convention. See *Sangamo Journal*, December 24, 1839.

⁸See *State Register*, June 12, 1840; *Sangamo Journal*, December 20, 1839.

⁹*State Register*, January 1, 1840; *Illinois Republican* (Rushville) January 2, 1840; *Harrisburg (Pa.) Reporter*, December 6, 1839.

common, but with Van Burenism as the issue, as it was in 1840, they could and did unite temporarily against the common foe.¹⁰

That the Whig leaders dared meet their opponents in the open, and there discuss the issues of the day, is evidenced by the tone of a set of resolutions offered by Lincoln for the consideration of a meeting of the Whig members of the General Assembly. The day before, December 10, 1839, the Democrats assembled in state convention had denounced "whig individuals, whig policies and the Whig party," and to such denunciations Lincoln took exception. He challenged their authors to meet him and other Whigs at any place they might designate, and there to plead their respective causes before the people. The meeting adjourned until the next evening, at which time it reassembled and its members listened to a "speech" by A. P. Field, and appointed a committee composed of Hardin, Brown, and Baker to make arrangements with the Democrats for joint debate.¹¹

Illinois was fully represented at the National Whig Convention held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in December, 1839. From the beginning the Illinois delegates supported Clay, but on the last ballot they separated from their neighboring delegates and voted for Harrison, thus gaining the distinction of being delegates from the most southern and western state to support the nominee.¹² Although Clay was favored over Harrison by the Illinois Whigs, that party loyally accepted the verdict of the nominating body and entered the campaign with enthusiasm.

Harrison's nomination in December, 1839, was followed during the next spring and early summer by ratification meetings, both national and state. In a national ratification convention held at Baltimore in May, 1840, the Illinois delegation

¹⁰To give the names of all the prominent Whigs taking part in this convention is out of the question. There are some, however, that deserve mention. Among the accredited delegates were E. D. Baker and Josiah Francis of Sangamon; J. C. Howell of Macoupin; W. B. Warren and William Sergeant of Morgan; Joshua Beal and Ezra Baker, Jr., of Wabash; George Smith and William Otwell of Madison; Archibald Job of Cass. John T. Stuart was one of the leading spirits. E. D. Baker furnished the oratory.

¹¹*Sangamo Journal*, December 20, 1839.

¹²For account of the National Nominating Convention see *Monthly Chronicle*, I., 519.

was comparatively large and attracted considerable attention. Upon the Illinois banner carried in the ratifying procession were inscribed, "She will Teach Palace Slaves to Respect the Log Cabin," and "The Prairies Are on Fire."¹³ One of the largest meetings held in the West was the "Young Men's Convention, and Old Soldiers' Meeting", which convened at Springfield, Illinois, June 2, 1840. As the title indicates this was a union meeting. The old soldiers met in a sort of rally, while the young Whigs held a convention. Accounts of the meeting are conflicting, but it is safe to say that it was attended by thousands, with practically every county in the state represented. The resolutions passed are but reiterations of those already noticed. The meeting was intended primarily to create interest and enthusiasm for Harrison and it succeeded in a large measure. In addition it gave an opportunity to the younger element to assert its influence.¹⁴ The enthusiasm generated at this meeting spread very generally to all parts of the state. A great many counties held rallies in connection with barbecues, at which times the gathered assembly was addressed by Lincoln or one of the other candidates for presidential elector.

The Whig State Convention had provided for a state central committee composed of five members, whose duties were to stimulate county organization and direct its work. The members of that committee were A. G. Henry, E. F. Barrett, A. Lincoln, J. F. Speed, and E. D. Baker. Following the instructions of the convention this committee drew up a comprehensive plan of organization, which, with modifications, has done service many times since. By this plan the leaders expected to know with remarkable exactness the party affiliations of every voter in the state. This committee had the power of appointing county central committees, which in turn were to divide their respective counties into small districts and appoint in each a sub-committee. The sub-committee was instructed to make "perfect lists" of all the voters in their respective districts. Nor were the sub-committees to be satisfied with ascertaining their neighbors' party affiliations: they were urged to encourage all Whigs to keep in line, and to seek out wavering Democrats and try to

¹³Norton, *Revolution of 1840*, p. 111.

¹⁴For account of this meeting see *Sangamo Journal*, June 5, 1840.

persuade them to support Harrison and Tyler.¹⁵ The circular embodying the plans of organization was intended for the eyes of good Whigs only, but thanks to the Democratic press it became public. Thereupon the Whig newspapers copied the circular and urged the acceptance of its provisions. "We call upon the Whigs in every county throughout the state to organize on the plan recommended in the circular. . . . If the villainous post masters have intercepted any of the circulars going to the several counties, the Whigs in each county are hereby requested to organize . . . and . . . rid . . . the country of the *corrupt horde of hireling office holders*, which are now, like hungry blood suckers, eating and stealing our substance."

Such methods characterized the presidential campaign of 1840. Not only was genuine and legitimate enthusiasm manifested, but extravagant and farcical pretensions were carried to an almost unbelievable extreme. Sympathies and passions were appealed to; the hospitality, unpretentious life, bravery, loyalty, and even the illiteracy and poverty of Harrison were cited and magnified by the Whigs in an endeavor to bring their candidate into sharp contrast with the cultured and cosmopolitan Van Buren.¹⁶ Songs, learned more quickly and remembered longer on account of their jingle than because of any sense they conveyed, were used to drown out any arguments that might be advanced by friends of the administration; pictures of log

¹⁵In Lincoln, *Complete Works*, I., 38-9, the circular is printed as having been written by Mr. Lincoln. The following is the way in which the circular became public: a copy was sent to John Wentworth, who published it in his paper, the *Chicago Democrat*, together with the following letter:

"Springfield, January 1, 1840.

J. Wentworth, Esq.—Sir: This letter [the circular] fell into my hands in a manner which I need not mention to you. It is well concocted, but it is hoped that their designs may be frustrated, by exposing their secretary at an early day.—It is printed in the form of a circular, and has the following endorsement: 'Don't forget to send Stuart a list of names, to whom he can send documents. Yours etc.

A. G. HENRY.'"

See *Sangamo Journal*, February 21, 1840.

¹⁶For an excellent account of the methods of Whig campaigning in 1840, see Buckingham, *The Eastern and Western States of America*, III., 283 ff.

cabins and cider barrels¹⁷ in the immediate vicinity of the American flag floating from a tall pole spoke mutely but effectively of some subtle connection between the environment of the frontier and a love for the country's flag. If the Whigs began these nonsensical methods of getting votes, the Democrats were not slow to adopt them with certain modifications.¹⁸

As soon as the nominations of the respective national conventions became known, attacks were made upon the integrity, honor, and ability of the candidates, and these attacks in a short time descended to invectives without foundation. The president was charged with being a blue light Federalist in 1812; an enemy to Jackson in 1824; a supporter of a large standing

¹⁷An examination of western Whig newspapers leads to the conclusion that the use of cuts of log cabins, cider barrels, and flag poles was very general, and on account of their exact similarity in size, etc., they must have been stock cuts sold or distributed from some central agency. Compare *Sangamo Journal* and *Log Cabin Herald* (campaign paper published in Chillicothe, O.). The origin of the expressions having to do with log cabins and hard cider seems to have been in an effort on the part of the Democrats to make capital of Harrison's early poverty. In reply to such an accusation a Whig paper said: "We thank the enemy for giving us the LOG CABIN for our party EMBLEM. It is a most fitting illustration of our principles. It carries the mind back to a period of Republican simplicity, when our Rulers were faithful and honest. Fortunately our country is not so old in years, nor our People so enervated by luxury, as to forget their LOG CABIN origin. We all know that Patriotism resides among our yeomanry. The watchfires of Liberty are guarded and fed by the dwellers in Log Cabins. We are proud therefore, of the opportunity of supporting a Log-Cabin candidate for President. We joyfully accept the LOG CABIN as our COAT OF ARMS."—*Sangamo Journal*, July 3, 1840.

¹⁸For examples of typical songs sung during the campaign, see Norton, *Revolution of 1840*, *Sangamo Journal*, April 24, May 9, 1840. Both parties established campaign sheets, e.g. *Ball in Motion*, (Democratic) issued from office of *Chicago Democrat*; *Old Hickory*, (Democratic) issued from office of *State Register*; *Old Soldier*, (Whig) issued from office of *Sangamo Journal*. See *State Register*, February 5, 21, 1840; Scott, *Newspapers and Periodicals of Illinois, 1814-1879*. Index. One of the most effective Whig campaign stories was that told of Harrison's address to his old comrades when taking leave of them after the War of 1812. "If ever you come to Vincennes, you will always find a plate and a knife and fork at my table, and I assure you that you will never find my door shut and the string of the latch pulled in." *Sangamo Journal*, May 9, 1840.

army; an abolitionist at heart; a friend and supporter of free-negro suffrage; a spendthrift; unfriendly to the West, to free labor, to catholicism and to white suffrage in some cases; bitterly opposed to federal aid for internal improvements; and finally with being uppish in his every day intercourse with his fellow citizens.¹⁹ A part of these accusations the Democratic press and politicians tried to refute; the rest were left contemptuously unanswered.

The Democrats on their part did not hesitate to turn like weapons against the Whigs. The result was that every act and utterance of Harrison was subjected to the closest scrutiny. First of all, it was charged that the Whig candidate was extremely senile. This charge the Whigs could not effectively disprove, but as if to render it inoperative they called upon the young men of the party to show their loyalty to the old hero. In addition it was urged that the candidate had not the ability to fill the office he sought, and as evidence to prove this contention pointed to his poor administration while governor of Indiana Territory. The strangest charge of all against the hero of Tippecanoe was that of military incompetency, and cowardice manifested in battle; strange because Harrison was in the minds of western people second only to Jackson in military ability and courage. What made the charge the more galling to the Illinois Whigs was the resurrection of an old accusation of this nature made by Governor Duncan, who had shared honors with Major Croghan in the heroic defense of Fort Stephenson. To the rank and file of both parties, however, this charge was preposterous and very generally unbelieved, despite the fact that the Democratic press reiterated it time and time again and brought forward rather good proof to support the contention.²⁰ To offset the prevalent opinion that Van Buren was not one of the common people, there was unearthed an old

¹⁹*Sangamo Journal*, October 8, 1836, January 19, March 30, December 27, 1839, May 9, July 10, 19, August 2, 14, 28, 1840. In some of these articles Van Buren's votes in United States senate, his message to Congress, Clarke's *Report of New York Convention*, and Holland's *Van Buren* are cited as evidence. The Whig press was adept in making such charges effective. In giving a two column account of the new furnishings in the White House, French names were uniformly given to articles whenever possible, even though they were of domestic manufacture. See *Sangamo Journal*, August 2, 1840.

²⁰*State Register*, October 30, 1840.

vote of Harrison's in the Ohio legislature, which seemed to put him on record as favoring property qualification for voting and imprisonment for debt. Because the entire procedure was susceptible of double interpretation the charge did little more than to cloud the real issues of the campaign.²¹

The greatest disability under which the Whigs worked, was the widespread belief that Harrison had a leaning toward the abolitionists. The Whig press and party organization recognized the danger of allowing such a charge to go unrefuted, and consequently nothing was left undone to convince Illinois voters that Harrison did not belong to that sect "of misguided philanthropists."²² Letters from the state organization with their replies from Harrison or his managers were printed in the Whig papers with the declaration that the Ohio man was a safe candidate; and this was no doubt true, for a study of these letters indicates that Harrison was satisfied with conditions, and desired to see no change whatever in the domestic affairs of any state, unless undertaken and carried out by that state itself.²³ Although the Whig leaders failed to prove conclusively that their candidate was untainted with abolitionism, the effect of such charges on the minds of the voters was more than neutralized by the widespread rumors that Van Buren was an out and out abolitionist, and that he was only waiting for an opportunity to declare his position.²⁴

Much has been said and written about the failure of the National Whig Convention of 1839 to promulgate a platform of principles upon which to base their claims for political sup-

²¹See *State Register*, September 31, 1839.

²²*House Journal*, 1838-9, p. 170.

²³See Harrison to T. Sloo, *Sangamo Journal*, June 11, 1840; Harrison to H. Alexander, *Ibid.* April 24, 1840; Harrison to A. G. Henry, *Ibid.* July 17, 1840. See also *State Register*, September 21, 1839, (quoting from *Indiana State Register*, and *Boston Globe*), July 17, 1840. For report of Harrison's Cheviot speech see *Sangamo Journal*, June 11, 1840. In an address said to have been delivered at Vincennes in 1835 Harrison said: "Am I wrong, fellow citizens, in applying the terms weak, presumptuous, and unconstitutional to the measures of the emancipation?" In a letter written the same year Harrison is said to have declared that Congress had no right to abolish slavery in any state, and only in the District of Columbia on the consent of Virginia and Maryland. Speeches in *Congressional Globe*, VIII, (Appendix), throw light on this subject.

²⁴*Sangamo Journal*, December 27, 1839.

port, and the generally accepted idea is that such failure was due to the knowledge among the leaders that no declaration of principles could be made without alienating one or more of the conflicting factions that went to make up the opposition to Van Buren. The Whig party in Illinois was not unlike the national organization in that it was made up of widely divergent elements, yet in the state convention of 1839, as has been seen, the Whigs came out openly upon issues that could not be mistaken, and a little later they declared their willingness to discuss them before the people in joint debate. There was a tendency, however, to inject personal abuse even when real issues were under discussion. The so-called "declaration of Harrisonian Principles" were thinly disguised attacks upon the Jackson and Van Buren administrations, and a discussion of them often partook of the nature of personal attack. In the hands of skillful campaigners these principles were practically irresistible, for even the Democratic leaders could not deny their applicability to a republican form of government.

First of all came the declaration that Harrison favored the proposition to make the president ineligible for re-election, and in proclaiming this doctrine the Whigs naturally applied the corollary that the incumbent of the office carried on the administration of the government in the interest of his re-election, and more specifically that Jackson had done so, and that Van Buren's whole term of office had been shaped with that object in view. Secondly, the Whigs raised the cry "back to the Constitution," charging Van Buren and his advisers with having perverted that instrument for their own benefit. Accompanying these declarations were demands for rigid accountability of public officers, more freedom by the states in administering their domestic affairs, freedom in election for public officials, a stable and uniform currency, and finally the demand for federal encouragement of American manufactures, and a restoration of confidence and credit throughout the land. In addition, any increase in the standing army, or the enactment of any enlistment law embodying the conscription feature, was condemned.²⁵

Although the Illinois Whigs declared for a protective tariff, they did not press it on the voters as a vital issue during the campaign of 1839-40, apparently for the reason that the people

²⁵For a list of these principles see *Sangamo Journal*, July 24, 1840.

of Illinois naturally favored a moderate tariff of the type of the one of 1846. Instead they relied for success on persuading the voters that Harrison was their logical candidate, and that Van Buren was unworthy of re-election.

A prominent characteristic of the presidential campaign of 1840, was the use, or rather misuse, of epithets to designate parties, factions and cliques. The Whigs were called bankites, wigs, wiggies, wiggles, Federalists, blue lights, and Abolitionists; while the Democrats, much against their wish, were stigmatized as Locofocos, Van Burenites, Tories, and Abolitionists. In the case of the Whigs, they hated above all the appellation, Federalists, for it was generally believed that the roots of the Whig party extended into the anti-Jeffersonian party of 1800, and to the mind of the ordinary voter of Illinois in 1840, opposition to Jefferson in 1800 and to Madison in 1812, was unparadonable. The Democratic press, recognizing that this was the most odious of all the terms applied to the Whig party, very generally refused to call its opponents anything but Federalists, and worked industriously to fasten the idea in the minds of the people that there was little difference between the Federalists and the Hartford Convention on the one hand, and the Whig party on the other. The Whig press and speakers very generally used the term locofocos to designate the Democratic party, and by its use hoped to convey a general idea of disgrace or perfidy, but its use could scarcely have affected the outcome of the election. Of all the terms used to designate the Whig party, the Whigs themselves preferred to be called anti-Van Buren, while their opponents clung tenaciously to Democrat or Democratic for themselves.

Something has been said already about the abolitionist movement and its effect upon this campaign, but an enlargement of that subject at this time seems appropriate, for of all the issues discussed, it was the most dreaded by the leaders, the least understood by the rank and file, and its influence the most difficult to trace. The leaders and press of each party fully realized the political value of proving that the opposition was in league with the abolitionists, and consequently the most extravagant and absurd stories were circulated to show the friendly attitude of one or the other candidate toward the movement to free the slaves. Harrison was charged with "double dealing," that is, with expressing sympathy with the

abolition movement in New England, and at the same time pretending to the southerners that he favored a continuation and extension of the slavery system.²⁶ Van Buren came in for similar denunciations, but the Democratic party organization in the state was too strong to allow any considerable defection from the party on this account. John Tyler, the Whig nominee for second place, escaped any such criticism, which Richard M. Johnson, who was the vice-presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket, came in for considerable censure because of the widely circulated story that he was married to a negro woman. Despite the unpopularity of the abolitionists, and the great reluctance of either party publicly to claim their political support, the political leaders in Illinois made an effort to poll the abolition vote for their respective candidates, with the result that the Whigs secured the major portion of such vote, not because the Whigs as a party were more favorable to anti-slavery than were the Democrats, but rather because a majority of the Illinois Abolitionists had formerly been Whigs, and gave nominal allegiance to that party in political matters; and what is more significant there is little evidence to show that such abolitionists felt the necessity at that time of appealing to the ballot for redress of what they considered primarily a social and religious wrong.

That Jackson's influence in Illinois politics existed long after he had retired from public life, is fully attested by the endeavor of each party to claim Jackson as a supporter for its candidate. The Democratic leaders laid stress on the fact that Van Buren had been Jackson's choice in 1836, and with this as a premise argued that a vote against Van Buren in 1840 would be an affront to "Old Hickory." The Whigs, on the other hand, claimed that the administration of Van Buren had been so radically different from that of Jackson, that the Tennessean actually repudiated the "Little Wizard" as his disciple. To help Harrison it was pointed out, and with considerable truth, that the training, ideals, and capacities of the "Hero of Tippecanoe" were not at all unlike those possessed by the "Hero of New Orleans" at his accession to the presidency in 1829, and

²⁶E.g. "In all the New England States he [Harrison] is an Abolitionist of the first water. In Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and all the other slave-holding States, he is represented as a whole-hog slaveite—one who is for slavery in every form." *State Register*, July 17, 1840.

all the arguments used by the Jackson adherents in 1824 and 1828, to further the interests of their candidate were revived and put into use by the Whigs for Harrison's benefit in 1840.²⁷

During this political campaign there cropped out a charge, which was made by the Democratic press, that there existed at Springfield a Whig Junto, not unlike the "Albany Regency" or the "Richmond Junto." It was asserted repeatedly, and never was it successfully contradicted, that this self-appointed, dictatorial body asserted its power even in the selection of Whig candidates for county offices in some of the more important counties. Mr. Lincoln, who was pointed out by the Democratic press as leader of this clique, vehemently denied that there existed such a body, called the editor of the *State Register* a liar, but, so far as is known to the writer, he brought forward no evidence to prove his contentions. Whatever the merits of the controversy may be, it cannot be denied that Lincoln, Stuart, W. H. Herndon, Logan, Baker, and other Springfield Whigs possessed an influence in the councils of the party out of all proportion to their numerical strength, but it is perhaps not too much to say that this influence was based entirely on superior political ability, for the Whigs of Jacksonville, Alton, Chicago, and Galena were too numerous and had too much ambition to have given up the party leadership on any other ground.²⁸

In the August election of 1840, the Democrats succeeded in electing fifty-one of the ninety-one members of the lower house of the General Assembly, but this success was in no wise indicative of what might be expected in the November election,

²⁷The Whig organization, however, was unable to prevent certain members of that party, who were fanatical anti-Jackson men, from attacking the "old hero" unmercifully. Mr. Hodge, editor of the *Free Press*, is reported to have said late in the year 1839, "It is time the eighth of January was stricken from the calendar of Festivals. I firmly believe that if the British had burned and pillaged New Orleans, it would not have been so great an injustice to the country as the effect (of) General Jackson's administrations have been, and will be for generations to come." Quoted in *State Register*, September 7, 1839. Particular stress was laid upon the statement that Jacksonianism and Van Burenism were entirely different. see Hales' *Memoirs*, I., 278; *Sangamo Journal*, November 7, 1836; T. C. Browne to H. Eddy, February 25, 1840. (Eddy MSS.)

²⁸For a thorough discussion of the Springfield Junto together with specific charges of political dictation, see *State Register*, November 23, 1839, *passim*.

for the apportionment under which members of the General Assembly were elected was that of 1836, since which date the Northern counties, which were supposed to be Whig, had received a very large immigration from the older states and from Europe. An examination of the election returns shows a marked sectional aspect. With the exception of Madison County and four counties bordering on the Ohio and Wabash Rivers, the whole southern part of the state south of the mouth of the Illinois River was solidly Democratic. In addition the Democrats carried the greater part of the Military Tract, a tier of counties adjoining Sangamon on the east and south, and the district along the route of the Illinois and Michigan Canal. The Whig strength lay principally in the districts adjoining Indiana, in Sangamon and adjoining counties, and in the extreme northwestern part of the state.

As the campaign drew to a close, enthusiasm grew beyond reasonable bounds. Both sides threw away whatever common sense arguments they had prepared: charges of contemplated election frauds were freely made on each side; the Van Buren administration was branded with maladministration: the private lives of many prominent state politicians were carefully scrutinized and exposed to ridicule by hostile editors, who were adepts in such kinds of attacks. The candidates for electors in particular canvassed the state with as much earnestness and enthusiasm as if they were seeking the most important state offices;²⁹ and the last issues of the papers of each party warned the reader of the most diabolical plots to "thwart the sovereign will of the people;" and prophesied that the most dreadful disasters would befall the country in case the candidates of the opposing party should be elected.

The Van Buren electoral ticket was successful, but only by a small majority of two thousand out of a total vote little short of one hundred thousand.³⁰ This large vote, which was almost

²⁹The Democratic electors in 1840 were: Adam W. Snyder, J. P. Walker, John A. McClernand, John W. Eldridge and James H. Ralston.

The Whig electors were: Samuel D. Marshall, Edwin B. Webb, Abraham Lincoln, Cyrus Walker and Buckner S. Morris.

³⁰Total vote cast was 93,514; number of votes cast for Van Buren electors, 47,631; number of votes cast for Harrison electors, 45,574.

(NOTE. In these totals each party is credited with the vote of its highest elector.) *MSS.* Election Returns, (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

three times as great as that cast for the presidential election in 1836, ten per cent greater than the entire vote cast for governor in 1842, and only some ten per cent less than the total vote for presidential electors in 1844, is evidence of the enthusiasm of the campaign, and the successful efforts of both organizations in bringing to the polls the full party vote.³¹

An examination of the few election schedules now intact indicates the strength of the defection from the earlier Jacksonian ranks due to various causes, particularly to the unpopularity of Van Buren and his administration.³² This loss, however, was more than offset by the heavy Democratic vote polled in the section in which the foreign elements had settled, and along the line of the Illinois and Michigan Canal. On the other hand, the Whigs received the unanimous support of the Mormons who had but recently come into the state from Missouri, with this exception, that they substituted the name of James H. Ralston, Democratic electoral candidate, for that of the Whig candidate, Abraham Lincoln. To this they were instigated, it was charged at the time, by Stephen A. Douglas.³³ Both before and after the election, charges of fraud were repeatedly made against both parties, particularly against the Whigs, who were charged with importing voters from Missouri, Iowa, Indiana, and Kentucky, but on account of the general

³¹Despite the loss of the state to Van Buren, Illinois Whigs rejoiced exceedingly in national victory. Henry Eddy, who was conservative to a marked degree, gave way to his feelings thus: "Glory enough for one day, or one year, or ten years. The spoilers are driven from the capital, and honest public servants will be installed on the 4th day of March, next. Never despair of the republic after this. The people, though slow to wrath, are terrible when aroused by 12 years maladministration." H. Eddy to J. Raum, November 9, 1840 (Raum MSS.)

³²Among other prominent men in Springfield the following voted for Harrison: William L. May, (Former Democratic Congressman); Enoch Moore, (Private secretary to Governor Ford); Ninina W. Edwards, (A prominent Jackson man in 1834); A. P. Field, (A typical "whole hog" Jackson man in 1824); Thomas C. Browne, (Jackson supporter in 1824). MSS. Election schedules. (Sangamon County Court House.)

MSS. Election Schedules in the following counties bear out this conclusion: Fayette, Coles, Macoupin, Edwards.

³³For further information about the Mormons' support of the Whig ticket, see Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II., lxxx, *passim*. *State Register*, November 27, 30, 1840.

success of the Democratic ticket in the state, these charges were never pushed, and the Whigs on their part, not having the machinery of government, were able to do nothing more than to charge unofficially that they had been defeated by unfair methods.³⁴

The real beginning of the struggle over the foreign vote in Illinois was in the gubernatorial election of 1838. The term foreign, as used at the time, had a double meaning, and as a result confusion has arisen. To many it simply meant citizens of other states who had not resided within the state the necessary six months, which, by the constitution of 1818, gave them a right to vote. To others the word foreign applied exclusively to all persons not born within the jurisdiction of the United States. According to the general practice members of either class voted at all elections after having lived the prescribed half-year within the borders of the state. The Democrats had elected Carlin governor in 1838, but only by a very small majority, and the charge was freely made by the Whigs that his election had been made possible by the vote of the canal laborers. In this case the foreigners were in the main citizens of other states who had not acquired franchise in Illinois by the proper length of residence.³⁵

The other and more important aspect of the foreign vote entered into the election of 1840. By this time it was estimated that at least ten thousand voters of European birth claimed Illinois as their homes.³⁶ There were those who contended that the residence requirement for voting as laid down by the constitution of 1818, was meant to apply only to citizens of other states, and with this interpretation granted, a great number of foreigners of legal age would have been denied franchise. Despite their denials, the Whigs as a party were inclined to look with disfavor upon foreigners voting, not because they were more of a native American party than were the Democrats.

³⁴*State Register*, November 13, 17, 1840.

³⁵Eastern papers took notice of the canal laborers voting the Democratic ticket in 1838 and 1839. Ignoring the real contentions in the case the *State Register* took occasion to say, "This is the old leaven of Federalism, drawing distinction between the 'educated' dandies travelling for 'recreation' and the hard working men in the 'canal ditches of Illinois.' The dandies are 'for Clay'; well so be it." Issue of October 19, 1839.

³⁶Ford, *History of Illinois*, 215.

but because it was evident that a large part of the foreign vote was Democratic. Hence a test case which was brought up in the circuit court of Jo Daviess County, in 1839, gave a precedent for excluding from the franchise all who were not citizens of one of the American states. A little later the case was appealed by interested Democrats to the State Supreme Court, and placed upon the calendar for the June term, 1840.

Beginning at this stage of the procedure the political aspect of the case became more and more prominent. All the judges of the State Supreme Court were Whig except T. W. Smith, and even his Democratic orthodoxy was questioned by the party leaders. Professing to believe that the decision would be given on a strict party vote, Douglas, who was the leading attorney for the Democrats, succeeded in getting the case continued to the December term, 1840, and thus postponed final decision until after the August and November elections.³⁷

Another political controversy, one that had considerable effect upon the election of 1840, was that occasioned by the attempt of the state administration, which was Democratic, to oust A. P. Field, who was a bitter Whig partizan, from the office of secretary of state. In 1829, Governor Edwards had appointed Field to the office he now held, and he continued in office without re-appointment through the following two administrations and into that of Governor Carlin. With Carlin's election as Governor, he began an agitation to replace Field with a Democrat. Accordingly, the governor appointed John A. McClernand to the office, sent his name to the senate for ratification, but that body resolved by a vote of twenty-two to seventeen that the nomination be "not advised and consented to."³⁸ Toward the close of the session Carlin sent in a second nomination. Many of the senators, among whom were prominent Democrats, declared that this second nomination "under the circumstances was an indignity offered to the Senate." The nomination was rejected by the decisive vote of twenty-two to fourteen. Afterward the governor sent in a protest against the course of the Senate and requested that the same might be spread upon the journal. This request the senate refused, but allowed

³⁷Spaggins v. Houghton. For reasons for continuing the case until the December term see *Illinois Reports*, III., 211 ff. For final decision see *Ibid.* 377 ff.

³⁸*Senate Journal*, p. 151 ff.

him to withdraw his protest.³⁹ After the General Assembly adjourned, the governor took advantage of the situation and appointed McClelland secretary of state *ad interim*, but Field refused to give up the office. Then followed a heated legal contest in which the State Supreme Court sustained Field. This victory was gained, however, at considerable expense to the Whig party. The court was under suspicion, and its decision for the Whig claimant seemed to the majority of Democrats conclusive proof of the court's partiality and partisanship.⁴⁰

At the special session of the General Assembly 1839-40, the Democrats made another attempt to oust Field by limiting and defining the length of term to which a secretary of state might be appointed, but the measure failed of passage by a strict party vote. A few days later Governor Carlin sent to the senate the name of Stephen A. Douglas for secretary of state, but this nomination was rejected by a vote of twenty-two to eighteen and at the same time the governor was censured for assuming that he had the right to appoint a secretary as long as the office was already filled. This censure, although made from the standpoint of political expediency, expressed a real line of difference between the Whigs and Democrats. The former claimed that as long as there was no vacancy in the office of secretary of state, no new appointment could be legally made. The Democrats, on their part, contended that as the secretary was merely an attachee of the governor's office, and in many respects his right hand man, it was eminently proper that each new state executive should be allowed to choose whom he would intrust with the affairs of his office. From the standpoint of political theories and the constitution, the Democrats argued that the Whig interpretation virtually made life officers, while the Whigs argued that the secretary of state had been intended by the framers of the Constitution to be a check on the governor's administrative acts, and not to be merely his confidential clerk and irresponsible tool.⁴¹

³⁹*Sangamo Journal*, March 9, 1839; Ford, *History of Illinois*, 213.

⁴⁰The case had been decided against Field in the circuit court presided over by a zealous Democrat, Sidney Breese. Field expected Breese to hand down an adverse decision, and was prepared to appeal the case to the supreme court. See A. P. Field to H. Eddy, May 26, 1839. (Eddy MSS.)

⁴¹Ford, *History of Illinois*, 213. The *Missouri Republican* went to the extreme, declaring: "It no doubt would be very convenient in these

The contest over the secretaryship had an important bearing on the election of 1840. Leaving aside the merits of the case, it was the poorest kind of a policy for the Whigs to contend that an appointive officer held office during his own pleasure, for in so doing they were running counter to the basic political principles of the great majority of the people in the Middle West. Field was in derision called King Alexander I, and the Democratic newspapers using as a hypothesis the Whig contention, that Field could not be ousted, built up the most absurd arguments to show that the opposition favored removing the choice of public officers from the hands of the people, and persuaded many to believe them. The Whigs, on the other hand, could advance nothing but technical arguments to support their contention, and, as was to be expected, arguments of such a nature fell to the ground. Everything considered, it appears that the Whigs were handicapped by Field, by their hostility to foreigners, and finally by the State Supreme Court, for neither Field nor the court was popular. Moreover, the Whigs as a party were opposed to the foreign vote, and, despite their professions to the contrary, this opposition was generally known to the foreigners and their friends.

On account of deplorable financial conditions due to the collapse of the internal improvement scheme, and to the suspension of specie payment by the state banks, the newly elected General Assembly was called together in special session,⁴² the meeting taking place two weeks before the regular session should convene pursuant to the constitution, on the first Monday in December, 1840. The house organized by electing William Lee Davis Ewing speaker over Abraham Lincoln, by a strict party vote.⁴³ In the senate the Democrats were in the majority by almost two to one, and that body, like the house, organized

days to Loco foco peculation and fraud for a Governor, who wishes to CHEAT a State, or ROB her treasury, to have at his back a secretary who would do just as he might be bid." *State Register*, September 7, 1839.

⁴²The special session met November 23, and adjourned December 5. This seems to have been the only time in Illinois history when a special session preceded a regular session of the General Assembly. It is held in some quarters at the present time that such could not be legally done under the Constitution of 1870. There is no evidence at hand to show that there was any doubt as to the legality of such an act in 1840.

⁴³Ewing, 46 (including Lincoln's vote); Lincoln, 36 (including Ewing's vote); nine members not present (5 Democrats, 4 Whigs).

on party lines.⁴⁴ The two weeks' special session was taken up in devising ways to minimize the evils resulting from the suspension of specie payments and from a depreciated bank currency. In spite of the fact that a Democratic legislature had chartered the two state banks,⁴⁵ the State Bank of Illinois, and the Bank of Illinois, that party now turned its fury upon these institutions, not because it, as a party, was opposed to state banks in general, but rather because it claimed, and with some justice, that from the beginning both banks had been administered by Whig officials to the detriment of the Democratic party as an organization, and to its members as individuals. A law of 1839-40 had authorized the suspension of specie payment until the adjournment of the next session of the General Assembly, provided no legislation was enacted upon the matter during that session; and in an attempt to continue a legalized suspension into the year 1841 the Whig members of both houses concerted to prevent *sine die* adjournment of the special session. In order to carry out their designs many of both houses not only absented themselves during the last day of the session in the hope that adjournment would be prevented by lack of a quorum, but also a few of the senators went to the extreme of threatening the sergeant-of-arms of the senate with bodily injury should he attempt to serve warrants in an effort to compel attendance.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Democratic, 26; old members, 12; new members, 14; Whig, 14; old members, 9; new members, 5.

⁴⁵"At the last session of the Legislature of this State, the proposition to create the present bank was brought forward by the friends of the administration. . . . This favor [government deposits] it is thought our State has some reason to expect; she has always been foremost in sustaining the measures of the administration." N. L. May to L. Woodbury, July 20, 1835 (*Committee Reports*) (U. S.), 1836-37, III., 608. See also *Ohio News* (Hillsborough, Ohio), September 13, 1839; *State Register*, September 14, 1839.

⁴⁶Joseph Gillespie in his *Recollections* says that Lincoln and others leaped from a window in order to break a quorum in the house. Mr. Gillespie is supported in his statement by the editor of the *State Register*, (See issue of December 11, 1840) who states emphatically that he was an eye witness of the occurrence. According to the *House Journal*, Mr. Lincoln was present and voting on the question of adjournment. The editor referred to above makes a similar statement. One wonders why Mr. Lincoln leaped after voting. If he leaped before voting did the house clerk with or without the knowledge of the speaker make the

Of the legislation enacted during the regular session of the General Assembly which convened December 7, 1840, two acts deserve special mention on account of their political significance. Despite the hostile attitude of the Democrats as a party toward the state banks, a sufficient number of members of that party united with the Whigs to give a new lease of life to those institutions, by allowing them to continue the suspension of specie payments, to issue notes of small denomination, and to charge an interest rate of nine per cent on notes of a certain nature.⁴⁷

The Democrats very generally believed that the supreme court, which was composed of three Whigs and one Democrat, was partisan in its decisions, and because of this belief they determined to change the political complexion of that tribunal by appointing a sufficient number of new judges to make it Democratic. The enacting of such legislation was prolific of the most bitter political quarrels. Mr. McClelland, of the house, declared emphatically that the court had been prevented from giving a decision hostile to the foreign vote at the previous June term only by a technicality, but this charge was denied by all the judges. In addition, he produced evidence of a more or less questionable character to prove that the decision of the court sustaining Field in his refusal to give up the secretary's office was made upon the basis of political expediency. Other Democrats made long and acrimonious speeches in which the Whig party in general and the Whig members of the Supreme Court in particular were the object of bitter attack. It must not be thought, however, that the Whigs were either intimidated or convinced of their error in opposing a re-form of the judiciary.

journal show that he was present? These and many other questions arise in connection with the episode and deserve attention at the hands of local historians. See *State Register*, December 11, 18, 25, (issued December 23 but bearing the date 25); *House Journal*, 1840-1, p. 80; *Senate Journal*, 1840-1, pp. 47-8; Ford, *History of Illinois*, 226; Moses, *Illinois Historical and Statistical*, I., 442. On Sunday, December 6, the day after the incident referred to, Dr. William Fithian, who was at the time a member of the General Assembly and an eye witness, wrote to a friend at Danville, giving minutely a description of the scenes enacted in the two houses, but he said nothing about Lincoln jumping from the window in an attempt to break a quorum. See W. Fithian to A. Williams, December 6, 1840. (Williams-Woodbury MSS.)

⁴⁷*Laws of Illinois*, 1840-1, p. 40 ff. For protest by certain Democrats against its passage see *House Journal*, 1840-1, p. 538 ff.

Led in the house by Lincoln, Hardin, Archer, Gillespie, and Webb, and in the senate by Baker, Churchill, Cullom, and Davidson, the struggle was carried on against an uncompromising majority; and a study of the speeches delivered by the leaders of each party, and reported *verbatim* in the Springfield newspapers, leaves the impression that open hostilities were narrowly avoided.⁴⁸

The judiciary reform bill,⁴⁹ which provided for the abolition of the office of circuit judge, and for the election of five additional supreme judges by the General Assembly, passed by a large majority in the senate, and by a vote of 45 to 43 in the house. Every Whig present voted against its passage, while Gatewood, Slocum and Warren of the senate, and Able, Blackman, Dougherty, and Hicks of the house, all Democrats, voted with the Whigs.⁵⁰ The Council of Revision, which was composed of the governor, and justices of the Supreme Court, refused its assent to the bill,⁵¹ but the dominant party, not to be thwarted in its desires by the very body that it was trying to reform, passed the bill over the veto. Mr. Lincoln and thirty-four other members of the house entering upon the *Journal* their protest against its passage.⁵²

⁴⁸There are indications that this contest over the judiciary gave opportunity for many members of the General Assembly to express their contempt for political opponents. The *lie* was repeatedly given, and an invitation to settle differences according to the code of honor would have occasioned no surprise, in fact it seems to have been expected in some quarters. See *Sangamo Journal*, *State Register*, *Alton Telegraph*, *Chicago Democrat*, and *Quincy Whig* for months of December, 1840, and January, 1841.

⁴⁹Called "puppy court" bill in derision. See *Illinois Republican*, February 27, 1841.

⁵⁰*Senate Journal*, 1840-1, p. 148 ff.; *House Journal*, 1840-1, p. 311.

⁵¹For opinions of the judges on the constitutionality of the bill, see *Senate Journal*, 1840-1, pp. 257-72. Governor Carlin's opinion is not given.

⁵²According to the constitution of 1818, a majority vote of the entire number of members elected to each house was necessary to pass a bill over the veto of the Council of Revision. Such a majority in the house was 46. The bill had previously passed by a vote of 45 to 43, but in the vote to pass the bill over the veto of the council Mr. Busey of Champaign, who had not voted when the bill was passed the first time, voted in the affirmative. See *House Journal*, 1840-1, pp. 266, 311. In *Illinois Republican*, February 27, 1841, the statement is made that Mr. Busey was prom-

On November 30, 1840, Governor Carlin nominated Stephen A. Douglas to be secretary of state, and asked the senate to confirm the nomination, which was done, all the Whigs voting in the negative.⁵³ Although Mr. Field's intentions regarding a judicial contest for the office have been variously interpreted, it would seem that he did not give up hopes of being able to be reinstated by the Supreme Court, until it became evident that that body would be reorganized, for it was not until January 27, 1841, nearly two months after the nomination of his successor had been confirmed by the senate, and after it was clear to all that the political complexion of the judiciary would be changed, that he formally handed his resignation to the governor.⁵⁴ This

used the clerkship of Champaign County for his affirmative vote on the judiciary bill. In the campaign for the presidential nomination in 1912, Mr. Roosevelt's Columbus (Ohio) address was contrasted with the above protest in order to show that he was out of harmony with Mr. Lincoln's attitude toward the sacredness of the judiciary. Considering the circumstances surrounding the protest there is nothing to indicate that it was anything more than an attempt on the part of the Whigs to put themselves decisively on record against a measure that they thought would prove unpopular with the people. See *House Journal*, 1840-1, p. 540 (last paragraph). There seems to be no doubt that the Whigs were obstructionists during the entire session. Their victory in the nation in 1840 caused the party to have an exalted opinion of itself. See W. Fithian to A. Williams, December 6, 1840. (Williams-Woodbury MSS.), *Sangamo Journal*, January 29, 1841. Even before the passage of the Judiciary Bill a Democratic Caucus seems to have chosen the five new judges required by the contemplated bill. See W. Fithian to A. Williams, February 14, 1841. (Williams-Woodbury MSS.)

⁵³*Senate Journal*, 1840-1, p. 31.

⁵⁴Field's resignation was addressed to Governor Carlin, and reads as follows:

"Sir:—I take this occasion to tender to you my resignation as Secretary of State. This step is taken, on my part, with the sole view of placing my conduct in a proper light. It has been said since the confirmation of Mr. Douglas's nomination, that I would still contend for my right to the office. I assure you sir, such a thought never entered my mind, and I take great pleasure in saying, that so far as your conduct is concerned, I left the office satisfied with your conduct toward me." *Sangamo Journal*, January 29, 1841; *State Register*, February 5, 1841. State Senator Gatewood sent the above resignation to the governor with an accompanying letter in which the latter was taken to task for his repeated attempts to assert the right to appoint and remove officers without the consent of the

acquiescence in superior force and numbers, and perhaps in justice, came too late, however, to be of any political advantage to the Whigs. Had Field been willing to allow his successor to be named two years before, it is not without the range of probability that the Whigs could have overcome the two thousand odd majority against them in 1840, for his deliberate attempts to defeat the will of the executive were unpopular.⁵⁵

In many respects the year 1840 was the high tide in the life of the Illinois Whigs. It is true that they were beaten in both the August and November elections, but under normal circumstances they would have won the latter and perhaps the former. The presence of the foreign vote and the unpopularity of Field's claim to be a perpetual state officer more than offset the strength gained by a display of unparalleled enthusiasm for a distinctly western candidate, who made a particularly strong appeal to the voters of Illinois. Especially was this true because of the fact that his opponent was Van Buren. The latter was never popular in Illinois, and but for good party discipline in the Democratic ranks his vote would have been smaller than it was. It would appear that the Whigs lost their greatest opportunity to put Illinois in the Whig ranks when they failed to carry the November election. Never again was so much enthusiasm displayed in any one campaign, not even when Clay himself was the candidate.

The presidential campaign of 1840 was the high water mark in the history of the Illinois Whigs. Beginning with the first Whig state convention in 1839 and extending over a period of almost a year to the November election of 1840, they displayed an enthusiasm unequalled during any other period of their history. In spite of this enthusiasm, however, and in spite of the marked ability of their leaders, they lost the state to the Democrats by a small majority. This loss was caused largely by the insistence of the Whig leaders that Alexander P. Field, secretary of state, could not be ousted by the governor, and by

senate. As soon as Field resigned his friends united in asking President-elect Harrison to appoint him to any office he (Field) might desire. A. P. Field to H. Eddy, January 18, 1841. (Eddy MSS.)

⁵⁵Although such a conclusion can never be more than speculative and in this particular case may be erroneous, it was the opinion of acute Whig observers that Field's persistent claim for place in an administration with which he was out of harmony was detrimental to the party's interest.

widespread feeling that they were opposed to the foreign vote. The views of the Whigs in both cases were generally unpopular among the voters.

Neither party was satisfied with the outcome of the election. The Whigs professed to believe that the Democrats had carried the state by fraud, while the Democrats charged the Whigs with having carried the nation by unscrupulous misrepresentation of the issues involved. Such was the feeling among the leaders when the special session of the General Assembly convened in November, 1840. The Whigs were in the minority, and following the practices of the preceding session, they obstructed Democratic legislation whenever possible.

CHAPTER IV.

SECTIONALISM AND STATE ISSUES.

1841-1845.

During the half decade ending with the year 1845, the attention of the people was distracted from matters purely political by the pressure of local issues that had arisen during the late thirties.¹ The failure of the internal improvements scheme, with the accompanying debt; the lack of banking facilities and an adequate medium of exchange; the efforts of the people in the southern counties to prevent the completion of the Illinois-Michigan Canal with state funds; and social disorders, particularly in Hancock and adjoining counties, all combined to minimize interest in national politics. These local issues brought prominently to the front sectionalism, which during the previous decade had been lost in the hysteria caused by the anticipation of the rapid economic development of the state. Even in the excitement of the campaign of 1844, the people were primarily interested in those national issues which were most directly connected with their own particular problems.

As soon as it became evident that the finances of the state were in disorder each party hastened to disclaim any responsibility for such a state of affairs.² Although the Whigs had never had a majority in any session of the General Assembly, they were charged by the Democrats with being responsible for the evils that had overtaken the state;³ and the justification for

¹This statement is based upon an examination of newspapers both Democratic and Whig. Papers printed in the southern parts of the state gave a large amount of space to the public debt, those in the northern parts to the canal, and those in the central and western parts to the Mormon question. In all parts of the state a popular subject for discussion was repudiation.

²For specific claims, see *Quincy Argus*, *Alton Telegraph*, *Sangamo Journal*, and *State Register*, for the months of August, September, and October, 1839.

³In the sessions of 1834-5 and 1836-7, a coalition of Whigs and anti-Van Buren Democrats in the senate outnumbered the Democrats.

such a charge lay in the fact that the Whig press, during the time when internal improvements and state banking seemed likely to succeed, claimed that the Whig party had fathered the schemes, and that it was entitled to credit for their initiation and development. Such claims had been based primarily upon the desire of the Whigs to gain political support for their activity in securing what a great majority of the people wanted. Another reason for such a claim was the ignorance on the part of the press as to the political affiliation of the members of the General Assemblies that had authorized internal improvements and state banking. Members whose political predilections were uncertain were claimed or rejected by either party depending on whether or not they were on the popular side of legislation.⁴

By 1842, the Democrats possessed a clear majority in each house of the General Assembly, and to them as a party the people rightfully looked for legislation that would bring relief to the burdened state. In this they were handicapped by division in their own ranks.⁵ Many of the members of that party had no sympathy with any plan whereby the state should pledge another dollar for completing the canal, nor were they prepared to agree to tax the people in order that the interest on the public debt might be paid. To a less degree the Whigs were divided over the same issues. To say the least they were obstructionists, and with the assistance of discontented Democrats they presented a formidable opposition to any legislation that might increase the popularity of the Democratic party. Both parties disclaimed any intention to support the principle of repudiation, yet neither would agree to attempt to tax the people sufficiently to pay even the interest on the public debt.⁶ Leaders of all shades

⁴See *Senate Journal*, 1837, p. 97; *Sangamo Journal*, March 23, September 27, December 17, 1839; *State Register*, September 14, 21, 1839; *Ohio News*, September 13, 1839; T. C. Browne to H. Eddy, February 1, 1838. (Eddy MSS.)

⁵The Democrats were divided into two large groups, the conservatives and radicals. The people in the extreme southern part of the state were opposed very generally to any proposition that would provide for the interest on the state debt by taxation. Those in the military tract were inclined in the same direction. See Ford, *History of Illinois*, 305 ff.; *Alton Telegraph*, January 27, February 10, 1844; *State Register*, and *Times* for December, 1843, and January, 1844.

⁶Such an attitude is illustrated by the convention that nominated Snyder for governor. See *Niles' Register*, LXII., 274; *State Register*, December 17, 1841.

of political belief professed to regard the state banks with suspicion and contempt, yet none of them could deny that these institutions had suffered irreparable damage from having been drawn into party politics. Under such circumstances it is surprising that the General Assembly legislated as well as it did. Many of its members followed a policy of sacrificing the interests of the whole state for the benefit of a section, while others embraced the opportunity of catering to a narrow sectional feeling in order to increase their own political prestige.

The issues upon which the gubernatorial campaign of 1842 were joined were colorless, to say the least.⁷ Neither party had a program, and the tocsin of battle was scarcely more than a reverberation from the clash of 1840.⁸ The Democrats, strictly orthodox, held a convention and chose Adam W. Snyder of St. Clair County, as their standard bearer.⁹ A majority of the Whigs appear to have desired a nominating convention, and one was actually called, but feeling it unwise to allow the clashing elements from the northern and southern parts of the state to meet and air their grievances to the delight of the Democrats, Lincoln, Davidson, Thornton and other prospective candidates withdrew their claims, leaving the field to ex-Governor Duncan, who was chosen by common consent as the Whig candidate for governor.¹⁰ In May, 1842, Snyder died, and a little later

⁷According to a newspaper report Duncan outlined his policies to a committee of Coles County citizens as follows: (1) opposed to sale of state bonds to complete the canal; (2) took a stand against the issuance of bonds for any purpose; (3) opposed the payment of interest on public debt by direct taxation; (4) declared for completion of canal, and gave it as his opinion that it ought to be completed by the National government. See *Illinois Republican*, March 26, 1842.

⁸Ford, *History of Illinois*, 291. The only additional issue of any note was Tylerism. On the whole the questions discussed in the campaign of 1840 were raised to the exclusion of all others, with the exception that the abuse heaped upon Harrison two years before was omitted.

⁹Snyder, *Adam W. Snyder in Illinois History*, 384-5; *State Register*, December 17, 1841.

¹⁰For information concerning the call for a convention and the discussion of the various candidates, see *Illinois Republican*, October 30, November 27, 1841, March 26, May 7, 1842; *Sangamo Journal*, May 21, June 11, August 1, October 22, December 3, 1841; *Alton Telegraph*, October and November, 1841, May 13, 1843; W. H. Davidson to H. Eddy, June 30, 1841; O. H. Browning to H. Eddy, November 8, 1841, (Eddy MSS.); Thompson, *op. cit.* 177 ff.

Thomas Ford of Ogle County, who was a half-brother of George Forquer, a close friend of Governor Edwards, and at the time of his nomination a judge of the State Supreme Court, was chosen in his stead.¹¹ Both candidates professed to believe that provision ought to be made for paying the state debt, but neither did nor could make any definite promise of procedure in case of election. In the southern parts of the state Ford was accused of wishing to cede to Wisconsin the territory lying in the fourteen northernmost counties of Illinois; in the northern part the Whigs kept alive a story to the effect that he opposed the completion of the Illinois-Michigan Canal.¹² Duncan was an old campaigner, never having lost a political battle up to this time. It must be said, however, that despite his sterling qualities, he was less popular than he had been before he became governor in 1834. In addition there was the unfounded report that he was indirectly responsible for certain defalcations that a member of his family had made.¹³ The Mormons declared for Snyder, and afterwards for Ford. This declaration the Whigs attempted to use as capital for securing the anti-Mormon vote.¹⁴ The election was a Democratic victory; Ford was elected by a majority of only a little less than eight thousand, and the General Assembly was safely Democratic.

Carlin's administration as governor had been both unpopular and weak. He had taken office just as the internal improvements and banking bubbles were breaking. Had he been a popular leader results might have been different. The party was divided over both local and national issues; young and enthusiastic partisans like Douglas, Trumbull, McClelland, and William "Jeff" Gatewood had little regard for precedents and past performances. In addition the governor had been compelled to carry on a long and acrimonious struggle with the senate over the appointment of a secretary of state.¹⁵ The legislative branch of government, while it included in its ranks men of ability and statesmanlike qualities, had spent a great part of its time in

¹¹*State Register*, June 10, 1842.

¹²Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II., xxxvi.

¹³Duncan's brother-in-law, William J. Linn, defaulted to the United States for a considerable sum of money. Duncan was his bondsman and in settling with the government he lost almost all his large fortune.

¹⁴See *Illinois Republican*, April 2, 1842.

¹⁵See *ante* 80 ff. for history of the struggle.

jockeying for position in future political races. Throughout the entire four years of Carlin's administration scarcely a single enactment had looked forward to an amelioration of conditions. Instead of making an attempt to put a stop to useless expenditures, and to provide for the payment of interest on the state debt by some sort of taxation, the members of the General Assembly had openly countenanced a policy of borrowing still larger sums, the greater part of which had gone to pay interest. Accordingly the public debt had mounted higher and higher until the annual interest charges exceeded a half-million, while the ordinary annual expenses of conducting the state government exceeded the income from taxation by something like forty thousand dollars.¹⁶ The banks, which had been established with the idea of furnishing a sound and adequate medium of exchange, were in a precarious condition.¹⁷ Their bills were worth less than face value and were unacceptable to tax collectors;¹⁸ and there was scarcely a half-million dollars of good money in the hands of the people.¹⁹

The Thirteenth General Assembly met December 5, 1842. If all the members of the senate, several of whom were subsequently unseated, be counted, thirty-two were Democrats and fourteen Whigs.²⁰ Of the one hundred and twenty-one members of the House, the Democrats numbered eighty-four, the Whigs

¹⁶The state debt in December, 1842, is given by the House Finance Committee as \$12,328,096.69, to which should be added the amount due the United States government and the amount of state bonds held by the two state banks, making in all \$15,471,895.69. See also *London Times*, December 8, 1842; *Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 22-23; *House Journal*, 1840-1, p. 20 ff., 1842-3, p. 16 ff.; Moses, *Illinois Historical and Statistical*, I., 52-3; Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II., liii.

¹⁷After suspension of specie payments soon after they opened their doors, the banks finally suspended operation in 1842. Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II., xliii; Dowrie, *Development of Banking in Illinois*, 104 *passim*.

¹⁸*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 19; *Niles' Register*, LXIII., 67, 165.

¹⁹*House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 44.

²⁰The apportionment act of 1841 provided for forty-one senators and one hundred and twenty-one representatives. Altogether as many as forty-six senators took part at some time during the session. Four were unseated, one of whom was re-elected during the session to fill an unexpired term of a member who had resigned.

thirty-seven.²¹ Thus on joint ballot the Whigs were outnumbered more than two to one. As was to be expected, both houses were organized on strict party lines. Other than the election of a United States senator and various state officers, all of whom were Democratic, the General Assembly gave comparatively little attention to matters of a purely political nature. The messages of both the outgoing and incoming governors laid stress upon the necessity of immediate legislation regarding the public debt, the state banks, and the canal. In his valedictory message Carlin made a vicious attack upon the banks, and the attack was received with unveiled satisfaction by that element of the Democratic party which was determined to destroy what it called nests of Whigism.²² Ford took a conciliatory attitude. He pointed out the desirability of putting both banks into liquidation with the least possible delay, keeping in mind, however, that those institutions had certain rights and privileges which must be respected. Ford was supported in his attitude by a majority of his own party. The Whigs were inclined not to commit themselves, preferring to await developments. They had sectional interests to protect, but what was far more important to them as a party, they were in a position to throw their weight where it would count most. They hoped that the majority would hopelessly split over a bank bill, with the result that they would hold a balance of power.

The governor himself drew up a bank bill putting the State Bank into liquidation.²³ In the house the measure passed by an almost unanimous vote, but four members, all Democrats, voting

²¹If a contemporary newspaper account can be relied upon, the General Assembly contained 113 farmers, 18 lawyers, 8 mechanics, 6 physicians and 2 clergymen. The same source distributes their nativity as follows: Kentucky 32, Virginia 25, New York 13, Tennessee 11, Massachusetts 10, Pennsylvania 10, North Carolina 10, South Carolina 8, Ohio 6, Maryland 5, New Jersey 5, Connecticut 5, Georgia 3, Maine 3, New Hampshire 3, Indiana 3, Illinois 3, Missouri 2, Alabama 1, England 2, Ireland 2, Germany 2.—*Alton Telegraph*, January 28, 1843.

²²It is safe to say that a majority of the officers and directors of both banks were Whig. It was charged, however, and there seems to be some truth in the charge, that the banks supported Ford in 1842. See *Alton Telegraph*, April 1, 1843. *Reports of Committee (U. S.)*, 1836-37, III., 610 *passim*.

²³Ford, *History of Illinois*, 303.

in the negative.²⁴ During the twelve days' interval between the passage of the bill by the house and a vote upon it in the senate, its opponents were active both within and without the senate chamber. Lyman Trumbull became so active in his opposition that the governor subsequently removed him from the office of secretary of state. Despite the efforts of the anti-bank Democrats, the bank bill, which was a compromise measure, passed the senate by a vote of twenty-five to thirteen. It was passed on sectional rather than on political lines.²⁵ Of the affirmative votes ten were Whig and fifteen Democratic, and two Whigs only voted in the negative.²⁶ The Bank of Illinois was likewise authorized to liquidate,²⁷ and with the severance of the relations between the state and the state banks the public debt was automatically reduced more than three million dollars.

A much larger question, one that involved the banks and a great deal besides, was the state debt. Since July 1, 1841, no interest had been paid upon it.²⁸ The reason for non-payment of both principal and interest was based upon neither disinclination to pay nor dishonesty. The debt was more than twelve million dollars, and the interest only a little less than three-quarters of a million a year. Ordinary state revenues did not even suffice to pay the ordinary expenses of carrying on the state government. A tax adequate to pay the interest charges was simply out of the question, not only because the people

²⁴Ames of Boone, Bell of Marshall, Brinkley of Hamilton, and Loy of Fayette. See *House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 135, for vote.

²⁵Those opposing the bank bill were from the counties in the southwestern part of the state, a few scattered counties in the central part, Adams and Hancock in the Military District, and a group in the extreme northern part consisting of McHenry, Boone, Kane, and DeKalb.

²⁶Henry of Morgan; and Waters of Pope, Hardin, and Johnson. Allowing the banks to liquidate was favored by Whigs, who, however, were opposed to having the bank charters repealed in such a way as to jeopardize the interests of the creditors and stockholders of the banks. George T. M. Davis expressed himself as follows: "But what has justly astonished this whole community, is, that Mr. Jonas, a leading Whig in the House, should introduce a minority report *approving of the repeal of the Charter of the Bank.*" *Alton Telegraph*, January 28, 1843.

²⁷*Laws of Illinois*, 1842-3, p. 27 ff.; *State Register*, March 24, 1843. See also *Alton Telegraph*, April 1, 1843.

²⁸Six months before it was freely predicted that the July interest would not be paid. G. Churchill to G. Flagg, January 2, 1841. (Flagg MSS.)

would not but because they could not have borne it.²⁹ The simplest calculation shows that such tax would have been rank confiscation. Repudiation was in the air. In many sections it was openly countenanced, in others disguised. Newspapers of both parties pretended to be horrified at the possibility of repudiation, but not a single one of them could offer definite plans for bringing relief. Positive repudiation, it has often been said, was held in check only by the fear of civic disgrace. European and eastern papers kept dinning in the ears of the people the dolorous results that would come from a declaration of repudiation, but they failed to censure the methods used by bond buyers and capitalists in getting state bonds at a moiety of their face value.³⁰ Yet upon no grounds of common honesty could a declaration of repudiation have been justified, and it seems that a majority was opposed to such a course despite the fact that the state had been swindled out of millions through bad management on the part of her own citizens, as well as of supposedly trustworthy agents in the East and Europe.

There was a general feeling among the lawmakers that the time was not ripe for increasing state taxes to the point where any considerable part of the interest charges could be provided for. Leaders of neither party had the courage to advocate such a proposition. They contented themselves with declarations of honesty and good faith, both on their own account and on account of the people, but they had nothing to offer the creditors in the way of current funds or salable securities.³¹

²⁹Amount of taxable property in 1841, \$69,831,419; state tax thirty cents on the hundred dollars. To pay the interest charges alone would have required a tax rate of something like one dollar and fifty cents on the hundred dollars. See *Illinois Reports*, 1842-3, (Senate) p. 25.

³⁰For typical article see *London Times*, December 8, 1842.

³¹To draw a line and place on one side all the repudiators and upon the other all who opposed repudiation is impossible. Repudiation had a variety of meanings depending upon the person using the word. It seems safe to say that Ford overdrew matters when he said that he could have led a majority of the people to the point where they would have refused to pay the state debt. At a Whig convention held at Springfield in December, 1842, the following resolution was passed: "*Resolved*, That justice to all men, and inviolability of public faith, and cardinal principles of the Whig party, and this convention, in the name of the Whig party of this state, repudiate the doctrine of repudiation." *Sangamo Journal*, December 14, 1842. *Alton Telegraph*, December 23, 1843. For other press

Those most enthusiastic in assuring the creditors of the state that they would eventually be paid represented counties on or near the incompleated canal. These members were not a whit more honest than those from other sections; they merely realized that some adequate provision must be made to pay the state debt before money for completing the canal could be secured; and in an attempt to gain for their local constituencies the advantages arising from a completed canal they opposed repudiation at every step, and thereby gained for themselves the reputation of possessing more civic honesty than their colleagues from the southern and eastern counties. In the end nothing came of the several attempts to provide for delinquent and current interest charges, and the friends of the canal had to content themselves for another two years with nothing more substantial to offer to the creditors than declarations of honesty and good faith.

By 1842, even the most optimistic friends of the canal were convinced that it could not be completed according to original plans, hence there was a widespread demand for its completion within more modest dimensions. Such a change was not only advisable because the canal would be more rapidly finished, but it was almost absolutely necessary in order to reduce the amount of money to be borrowed from the creditors for its completion. The Canal Bill of 1843 provided for turning over the canal and its appurtenances to the bond holders on condition that they advance \$1,600,000 for its completion.³² In the senate, party lines seem not to have been drawn; the vote was strikingly sectional. Of the eleven Whig members voting, six supported and five opposed the measure; while of the twenty-nine Democrats voting, sixteen supported and thirteen opposed.³³ The principal opposition to the bill was by members from the southern and southeastern counties; its support came from Sangamon and adjoining counties, and from the counties north and west of the Illinois River. It is interesting to note that senators from three districts bordering on the Illinois River were opposed to the measure; one was from Morgan, one from Morgan and Scott,

opinion on the subject, see *Quincy Herald*, March 3, 1843; *Chicago Express*, December 30, 1843; *Alton Telegraph*, January 7, 14, February 11, 1843; *Sangamo Journal*, May 14, 1841.

³²*Laws of Illinois*, 1842-3, p. 54 ff.

³³*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 383.

the third from the district composed of Morgan, Menard, and Logan counties.³⁴ But one senator north and west of the river, Ralston, Democrat, of Adams County, voted against the bill. In the house similar lines were drawn. The sixty-seven supporters of the measure were composed of fifty-two Democrats and fifteen Whigs; of the thirty-seven in opposition seventeen were Whigs and twenty Democrats.³⁵ Sectional jealousies cropped out as they had in the senate. The bulk of the opposition was from the southern counties, from those lying on and near the Indiana line, and from certain sections of the Military District. Here and there one sees what appears to be a desire in certain sections to keep others from surpassing them in economic development.³⁶ The representatives and senators from districts situated along the upper and middle valley of the Illinois River voted consistently for completing the canal, while those from farther down the stream opposed it. The latter had an outlet for their surplus products, and seemed to concern themselves little with the development of the counties farther to the north. The attitude in the extreme southern sections is more easily explained. They had never favored a canal, because, so they said, it would not only be of no direct benefit to them but it would open up an avenue for a flood of tricky Yankees to pour into the state.³⁷

³⁴John Henry (Whig), T. M. Kilpatrick (Whig), and Lewis B. Wynne (Democrat).

³⁵*House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 324.

³⁶Of the three representatives from Madison County, two voted against bill; of the five from Adams County two did not vote and three voted against bill; both representatives from Vermilion voted in negative; of the four from Sangamon one voted for the bill, one against and two did not vote. These four counties perhaps felt the growing strength of Chicago more than any other counties of the state. The counties on the lower Illinois dreaded to see commerce set in through the canal toward Chicago. Vermilion and adjoining counties already felt the competition of Chicago.

³⁷Almost twenty years before one finds the same attitude regarding "Yankees." In a communication to H. Eddy, Governor Edwards says the friends of slavery "have been at heart opposed to this Illinois-Michigan Canal. Some of them more bold, but not more determined in opposition than others, have denounced it as an avenue through which the d-d Yankees would pour in upon the state." N. Edwards to H. Eddy, Communication about August Election, 1828. (Eddy MSS.) Some ten years later one finds a similar feeling on the part of members of the General Assembly from the southern part of the state. "Mr. Hacker from the

Intermingled with the more serious affair of trying to extricate the state from her financial difficulties, was another resembling very much a comedy. The Mormons, upon being driven from Missouri, came across the Mississippi in the winter of 1839-40, and settled in Hancock and adjoining counties.³⁸ Owing to their numbers and solidarity their support was sought by both political parties. Joseph Smith, the prophet, and his followers were inclined at first to favor the Whigs, and it appears that they supported Harrison in 1840. This inclination was only natural, for both the administration of the state that had driven them out and the national administration that had refused them redress were Democratic. In an effort to get redress for wrongs suffered in Missouri, they had the active support of Senator Young and Representative Stuart, the one a Democrat, the other a Whig.³⁹ When the General Assembly met in the winter of 1840, the Mormons, through Dr. John C. Bennett, a recent convert, asked for a charter for their new city Nauvoo.⁴⁰ In the midst of strife over banks and judiciary the lawmakers found time to grant practically every request made of them by the Mormons, usually by a unanimous vote.⁴¹ Early in 1841 the city government of Nauvoo was organized with Dr. Bennett as mayor and Joseph Smith in the body of councillors. Smith had scarcely become acquainted with his new surroundings before he began a remarkable struggle for his freedom before state and

select committee to which was referred the petition of sundry citizens of the town of Vandalia, praying relief for *Clock pedlars*. . . Report that they have had the subject under consideration, and are of the opinion that as the petitioners do not show that any portion of the State is *suffering* for the article of *clocks*, they can see no reason why the prayer of the petitioners should be granted.—*Senate Journal*, 1835, p. 149. The meaning of such a veiled attack is seen clearly when one recalls that "Yankees" and "Clock pedlars" were looked upon by many as one and the same.

³⁸A good account of the Mormons in Illinois is to be found in Linn, *Story of the Mormons*.

³⁹*Niles' Register*, LVII., 364.

⁴⁰John C. Bennett became a general in the Nauvoo Legion as well as the first mayor of Nauvoo. At about the time his term as mayor expired he and Smith disagreed and Bennett went up and down the state denouncing Smith and his religion.

⁴¹See *Laws of Illinois*, 1840-1, index s. v. Nauvoo, Nauvoo Legion, Nauvoo University.

federal courts.⁴² On the whole the bulk of the people sympathized with him. They considered him a much persecuted man, and felt that he and his followers were a valuable acquisition to the state.⁴³ As yet there seems to have been no settled conviction in any quarter that the Mormons were an undesirable element, and the dread that either party may have had of their opposition was overshadowed by its hope for their support.

In the congressional election of 1841, the Mormons apparently supported Stuart (Whig), but already a break appeared in their ranks, and with this break begins their attempts to become a deciding factor in party contests.⁴⁴ By the beginning of the year 1843, each party was divided over the proposition to curtail the powers granted in the various charters given the Mormons. Such a proposition recurred from time to time in both houses of the General Assembly, and with the fluctuation of opinion as expressed in various votes recorded in the Journals one can see back of the scenes a skilled manipulator in the Democratic ranks.⁴⁵ Throughout January and February, 1843, there was a growing sentiment among the Democrats against Smith and his followers. On the twenty-seventh of the latter month the senate on a second reading, by a vote of twenty-three to eleven, declared the Nauvoo city charter revoked,⁴⁶ but on March 6, the same body without recording its vote refused to advance the bill to a third reading.⁴⁷ The house had already voted fifty-eight to thirty-three to repeal the more obnoxious sections of the charter.⁴⁸ Of the fifty-eight affirmative votes forty-four were Democratic and fourteen Whig, while eighteen Demo-

⁴²Stenhouse, *Rocky Mountain Saints*, 138; Ford, *History of Illinois*, 266; Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II, lxxviii; Federal Cases, case No. 12,968; *Sangamo Journal*, September 30, 1842; *Alton Telegraph*, January 14, 28, February 4, 1843; *Quincy Herald*, January 12, 1843; *Niles' Register*, LXIII., 389.

⁴³*Niles' Register*, LVIII., 57, 297; Linn, *Story of the Mormons*, 221; Ford, *History of Illinois*, 261.

⁴⁴Hancock County; Stuart, 1201; Ralston, 523; Collins, I. MSS. Election Returns. (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

⁴⁵If the writer may be allowed to hazard a guess he would say that Stephen A. Douglas was the cause of the change in the attitude of the Democrats toward the Mormons.

⁴⁶*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 446.

⁴⁷*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 553.

⁴⁸*House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 528.

crats and fifteen Whigs voted in the negative. In the senate vote mentioned above nineteen Democrats supported the measure and three opposed it. This would indicate that the Democrats were inclined to be hostile to the Mormons. Whatever the cause of the opposition it ceased in a mysterious fashion in the senate within the space of a few days. A closer view of the situation may be got by an examination of the stand taken by senators and representatives who had Mormon constituents. Of the twenty such members, fourteen were Democrats and six Whigs. The Democrats divided their vote so that five of them favored revoking all or parts of the Nauvoo charter, four opposed such revocation, and five failed to vote. A similar lack of unity existed among the six Whigs. Two voted for the measure, two against it, while two did not vote. The fact that the members voting were almost equally divided for and against revocation, and that seven of the twenty failed to vote would indicate that those in the best position to know just where the Mormons stood politically were not at all sure of their ground.

During the session of the General Assembly under consideration an attempt was made by certain members of the Galena bar to impeach Thomas C. Browne, one of the justices of the State Supreme Court. Browne was a Whig, and at an earlier day an anti-Jackson man. He had been on the supreme bench for more than twenty years, and during that time, owing to his persistent attempts to get political office, he had made many bitter enemies in the ranks of both parties. His accusers made it clear that there was no suspicion against his honesty of purpose, and that the charges against him involved "nothing derogatory to his character as a man of integrity, but is founded on the natural infirmity and feebleness of his intellect, and over which he has no control."⁴⁹ Between December 24, 1842, the day upon which a petition was presented to the house calling upon that body to investigate the accusation, and January 3, 1843, the date set for beginning the investigation, friends and enemies of Browne worked incessantly, the former to have the charges dismissed without a hearing, the latter to have them pressed with undue severity. On January 4, after hearing evidence, the committee of the whole asked to be discharged from further consideration of the charges made against Browne. The request was refused by a vote of seventy-one to forty. Of the thirty-five Whigs

⁴⁹*House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 135-6.

voting, fifteen opposed it. The next day the house declared that it would consider the charges no farther.⁵⁰ Already on January 3, the senate by a vote of twenty to seventeen, had declined to send a committee or attend as a body at the investigation. The Whigs in the senate were almost equally divided over the question. Seven had voted to refuse to accept the invitation of the house to participate in the proceedings, while six had voted to accept it.⁵¹

In this contest there seems to have been a mixture of motives. In all sections of the state the Whigs professed to view the proceedings as persecution and proscription. To many this was the beginning of a solid Democratic judiciary. The Whig press denounced it in no uncertain terms, charging that the Democrats were determined to stop little short of physical force to gain their ends.⁵² The twenty Whig members voting in the house to discontinue all investigation voted their political convictions. A few of the fifteen voting in what appears to be opposition to the party were perhaps influenced by their local constituencies, while the greater part of the fifteen that cast an apparently hostile vote to Browne were doing it for political purposes. Lincoln was Browne's attorney, and his friends, who in this case were the wheel horses of the Whig party and men of expediency, wanted nothing better than to bring the impeachment proceedings before the senate so that Lincoln could there make political capital for the approaching campaign. The only alternative acceptable to them, and the one they finally agreed to take, was an open acknowledgement on the part of the Democrats that they were in the wrong and that the charges were baseless. The Democrats apparently understood the situation, for as we have already seen they agreed to drop matters without further investigation. As had so often happened before, the majority was circumvented by a few shrewd politicians of the opposition party backed by the ability and ingenuity of Lincoln and his close associates. The accusers of Judge Browne had some ground for their accusations, and while it was perhaps not sufficient to justify impeachment and conviction, it was certainly sufficient to

⁵⁰*House Journal*, 1842-3, pp. 111, 122, 123, 124, 125, 132, 135-6, 140-3, 147, 149-50.

⁵¹*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 147.

⁵²For the best exposition of Whig view known to the writer, see *Alton Telegraph*, January 14, 1843.

justify a more thorough examination of the charges than was given.⁵³

During the year and a half that intervened before the next session of the General Assembly the question of paying the public debt and finishing the canal were taken up and discussed, and the members of the General Assembly elected in August, 1844, knew much better the attitude of their constituents toward the matters at hand than had their predecessors. Governor Ford had used the intervening time to good account in putting the affairs of the state in their proper light before the people,⁵⁴ and in assuring the creditors that there was a growing sentiment for paying a part of the rapidly accruing interest. His correspondence with the holders of state stock both in Europe and in New York was productive of good results. Besides, he had sent agents to meet, and if possible to convince, the creditors that the undeveloped resources of the state would eventually pay every dollar of the debt, and that the development of such resources would be brought about much more quickly with a completed canal.

The Mormon problem likewise demanded attention at the hands of the legislature. Since the adjournment of the previous session, many things had occurred to make it advisable that the problem be attacked and solved. During the congressional election of 1843, the Mormons had thrown their strength to the Democrats with the result that they had alienated the support and friendship of the Whigs; and their vacillation failed to gain any substantial support from the Democrats. The belief that polygamy was being practiced in their ranks made the greater part of the non-Mormon population in Hancock and neighboring counties their most bitter enemies. Events now ran rapidly. In 1844 Smith declared his candidacy for president of the United States.⁵⁵ Armed opposition to the sect arose. The governor went to the scene of conflict with a military force, and by his advice Smith and several of his followers surrendered themselves as prisoners.

⁵³If Judge Browne's ability can be judged by his correspondence, which has just become public, one may say with a great deal of certainty that he was scarcely competent to write out decisions in cases coming before the highest tribunal in the state. See Eddy MSS.

⁵⁴*State Register*, November 8, 1844.

⁵⁵Greene and Thompson, *Governors' Letter-Books*, II., lvii., 58 *passim*.

⁵⁶For a complete discussion of Smith's candidacy, see *Times and Seasons*, February 15, 1844.

The two Smiths, Joseph and Hiram, were imprisoned in the Carthage jail on a charge of treason, and a few days later were put to death by a mob of infuriated anti-Mormons. Following this came assault, arson, and even murder. State troops were called into the field, and western Illinois became an armed camp. Quiet was at length partially restored, but it was apparent that neither party would rest content until the other was completely crushed.⁵⁷

Thus the Legislature, when it met in December, 1844, was confronted with a full program. Added to the cares of watching over and nursing to maturity the feeble and undeveloped resources of the state, was the necessity of quieting the disorders in Hancock and adjoining counties and of putting an end to the internecine warfare in that quarter.

The Fourteenth General Assembly was composed of one hundred and nineteen representatives and forty-one senators.⁵⁸ In the house were seventy-nine Democrats and forty Whigs, in the senate twenty-seven Democrats and fourteen Whigs.⁵⁹ Both

⁵⁷For contemporary and later accounts of the Mormons in Illinois see *Niles' Register*, LVII., 320, 364, LXII., 123, 323 LXIII., 389, LXIV., 320, 336, LXV., 180, 354, 355, 357, LXVI., 311, 325, 329, 330, LXVII., 68, LXIX., 53, 68, 416, LXXI., 99; *Sangamo Journal*, August 12, 1842, October 11, 1844, September 25, October 24, December 25, 1845; *State Register*, November 1, 1844, January 10, February 14, August 29, September 19, 26, October 3, 10, 1845, May 22, October 16, November 6, 1846; *Alton Telegraph*, January 14, 28, August 12, 1843, July 6, August 3, 1844, October 5, 12, 26, November 9, December 12, 1844, February 22, May 31, June 14, July 12, August 23, October 4, 18, 1845, March 14, May 2, 1846; *Quincy Herald*, January 12, 1843; *Expositor*, June 7, 1844; *Neighbor*, June 15, 1844. Current files of *Missouri Republican* and *Chicago Democrat* are valuable in checking up other papers. A good secondary account may be found in Linn, *The Story of the Mormons*; Lee, *The Mormon Menace*; Gregg, *The Prophet of Palmyra*; Stenhouse, *The Rocky Mountain Saints*.

⁵⁸The apportionment of 1841 provided that there should be 121 members of the lower house, of which number Adams County was entitled to five. A division of Adams County between the passage of the law and the election of 1844 gave two of these representatives to Marquette County, which was never organized and hence did not elect members of the General Assembly. Later these representatives were restored to Adams County. See *Laws of Illinois*, 1840-1, p. 22 ff., 1842-3, p. 79.

⁵⁹*Alton Telegraph*, August 24, 1844; *State Register*, August 23, 1844; *Chicago Democrat*, September 11, 1844; G. Churchill to G. Flagg, Decem-

houses were organized on party lines, the Whigs in the house giving a complimentary vote for speaker to their brilliant leader, Stephen T. Logan of Sangamon County. During the session the members took some interest in current political happenings. They passed resolutions on religious tests for public office, on the annexation of Texas, on the occupation of the Oregon country, on Dorr's Rebellion, and on West Point, but the greater problem, the one that necessarily occupied a major portion of their time, was local. This local problem was nevertheless important, for political and sectional lines cut and re-cut each other in a most haphazard fashion. The same old jealousies between parties and sections reappeared in the most out-of-the-way places. Here were revived postponed battles between partisans in the late presidential struggle, there flared up and blazed brightly the dangerous and seemingly unextinguishable fire of sectional envy and hatred.

Almost as soon as the two houses were organized agitation to repeal the charter of the city of Nauvoo developed. Bills to revoke or amend the charter were introduced in both houses. The senate after a much interrupted consideration of some two weeks passed the revocation measure substantially as it appears in the laws by a vote of twenty-five to fourteen.⁶⁰ Of those voting in the affirmative sixteen were Democrats and nine Whigs, in the negative nine were Democrats and five were Whigs. The Whigs were apparently actuated by varied motives. Some wished to destroy forever Mormon influence and power, and considered a revocation of the charter of their capital city the most effective method. Others preferred to support the Mormons in an effort to hold a balance of power between the opposing

ber 3, 1844. (Flagg MSS.) In this classification Starkweather of Cumberland is considered to be a Whig. The newspapers were unanimous in classing him as such, and this supported by a statement made to the writer by his daughter, Mrs. David B. Green, of Toledo, Illinois, who says that he was always a Whig, having held office in the East with that party, and that he continued so down to the formation of the Republican party when he entered that party. Despite what appears to be the best of evidence Mr. Starkweather almost invariably voted with the Democrats on political measures, and in 1852 he was seriously considered by them as a candidate for lieutenant-governor. For particular votes, see *House Journal*, 1844-6, pp. 5, 43, 150, 330, 341.

⁶⁰Vote taken December 19, 1844. For vote see *Senate Journal*, 1844-5, p. 81. For law see *Laws of Illinois*, 1844-5, p. 187 ff.

factions of the Democratic party. Still others had Mormon constituents whose friendship was worth cultivating at the risk of alienating the support of the anti-Mormons. In the house the struggle was more pronounced. Bills varying widely in their provisions were introduced, but all looked forward to revocation or radical modification of the Nauvoo charter. On January 24, 1845, almost a month after the measure had passed the senate, the house concurred in revoking the charter by a vote of seventy-five to thirty-one.⁶¹ Thirty-five Whigs supported the measure, and but two, Harriot of Jersey and Starkweather of Cumberland, opposed it.⁶² The Democrats were more evenly divided. Of the sixty-nine present and voting forty voted in the affirmative and twenty-nine in the negative. An examination of the thirty-one negative votes of both parties shows a sectional aspect as strange as it is striking. If the "Jack Mormons" from Hancock County, and a comparatively few scattered members from other parts of the state be excluded from consideration, the opponents of revocation came from counties and districts very much affected by rapidly growing urban communities in which one might expect to find a wide variance of religious and racial elements, and hence a considerable degree of toleration. Thus the representatives from Cook, DuPage, Peoria, Kane, Fulton, and LaSalle counties consistently opposed the revocation measure.⁶³ The comparative unanimity of the Whigs may be accounted for by the fact that they happened on the whole to represent counties and districts where the feeling against Mormonism was exceedingly bitter.⁶⁴

Following the revocation of the Nauvoo charter an armed truce dragged on for months. At last open war broke out in and around Nauvoo. Under the leadership of Brigham Young and others of the Twelve, thousands of the sect crossed the

⁶¹*House Journal*, 1844-5, p. 276 ff.

⁶²For a discussion of Starkweather's politics, see *ante* p. 15, n. 3.

⁶³Without more conclusive proof one cannot say that the canal supporters "swapped" with the "Jack Mormons" and their friends, but the vote for canal and against revocation of Nauvoo charter are strikingly co-incident. Of the thirty-one members in the house that voted against revocation of the charter, but one, Starkweather of Cumberland, voted against the canal measure. In the senate, Parker of Clark County and Worthington of Pike voted similarly.

⁶⁴E.g. Madison, Sangamon, Knox, Jo Daviess, Morgan, Tazewell, McDonough, St. Clair, Vermilion, and Coles.

Mississippi and began their wearisome march to the westward. Later an army under the command of "General" Brockman attacked Nauvoo, which surrendered after some fighting. Governor Ford called the militia into the field and succeeded in putting a stop to hostilities. Cooler counsels at last prevailed, and with a promise on the part of the remaining Mormons that they would follow their brethren without delay, the anti-Mormon forces agreed to peace. So well was the agreement carried out, that one of the first official acts of Governor French was an order withdrawing the state troops from the scene of the late conflict.

In the discussion of ways and means of paying interest on the state debt by some sort of taxation, and of completing the canal by turning it over with its property and appurtenances to the holders of canal bonds on condition that they complete it, party and sectional differences had full play. Taxing the people to pay interest was inseparably bound up with the completion of the canal.⁶⁵ Creditors were unwilling to advance further funds for the canal unless the people through their representatives showed an inclination to declare their honesty and good intentions in something more substantial than platitudinous and unproductive resolutions. In general, one finds that those favoring one proposition favored the other, but on the part of the opposition there was some diversity of opinion. Unwilling to afford special advantages to Chicago and other towns along the route of the canal, some were prepared to support measures for paying interest without canal legislation, others were willing to turn the canal over to the holders of canal bonds, but unwilling to favor any measure that had for its end taxation, while the great majority in the opposition was unfriendly to both measures. In one quarter the opposition was due to an obstructionist policy on the part of a few Whigs, in another to sectional envy and distrust, and in still others to a feeling that the state had been swindled and that the holders of the bonds were bloated and unscrupulous capitalists who thrived upon the meager product of the hard earned labor of the common people. When Governor Davis of Massachusetts and David Leavitt of New York visited Springfield in February, 1845, in the interest of the canal project they were regarded by many members of the General Assembly with suspicion and distrust; some even declared that they had come to the capital with the expressed purpose of dictating to

⁶⁵G. Churchill to G. Flagg, February 19, 1845. (Flagg MSS.)

the "representatives of a sovereign state." Actuated by a diversity of opinions as expressed by widely separated constituencies, and beset with doubts and suspicions, a great many members vacillated between parties, laying themselves open to the charge of log-rolling and graft.

Opposition to the canal and interest measures was not less pronounced in the house than in the senate, in spite of the fact that the former body passed both measures by large majorities. Not having the original bill and the various amendments, some of which were incorporated in the act that finally became law, one is unable to determine with exactness just what caused the long debates over measures that had such a large following. There is evidence at hand, however, to show that the opposition consumed both time and patience by offering impossible amendments and by calling for a recorded vote at every opportunity. At last on February 22, 1845, a bill, after having been amended so as to gain the greatest possible number of supporters, was passed in the house by a vote of sixty-six to forty-two.⁶⁶ Before the clerk could be ordered to report the same to the senate and ask their concurrence therein, Mr. Sexton of Gallatin County moved to amend the title of the bill by striking it out and inserting in its stead, "A bill for an act to increase the state debt; or the British grant." Upon the motion of Mr. Arnold of Cook County the amendment was laid upon the table. An amendment such as was proposed by the member from Gallatin, illustrates clearly the opinion held by those who would have scorned the idea of any attempt on their part to reject sound state policies, simply because beneficial to the northern counties; they considered their acts to be based upon the purest motives, and felt that their colleagues from the canal district were influenced in their actions by a selfish desire to gain advantages for their own sections at the expense of the whole state. To their way of thinking, the members from Cook and other northern counties were deliberately attempting to increase the state debt and to saddle a large tax upon the people, the corollary of which was a grant to British bond holders.

⁶⁶*House Journal*, 1844-5, pp. 497-8. Of the sixty-six affirmative votes forty were Democratic and twenty-six Whig; of the forty-two negative votes thirty-two were Democratic and ten Whig. Not a single representative from a strictly southern county, except Adams of Monroe, voted in the affirmative.

When the bill reached the senate it met not more pronounced but rather more successful opposition. That body was divided almost equally over any proposition which combined completing the canal with taxation to pay interest. As it eventually turned out, a majority favored each proposition standing alone, and not until that fact was discovered by the friends of the canal, and a scheme devised for divorcing the two propositions, was any headway made. When on February 25, 1845, the question of ordering the house bill to a third reading was under consideration, Mr. Edwards of Sangamon County, offered an amendment that would have changed the bill so as to render it entirely unsatisfactory to the creditors of the state. On motion of Mr. Markley of Fulton County, the proposed amendment was laid on the table until the "4th of July next."⁶⁷ Several other amendments of a like nature were offered, but all suffered the same fate. At last a motion was made to advance the bill to a third reading, but it was voted down by a vote of twenty-two to nineteen. The vote was later reconsidered and the bill was referred to a select committee of five, three of whom were warm friends of the canal.⁶⁸ Later it was ordered to a third reading and referred to another select committee composed of Judd, Harrison, and Kilpatrick.⁶⁹ This committee referred it back to the senate without amendments and recommended its passage, which was done by a vote of twenty-one to twenty.

An analysis of this vote is significant, although it differs but little, so far as political and sectional lines are concerned, from those taken on similar subjects two years before. Of the fourteen Whigs voting seven voted in the affirmative. All but one of these seven represented districts adjacent to, or north of, the Illinois River, and this excepted district was a northern one composed of McLean, Macon, Livingston, Piatt, and DeWitt counties. Conversely, the opposition among the Whigs came from members representing southern counties and districts. Twenty-seven Democrats took part in the voting, and of that number fourteen supported the measure. With the exception of Dunlap, who rep-

⁶⁷The favorite method of killing measures in this and many other sessions of the Legislature.

⁶⁸Committee: McMurtry (Dem.), Worthington (Whig.), Judd (Dem.), Ryan (Dem.), Dunlap (Whig). All except Dunlap represented districts having a direct interest in completing the canal.

⁶⁹Judd was a Democrat, while Kilpatrick and Harrison were Whigs.

resented a district composed of Crawford, Lawrence, and Jasper counties and a part of Richland, these same fourteen senators represented districts adjacent to, or north of, the route of the canal. The opponents of the bill, on the other hand, were, with one exception, from the southern part of the state. Thus not upon political but upon sectional lines was the interest-paying measure passed. Senators from the northern counties, alive to the benefits to be derived from a completed canal and the expenditure of more than one and a half million dollars in their midst, voted to impose a tax upon the people in order that the canal might be completed, and their justification, if they needed any, was the completion of the canal within four years and a final extinguishment of the state debt as to both principal and interest.⁷⁰

The house bill, which the senate had just passed with so much difficulty, had been so amended in the latter body that the canal was left unprovided for. No sooner was the interest bill passed and on its way back to the house for ratification than another house bill entitled, "An act authorizing the school commissioners of Greene County to sell certain property purchased on execution," was taken up and read a second time. Immediately Mr. Kilpatrick moved to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert what eventually became the "supplementary canal bill of 1845." This was done, and after being ordered to a third reading was referred to a select committee composed of Kilpatrick, McMurtry, and Minard, each of whom represented a district vitally interested in a completed canal. The next day, February 28, 1845, the committee reported the bill back to the senate without amendment and recommended that it be passed, which was done by a vote of twenty-three to eighteen. This vote differs in its sectional aspect only a little from the one just considered, in that the north favored its passage and the south

⁷⁰Governor Ford and others have mentioned the support gained by dividing the bills, but the names of the senators that changed appear to have slumbered heretofore in the journals of the senate. First of all it ought to be noticed that every senator was present and voting, secondly that every senator that supported the combined measures supported them when separated. After the separation the interest bill gained the support of Dunlap and Worthington, both of whom opposed the canal bill. The canal bill, on the other hand, was supported by Edwards, Smith of Madison, Warren, and Davis, none of whom was willing to support the interest bill. See *Senate Journal*, 1844-5, pp. 383, 400, 412.

opposed it. Later in the same day an appropriate enacting clause replaced the one concerning the school commissioners of Greene County. Both bills were returned to the house where they were repassed as amended by the Senate, and sent to the Council of Revision.

The struggle over a completed canal and the payment of interest on the state debt had far reaching results. During the two years in which the contest was carried on, the influence of Chicago and Cook County became apparent. Judd in the senate, and Arnold, Sherman, and Stewart in the house displayed a more aggressive spirit than their predecessors had done. Their success in advocating measures beneficial to their own locality was noticed by their contemporaries, and this success increased regardless of the party in power at the capital; and either by design or accident a majority of the people along the Lake had the same political affiliations as a majority of the entire state.

Sectionalism has always been a potent factor in Illinois political life. In the early days the line of demarcation rested on a question of birth. Those born in the South and West were hostile to those born in the East, particularly in New England. Because of the extreme length of the state, and the fact that the settlers from New England and New York settled in the northern counties, sectionalism continued in much the same form but upon a modified basis. There was a perpetual misunderstanding between the common people of the two sections. The settlers in the north regarded their less progressive neighbors with contempt that was not always hidden, and the feeling was reciprocated on the part of the people in the southern counties with one of hatred and distrust. This attitude is well illustrated by the remark of a public man who usually displayed a generous spirit toward all sections and people. "Mr. Ames, who is as near the *little end of nothing* as any person I ever saw, introduced a bill to repeal the Cairo City Charter. . . . This individual is one of the Northern wise-acres sent to the Legislature to enlighten the ignorant and un-intelligent South."⁷¹ If such an expression represented the feeling of men who had a broad knowledge of affairs, what must have been that of the great mass in the southern counties, who had a very distorted idea of their northern neighbors, whom they called "Yankees?"

⁷¹G. T. M. Davis in *Alton Telegraph*, January 28, 1843.

During the five years following 1840, local problems received the major portion of the people's attention, and there arose in solving these problems serious aspects of sectionalism. Consequently the activities of the Whig party are less noticeable than formerly. The four important state issues before the General Assemblies of these years were: (1) liquidation of the state banks; (2) provisions for the state debt; (3) completion of the Illinois-Michigan Canal; (4) the Mormon question. The banks were liquidated without serious opposition. On the other issues the people as well as their representatives were divided. The southern and eastern counties very generally opposed completing the canal and paying interest on the state debt. The question of revoking the Nauvoo City Charter brought on acrimonious debate in the General Assembly, but in the end those favoring revocation prevailed. There were, however, national political issues that demanded attention during this period, and they are noticed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V.

THE ILLINOIS WHIGS AND NATIONAL POLICIES.

1841-1845.

The character of the Federal Constitution, and the large place occupied by national policies in the lives of the people, make it impossible to divorce local and national issues. It becomes necessary in the lives of most political leaders, in order that they may remain connected with their party politics, to deny principles which they personally hold, and to adhere to those dictated by party policy. Therefore in a discussion of a political party within any particular state and its support or opposition to local issues, such as has been attempted in the previous chapter, there is always a necessary correction of inference concerning principles followed by local men, by bringing them into connection with national politics. It has been seen that there was a natural tendency in Illinois by both Democratic and Whig leaders to view all local issues according to sectional interests, but the true condition of politics cannot be understood unless it is realized that the tendency to break into sectional groups was retarded by the demands of allegiance to national politics. The Whigs were held rather loosely together by a common adherence to certain national policies, which had come by 1840 to be recognized as belonging peculiarly to that party. The most important of these policies were the American system, the United States bank, and federal aid for internal improvements. Closely connected with these policies was a personality, which was a policy in itself; and sometimes it overshadowed the principles for which the possessor of it stood. The support of the principles, and their sponsor, Henry Clay, divided with local issues the attention of the Whigs during the early forties.

As March 4, 1841, drew near, the Whigs again gave vent to the enthusiasm that had won the preceding November election for them. To a great many in the party, the opportunity to hold an office under the federal government had never before been

present; and the prospect of applying the principle "to the victor belong the spoils," to oust thousands of Democratic office-holders was pleasant to contemplate. Particularly was this true in Illinois where the Democrats had been in complete control for years. At the same time the Democrats, unmindful of past practices, denounced the proposed removal of federal officers for political reasons, calling it proscription for party's sake. This contemplated distribution of offices put the Springfield "Junto" in an enviable position. John T. Stuart, one of its members, enjoyed the distinction of being the only Whig representative from the state in either house of Congress, and it was expected, and rightfully so, that his influence with the new administration would be very great.

If the Whigs were jubilant at the prospect of actual participation in the administration of national affairs, the Democrats professed to be filled with the greatest alarm. Before Harrison's administration should expire, it was predicted that every landmark set up by preceding Republican presidents would be destroyed; that the state governments would be overshadowed by the central government and "rushing to consolidation;" and that the United States would be burdened with a debt of three hundred million dollars. It was declared that a United States bank with a capital of one hundred million dollars supplied from Great Britain, having under its control "myriads of dependent branches," was contemplated by the new administration. The tariff, it was predicted, would be raised to the point where it would yield forty millions of revenue annually, and grind "to the dust the working man, leaving him but the mere bread of existence for himself, his wife, and his children." The climax of gloom was reached in picturing the result of the abolitionist tendencies of the new president and his advisers; one writer claimed with the greatest apparent sincerity that he expected to see in a short time "the monster Abolitionism stalking through the land, and severing the bond of fraternal feeling and love which now unites the people of the different states."¹ Long lists of contemplated Whig appointees to federal offices were published in Democratic papers in an effort to prove that the change of administration would be revolutionary. The same papers fairly teemed with extravagant notices of the supposed hostile

¹See *State Register*, March 5, 1841. An article entitled "THE RESTORED DYNASTY OF FEDERALISM" is particularly suggestive.

attitude of Harrison and his advisers toward unorthodox Whigs as well as Democrats.

In the midst of these ominous predictions the news of President Harrison's death reached Illinois. It was received with sincere regret by the press of both parties. For the instant, political differences were sunk as a tribute to the dead executive. Even the most extreme Democratic papers gave him the praise they had withheld in the late presidential campaign, and none was heartless enough to mention any of the calumnies that had been hurled at him in the heat of battle. It was very generally expected that his death would not hinder the Whig program of national legislation.

A close examination of available newspapers does not indicate any suspicion on the part of the Whigs that Tyler would refuse to carry out the policies of his deceased predecessor. Nor did the Democrats seem to have any intimation that this would happen, for they began immediately to criticize the new president and his cabinet. Particularly was criticism directed toward Webster, whom the Democrats professed to regard as the representative of special privileges and a particular section, and the incarnation of "revived Federalism." He had been the focus of attack since his appointment to the state portfolio had been made public, but with the death of Harrison, came the belief that the New Englander would assume a larger place in national affairs. This belief actuated the Democratic press to redouble its efforts in an attack on Webster no less bitter than those which it had carried on against Clay, Harrison, and Adams.

Even before the Harrisburg Convention had named John Tyler for second place on the Whig ticket, there was a respectable demand in Illinois for such a choice. Tyler had been supported by the Whigs and anti-Van Buren Democrats in the campaign of 1836 as vice-presidential candidate on the Harrison and White tickets. As soon as the news of Tyler's nomination in 1839 reached Illinois, the *Alton Telegraph*² voiced the sentiment of the Whigs by declaring that "against *John Tyler* as a candidate for the Vice Presidency, we presume not a single objection can be raised by any one who is not already enlisted in the Loco-Foco ranks. The choice of the convention could not have fallen upon a worthier man; and he will doubtless obtain the unanimous support of all the opponents of the existing Administration."³

²Issues of January 4, 1840, and *passim*.

Like sentiments were expressed by the *Sangamo Journal*, *Mt. Carmel Register*, and other Whig papers.³

This feeling of satisfaction in Tyler's selection was not confined to the press. County ratification meetings endorsed his nomination with the greatest show of sincere enthusiasm. At the great rally held at Springfield in June, 1840, it was resolved, "that we believe that JOHN TYLER—the old fashioned Virginian Republican, is every way better qualified to fill that distinguished station [vice presidency] than any or all of his competitors."⁴ Throughout the campaign Tyler's name was inseparably connected with that of Harrison, the battle cry being "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," and there appeared to have been no feeling in Illinois that Tyler was any but an orthodox Whig of the purest type.

For several weeks after Harrison's death, eulogies on the dead president allowed little space to the Whig editors of Illinois for expressing an opinion on Tyler's attitude toward carrying out what were called "Harrisonian Principles." The first discordant note came from the Democratic press, which professed to believe that the new president was a Democrat at heart. These professions were presumably reiterated by the two senators from Illinois, both of whom were Democrats, who claimed to have information at first hand that Tyler was not and never had been a Whig as the people of Illinois understood the term. In the face of these claims the Whig press manfully, but with apparent misgivings, declared emphatically that the Whigs were satisfied with Mr. Tyler.⁵

The president's message to the called session of Congress in 1841, was published with a professed degree of satisfaction by the papers of both parties, each side claiming loudly that the message was Whig or Democratic as the case might be.⁶ On the

³*Sangamo Journal*, December 27, 1839; *Vandalia Free Press*, January 24, 1840.

⁴*Sangamo Journal*, June 5, 1840.

⁵"If there is any truth or sincerity in the professions of the loco foco party, we shall soon have very peaceable times, so far as politics are concerned. The loco foco press professes to be satisfied with Mr. Tyler,—the Whig press certainly is. If so, what is there to quarrel about? Nothing most certainly, if the loco foco speaks the truth. 'Nous Verrons,' as Ritchie used to say." *Sangamo Journal*, April 30, 1841. See also issue of May 7, 1841; also *Illinois Republican* (Shawneetown), April 24, 1841.

⁶*State Register*, June 11, 1841; *Alton Telegraph*, June 19, 20, 26, 1841.

whole, however, the Democratic press had the advantage on its side, for those parts of the message dealing with a bank, the tariff, and the distribution of patronage, ran counter to the generally accepted ideas of the Illinois Whigs. The Democratic press and politicians left nothing undone to discredit Tyler in the eyes of the Whigs, in the hope that misunderstandings and mutual jealousies might be brought to life and stimulated into a healthy growth.

In the midst of political uncertainties the congressional election of 1841 occurred. Originally the elections for representatives had been held on the first Monday of August in even numbered years, but the General Assembly, in the hope of being able to secure an increased number of representatives on the basis of the census of 1840, had postponed the election from 1840 to 1841.⁷ In only one of the three congressional districts, the Third, did the Whigs have a candidate of their own party. In the First district they combined with one element of the Democrats against ex-Governor Reynolds;⁸ in the Second, they supported Casey, whom they considered less objectionable than his more radical opponent, Stinson H. Anderson of Jefferson County;⁹ in the Third, they had their own party candidate, John T. Stuart of Sangamon County. Lack of candidates in two of the districts was due to demoralization resulting from Harrison's death and Tyler's reported defection from the party ranks, as well as from a feeling that a strict party man could not be elected. Under the circumstances it was considered good politics by the Whig leaders to combine with their more conservative opponents against the radical wing. Reynolds was elected in spite of coalition against him; Casey with the assistance of his Whig allies defeated Anderson; and Stuart, whose district comprised all the northern part of the state, was re-elected by a small majority. On the whole the Whigs considered that the election had resulted in their favor.¹⁰

⁷See *Laws of Illinois*, 1838-9, p. 109; A. Lincoln to J. T. Stuart, January 1, 1840, Lincoln, *Complete Works*, I., 37.

⁸A number of letters in the Eddy MSS. throws light on Reynolds' candidacy. See also MSS. Election Returns, (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

⁹Whig counties in this district invariably went for Casey. See MSS. Election Returns, (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

¹⁰Candidates: First district—Henry L. Webb (Whig); John Reynolds (Loco); Stephen R. Rowan (Loco). Second district—Zadok Casey

Following on the heels of the congressional election came the president's veto of the Whigs' pet measure, the legalizing of a third United States bank. Forthwith the Whig press denounced Tyler in the most bitter terms, and in so doing showed their past fears. "Our worst fears are more than realized. The die is cast! The hopes of a nation are blasted. . . and rights for which they, the Whigs, have been manfully contending for twelve years past, have been trampled upon by the arbitrary use of the veto power by John Tyler in returning the Bank bill, refusing his approval."¹¹ What made the situation more exasperating was the attitude of the Democratic press, which fairly teemed with letters and editorials designed to widen the breach between the president and his party. In the minds of the rank and file of the party Tyler was a traitor, a renegade, and a political outcast. His veto of the Bank bill alienated from him practically all the Whigs in Illinois, who saw their well earned victory of 1840 lost through what many called "political intrigue and personal knavery."

Every act of the president which could be interpreted as unfriendly to the Whigs, was subjected to the fiercest criticism by the Whig press. Removal of Whig incumbents from federal offices and refusal by the president to replace Democrats with Whigs were denounced, even in the face of recent declarations that the good of the public service should take precedence over personal preferment and that there should be no proscription for party's sake. Time opened rather than healed the wound inflicted upon the Whig party by Tyler's refusal to co-operate

(Conservative); Stinson H. Anderson (Loco). Third district—John T. Stuart (Whig); James H. Ralston (Loco). *Alton Telegraph*, July 24, 1841.

It is hardly correct to class Webb as a Whig, despite the fact that he had leanings in that direction. See H. L. Webb to H. Eddy, June 20, 1840. (Eddy MSS.) While a member of the General Assembly in 1838-40, Webb voted consistently with the Democrats, except in the election of public printer. Mr. Weber, against whom Webb had voted for that office, merely considered Webb's successor a better Democrat than was Webb. Rowan was a Democrat, but in the phraseology of the time he was a "conservative." Rowan withdrew from the race but received 171 votes.

¹¹*Alton Telegraph*, August 28, 1841. *The Illinois Republican*, August 21, 1841, made a characteristic attack on the president. "The long agony over—the Bank Bill vetoed by his accidency President Tyler. The will of the People violated and set at naught—the days of Jacksonianism, Vetoism and Monarchism restored."

with its members in passing the bank bill. Stung by the taunts of the Democratic press, the leaders of the Illinois Whigs were in a bad humor when they gathered together to compare notes at the opening of the General Assembly in December, 1842.

Although the bankrupt state demanded the closest attention of the lawmakers, there inevitably came to the surface from time to time national issues, which divided their attention with state affairs. When the question arose of accepting from the federal government certain moneys derived from the sale of public lands, the old controversy about the attitude taken by each party toward federal aid for internal improvements was renewed. The senate committee on finance voiced the sentiment of a great number of the Democratic party when it laid down the dictum that the proceeds arising from the sale of public land within the state differed greatly from those arising from the sale of land without the state. The former, the committee believed, rightfully belonged to the state, the latter to the state in which the lands sold were located.¹² Governor Carlin had gone further in declaring that there was essentially no difference between distributing funds collected on imports and funds derived from the sale of public land. To support his contention he devoted considerable space in his last message to defining the powers of Congress, and declared that the law authorizing the distribution was unconstitutional.¹³

The demand for money was so pressing that a majority of the Democrats in the house supported by every Whig present voted to accept all the funds to which Illinois was entitled under the law.¹⁴ In the senate the measure met sturdy opposition. The finance committee of that body recommended that only a part of the fund be received. After animated debates, and filibustering tactics on the part of the opposition, the house bill was passed by the senate.¹⁵ Every Whig present supported the measure, with the feeling that the distribution of the proceeds arising from the sale of public lands was a national Whig policy, which had the support of Clay.

Another national policy to which the Democratic members of the Assembly took exception was the recent Whig tariff, and

¹²*General Assembly Reports* (Senate), 1842-3, p. 102.

¹³*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 23; *House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 28; *General Assembly Reports*, 1842-3, p. 14 ff.

¹⁴*House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 107.

¹⁵*Senate Journal*, 1842-3, p. 392 ff.

in their opposition they were divided as they had been over the proposition to receive the funds from the sale of public lands. The senate resolved that the senators in Congress be instructed and the representatives be requested to "use their endeavors to obtain a modification of the same [tariff], so that it may favor, if possible, all branches of industry alike; and secure an adequate revenue for the wants of the government."¹⁶ In the same set of resolutions the Democrats took advantage of the opportunity to go on record against the protective principles, and a United States bank, and to declare in favor of an independent treasury. The Whigs lined up solidly against the resolutions. Under the leadership of E. D. Baker, every obstacle possible was interposed. Amendments that would have changed the resolutions materially were proposed by the Whigs, but to no avail. The resolutions were passed, all the Whigs, thirteen in number, and one Democrat voting in the negative.¹⁷ Opposition in the Democratic ranks appeared when the resolutions were sent to the house, and they seem never to have been acted upon by that body.

The meeting of the General Assembly gave to the Whig members an opportunity for getting together in informal meetings where ways and means of conducting the congressional campaign of 1843 and the presidential campaign of 1844 were discussed. Although not a member of the General Assembly, Mr. Lincoln was an active participant in the meetings held by his political friends, and when a program of action and platform of purpose were proposed he was invariably selected to assist in formulating them. These meetings were enthusiastically attended and the published utterances of the men who made speeches in them show that the leaders were optimistic of success. The first event at hand of a political nature was the congressional election to be held in August, 1843.

The increase in the number of representatives from three in 1841 to seven in 1843, was encouraging to both parties. Particularly were the Whigs encouraged. This increase was due in great part to an increased population in the northern and central

¹⁶The senate resolutions as passed are found only in *House Journal*, 1842-3, p. 146.

¹⁷Nathaniel Parker, representing Coles and Clark counties, was the Democrat voting with the Whigs. Mr. Parker was perhaps not a very strong party man, for upon several occasions he voted with the Whigs.

counties where the Whigs had always had a fighting chance.¹⁸ In the Seventh district especially was the competition sharp between three of its strongest Whigs—Lincoln, Hardin and Baker. Each of these men was popular, each was a regular party man, and all three possessed more than ordinary ability. For many weeks the outcome was doubtful.¹⁹ Fortunately for the party, Hardin, who was the strongest of the three, was selected by a nominating convention. Equally fortunately, the defeated candidates endorsed the nominee and gave him their support. In some of the districts there were Tyler candidates for Congress, but in no case did they receive any great support, for Tylerism was unpopular among all parties and classes. In the districts where the Whigs had no chance whatever to elect their own candidates, they did as they had often done before, supported the least offensive candidate of the Democratic party. Thus in the Second district, they supported Casey against McClelland, who was decidedly radical.²⁰ In but one of the seven districts, the Seventh, was a regular Whig chosen as representative, yet the Whig leaders professed to believe that their party was relatively stronger than it had been in the campaign of 1840.

With the election of 1843 out of the way, the Whig press took up in earnest the campaign and election of 1844. Clay was the only candidate seriously considered.²¹ His public acts served as the basis for pages of editorials and communications. His friendship for the West and South was held up before the voters of all parties: and they were asked to support him because of this friendship. Sectional prejudices were appealed to in an effort to attract Democrats from Van Buren to Clay. In addi-

¹⁸Until 1843, practically the entire northern and central parts of the state were in the Third district. After the re-apportionment, but three of the seven districts can be said to have been southern. See *Laws of Illinois*, 1842-3, pp. 71-3.

¹⁹Lincoln, *Complete Works*, I., 79 *passim*; *Alton Telegraph*, April 15, 1843.

²⁰W. Pickering to J. Marshall, April 18, 1843. (Eddy MSS.)

²¹For various opinions see *Alton Telegraph*, December 30, 1843, February 17, 1844. The attitude of the *Telegraph* toward some other candidates is expressed in the following words: "Daniel Webster, it is asserted, intends to be a candidate for the Presidency. We do not believe it but should the rumor be true his success will be *nearly equal* to those of John Tyler. Neither of them could carry over one State in the Union." Issue of May 6, 1843.

tion, the story of the poverty of the early life of Clay was told and retold in an effort to excite sympathy and admiration for him in the minds of the people, many of whom had risen from a position no higher. Every attention shown Clay by the people was interpreted by the Whig press as an omen of victory. Praise for him was unsparing. "We notice with pride that the *Cincinnatus of the West*—Henry Clay—in his journey South, is greeted at every landing, town, and city, with enthusiastic demonstrations of regard and respect. How could it be otherwise, unless the people whom he has so long and faithfully served, both at home and abroad, were perfectly *callous* to every feeling of gratitude and national pride."²²

What made the situation more encouraging was a threatened split in the Democratic ranks. Van Buren was the choice perhaps of a majority of the Democrats, and he was certainly considered by the Whigs as the prospective candidate. There was, however, a strong feeling that Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky ought to be and would be the nominee of the Democratic party.²³ Such was the situation in both parties when the Whigs formulated the principles upon which they stood as a party.

A great deal has been said about the reluctance of the Whigs to declare for certain definite principles. However much such a state of affairs may have been true in the nation at large, it was not true in Illinois. In 1840 the Whigs had adopted clean cut principles upon which they asked the support of the people;²⁴ and now in 1843, they reiterated their former declarations with greater emphasis. Without apparent hesitancy they proclaimed through the press and from the stump, political doctrines that cannot be mistaken or explained away.

In an "Address to the People of Illinois" by a Whig committee composed of Messrs. A. Lincoln, S. T. Logan, and A. T. Bledsoe, there were laid down in detail six principal articles of faith of the party.²⁵ First of all came the tariff. A demand was made for a tariff for revenue that would give protection to American industries. To support their contentions the members of the committee quoted Jefferson, Jackson, and Calhoun,

²²*Alton Telegraph*, January 7, 1843.

²³*State Register*, November 27, 1840; *Alton Telegraph*, December 30, 1843.

²⁴*Sangamo Journal*, October 11, 1839.

²⁵Lincoln, *Complete Works*, I., 72 ff.; *Alton Telegraph*, March 25, 1843.

and in so doing brought to bear upon their political enemies their own artillery. Without taking into consideration any change in conditions, either political or economic, Jefferson was made to say in a letter to Benjamin Austin that manufacturing was no less important than was agriculture, and that American independence depended to a large extent upon the former. Jackson was quoted in a similar fashion, and his sentiments for a protective tariff shown to have been even stronger than those expressed by Jefferson: "In short, we have been too long subject to the policy of British merchants. It is time we should become a little more *Americanized*, and, instead of feeding the paupers and laborers of England, feed our own; or else, in a short time, by continuing our present policy, we shall all be rendered paupers ourselves." From a speech of Mr. Calhoun on the tariff an excerpt was made which showed that statesmen to consider the prosperity of the manufacturer and his workmen essential to a widespread prosperity, and that the farmer would of all classes share in that prosperity. The committee took a definite stand for a tariff that would yield a revenue sufficient to provide for the public debt, and at the same time obviate any necessity of imposing a direct tax upon the people for purposes of the general government. In support of this claim it was pointed out that a tariff would fall principally upon the rich, while a direct tax would have to be borne by all classes, with the result that it would bear most heavily upon the poor.²⁶

The question of a United States bank came in for considerable attention. As an argument for its constitutionality it was pointed out with emphasis that the first bank had been established by the Fathers of the Constitution. To strengthen the argument it was recalled that the establishment of the bank had been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, "the most enlightened judicial tribunal of the world." All this dealt with the constitutionality of the question, but in the minds of westerners expediency had considerable weight. The committee in a most characteristic

²⁶The nature of that part of the address relating to direct taxation is illustrated by the following excerpt: "By the direct tax system, none can escape. However strictly the citizen may exclude from his premises all foreign luxuries—fine clothes, fine silks, rich wines, golden chains, and diamond rings; still, for the possession of his house, his barn, and his homespun, he is to be perpetually haunted and harassed by the tax gatherer."

way solved the problem by saying, "Upon the question of expediency, we ask you only to examine the history of those times with the miserable present."

Other issues were discussed in a similar way; Clay's Land Bill, the naming of candidates for Congress in every district regardless of chances for Whig success, and the adoption of the convention system for nominating candidates, received their share of attention. On the whole these questions were ably handled, and the sectional interests of the people of Illinois appealed to in an effort to gain support for the Whig party. The address closed with an analysis of political conditions both present and past, and the prediction was made that Whig victory in the approaching election was assured if only the Whigs would remember the principles for which they had fought in 1840, and act upon them as patriotic citizens should. "We declare it to be our solemn conviction, that the Whigs are always a majority of this Nation; and that to make them always successful, needs but to get them all to the polls, and to vote unitedly. This is the great desideratum. . . . At every election, let every Whig act as though he knew the result to depend upon his action." If the address is indicative of the feeling of the committee as well as of the party it represented, one sees that along with the spirit of optimism expressed there was a soreness occasioned by Harrison's death and the loss of benefits from the Whig victory of 1840.

With the Whig declarations thus set forth, the campaign for the presidency began in earnest. There seems to have been no inclination to consider any candidate other than Clay. Throughout the summer of 1843 Clay clubs were formed.²⁷ The Whig press kept Clay before the people by reciting his many virtues, and by comparing them with those of Van Buren, whom the Whigs considered to be the opposing candidate. The congressional election of that year gave the opportunity of bringing national politics to the front, and while the Democrats were uniformly successful in that contest, the Whigs took advantage of the opportunity, as has been seen, to form coalitions with conservative elements of the opposition.

In December, 1843, a Whig state convention similar to that held four years before convened for the purpose of defining

²⁷*Alton Telegraph*, May 27, December 30, 1843.

policies and selecting electors for the approaching campaign.²⁸ Among other things Tyler was denounced and declared to be without a party; Clay, and Davis of Massachusetts were endorsed for president and vice-president respectively, but the convention promised support to the candidates that might be selected by the national Whig convention to be held at Baltimore; a protective tariff, and a sound and uniform currency, not metallic, were endorsed; and as a further slap to the Democrats, the convention declared itself in favor of the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the public lands. No previous convention seems to have had a more complex and complete organization. Besides the various committees incident to such bodies, congressional central committees were chosen, and a campaign outlined. The leading spirits were Archibald Williams, A. Lincoln, G. T. M. Davis, Joseph Gillespie, John Wood, E. H. Gatewood, and Henry Eddy. Other prominent Whigs taking a part rather more informal were Judge Logan, W. H. Herndon, and John J. Hardin. Of the nine candidates for presidential electors, the most prominent were Lincoln, A. Lisle Smith, Joseph Gillespie, U. F. Linder, and Edwin B. Webb.²⁹ Two delegates-at-large to the Whig national convention were chosen,³⁰ and the selection of district delegates was left to the districts themselves.

In common with their political brethren of other states, the Illinois Whigs made the fatal mistake of assuming too strongly that Van Buren would be the Democratic candidate for the presidency. Working upon such an assumption they attacked him from every angle. Every charge that had been brought against him in the campaign of 1840 was made to work overtime. Van Buren had never been popular in Illinois, even though he had carried the state's vote in 1836 and 1840; and common sense on the part of the Democrats demanded that he be not nominated in 1844, particularly after it was evident that the attacks of the Whigs would be effective. Had the leaders

²⁸For report of the convention, see *Sangamo Journal*, December 14, 1843; *Alton Telegraph*, December 16, 23, 1843. Permanent officers: president, A. Williams (Adams); vice-presidents, E. H. Gatewood (Gallatin), L. B. Knowlton (Peoria), Joseph Gillespie (Madison); secretaries, J. H. Ruggles (Scott), B. Bond (Clinton).

²⁹Other electors were, John J. Brown, D. M. Woodson, N. Belcher, and William Brown.

³⁰State senatorial delegates to the Whig national convention were G. T. M. Davis and L. B. Knowlton.

of the latter party had the foresight to see the trend of events, and the ability to restrain the rank and file of the party from premature attack on Van Buren, the outcome of the election of 1844 might have been materially different.³¹

With Clay nominated by the Baltimore Convention as stand-ard bearer for the Whigs, the charge of bargain against him and Adams was raised by the opposition.³² Because Jackson continued down to the very end of his life to believe in the charge, it was impossible to dispel from the minds of many, who otherwise would not have believed the story, a suspicion that the charge was founded on truth. On the part of the Whigs, attempts to prove that the charge was unfounded and unjust were imperative. The Whig newspapers devoted considerable space to a refutation of the charge; and to prove their contention they quoted letters and statements from men who had been associated with the principal actors of the drama, and who declared that there was no foundation for the charge.³³ The evidence thus marshalled in defense of Clay was, to the minds of present day scholars, conclusive, but it is quite certain that many who otherwise would have supported Clay, refused to do so because they believed that he with Adams had "thwarted the popular will" in 1825.

In an effort to revive the enthusiasm of 1840, the Whigs of the nation had large gatherings where spell-binders set forth the virtues and statesmanlike qualities of Clay as well as the principles upon which the suffrage of the people was asked.³⁴ At the Young Men's Whig National Convention of Ratification, held at Baltimore in 1844, it was reported that thirty-six Whigs from Illinois were in attendance.³⁵ If such was the case, it indicates the degree of enthusiasm that must have pervaded the ranks of the party, for a journey from Illinois to Baltimore in 1844 was laborious and expensive and to be undertaken only

³¹*Spirit of '76*, May 11, 1844; *Broadside* (Hardin); *Alton Telegraph*, December 30, 1843, January 6, 27, 1844.

³²*Nashville* (Tenn.) *Union*, 1843-4, *passim*.

³³*Spirit of '76*, April 25, 1844.

³⁴*Alton Telegraph*, December 30, 1843, August 31, 1844 (quoting from *Albany Argus*, *Newark Daily Advertiser*, *Cincinnati Gazette*, *New York Post*, *Plebeian Globe*, *Richmond Enquirer*, *Albany Journal*, *Baltimore American*, *Louisville Journal*, *Missouri Republican*, *Lexington Observer*, *Ohio State Journal*, and *Cincinnati Atlas*).

³⁵*Spirit of '76*, May 11, 1844.

under extraordinary circumstances. At a mass meeting held at Nashville, Tennessee, in August, 1844, Edward D. Baker, congressman-elect from Illinois, was one of the principal speakers.³⁶ Both these performances were repeated throughout the state on a smaller scale. Mass meetings were held at which Lincoln and others contrasted the known ability of Clay with that of his relatively unknown opponent, James K. Polk.³⁷

To set forth more effectively the issues upon which the Whigs wished to do battle, campaign sheets were issued from the offices of the principal Whig papers in the state:³⁸ and broadsides in which the Democratic party and its candidate were bitterly attacked were distributed among the people. These campaign sheets were well edited, usually by the leading politicians, and on the whole were more scurrilous than the regular newspapers. Intermingled with sound arguments and just accusations, one finds much that is untrue and apparently intended only to ridicule the opponents and to laugh them out of court if possible. Both parties issued such sheets, and the editors from whose offices they were issued welcomed them, because it relieved them of offending subscribers of opposite political faith by printing the more objectionable matter in their regular issues.

With the growth of the abolitionist spirit in Illinois came a corresponding spirit of opposition. The principles advocated by the abolitionists had never been popular in the state, and consequently each party attempted to make capital of the fact by claiming that the opposing candidate was an abolitionist or at least was friendly to the principles of that party.³⁹ Both Clay and Frelinghuysen, who had been nominated for vice-president on the Whig ticket, were charged with abolition tendencies, but denials were vehemently made by the Whig press.⁴⁰ In the case of the latter it was pointed out in the most emphatic terms that he was a slave owner; Clay on his part denied the

³⁶*Republican Banner*, August 26, 1844; *Alton Telegraph*, August 31, September 7, 1844; *State Register*, September 13, 1844.

³⁷*Alton Telegraph*, August 31, 1844, *passim*.

³⁸E.g. *Olive Branch*, issued from office of *Sangamo Journal*; *Sharp Stick*, published at Chillicothe, Ohio; *Spirit of '76*, from office of *Republican Banner* (Nashville, Tenn.).

³⁹*Spirit of '76*, May 11, 1844; *Hardin (Broadside)*; *State Register*, August 1, 1844.

⁴⁰*Spirit of '76*, May 25, September 14, 1844.

charge and there is little reason to believe that the candidacy of either was hurt by such charges.

Worn-out issues divided interest with new ones. The Democrats, called "Polkers"⁴¹ by the Whigs, kept up the old pretense that the Whigs held the principles of the old Federalists, and while such a charge must have had its effect upon some voters, it appears to have lost the potency it had possessed in previous campaigns. The Democrats came out openly against the distribution of the proceeds of the land sales among the states, while the Whigs favored such a scheme.⁴² Likewise the former party favored the annexation of Texas. The Whigs approached that question with considerable hesitation. In order to be regular the Whig press opposed annexation during the campaign, and afterwards poured out their wrath upon Tyler for favoring the scheme, but it would appear from an examination of the files of these papers that their opposition was half-hearted and halting.⁴³ Many men from Illinois had gone into the Texas country, and their reports stimulated those remaining at home to desire that that great empire be added to the United States. Something inherent in the western country made its citizens favor expansion, and blinded their eyes to abstract justice. In addition, the arguments made against the annexation of Texas by those opposed to the expansion of slavery failed to have their full effect upon the people of Illinois, and when it was hinted around that Great Britain had designs upon the Texas country, many regular Whigs broke with their party.

For the first time in Illinois politics the question of Native Americanism assumed alarming proportions. With the coming of large numbers of foreigners, especially from Germany and Ireland, politics took on a new tone and Americanism became an issue that would not down. Each party of course desired the support of the new emigrants, and in states like Illinois where citizenship was not a prerequisite for voting, the scramble for this support was the more evident.⁴⁴ Although the proportion of foreign vote given to either party can never be mathematically determined, there seems to be no doubt that the Democrats

⁴¹See any Illinois newspaper of the time, also G. Churchill to G. Flag, December 3, 1844. (Flag MSS.).

⁴²*Nashville Union*, June 6, 1844; *Alton Telegraph*, February 4, 1843.

⁴³See *Alton Telegraph*, October 19, 1844. See also Baker's reply to the question of annexation in *State Register*, July 12, 1844.

⁴⁴All white males twenty-one years of age and over were entitled to vote after a residence of six months. Constitution 1818, Art. II., par. 27.

received the lion's share of it.⁴⁵ Following what were called anti-foreign riots in Philadelphia in 1844, the Democratic press in Illinois made the charge that the rioters were Whigs, and that it was a determined policy on the part of the Whigs as a party to oppose any attempts by foreigners to take part in the government.⁴⁶ As was to be expected the Whig newspapers denied that the rioters were Whigs, and to prove their position quoted from letters purporting to have been written by prominent Philadelphians⁴⁷ in which the Democrats were said to be the rioters. In addition the counter charge was made that the rioters were Democrats, and that Democratic clubs in Philadelphia had adopted measures hostile to foreigners.

During the campaign the Whigs said little about the tariff. Apparently the leaders of that party were satisfied with the tariff act of 1842. Consequently they left offensive action to the Democrats, who appear to have done little with the issue.

In addition to what may be called paramount issues such as the foreign vote, tariff, banks, expansion of territory and abolition, there crept in and colored the campaign to a marked degree others of a more or less personal character. The Whig press charged that Polk had branded his slaves, had opposed paying pensions to Revolutionary soldiers, had favored the annexation of Texas or disunion, and that he was merely a stool pigeon for designing politicians within the Democratic ranks. The Democrats charged Clay with being a duelist, murderer, perjurer, gambler, Sabbath-breaker, and an all around sealawag, and that he held political principles similar to those held by the Hartford Conventionists; furthermore that he was opposed to equal rights, equal privileges, and equal laws.⁴⁸ Charges of an even more trivial nature were made by both sides. Polk's aristocratic tendencies were shown by the price paid for the chair he used while speaker of the National House of Representatives; Clay's private life was laid bare by his political enemies, and the people were called upon to vindicate "American manhood" by rejecting his candiacy.

Both parties made strenuous efforts to carry the Congress-

⁴⁵Koerner, *Memoirs*, Vol. I., throws light on this subject.

⁴⁶*State Register*, August 16, 1844, *passim*.

⁴⁷*Alton Telegraph*, September 28, 1844.

⁴⁸*State Register*, August 23, 1844.

sional election in August.⁴⁹ It was considered that the result of that election would be a criterion of the presidential election to follow on the first Monday in November.⁵⁰ In some of the congressional districts the Whigs had no candidate, in others they had regular candidates. In the First district the contest was between Robert Smith of Madison and John Reynolds of St. Clair. The former seems to have been a Whig about 1836, while the latter had a leaning toward that party at opportune moments. Both, however, were avowed Democrats in 1844. In the Second district McClelland had no organized opposition. The only out and out Whig elected to Congress was Baker from the Seventh district, and his lead over his Democratic opponent was too slight for comfort. Ficklin, Wentworth, Douglas, and Hoge, all Democrats, were re-elected by substantial majorities. The election, while it was a great disappointment to the Whigs, was not in itself an exact criterion of the presidential election, because of coalitions in several districts, and the tremendous personal strength of such men as Douglas, Wentworth, and McClelland. The *Alton Telegraph* voiced the opinion of its party when in commenting on the election it declared that Illinois was the "only state which has not made some progress in bursting asunder the shackles of Locofocoism, and giving some evidence of returning sanity."⁵¹

On the whole the presidential election of 1844 resembled very much the election held in the previous August; in both the Whigs were decisively beaten. Clay carried scarcely one-fourth of the counties, and in several of these his majority was small; in several of them the combined vote of the Democrats and Abolitionists exceeded his. The Clay counties may be grouped into five distinct geographical groups: Coles, Vermilion and Cumberland in the east central part; Madison and Jersey in the southwest; Sangamon and neighboring counties in the central part; Edwards and Wabash in the southeast; and a contiguous territory in the northwest extending from Warren and Knox on the south to the Wisconsin line on the north. Thus but three counties south of the mouth of the Illinois River supported Clay, and none within a radius of sixty miles from Chicago. The abolition vote had considerable effect upon the election, although it was not until four years later that it was

⁴⁹Congressional elections had been changed from odd numbered to even numbered years.

⁵⁰*State Register*, July 26, 1844.

⁵¹*Alton Telegraph*, August 17, 1844.

a deciding factor. In sixteen counties this vote was worth while. In some, either the one or the other of the old parties received a majority; in others, the successful party had to be content with a plurality. Between the August election and the November election the Whig strength increased something like twelve and one-half per cent., while the strength of the Democrats and Abolitionists each showed an increase of about five per cent. Apparently the Whigs drew from the Abolitionists, many of whom supported Clay because of his reputation as a statesman, or because they had formerly been Whigs. In those counties where the Abolitionists held the balance of power, the successful candidates for the General Assembly were usually elected by plurality vote.⁵²

Clay's defeat was a hard blow to his most zealous followers, for it seems to have been the consensus of opinion that never again would he be a candidate for the presidency. Although there was a feeling that an unknown candidate would have made a better race than had Clay, no one could deny that his services both at home and abroad merited recognition of the highest order. The reasons offered by the Whig press for Clay's defeat by an unheard-of candidate were well put by one editor: "The diversion made in favor of its old opponents by the partisans of the accidental executive, by a large portion of the abolition party and above all, by the foreign population, naturalized and unnaturalized—who, deceived by the grossest misrepresentations have been induced to rally almost to a man . . . has turned the scale in favor of the locofocos; and thus enabled them, once more, to riot on 'the spoils of victory.'"⁵³ Stung by defeat, the more ardent Whigs denounced the foreign vote cast for Polk, and declared that in spite of Clay's defeat, he had been supported by a majority of those in whose hands the Constitution intended to place the selection of presidents. The expressions of some were truly pathetic, even prophetic. They saw free trade, nullification, disunion, and the extension of slavery as the logical result of Polk's victory.⁵⁴ In their hearts they cursed Tyler as the evil spirit that had brought defeat, and in their despair took consolation in the belief that he of all public men in the country was hated the most.

⁵²See MSS. Election Returns, (Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois.)

⁵³*Alton Telegraph*, November 23, 1844.

⁵⁴*Alton Telegraph*, November 23, 30, 1844.

APPENDIX.

Under the first state Constitution, which was in force from 1818 to 1848, the election for members of the General Assembly was held on the first Monday of August in even numbered years; and the regular session of each General Assembly convened on the first Monday of December following each election. Senators were elected for four years and representatives for two years. The Ninth General Assembly (1834-36), was composed of 26 senators and 55 representatives; the Tenth (1836-38), the Eleventh (1838-40), and the Twelfth (1840-42), of 40 senators and 91 representatives; the Thirteenth (1842-44) and the Fourteenth (1844-46) of 41 senators and 121 representatives. Important variations from the apportionments are explained in the text, but there never was any variation from any of the apportionments "owing to a variation of population," as is sometimes stated.

It is hoped that the political affiliations noted below are correct, although, as will be noticed, there are a few cases in which some doubt is expressed. The authorities for making the determination of political affiliation are newspapers, political votes in the General Assembly, histories of Illinois, reminiscences, county histories, county archives, state archives, and personal letters and inquiries.

SENATE

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Allen, James.....	Whig		*	*			
Allen, John.....	Dem.		*		* ¹		
Allen, Willis.....	Dem.						*
Baker, Edward D.....	Whig				*	*	
Barnett, Robert.....	Dem.					*	
Blackwell, Robert.....	Whig			*			
Boal, Robert.....	Whig						*
Bond, Benjamin.....	Whig	*	*				
Borough, Joseph.....	Dem.		*	*			
Bostwick, Manoah.....	Dem.			* ²			
Browning, Orville H.....	Whig		*	*			

¹Died.

²*Vice* Turney.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Buford, John.....	Dem.					*	*
Butler, Peter.....	Whig		*	*			
Catlin, Seth.....	Dem.					*	*
Cavarly, Alfred W.....	Dem.					*	*
Churchill, George.....	Whig			*	*		
Constable, Charles H.....	Whig						*
Craig, Larkin.....	Dem.	*	*				
Crain, John.....	Dem.					*	*
Cullom, Richard N.....	Whig				*	*	
Davidson, William H.....	Whig	*	*	*	*	*	
Davis, Jacob C.....	Dem.					*	*
Dougherty, John.....	Dem.					*	*
Dunlap, Samuel.....	Whig						*
Edwards, Cyrus.....	Whig	*	*				
Edwards, Ninian W.....	Whig						*
English, Revill W.....	Dem.					*	
Evans, Aiken.....	Dem.				*	*	
Ewing, William Lee Davis.....	Dem.	* ⁴					
Feaman, Jacob.....	Dem.				*	*	
Fithian, William.....	Whig			*	*	*	*
Fletcher, Job.....	Whig	* ⁵	*	*			
Forman, Ferris.....	Dem.						*
Forquer, George.....	Dem.	* ⁶					
Gaston, William.....	Dem.			*	*		
Gatewood, William J.....	(⁷)	*	*	*	*		
Gibbs, Worthington J.....	Dem.			*	*		
Gillham, James.....	Dem.					* ⁸	
Greer, Abner.....	Whig			*			
Hackelton, Samuel.....	Dem.		*	* ⁹			
Hacker, John S.....	Dem.	*	*	*	*		

³Unseated.

⁴Resigned.

⁵Vice Taylor.

⁶Resigned.

⁷Gatewood was elected to the General Assembly in 1836 as a Whig, and during the first session voted with the Whigs. By the beginning of the second session, July 10, 1837, he was a Democrat. He continued in that political faith until his death. See *State Register*, August 4, 1837, June 8, October 12, 1838; Snyder, *Snyder*, p. 201.

⁸Unseated.

⁹Resigned.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Hamlin, John.....	Whig		*	*	*		
Harris, John.....	Dem.				*	*	*
Harrison, George W.....	Whig			*	*	*	*
Harrison, Reuben.....	Whig					* ¹⁰	
Henry, John.....	Whig				*	*	*
Herndon, Archer G.....	Dem.	* ¹¹	*	*	*		
Hoard, Samuel.....	Dem.					*	
Houston, John.....	Dem.				*	*	
Hunter, William.....	Dem.			*	*		
James, James A.....	Dem.				*	*	
Johnson, Benjamin.....	Whig					*	*
Johnson, Noah.....	Dem.			*	*		
Jones, Waller.....	Whig	* ¹²					
Judd, Norman B.....	Dem.						*
Kilpatrick, Thomas M.....	Whig				*	*	*
Lane, Levin.....	Dem.	*	* ¹³				
Leviston, George.....	Dem.					*	*
Little, Sidney H.....	Whig			*	*		
McGahey, David.....	Dem.	*					
McLaughlin, Robert K.....	Dem.		*				
McMillan, William.....	Dem.						*
McMurtry, William.....	Dem.					*	*
Markley, David.....	Dem.			* ¹⁴	*	* ¹⁵	*
Mather, Thomas.....	Whig	* ¹⁶					

¹⁰Unseated.

¹¹*Vice* Forquer. Herndon voted with the Whigs to endorse the candidacy of Hugh L. White for president. At that time and afterward he emphatically denied that he was anything but an orthodox Democrat. See *Sangamo Journal*, June 20, 28, August 22, 1835; July 9, 1836; *State Register*, October 12, November 2, 1838; *Niles' Register*, LIX., 57; *History of Sangamon County* (Interstate Pub. Co.), p. 273; Newton, *Lincoln and Herndon*, p. 6,

¹²Died.

¹³Lane voted with Whigs to endorse candidacy of Hugh L. White. He also lined up with the Whigs against the nominating convention system. See *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, pp. 76, 510. In 1837 Lane voted for Davidson (Whig) for speaker of the senate. He and Davidson were from adjoining counties, which may explain his defection in this case.

¹⁴*Vice* Hackelton.

¹⁵Resigned.

¹⁶Resigned.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Matteson, Joel A.....	Dem.					* ¹⁷	*
Maxwell, George W. P.....	Dem.	*	*				
Mills, Henry I.....	Whig	*	*	*			
Minard, Ira.....	Dem.					*	*
Mitchell, Benjamin.....	Dem.	*	*	*			
Monroe, Byrd.....	Whig			*	*		
Moore, James B.....	Whig		* ¹³	*			
Moore, John.....	Dem.				*		
Morrison, Joseph.....	Dem.						*
Murray, John.....	Whig		*	*			
Noel, Lunsford R.....	Dem.	*	*				
Nunnally, Nelson W.....	Dem.			*	*	*	*
O'Rear, William.....	Whig		*	*			
Owen, Thomas H.....	Dem.		*				
Parker, Nathaniel.....	Dem.		*			*	*
Parrish, Braxton.....	Dem.	* ¹⁹	*	*	*	*	
Pearson, John.....	Dem.				*	*	
Peck, Ebenezer.....	Dem.			* ²⁰			
Powers, George W.....	Whig						*
Pruyne, Peter.....	Dem.		*				
Ralston, James H.....	Dem.				*	* ²¹	
Rattan, Thomas.....	Dem.	*					
Reilly, John C.....	Dem.		*				
Richardson, William A.....	Dem.			*	*		
Ross, William.....	Whig		*	*	*		
Ruggles, Spooner.....	Whig					*	*
Ryan, Michael.....	Dem.					*	*
Sargeant, William L.....	Whig			* ²²	*		
Servant, Richard B.....	Whig	* ²³	*	*			
Slocum, Rigdon B.....	Dem.				*	*	
Smith, George.....	Whig					*	*
Smith, Jacob.....	Dem.						*
Snyder, Adam W.....	Dem.	*			*		

¹⁷Unseated, re-elected. Took seat on January 7, 1843.

¹⁸Vice John D. Whiteside.

¹⁹Vice Will.

²⁰Resigned.

²¹Resigned.

²²Vice Thomas.

²³Vice Mather.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Stadden, William	Dem.		*	*	*		
Stapp, Wyatt B.	Whig				*	*	
Stephenson, James W.	Dem.	* ²⁴					
Strode, James M.	Dem.	* ²⁵					
Taylor, Edmund D.	Dem.	* ²⁶					
Thomas, William	Whig	*	*	* ²⁷			
Thompson, W. W.	Dem.					*	*
Turney, James	Dem.		*	* ²⁸			
Vance, John W.	Whig	*	*				
Vandeventer, Jacob	Dem.					*	*
Warren, Peter	Dem.		*	*	*	*	*
Waters, George W.	Whig					*	*
Weatherford, William B.	Dem.	* ²⁹	*	*			
Webb, Edwin B.	Whig						*
Whiteside, James A.	Whig	* ³⁰	*				
Whiteside, John D.	Dem.		* ³¹				
Wight, A. G. S.	Whig		*				
Wilbanks, R. A. D.	Dem.					*	*
Will, Conrad	Dem.	* ³²					
Williams, Archibald	Whig	*					
Williamson, William	Dem.	*					
Witt, Franklin	Dem.			*	*		
Wood, John D.	Dem.		*	*	*		
Woodworth, James H.	Dem.			* ³³			
Worthington, Thomas	Whig					*	*
Wynne, J. R.	Dem.					*	*

²⁴Resigned.

²⁵Vice Stephenson.

²⁶Resigned.

²⁷Resigned.

²⁸Resigned.

²⁹Vice Jones.

³⁰Claimed by Whig papers as a Whig, by the Democratic papers as a Democrat. See *Sangamo Journal*, December 17, 1830; *State Register*, July 6, 1838, September 14, 1839. Whiteside voted with Whigs to endorse candidacy of Hugh L. White; voted with Democrats to condemn United States Bank. See *Senate Journal*, 1834-5, p. 76. Because he gave evidence of lining up with the Whigs at this time and later, Whiteside is here listed as a member of that party.

³¹Resigned.

³²Died.

³³Vice Peck.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Able, Wilson	Dem.	*	*	* ³⁴	*		
Adams, Darius	Whig					*	
Adams, E.	Dem.						*
Aldrich, Cyrus	Whig						*
Aldrich, Mark	Whig		*	*			
Aldrich, Robert	Whig					*	
Alexander, Harmon	Dem.			*			
Alexander, W.	Dem.						*
Allen, John	Dem.			*			
Allen, Willis	Dem.			*			
Ames, Alfred E.	Dem.					*	
Anderson, Samuel	Dem.						*
Anderson, Stinson H.	Dem.	* ³⁵					
Anderson, William G.	Dem.					*	*
Andrus, Leonard	Whig					*	
Archer, William B.	Whig			*	*		
Arenz, Francis	Whig						*
Armstrong, George W.	Dem.						*
Arnold, Isaac N.	Dem.					*	*
Atwater, Thomas	Dem.		*				
Babbitt, A. W.	Dem.						*
Backenstos, J. B.	Dem.						*
Bailey, William W.	Whig				*		
Bailhache, John	Whig					*	
Bainbridge, Allen	Dem.			*			
Baker, Edward D.	Whig		* ³⁶	*			
Baldwin, Daniel	Dem.				*		
Ball, Asel F.	Whig		*				
Barnett, George	Dem.		*				
Barnett, Robert	Dem.				*		
Barnsback, George	Whig						*
Bartlett, S. M.	Whig		* ³⁷				
Beall, James	Whig				*		
Bell, Robert	Dem.					*	
Benedict, Kirby	Dem.						*

³⁴Vice Webb.³⁵Resigned.³⁶Vice Stone.³⁷Vice Charles.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Bennett, John	Whig				*		
Bentley, Richard	Dem.		*		*		
Berry, Isaac S.	Dem.						*
Bibbens, Elisha	Dem.					*	
Bishop, Mahlon	Dem.					*	
Bissell, William H.	Dem.				*		
Blackford, Nathaniel	Dem.	* ³⁸					
Blackman, David J.	Dem.				*		
Blackwell, Robert	Whig	*					
Blair, William	Dem.					*	*
Blakeman, Curtis	Whig					*	
Blockberger, C. B.	Dem.	*					
Bone, Elisha	Whig					*	
Bowman, Joseph G.	Whig			* ³⁹			
Bowyer, George P.	Dem.	*					
Boyakin, H. P.	Dem.						*
Bradford, James M.	Whig				*		
Bradley, Richard A.	Dem.					*	*
Brinkley, William	Dem.					*	*
Brown, Benjamin D.	Whig					*	
Brown, James N.	Whig				*	*	
Brown, John	Dem.			*			*
Brown, John J.	Whig				*		
Brown, William	Whig	*					
Browning, Orville H.	Whig					*	
Bryant, John H.	Dem.					*	
Buckmaster, Nathaniel	Dem.	* ⁴⁰					
Burklow, John D.	Dem.					*	
Burnett, John M.	Dem.						*
Busey, Matthew W.	Dem.				*	*	
Butler, H.	Dem.						*
Butler, Peter	Dem.	*					
Caldwell, William	Whig					*	
Calhoun, John	Dem.				* ⁴¹		
Campbell, Joseph	Dem.						*
Canady, John	Whig				*	*	

³⁸Vice McHenry.

³⁹Vice Smith.

⁴⁰Vice Thomas.

⁴¹Resigned.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Carpenter, Milton	Dem.	*	*	*	*		
Carpenter, William	Dem.	*					
Cavarly, Alfred W.	Dem.				*		
Charles, Elijah	Whig		* ⁴²				
Charles, John F.	Whig				*		
Churchill, George	Whig						*
Churchill, Joseph W.	Dem.			*			
Clark, Benjamin A.	Dem.	* ¹					
Cloud, Newton	Dem.	*	*	*		*	
Cochran, John	Dem.					*	*
Collins, Addison	Dem.					*	*
Comphor, William	Dem.			*			
Compton, John	Dem.					*	
Connelly, Samuel	Dem.		* ⁴⁴				
Copeland, James	Dem.		* ⁴⁵	* ⁴⁵			
Courtwright, Isaac	Dem.		*		*	*	
Cox, David	Dem.						*
Cox, Jeremiah	Whig				*		
Craig, Basil B.	Dem.	* ⁴⁷					
Craig, James	Whig		*	*			
Crain, John	Dem.		*	*	*		
Cullom, Richard N.	Whig		*				
Cunningham, James T.	Whig	*	* ⁴⁸	*	*		
Cushman, W. H. W.	Dem.					*	*
Daley, Edward M.	Dem.			*			
Danner, Jacob J.	Dem.					*	
Darnielle, John	Whig				*		
Davidson, William	Dem.		*				
Davis, Cyrus A.	Dem.		*				
Davis, David	Whig						*
Davis, James M.	Whig					*	
Davis, John T.	Dem.					*	*
Dawson, John	Whig	*	*	*			

⁴²Resigned.

⁴³Died.

⁴⁴Vice French.

⁴⁵Vice Enloe.

⁴⁶Died.

⁴⁷Vice Dougherty.

⁴⁸Vice Linder.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Dement, John	Dem.		* ⁴⁹				
Denning, William A.	Dem.						*
Dennis, Elias S.	Dem.					*	
Denny, John	Whig				*		
Deskines, John	Dem.						*
Diarmon, Jonathan	Dem.		*				
Dickinson, Andrew J.	Dem.					*	
Dodge, Abram B.	Dem.				*		
Dollins, Achilles D.	Dem.		*		*	*	
Dougherty, John	Dem.	* ⁵⁰	*		*		
Dougherty, Willis	Dem.					*	
Douglas, John	Dem.					*	
Douglas, Stephen A.	Dem.		* ⁵¹				
Drummond, Thomas	Whig				*		
Dubois, Jesse K.	Whig	*	*	*		*	
Dunbar, Alexander P.	Whig		*				*
Dunlap, Samuel	Dem.				*		
Dunn, Charles	Dem.	*					
Dunn, Tarlton	Whig		* ⁵²	*			
Edmonston, William	Dem.		*	*			
Edwards, Cyrus	Whig				*		
Edwards, Lorenzo	Whig					*	
Edwards, Ninian W.	Whig		*	*			
Elkin, William F.	Whig		*	*			
Elliott, Asa	Whig	*		*			
Emmerson, Allen	Whig			*	*		
Emmerson, R.	Whig						*
English, Revill W.	Dem.		*	*	*		
Enloe, Benjamin S.	Dem.		* ⁵³				
Epler, David	Dem.					*	
Erwin, Hugh	Whig					*	
Ewing, Charles F.	Whig					*	
Ewing, William Lee Davis ..	Dem.		* ⁵⁴	*	*		

⁴⁹Resigned.

⁵⁰Resigned.

⁵¹Resigned.

⁵²Vice McClermand.

⁵³Resigned.

⁵⁴Vice Dement.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Ficklin, Orlando B.....	(⁵⁷)	* ⁵⁵		*		*	
Fisk, Josiah	Dem.			*			
Fithian, William	Whig	*					
Flanders, Abner	Dem.					*	
Fletcher, Job	Whig						*
Flood, William G.....	Dem.			* ⁵⁷			
Foster, Hardy	Dem.			*			
Fowler, Joseph	Dem.					*	
Francis, Josiah	Whig				*		
Frazier, Elijah S.....	Dem.	*					
French, Augustus C.....	Dem.		* ⁵⁸	* ⁵⁸			
Froman, Isaac	Whig				*		
Funk, Isaac	Whig				*		
Funkhouser, Presley	Dem.						*
Galbraith, George	Dem.		* ⁵⁹				
Garrett, Peter B.....	Whig					*	
Gillespie, Joseph	Whig				*		
Gillham, William	Whig			*			
Glass, Robert W.....	Whig					*	
Gobble, Sergeant	Dem.					*	
Gordon, William	Whig	*					
Gouge, Jesse W.....	Dem.			* ⁶⁰			

⁵⁵During the early years of the Whig party, Ficklin was one of its ablest and most active members. He disagreed, however, with his colleagues on the Bank question. In 1835 he was editor of a Whig newspaper at Mt. Carmel. See *Illinois Advocate*, January 13, 1836. In 1838 the *State Register* claimed him as a Democrat on the following ground: "We have placed Ficklin in Democratic list because of his hostility to Clay and support of sub-treasury system." Two weeks later (October 26) Ficklin stated his political position as follows: "I have uniformly advocated a strict construction of the Constitution of the United States, as understood by the *State Right's party*, and the curtailment of Executive patronage within the narrowest possible limits. . . . I am supporter of the Sub-Treasury bill . . . am opposed to the election of Mr. Clay in the ensuing contest for the Presidency. I do not expect to support him in any event."

⁵⁶Resigned.

⁵⁷Resigned.

⁵⁸Resigned.

⁵⁹Died.

⁶⁰*Vice* Reddick. Reddick died before session convened. Strictly speaking Reddick was not a member of the 11th General Assembly.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Graham, Resolve	(⁶¹)		* ⁶²				
Graves, Hubbard	Whig					*	
Green, John	Dem.		* ⁶³	*		*	
Green, Joseph	(⁶⁴)		*				
Green, Peter	Dem.		*	*	*	*	
Gregg, David L.....	Dem.					*	*
Gregory, Charles	Whig	*					
Gridley, Asahel	Whig				*		
Hackelton, Samuel	Dem.	*				*	
Haley, Maximilian	Whig					*	*
Hambaugh, Stephen D.....	Dem.					*	
Hamlin, John	Whig	* ⁶⁵					
Hampton, James	Dem.	*					
Hankins, William J.....	Dem.		*	*	*		
Hannaford, Levi A.....	Dem.					*	*
Hanson, George M.....	Whig					*	*
Happy, William W.....	Dem.		*	*			
Hardie, H.	Whig						*
Hardin, John J.....	Whig		*	*	*		
Harlan, Moses	Whig			* ⁶⁶			
Harper, Joshua	Whig					*	*
Harreld, James	Dem.	*					
Harriott, James	Whig						*
Harris, John	Dem.	*	*	*			
Hatch, Jeduthan	Dem.					*	
Henderson, William H.....	Whig			*	*		*
Hendry, William	Dem.						*
Henry, John	Whig	*		*			
Henshaw, George	Dem.		*				

⁶¹Politics uncertain. His colleagues from same county were Whigs, and his successor, who was elected at special election after Graham's death, was Whig.

⁶²Died.

⁶³*Vice* Lane. Green died during the next session.

⁶⁴Green was considered to be a Whig by many of his colleagues in the General Assembly. See *State Register*, January 4, 1840. He voted in 1836, however, with Democrats in support of Jackson's administration.

⁶⁵Resigned.

⁶⁶*Vice* Comphers. From available information it is not known whether Comphers died or resigned. Hence no note after his name.

Name	Politics	5th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Herndon, William H.....	Whig						*
Hick, Thomas S.....	Dem.					*	*
Hickman, William.....	Whig					*	
Hicks, Stephen G.....	Dem.				*	*	*
Hinton, Alfred	Dem.					*	
Hitt, Samuel M.....	Whig						*
Hogan, John	Whig		*				
Holmes, William	Whig			*			
Horney, Samuel	Dem.					*	
Houston, John	Dem.			*			
Howard, Jonathan B.....	Dem.					*	
Huffman, Samuel	Whig						*
Hughes, John D.....	Dem.	*					
Hughey, Joseph	Dem.		*	*			
Hull, Alden	Whig			*	*		
Humphrey, John G.....	Dem.				*		
Hunsacker, James J.....	Dem.					*	
Hunt, Thomas	Whig	*	*				
Hunter, William	Dem.	*					
Jackson, Aaron C.....	Whig					*	
Jackson, B. M.....	Dem.						*
Jackson, William M.....	Dem.					*	*
Janney, Eldridge S.....	Dem.						*
Jarrot, Vital	Whig			*			
Jewell, E. G.	Dem.						*
Johnson, Benjamin	Whig			*			
Jonas, Abraham	Whig					*	
Jones, Gabriel	Whig			*			
Kelly, John M.....	Dem.				*		
Kendall, Samuel T.....	Whig					*	
Kent, Germanicus	Whig			*			
Kercheval, Gholson	Dem.			*			
Kerr, Richard	Dem.			* ⁶⁷			
Kirkpatrick, John	Dem.						*

⁶⁷Kerr had removed to Iowa after the regular session of 1838-9. Evidently his constituents considered that he had removed from the state, for they elected Love to fill out his unexpired term. Kerr took the opposite view. He appeared before the house and convinced that body that he was still a citizen of Illinois and hence entitled to his place, whereupon Kerr was seated and Love's claim was rejected.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Kitchell, Wickliffe	Dem.				*		
Koerner, Gustav	Dem.					*	
Kuykendall, Andrew J.	Dem.					*	*
Lagow, Wilson	Dem.		*				
Lane, William	Dem.		* ⁶³				
Langworthy, Cyrus	Whig					*	
Laughlin, William	Dem.				*		
Lawler, John S.	Dem.					*	
Leary, Albert G.	Dem.		*		*		
Leighton, James	Whig						*
Lester, Harvey	Dem.				*		
Lincoln, Abraham	Whig	*	*	*	*		
Linder, Usher F.	(⁶⁴)		* ⁷⁰				
Link, Lewis W.	Dem.	* ⁷¹					
Lockard, James	Whig					*	*
Logan, John	Dem.		*	*	*		
Logan, Stephen T.	Whig					*	*
Loop, James L.	Dem.						*
Lott, Peter	Dem.						*
Love, Oscar	Dem.			* ⁷²			
Loy, Thomas M.	Dem.					*	
Lyons, James H.	Whig		*	*			
McBride, William	Dem.					*	
McClernand, John A.	Dem.		* ⁷³		*	*	
McClurken, James	Dem.				*		
McCormick, Andrew	Whig		*	*			
McCown, John	Dem.		*				
McCutchen, Jesse M.	Whig			*			
McDonald, John	Dem.				*	*	*
McDonald, John	Dem.					*	

⁶⁸Resigned.

⁶⁹Linder was Democrat until about 1839. See Linder, *Early Bench and Bar of Illinois*, 228, 281. In 1842, he was Whig candidate for General Assembly and in 1844 a Whig candidate for presidential elector. He supported Douglas in 1858 and was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention at Charleston in 1860.

⁷⁰Resigned.

⁷¹Resigned.

⁷²See note on Kerr.

⁷³Resigned.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
McGahey, James D.	Dem.	* ⁷⁴					
McGinnis, John P.	Dem.				*		
McHenry, William	Dem.	*					
McLean, James M.	Whig				*		
McMillan, Andrew	Dem.					*	
McMillan, Robert	Whig			*			
McMurtry, William	Dem.		*				
McWilliams, James	Dem.			*			
Madden, Henry	Dem.		*			*	
Manley, Uri	Dem.	*					
Manning, Julius	Dem.					*	*
Marrs, William B.	Dem.		*				
Marshall, James	Dem.				*	*	
Marshall, Samuel D.	Whig			*			
Matthews, Samuel T.	Whig						*
Maus, William S.	Dem.			*			
Menard, Edmund	Whig			*			
Menard, Pierre	Whig				*	*	
Metz, Benjamin B.	Whig						*
Miller, Anson S.	Whig						*
Miller, Harvey L.	Dem.					*	*
Miller, William	Dem.						*
Minor, Gideon	Dem.		*				
Minshall, William A.	Whig		*		*		
Mitchell, Edward	Whig					*	
Moore, Daniel P.	Dem.				*		
Moore, John	Dem.		*	*			
Moore, William	Whig	*	*				
Moore, William J.	Whig						*
Morgan, Edward T.	Dem.			*			
Morrille, Jacob C.	Dem.						*
Morris, R. G.	Dem.						*
Morrison, J. L. D.	Whig						*
Morton, Joseph	Dem.		*				
Munsell, Leander	Whig				*		
Murphy, John H.	Whig		*	*			
Murphy, Richard	Dem.			*	*	*	
Murphy, Richard G.	Dem.	*	*	*	*		
Myers, Elias B.	Whig						*

⁷⁴Died.

⁷⁵Died.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Nance, Thomas J.....	Dem.			* ⁷⁶			
Naper, Joseph	Dem.		*	*			
Nesbitt, Samuel G.....	Dem.					*	
Norris, James	Dem.					*	
Nowlan, David	Dem.			* ⁷⁷			
Nunnally, Nelson W.....	Dem.	*					
Nye, Iram	Dem.						*
O'Connor, Ambrose	Dem.						*
O'Neill, Edward J.....	Whig		*				
Odam, Dempsey	Dem.		*		*		
Oglesby, John M.....	Dem.						*
Olds, Francis A.....	Dem.				*		
Oliver, John	Dem.	*			*		
Ormsbee, Joseph W.....	Dem.				*		
Otwell, William	Whig			*			
Outhouse, James	Dem.	*					
Owen, Thomas H.....	Dem.	*				*	
Pace, Harvey T.....	Dem.	* ⁷⁸	*	*			
Parkinson, James	Whig				*		
Parrish, Braxton	Dem.						*
Parsons, Solomon	Dem.				*		
Paullen, Parvin	Dem.		*				
Peck, Ebenezer	Dem.				*		
Penn, Philip	Dem.					*	
Phelps, William J.	Whig				*		
Phillips, Alexander	Whig			*	*		
Pickering, William	Whig					*	*
Pitner, Franklin R.....	Dem.						*
Porter, David	Dem.	* ⁷⁹					
Pratt, John W.....	Whig					*	*
Prentice, Owen	Dem.				*		
Prevo, Samuel	Dem.						*
Ralston, James H.....	Dem.		*				
Randolph, William H.....	Whig						*
Rawalt, Jonas	Whig		*	*			
Rawlings, Isaac D.....	Whig						*
Read, John W.....	Whig			*			

⁷⁶Vice Calhoun.

⁷⁷Died.

⁷⁸Vice Anderson.

⁷⁹Vice McGahey.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Reddick, William G.....	Dem.		*	* ⁸⁰			
Reed, J. H.....	Dem.						*
Reynolds, James	Whig				*		
Richardson, William A.....	Dem.		*				*
Ricks, William S.....	Dem.						*
Robbins, E. W.....	Dem.						*
Roberts, Louis,	Whig				*		
Robinson, Jeffrey	Dem.				* ⁸¹		
Roman, William W.....	Dem.			*			
Ross, Lewis W.....	Dem.				*		*
Ross, William	Whig	*					
Rowan, Stephen R.....	Dem.	* ⁸²					
Scarborough, George	Dem.		*				
Scott, James K.....	Dem.					*	*
Scott, John	Dem.				*		
Scott, John	Dem.						*
Simple, James	Dem.	*	*				
Sexton, Orville	Dem.						*
Sharp, Joseph L.....	Dem.					*	*
Shepley, Oliver	Dem.				*		
Sherman, Francis C.....	Dem.						*
Shields, James	Dem.		*				
Shirley, John	Dem.					*	
Simms, Hall	Dem.				* ⁸³	*	
Smith, Benjamin L.....	Dem.						*
Smith, Edward	Dem.	* ⁸⁴	*	* ⁸⁵			
Smith, George	Whig			*			
Smith, Guy W.....	Whig					*	
Smith, Henry	Whig						*
Smith, Joseph	Whig						*
Smith, Robert	Dem.		*	*			
Smith, William	Dem.					*	
Spicer, Reuben H.....	Dem.					*	
Stapp, Wyatt B.....	Whig			*			

⁸⁰See note on Gouge.⁸¹Resigned.⁸²Resigned.⁸³Vice French.⁸⁴Vice Ficklin.⁸⁵Died.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Starkweather, Elisha H.....	(⁸⁶)						*
Starne, Alexander	Dem.					*	*
Starr, Richard W.....	Whig			* ⁸⁷		*	
Steele, John	Dem.						*
Stewart, Hart L.....	Dem.					*	*
Stewart, Robert	Whig	*					
Stockton, William S.....	Whig					*	
Stone, Daniel	Whig			* ⁸⁸			
Strong, N. D.....	Whig						*
Stuart, John T.....	Whig	*					
Stuntz, John	Dem.		*				
Summerville, John A.....	Dem.		* ⁸⁹				
Tackerberry, Middleton	Dem.					*	
Thomas, Cheney	Whig			*			
Thomas, Jesse B., Jr.....	Dem.	* ⁹⁰					
Thomas, John	Dem.		*				
Thompson, Amos	Dem.					*	*
Thompson, John	Dem.	* ⁹¹					
Thompson, Samuel G.....	(⁹²)		*				
Thornton, Hiram W.....	Whig				*		
Thornton, William F.....	Whig			* ⁹³			
Threlkeld, Thomas	Whig				*		
Trower, Thomas B.....	Dem.	*					
Troy, Daniel	Whig				*		
Trumbull, Lyman	Dem.				*		
Tunnel, Calvin	Dem.	*					*
Turley, John S.....	Dem.		*				*
Turner, Horace	Dem.					*	
Turney, Daniel.....	Dem.		*	* ⁹⁴	*		
Turney, James.....	Dem.	* ⁹⁵					

⁸⁶See ante p. 105 n.

⁸⁷Vice Flood.

⁸⁸Resigned.

⁸⁹Vice Nowlan.

⁹⁰Resigned.

⁹¹Died.

⁹²Claimed by Democratic press as a Democrat. See *State Register*, January 4, 1800. Voted with Whigs in 1836, however, to condemn Jackson's administration.

⁹³Resigned.

⁹⁴Vice Robinson.

⁹⁵Vice Link.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Vance, P. C.....	Dem.					*	
Vandever, Horatio M.....	Dem.					*	
Vandeventer, Jacob	Dem.	*					
Vedder, F. P.....	Dem.						*
Vineyard, Philip	Dem.					*	*
Voris, Francis	Whig		*				
Wagner, Jacob	Dem.						*
Walker, Isaac P.....	Dem.			*			
Walker, James	Dem.		*				
Walker, Newton	Whig			*			
Walker, Richard S.....	Dem.		*				
Warren, J. M.....	Dem.						*
Waters, George W.....	Whig				*		
Watkins, Joseph E.....	Whig		* ⁹⁶				
Weatherford, William B.....	Dem.					*	
Webb, Edwin B.....	Whig	*	*	*	*		
Webb, Henry L.....	Dem.			* ⁹⁷			
West, Amos S.....	Whig				*		
West, Edward	Whig					*	
Wheat, Almeron	Dem.					*	
Wheeler, Alpheus	Dem.		*		*		
Whitcomb, Lot	Dem.					*	
White, James	Whig						*
White, John	Dem.					*	*
White, John	Whig						*
White, Martin	Dem.				*		
Whiteside, John D.....	Dem.	*					*
Whitten, Easton	Dem.		*			*	
Wilcox, Charles C.....	Whig						*
Wilkinson, Winfield S.....	Dem.						*
Williams, Archibald.....	Whig		* ⁹⁸	*			
Williams, Isaac	Whig						*
Williamson, William.....	Dem.				* ⁹⁹		
Wilson, Robert L.....	Whig		*				
Wilson, William	Dem.			*	*		
Witt, Franklin	Dem.		*				

⁹⁶Vice Graham.

⁹⁷Resigned.

⁹⁸Vice Galbreath.

⁹⁹Vice Thornton.

Name	Politics	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
Wood, Daniel.....	Dem.	* ¹⁰⁰	*	*	*		
Wood, John T.....	Dem.						*
Woodburn, William	Dem.						*
Woodson, David M.....	Whig				*		
Woodworth, James H.....	Dem.					*	
Woolard, James B.....	Dem.						*
Wren, Johnson	Dem.	*					
Wyatt, John.....	Dem.	*		* ¹⁰¹			
Yates, Richard.....	Whig					*	*
Youngkin, John F.....	Whig						*
Zeiber, John S.....	Dem.						*
Zimmerman, Jacob	Dem.				*		

¹⁰⁰*Vice* Rowan.

¹⁰¹*Vice* Douglas.

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MSS. Election Returns (County Court Houses). Election schedules of the following counties have been examined and used in this work: Coles, Sangamon, Edgar, Clark, Crawford, Lawrence, Gallatin, Edwards, Macoupin, Wayne, Fayette and Tazewell. In a few cases only are the original schedules intact. Those found in Sangamon, Fayette, Coles and Macoupin are the most important.

Miscellaneous MSS. (County Court Houses.) Court Records, etc.

NEWSPAPERS.

This study has necessarily depended in large part upon contemporary Illinois newspapers, which fall into two groups corresponding roughly to periods of time. For the twenties, the *Edwardsville Spectator* and the *Illinois Intelligencer* have furnished the greater amount of information; while the *Alton Telegraph*, *Sangamo Journal*, *State Register*, *Chicago Democrat*, and *Chicago American* have been used very extensively for the thirties and forties. Scattering issues of a number of less important papers have been examined whenever the opportunity offered itself.

No attempt has been made in this bibliography to give a complete history of the newspapers consulted. Change of name or location has been indicated only when the omission of such information might confuse and mislead the reader. The dates given immediately after the place of publication, indicate the extreme limits in which that particular newspaper has been used in the preparation of this study. The newspaper file referred to in the case of the more important papers, is believed to be the most complete. For further information about Illinois newspapers for the period covered in this study, the reader is referred to *Scott's Newspapers and Periodicals of Illinois, 1814-1879*.

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Alton Telegraph, Alton. 1836-1845. The *Telegraph* was a strong Whig paper. Of its editors the ablest were John Bailhache and George T. M. Davis. The former was a strong anti-slavery man but in common with his political brethren he was willing to allow the subject to be kept in the background. Davis was one of the state's leading lawyers, a fluent writer, and prominent in both state and national politics. In many respects the *Telegraph* was the best edited paper in the state during the late thirties and earlier forties. Chicago Historical Society Library.

Chicago American, Chicago. 1836-42. The *American* was Whig in politics and kept up a continual editorial warfare with the *Chicago Democrat*. Of its editors the best known politically were T. O. Davis and Buckner S. Morris. Chicago Historical Society Library.

Chicago Express, Chicago. 1842-4. Whig in politics. Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois.

Chicago Democrat, Chicago. 1833-45. Democratic in politics. Edited by John Calhoun, later by "Long" John Wentworth. The latter was representative in Congress from 1843 to 1851. The *Democrat* was the leading journal of the northern part of the state. When the Kansas-Nebraska agitation set in Wentworth opposed Douglas and later aided in organizing the Republican party. The paper became Republican. Chicago Historical Society Library.

Cincinnati American, Cincinnati, Ohio. 1830. Whig in politics and well edited. University of Illinois Library.

Crisis, Edwardsville. 1830. Supported the Reynolds Administration. Chicago Historical Society Library.

Expositor, Nauvoo. There was but one issue of this paper, June 7, 1844. As its name implies it was established for the purpose of exposing certain things. It openly denounced Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, with the result that its press was thrown into the river and its owners and editor compelled to flee from the city. Illinois State Historical Library.

Galena Advertiser, Galena. 1830. Established by Hooper Warren and supported by the Edwards party. Chicago Historical Society Library.

Illinois Advocate, Vandalia. 1835-6. Edited by John York Sawyer. (See State Register.)

Illinois Gazette, Shawneetown. 1822. The *Gazette* had three very able editors, Henry Eddy, James Hall, Alex. P. Field. It was one of the five papers taking part in the slavery contest of 1822-4, and its attitude during this time is a matter of dispute. Mercantile Library, St. Louis, Mo.

Illinois Intelligencer, 1820-32. Originally established at Kaskaskia. Among its editors were Elijah C. Berry, William H. Brown, and Robert Blackwell. It took part in the slavery struggle of 1822-4, at first as pro-slavery, later as anti-slavery. Because of its location at the state capital and the intimacy of its editors with the state administration, the *Intelligencer* is the best newspaper source for the twenties. Mercantile Library, St. Louis, Mo.

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Sangamo Journal, Springfield. 1831-1845. One of the most prominent Whig papers during the thirties and forties. Besides being ably edited it was located, after 1839, at the state capital where it occupied a position that gave it an insight into state politics. Mr. Lincoln usually used the *Journal* as a mouth piece. The *Sangamo Journal* is continued in the *Illinois State Journal*. Illinois State Historical Library.

Scioto Gazette and Fredonian Chronicle, Chillicothe, Ohio. 1830. Edited by John Bailhache, who afterward edited the *Alton Telegraph* for many years.

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Edwardsville Spectator, Edwardsville. 1820-5. Hooper Warren, editor. The *Spectator* is said to have been the best edited paper in Illinois during its existence. Edwards seems to have supplied the money for starting the paper, but a few years after it was launched Warren denied that Edwards had any interest in it. The *Spectator* led the fight against slavery in 1822-4, and it is a very valuable source for that period. Mercantile Library, St. Louis, Mo.

Spirit of '76, Nashville, Tenn. 1844. Whig campaign sheet. File in possession of Professor John Connely, Carlinville, Illinois.

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES

IN THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOL. IV NO. 3

JUNE 1915

BOARD OF EDITORS

ERNEST L. BOGART

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PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
URBANA, ILLINOIS

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The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus

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PREFACE

The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In 1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university, working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: "The Effect of the Defeat of Varus upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier." We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed, and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and continued, with intermissions, to the present time.

In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration.

To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is involved in a momentous conflict. We do not

so feel. Disinterested scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected. That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history, has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to shed renown upon the present.

We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A. S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the manuscript in proof.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

May 24, 1915

W. A. O.

H. V. C.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE QUESTION

Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A. D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river Elbe. Gardthausen¹ unhesitatingly predicates the emperor's intention in the following words: "er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere Grenze zu geben." Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In discussing Drusus' command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he says:² "Drusus . . . übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741) die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward." Further on³ Drusus' successor, Tiberius, is represented as having suc-

¹*Augustus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1861, I, p. 1066.

²*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 24 (6th ed. 1909); cf. *Die germanische Politik des Augustus* (originally in *Im Neuen Reich*, 1871, pp. 537-556), p. 14: "Die Unterwerfung Germaniens, kräftig begonnen, und sieben Jahre hindurch beharrlich . . . geführt." Other representative expressions of opinion among recent writers may be found: R. von Poehlmann (in Pflugk-Harttung's *Weltgeschichte*, 1910, I, p. 516); E. Kornemann (in Gercke-Norden's *Einleitung in die Altertumsw.*, 1912, III, p. 208); E. Kornemann, "Zu dem Germanenkriege unter Augustus," *Klio*, IX (1909), p. 449. On the basis of Tiberius' campaigns (4-6 A. D.) he speaks also of "die gewaltigen Anstrengungen Roms zur Unterwerfung Germaniens"; H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, 1905, p. 460; H. Stuart Jones, *The Roman Empire*, 1913, p. 34; C. H. Hayes, *Sources Relating to the Germanic Invasions*, 1909, p. 64.

³*Ibid.*, p. 28. So J. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*², I, 1 (1912), Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany was actually subjugated: "Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach."

ceeded in making this subjugation: "weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte, dass sämtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen hätten fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme." Again, Mommsen⁴ calls Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national independence, and speaks⁵ of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück's position on the question is unequivocal⁶. So is that of Schiller.⁷ Hübner⁸ voices the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp⁹ hazards the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more pressing duties prevented Caesar's heir, for thirty years after Gaul's subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.) was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B. C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the Ubii from the attack of their neighbors.

Seeck¹⁰ and many others assert that not only was Ger-

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁶See the chapter "Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer" in his *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, Berlin, 2nd edit., 1900, II, p. 47 f.

⁷*Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f.

⁸*Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa*, Berlin, 1800, p. 110.

⁹*Die Römer in Deutschland* (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII), 1912, p. 8. Fischer (*Armin und die Römer*, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4) is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar's conflicts with the Germans were intended merely "die Germanen von Einfällen in Gallien abzusrecken," i.e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride. However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of expansion in this direction, "und demgemäss sah er, als Adoptivsohn Cäsars, die Unterwerfung Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige Pflicht an" (p. 25).

¹⁰See *Kaiser Augustus* (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902, p. 111: "bedrängte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen Tiberius

many subdued by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new province.¹¹ This is stated by Knoke as follows:¹² "Das germanische Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten Römische Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge und Tribut gezwungen. . . . nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das deutsche Volk die Zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft Roms verfallen war." However, there is no general agreement as to when Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg¹³ believes it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius' defeat (16 B. C.): "Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschland bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich zweifelhaft." Abraham's conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C. Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: "Später indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe . . . zur Provinz machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung Norddeutschlands für vollendet an."¹⁴ Many believe that an effort was made on Augustus' part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and they regard this as tantamount

. . . . vollendete dann in den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der neuen Provinz."

¹¹See also Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, 31 f.; Schiller, *op. cit.*, p. 222. Riese (*Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit*, Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen's statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons, is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor's worship was by no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f; also by Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*², I, p. 504. Ferrero (*Characters and Events of Roman History*, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws.

¹²*Armin der Befreier Deutschland*, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f.

¹³*Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland*, Halle, 1872, p. 49.

¹⁴*Zur Gesch. der germanischen u. pannonischen Kriege unter Augustus*, Berlin, 1875, p. 7.

to an attempt to subjugate Germany.¹⁵ The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited as proofs of Rome's purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham¹⁶: "Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the Rhine by Augustus' two step-sons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B. C.—6 A. D.), had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe] river." Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome's policy. So Abbott¹⁷: "To the north the frontier policy of Augustus was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans." Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work¹⁸ to the "Conquest of Germania," concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy¹⁹: "he had persistently avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the people." We may observe also that Eduard Meyer's view²⁰ is not wholly in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality of the German nation: "Wenn wir . . . die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung

¹⁵Cf. Koepp, *op. cit.*, p. 9: "der Wunsch, eine solche Grenze zu verkürzen, den einspringenden Winkel zum Reiche zu ziehen, erscheint fast selbstverständlich. Das bedeutete aber die Eroberung Germaniens bis zur Elbe"; Idem, *Westfalen*, I (1909), p. 35: "Dieses Ziel hat nun Augustus ohne Zweifel erstrebt." See also Schiller, *op. cit.*, p. 214: "Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt, von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberungen zu mehren, abzugehen und für Gallien die Grenze nach der Elbe, für Italien und Macedonien nach der Donau vorzuschieben und auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen, welche leichter zu verteidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende."

¹⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 460.

¹⁷*History of Roman Political Institutions*, Boston, 1910, p. 282.

¹⁸*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, New York, 1909, V, p. 142 f.

¹⁹So Mommsen, *Die germanische Politik des Augustus*, p. 9: "Caesar Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner Herrschaft, den Frieden."

²⁰*Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie*, Halle, 1910, p. 444.

nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald nennen dürfen." And although he insists on the necessity resting upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the desire for imperial expansion²¹: "aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art wie Cäsar seinen Geten-und Partherkrieg geplant hatte."

Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions, which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting the conquest of Germany: that the disaster which overtook the legions of Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce all hope of making Germany a province²². Most historians claim in addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world's history. So Seck²³: "Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet, aus dem künftig die Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen sollte." Gardthausen²⁴ states the same belief in still stronger terms: "Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt, so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Ver-

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 471.

²²Niese, *Grundriss der röm. Gesch.* (4th ed. 1910), p. 299: "Eine Wiedereroberung des Verlorenen ward nicht versucht. Mit Ausnahme der Küstenvölker, Bataver, Friesen, und Chauken, gingen die Eroberungen in Germanien verloren, und an Stelle der Elbe ward der Rhein Grenze Das römische Germanien beschränkte sich in Zukunft auf die dem Rhein benachbarten Gegenden"; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. 1910, p. 2: "And though, on the first attack they [the Germans] seemed to yield to the weight of the Roman power, they soon, by a signal act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the vicissitudes of fortune."

²³*Op. cit.*, p. 117. Cf. von Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, III, 1, Leipzig, 1883, p. 28: "Und auch die Geschichte muss bestätigen, dass dem Ereigniss eine allgemeine und auf immer nachwirkende Bedeutung zukommt."

²⁴*Op. cit.*, I, p. 1202 f.

dienst des Arminius kurz, die Entwicklung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er nicht später—was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen Germanicus vertheidigt hätte." The debt of the German nation, and the world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs, remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize estimates of historical significance.²⁵ Mommsen and Koepp may be cited as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing in the tide of Rome's sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube.²⁶ Koepp is the more guarded. He says²⁷, "Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht, auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde." But this view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of

²⁵See F. Knoke, *Armin der Befreier Deutschlands*, 1909, p. 80: "Dass uns die Eigenart erhalten blieb, dass wir unsere Sprache retteten, dass wir ein freies Volk geblieben seien, dass wir eine Geschichte erleben durften, dies alles haben wir Armin zu verdanken ja selbst fremde Völker hätten alle Ursache mit uns zusammen ihn zu ehren. Gäbe es doch, um vom anderen zu schweigen, ohne seine Taten weder ein Volk der Franzosen, noch der Engländer, selbst nicht der Amerikaner in den Vereinigten Staaten. Ihnen allen hat er die Möglichkeit ihres Volkstums erst geschaffen. Das wird ihnen freilich schwerlich zum Bewusstsein kommen. Um so mehr wollen wir ihn feiern, als den Befreier Deutschlands, als den ersten Helden unseres Vaterlandes"; Felix Dahn, *Armin der Cherusker*, München, 1909, p. 43: "ohne ihn [Arminius] und sein Meisterstück der Kriegskunst wären wir Germanen eben romanisiert worden wie die Kelten in Gallien . . . Wir danken für Kant und Schiller und für Erhaltung unseres deutschen Art und Sprach Armin und der Varus-Schlacht."

²⁶See Mommsen, *Rom. Gesch.*, V, p. 53: "wir stehen hier an einem Wendepunkt der Völkergeschichte. Auch die Geschichte hat ihre Fluth und ihre Ebbe; hier tritt nach der Hochfluth des römischen Weltregiments die Ebbe ein"; Idem, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 19: "Die Katastrophe ist von den weitgreifendsten Folgen geworden, ja man kann sagen ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte."

²⁷"Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung," *Westfalen*, I (1900), p. 34.

German authors. Thomas Arnold voices it²⁸ with all the extravagance that characterizes rash generalizations: "The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours over the invading host of the Mohammedans." We find it, as one might expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy²⁹, the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from the epitomator Florus, "Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret." And we need feel no surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of P. V. N. Meyers.³⁰ Here and there, however, are to be found writers who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who has been quoted above,³¹ Ferrero too shows a saner historical view when he says³²: "Historians have long been accustomed to regard the defeat of Varus as one of the 'decisive' battles of the world, and as an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved her

²⁸*History of the Later Roman Commonwealth*, London, 1845, II, p. 317.

²⁹*The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, London, 1859, pp. 179, 195: "Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of England . . . Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an oppressed people more instantaneous and complete . . . within a few weeks after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the invader."

³⁰*Rome: Its Rise and Fall*, Boston, 1901, p. 323: "The victory of Arminius . . . was an event of the greatest significance in the history of European civilization . . . the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence."

³¹Note 20.

³²*Op. cit.*, p. 325.

grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what *might* have happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt to explain what *did* happen.³³ It should be observed also that such a generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the person of Rome's new representative, Charlemagne.³⁴

³³Oskar Jäger (*Deutsche Geschichte*, München, 1909, I, p. 28) is correct in denying any significance to Arminius' victory further than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were not invincible: "Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich." Cf. also Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: "Mais la victoire d'Arminius n'eut point d'autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu'au Rhin. Il ne put rein entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie"; p. 127: "Les temps n'étaient donc point venus ni de la défaite pour l'Empire romain ni de l'unité pour la Germanie."

³⁴Ch. Gailly de Taurines, *Les Légions de Varus*, Paris, 1911, p. 312: "Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin, champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus

Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius' achievement will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius' one great deed. Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations, and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their peculiar characteristic;³⁵ that frequently what these sources say in express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never intended to serve as objective pictures of reality;³⁶ that only the less cautious writers assert that

germaniques de l'intérieur dans l'état même—ou peu s'en faut—ou les avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles, elles n'avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument, ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre." Cf. also Fustel de Coulanges, *Histoire des Institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*, Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: "Nous ne possédons aucun document de source germanique . . . nous n'avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une monnaie."

³⁵Delbrück, *op. cit.*, p. 53: "Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist. Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind, diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben, doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug gezogen worden ist."

³⁶For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton, *History of Rome*, New York, 1891, p. 436: "Without troubling about military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome. The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A. D. to quell

Augustus in a spirit of imperialism sought to conquer Germany;³⁷ that historians who have the best standing as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province; that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force, in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a wide strip of the enemy's territory.

It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the rank of one of the world's greatest heroes.³⁸ As Koepp pertinently observes, many well-meant accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been written

the revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had advanced into the Teutoberger [*sic*] forest. Then Arminius turned and defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000 soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against the wall and exclaimed 'Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.'"

³⁷Creasy, *op. cit.*, p. 182: "It is a great fallacy, though apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had followed a very different course."

³⁸Cf., e. g., the poem *Hermann* (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning:

"Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,
Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;
Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,
Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen."

See also J. E. Riffert, "Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur," *Herrigs Archiv*, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, "Armin in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 36, pp. 332-40.

under mere impulse of national feeling.³⁹ However, that the glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp⁴⁰, who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: "eher dürften wir heute unseren Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben." So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius' case historians have taken liberty with historical

³⁹*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 24: "Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis! Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so ungenau, mit Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher, so mancher wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: 'In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus Nationalgefühl hat er's angefertigt.'" A good instance of blind adulation is that of Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 307: "Niemals wieder spiegelten sich die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin gewesen . . . das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation . . . die eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius."

⁴⁰*Westfalen*, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a similar celebration, by T. Beneke, *Siegfried und die Varusschlacht im Arnsberger Walde* (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier), Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: "Sechszwanzig Jahre war Siegfried alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht . . . Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit, Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gedenken, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der Ueberlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung der Welt ausgehen sollte."

facts under motives of idealization⁴¹: "Nous désapprouvons les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l'histoire pour créer, un Arminius légendaire et une Germanie idéale." Finally, we may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at their disposal.⁴²

⁴¹Quoted by Gardthausen, *op. cit.*, II, p. 793.

⁴²*Histoire des Institutions politiques*, etc., II, p. 247: "Il y a une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains, comme une école historique en France se plaît à parler des anciens Gaulois. On ne connaît pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu'il décuple le peu de renseignements que l'on possède.

CHAPTER II

SOURCES

The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius, II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, *Annales*, I, 60-62. These we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors, of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose had in view.¹

Cassius Dio (*ca.* 150— *ca.* 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the catastrophe.² Although he wrote in Greek, Dio

¹The great interest in the story of Arminius and his victory has led to an examination of the sources by many investigators. The following is a partial list of the works of which use has been made:

Knoke, *Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1887, pp. 4-17; 63-82. Knoke, *Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland: Nachtrag*, Berlin, 1889, pp. 19-31; 174-189. Knoke, *Fleckeisens Jahrbr. f. Phil.*, CXXXIX (1889), pp. 361-368. Delbrück, *Gesch. der Kriegskunst*, II, p. 65 f. Koepp, *Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 25 f. Koepp, *Westfalen*, I, p. 35. Von Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, III, 2, p. 272 f. Höfer, *Die Varusschlacht*, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 133-166. Asbach, *Rhein. Jahrbr.*, LXXXV (1888), pp. 14-54. Deppe, *Rhein. Jahrbr.*, LXXXVII (1889), p. 53 f. Riese, *Das rhein. Germanien in der antiken Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 39-84. Riese, *Forsch. zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit*, Frankfurt a. M., 1889. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, 41. Gardthausen, *Augustus*, II, 802. Wilisch, *Neue Jahrbr. f. d. kl. Alter.*, XXIII (1909), p. 322 f. Hayes, *Sources Relating to the Germanic Invasions*, New York, 1909, p. 36 f. Wolf, *Die That des Arminius*, Berlin, pp. 9-13. Winkelsesser, *De Rebus Divi Augusti in Germania Gestis*, Detmold, pp. 42 f. Edmund Meyer, *Untersuchungen über die Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde*, Berlin, 1893, p. 56 f.

²For details of his life, and an estimate of Dio as a writer, see Schwartz, Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.*, VI (1899), p. 1684 f.; Christ-Schmidt, *Gesch. der griech. Literatur*⁵, 1913, II, 2, p. 629 f.; Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Gesch.*, 1895, pp. 596-601; Peter, *Die gesch. Lit. über die röm. Kaiserzeit*, 1897, II, 84-101.

must be regarded as a Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.) in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises.³ Noticeable also is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after the rhetorical manner.⁴ Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or fourth hand, and that Dio's account was written at the very time when the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an *opus oratorium*, and sought first of all to hold the reader's attention by brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.

To Velleius (*ca.* 19 B. C.—*ca.* 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account.⁵ A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with undeniable *studium*, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut legatus.”⁶ His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely

³Schwartz, *loc. cit.*: “Die Schlachtbeschreibungen Dios sind ausnahmslos rhetorische Schildereien ohne jeden Wert . . . Ein drastischer Beweis, wie unmöglich es dem im Praktischen verständigen Manne war, als Schriftsteller den Bann der Schultheorie zu durchbrechen.”

⁴As an example of this tendency Christ (*l. c.*) cites 40, 41, where Dio writes a whole chapter of rhetorically effective scenes on the surrender of Vercingetorix and his last meeting with Caesar, whereas his source, Caes., *B. G.*, VII, 8, has only “Vercingetorix deditur.”

⁵For Velleius as a historian, see Schanz, *Röm. Literaturgesch.*, II, 2 (1913), p. 255 f.; Wachsmuth, p. 60 f.; Peter, I, 382 f.

⁶Velleius, II, 104, 3.

more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies, it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram, and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver Age, of which he is the earliest representative.⁷ His reflections and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius' training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.

L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of Hadrian's time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two short books of Rome's wars from the foundation of the city to the era of Augustus. As to Florus' purpose in writing, and his rating as a rhetorician, scholars are agreed.⁸ He composed solely from rhetorical motives⁹, hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions, and contradic-

⁷Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, I, p. 302: "Velleius ist für uns der erste, der, jedes historisches Sinnes bar, Geschichte nur vom Standpunkt des Rhetors geschrieben hat."

⁸Rosbach, Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.*, VI, pp. 2761-70; Wachsmuth, p. 610 f.; Peter, II, 278 f.; Schanz, III (1896), p. 56 f.; Eussner, *Philol.*, 37 (1872), pp. 130-136.

⁹Cf. Rosbach, *loc. cit.*, p. 2763: "Dabei ist er nicht Historiker, sondern Rhetor und will kein Handbuch der römischen Geschichte schreiben, sondern aus dem besonders geeigneten Stoff sein Beredsamkeit zeigen"; Wachsmuth, p. 610: "So ist bei Florus sachliches Interesse ganz geschwunden und nur ein rhetorisch-stilistisches übrig geblieben und damit sein Werth als Geschichtsquelle auf Null reducirt"; Eussner, *op. cit.*, p. 133: "Ihm ist die Geschichte Roms, welche die Weltgeschichte in sich begreift, nichts als ein *corpus vile*, an dem die stilistische Begabung und Kunst sich erproben kann Freilich fehlt dem Künstler der Sinn für das Massvolle, der Geschmack für das Einfache. Die Umrisse der Zeichnung verrathen seine Vorliebe für das Colossale, die Farben des Gemäldes seine Neigung zum Glänzenden und Blendenden."

tions.¹⁰ Florus' work is declamatory in tone, shows no traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual, and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as *ingens*, *immensus*, *incrēdibilis*, *perpetuus*, etc., and that he was himself conscious of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as *quippe*, seventy-five times, and *quasi*, more than a hundred times. In Florus each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the honor of being our chief authority.¹¹

It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are contradictory¹², notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to show that there is no conflict between them.¹³ According to Dio, supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.¹⁴ Further, a

¹⁰Cf. Wachsmuth, p. 612: "Wie ein solcher Litterat mit dem historischen und chronologischen Thatsachen umspringt, kann man sich denken, und das Sündenregister seiner absichtlosen Versehen und absichtlichen Verdrehungen ist ellenlang." See also Peter, II, 289; 292.

¹¹Equally pertinent for Florus is von Ranke's criticism (II, 2, p. 396 N. 1) of Dio: "Bei Dio muss man immer seine Bemerkungen, die aus einer späteren Epoche herrühren, von den Thatsachen, die er authentisch kennen lernt, scheiden; dann haben auch die ersten ihren Wert."

¹²Von Ranke, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 275: "Schon daraus sieht man, dass die Nachrichten bei Dio mit den beiden andern Autoren sich nicht vereinigen lassen. Es ist eben, als wenn von zwei ganz verschiedenen Ereignissen die Rede wäre, die nur durch den Namen des Varus zusammengehalten werden."

¹³Knoke, *Fleck. Jahrbr. f. Phil.*, CXXXIX (1889), p. 368; cf. also Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 41; "Der Bericht des Florus beruht keineswegs auf ursprünglich anderen Quellen . . . sondern lediglich auf dem dramatischen Zusammenrücken der Motive, wie es allen Historiken dieses Schlages eigen ist."

¹⁴On the assumption that a choice must be made between Dio and Florus, a great difference of opinion has arisen among investigators as to their respective value. Von Ranke, followed by Höfer, Asbach, and others, argues that Dio's report is untrustworthy, while that of Florus is correct. This view has been rejected by Knoke, Edmund Meyer, Deppe, Mommsen, and Gardthausen.

detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio tells us¹⁵ that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the other writers, and is in itself improbable¹⁶, as Roman generals had frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus' sudden reversal of fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest officers committed suicide.¹⁷ If this remarkable event took place, it is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus' body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to surrender, while Varus' legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted. Dio's description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction to that revealed by Tacitus' account of conditions in Varus' camp, as discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down, i. e. the camp was laid out after a day's loss with heavy fighting. Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered or accumulated, just as Varus'

¹⁵56, 18.

¹⁶Von Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 275: "Dass sich nun Varus in unwegesame Gegenden mit seinem ganzen Lager, seinem ganzen Gepäck habe führen lassen, um eine kleine Völkerschaft niederzuwerfen, ist . . . kaum zu glauben."

¹⁷Von Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 275: "Diese letzte Nachricht ist die unglaublichste von allen."

men had fled or made their stand in the final catastrophe.¹⁸ Tacitus' description of a regular camp, the "wide circuit and headquarters" on a scale suitable for the whole force, is utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was pitched "after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain." And so is there contradiction in Tacitus' statement that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were on the first day's march before their first encampment; on the second the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.

According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it. Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by Segestes of the enemy's plans. Further, the storming of a single camp is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly implied in Dio's narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests, swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus' account is contradicted by Velleius¹⁹, who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus' camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment

¹⁸Cf. Tac., *Ann.*, I, 61: "Prima Vari castra lato ambitu et dimensis principis trium legionum manus ostentabant; dein semiruto vallo, humili fossa occisae iam reliquiae consedissee intellegebantur. Medio campi albertia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disiecta vel aggerata."

¹⁹ II, 119, 4.

(for which there is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly not the summer camp, as Florus relates.

Florus' account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as the theme for the part that follows: "Germaniam quoque utinam vincere tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita." The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under Varus' rule: "sed difficilior est provinciam obtinere quam facere."²⁰ Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking; that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned for this conquest is as follows: "set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem his transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem concupierat facere provinciam."²¹ It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter "had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest of

²⁰This same observation is made in slightly different words (I, 33, 8) with respect to affairs in Spain, recently won by Scipio Africanus: "plus est provinciam retinere quam facere."

²¹We must notice that in Florus' account *provincia* is used several times, and in no clearly defined way. He says, e. g. (II, 30, 23): "missus in eam provinciam Drusus primos domuit Usipites"; and again (II, 30, 26): "et praeterea in tutelam provinciae praesidia ubique disposuit." In the first *provincia*="land," since at that time, before Drusus' campaigns, it is clear there could have been no province even in a rhetorical sense; in the second it can easily refer to the province of Gaul.

Britain."²² If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar's supposed wish. Julius Caesar's expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen himself²³, merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy of his father.

How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the following: "quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt."²⁴ That is, according to Florus, Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a long series of important events.²⁵ The reason for this statement is Florus' indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme "*difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere*," and hence to bring into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was directly responsible for its loss.²⁶ Florus' method is observable elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his guard. It suits Florus'

²²Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, V, p. 9. In point of fact what charge had Julius Caesar given his heirs at all? At the time of his death he was planning an expedition against the Getae and the Parthians. There is not a shred of evidence that he himself contemplated action of any kind in the northwest, or ever enjoined it upon his heirs.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 155.

²⁴II, 30, 30.

²⁵Drusus died in 9 B. C. Tiberius was in command during the years 8 and 7; Domitius Ahenobarbus, years 6-1. M. Vinicius took charge in 1 B. C. Tiberius, on his return from Rhodes, was again in command in 4, 5, and 6 A. D., and after he started on his great campaign against Maroboduus (year 6), Varus was placed in charge in Germany, probably at once, or at all events early in the year 7.

²⁶Note also the purpose of Florus' insipid and misleading exaggeration of the result of Drusus' deeds, II, 30, 27: "ea denique in Germania pax erat, ut mutati homines, alia terra, caelum ipsum mitius molliusque solito videretur." Drusus' success is magnified by way of contrast with Varus' failure, and with the aim of preparing the reader for the statement "*sed difficilius est*," etc.

purpose, however, to represent them as having recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence of Florus' inaccuracy is found in his statement that "to this day the barbarians are in possession of the two eagles." They had as a matter of fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the time of Tiberius²⁷, and the third during the reign of Claudius.²⁸ With this fact established, Florus' story to the effect that one of the standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus' concluding statement: "hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret." This has no value save that of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who discuss the effect of Varus' defeat upon Rome's imperial policy.

Velleius' undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius' second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of Varus' legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman

²⁷Tac., *Ann.*, I, 60; II, 25.

²⁸Cassius Dio, 60, 8.

empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the beginning of his command still continued with him.

Certain disagreements between Tacitus' account of the Varus disaster and that of our other sources have already been cited.²⁹ But of even more importance for our discussion is Tacitus' warm personal eulogy of Arminius at the notice of his death.³⁰ There can be no doubt that this tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect of Varus' defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus' sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic;³¹ that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become impossible and the monarchy necessary³², the terrors and indignities of Domitian's reign embittered his whole thought;³³ that although he felt that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state the best possible combination of liberty and authority³⁴, "those happy and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say what they thought"³⁵, the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising judgment found in Tacitus' representation of the whole imperial

²⁹See p. 25 f.

³⁰*Ann.*, II, 88: "liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium lacesierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello victus. Septem et triginta annos vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturque adhuc barbaras apud gentes, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus recentium incuriosi."

³¹Boissier, *L'Opposition sous les Césars*, 1892, p. 288 f.

³²*Hist.*, I, 16.

³³*Agr.*, 45: "praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et adspici, cum suspiria nostra subscriberentur; cum denotandis tot hominum palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem muniebat"; *Ibid.*, 2: "dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum; et sicut vetus aetas vidit quid ultimum in libertate esset, ita nos quid in servitute."

³⁴Cf. Boissier, *op. cit.*, p. 30: "il possédait enfin le gouvernement qui lui semblait préférable aux autres, et, sous les plus mauvais empereurs il n'a jamais attendu et souhaité que l'avènement d'un bon prince." *Agr.*, 3: "nunc demum redit animus; sed quamquam primo statim beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum ac libertatem, augeatque quotidie felicitatem temporum Nerva Trajanus."

³⁵*Hist.*, I, 1.

period covered by the *Annals* owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus himself felt at the hands of Domitian.³⁶ Having at best little or no sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus.³⁷ He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors³⁸ that down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire. These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering on affection.³⁹ And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the Roman aristocracy⁴⁰, so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led by the supine and incompetent Varus.

³⁶Spooner, *Histories of Tacitus*, 1891, Introd., p. 7.

³⁷See Chapter III, n. 68.

³⁸That Tacitus disliked Tiberius' conservative attitude toward Germany is clear from such a passage as *Ann.*, IV, 74, where it is implied also that for selfish reasons Tiberius was unwilling to entrust the war to any commander who might thus gain military prestige: "clarum inde inter Germanos Frisium nomen, dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum permitteret. Neque senatus in eo cura an imperii extrema dehonestarentur."

³⁹Ferguson, "Characterization in Tacitus," *Class. Weekly*, VII, 4 f.

⁴⁰Cf. Mackail, *Latin Literature*, p. 210: "What he [Tacitus] has in view throughout [the *Germania*] is to bring the vices of civilized luxury into stronger relief by a contrast with the idealized simplicity of the German tribes . . . the social life of the Western German tribes is drawn in implicit or expressed contrast to the elaborate social conventions of what he considers a corrupt and degenerate civilization." Gudeman (ed. of *Agricola and Germania*, Boston, 1900, Introd., p. xli), though rejecting the ethical purpose of the *Germania*, says: "Now to a man like Tacitus who, dissatisfied with the conditions in which his lot was cast, longed to dwell in the 'good old times,' these sturdy vigorous Germans naturally came to serve as a welcome background for his pessimistic reflections."

It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus' generalization, "liberator haud dubie Germaniae." Does Tacitus here summarize correctly the facts as given by him of Rome's conflict with Germany under the leadership of Varus and his successors?⁴¹ Did Arminius become a liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus' successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the Romans? An examination of Tacitus' narrative forces a negative to each of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D.⁴² In this year Germanicus fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods. Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before Germanicus marched back to the Rhine.⁴³ Then acting on an appeal from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued, together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the wife of Arminius.⁴⁴ Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusei and bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri⁴⁵, himself pursued Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes.⁴⁶ The Germans, after engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered and the slaughter continued as long as daylight

⁴¹See T. S. Jerome, "The Tacitean Tiberius: A study in Historiographic Method," *Class. Phil.*, VII, pp. 265-292. In this valuable study two main conclusions are reached: (1) That the disharmonies between data and generalizations in the *Annals* are so constant and glaring as to give conclusive evidence of Tacitus' untrustworthiness in that work; (2) that the *Annals* are "an example of historical writing done according to the method of the rhetorician, and that this is the true explanation of those disharmonies which are not explicable on the theories that Tacitus told the truth, or followed an established tradition, or that a strong bias against Tiberius entered into the composition thereof."

⁴²*Ann.*, I, 55.

⁴³*Ibid.*, I, 56.

⁴⁴*Ann.*, I, 57.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, I, 60.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, I, 63.

lasted.⁴⁷ Tacitus adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health, and abundance.

With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted to fighting.⁴⁸ The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser. Tacitus, after giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell the Germans⁴⁹, says that it was a great victory for the Romans and without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans.⁵⁰ But after the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by fleet to winter quarters⁵¹, the Germans were encouraged to renew their attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any misfortune.⁵² Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are his concluding words: "nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if another summer were added the war could be brought to completion."⁵³ Immediately following this we read of Germanicus' recall by Tiberius to celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for this reason or for the far more probable one,

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, I, 68.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, II, 5.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, II, 17-18.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, II, 19-22.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, II, 23-24.

⁵²*Ibid.*, II, 25.

⁵³*Ibid.*, II, 26.

assigned by Tiberius himself⁵⁴, it is evident to any one following the story as told by Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus' successors. Tacitus' account shows on the one hand that the Romans were not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusci, led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against each other;⁵⁵ that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen, and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen.⁵⁶ The opportunity here for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country's liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist. Hence, "liberator haud dubie Germaniae," notwithstanding the fact that this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.

⁵⁴*Ann.*, II, 26: "se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse; sic Sugambros in deditionem acceptos, sic Suebos, regemque Maroboduum pace obstrictum; posse et Cheruscos ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esset, internis discordiis relinquī," i. e. that the Romans were acting from diplomatic considerations, and in accordance with this policy he himself, sent nine times into Germany by Augustus, had by diplomacy brought the Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus into peaceful relations; that the Cherusci also, and other hostile tribes, now that enough had been done to satisfy Roman honor, might be left to their own internal dissensions. See also Jäger (*l. c.*): "die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich." Lang (*Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius*, Diss. Jena, 1911, p. 56) says that Germanicus was not recalled through envy; that Tiberius avoided all wars except such as were immediately necessary: "Aus diesem Grunde (nihil aequē Tiberium anxium habebat quam ne composita turbarentur, *Ann.*, II, 65), suchte er alle Kriege zu vermeiden, die nicht unbedingt im Interesse des Reiches lagen. Den Abbruch der Germanenfeldzüge veranlasste nicht Angst oder Neid gegen Germanicus, wie kurzsichtige Schriftsteller jener Zeit vermuten, sondern die Tatsache, dass wenig dabei erreicht, den Provinzen jedoch grosse Lasten aufgebürdet wurden."

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, II, 44.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, II, 88.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF THE ACCEPTED VIEW

Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part without question by later writers—and their availability for sound historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted view as to the effect of Varus' defeat.

The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions, which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000 troops.¹ The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the Romans were hemmed in, we are told², by woods, lakes, and bodies of the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests, a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to the Roman defeat.³ Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed by a leader very generally represented⁴ as indo-

¹Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 41; 51; Idem, *Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht*, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (*Les Légions de Varus*, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.

²Vell., II, 119.

³Velleius' words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents and conditions: "ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate fortunae circumventus . . . inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis"; cf. also Tac., *Ann.*, I, 65: "Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus emersum".

⁴Vell., II, 117; II, 120: "ex quo apparet Varum magis imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum"; Suet., *Tib.*, 18: "Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse." Cf. also Tac., *Ann.*, II, 46: "quoniam

lent, rash, and self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.⁵

This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against Maroboduus⁶, while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united under the same command.⁷ This diffi-

tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum perfidia deceperit" [Arminius], where "vagas" suggests an army marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper leadership. So Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 40) calls Varus: "Ein Mann . . . von tragem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische Begabung und Erfahrung"; Deppe (*Rh. Jahrb.*, 87, p. 59) accepting Zangemeister's date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see *Westd. Zeitschr.*, 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: "Die Soldaten waren an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet, entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den *Ann.*, II, 46, nennt 'tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum'".

⁵Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them, particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (*Die Oertlichkeit*, etc., p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three times their equal.

⁶Cf. Tac., *Ann.*, II, 46: "At se [Maroboduus] duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse." Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen.

⁷See Eduard Meyer, "Kaiser Augustus" (in *Kleine Schriften*, Halle a. S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, *Suet., Aug.*, 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling ("Zur Geschichte des römischen Heeres

culty has not escaped notice. Schiller recognizes it, and while denying that the explanation is to be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen observes⁹: "We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously governed universal empire." Immediately following this Mommsen offers as explanation: "there is no other reason to be found for it than that they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the em-

in Gallien," *Rh. Jahrb.*, 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27 legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the uprising in Illyricum.

⁸*Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit*, I, p. 232 f.: "Der Verlust—er mag 16,000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen." Koepp (*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: "so ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte, dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse." Much the same view is expressed by him in *Westfalen*, I, p. 40: "nicht als ob der Untergang dreier Legionen eine Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboden hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden."

⁹*Hist. of Rome*, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: "The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which . . . an isolated failure in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course."

pire." Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome's policy in the time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus¹⁰, believes that Augustus turned back to his "weaker wisdom" of an earlier day (the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius' revolt and the battle as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army, the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which permitted service in the army only to citizens.¹¹ To have subdued Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.

These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome's lack of resources necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and Germany at this period.

When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof, been employed. The

¹⁰*Kaiser Augustus*, p. 116.

¹¹*Kaiser Augustus*, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., *Aug.*, 25. According to Suetonius *libertini* were employed twice by Augustus: "Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni." These two occasions, at the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.

population of the empire under Augustus was not far from 55,000,000¹², and, as service was voluntary and men of any nationality were admitted, at least into the *auxilia*, practically the whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions were restricted to Roman citizens, and the *auxilia*, consisting of foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries¹³, but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the so-called *legiones vernaculae*), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil, *Ecl.* I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and out "miles . . . barbarus."¹⁴ Now Augustus appears to have made some con-

¹²This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer ("Bevölkerung des Alterums," *Conrad's Handw. d. Staatsw.*, 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who accepts with slight modifications, Beloch's calculations. The latter (*Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (1886), p. 507) gave 54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (*Rh. Mus.*, IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible, would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch's revision, calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions, and O. Seeck (*Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, III, 13 (1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch's vigorous reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more conservative figure.

¹³That this was the custom followed for the *socii* and *auxilia* during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, *N. H.*, 25, 33, 6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 5, in speaking of the "sociæ triremes alasque et auxilia cohortium," adds, "neque multo secus in numero virium." Detailed information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere given. See Liebenam, art. "Exercitus," *Pauly-Wiss.*, VI, 1601, 1607. G. L. Cheesman (*The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, Oxford, 1914, p. 53 ff.) finds that the *auxilia* under Augustus were at least as numerous as the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf. also Delbrück, *op. cit.*, II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).

¹⁴Cf. Ed. Meyer, *ibid.*, p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by Liebenam, art. "Dilectus," *Pauly-Wiss.*, V, 611 ff.

sistent efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least, from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the Latin Occident¹⁵, and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army.¹⁶ Seeck indeed, after a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman citizens of the provinces.¹⁷ But granting this position for the sake of argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legionaries only from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of the empire

¹⁵Mommsen, *Epith. Epigr.*, V (1884), p. 159 ff.; *Hermes*, XIX (1884), p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.

¹⁶We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus, whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, *l. c.*, p. 611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing in the general conditions which required it.

¹⁷*Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a Galatian contingent, the *Deiotariana*, which was given citizenship and a place in the army (Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, 2nd ed. (1885), p. 70; O. Seeck, *Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt*, 3rd ed., I, p. 260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome (Tac., *Ann.*, I, 31, "vernacula multitudo"; cf. Mommsen, *Hermes*, XIX (1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck's statement of the system which he believes Augustus followed is: "Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und Alen und einen Theil der Flotte."

(about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.)¹⁸ was sufficient to raise an army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause, which, with an equal number of *auxilia*, would yield a total potential military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken.¹⁹ That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a total army of between five and six hundred thousand men²⁰, while after Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything, and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000 men.²¹

However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we must remember that the resources of the whole population were available to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency, and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men; for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception con-

¹⁸In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the *Mon. Anc.*, 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population (*Augustus*, II, 532; and *Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik*, III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the numbers in the *Mon. Anc.* include women and children seems the only one possible. See Meyer's complete refutation of Kornemann, *Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie*, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.

¹⁹This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her total population in the field, even according to the most conservative estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, I, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 349, 355 ff.

²⁰Mommsen, *Hermes*, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as 300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.

²¹The details in Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsver.*, V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884), p. 444 f.

tributed abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed. Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or three campaigns.

For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions varied somewhat from time to time. After Actium Augustus had about 50 legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt.²² Three were lost in 9 A. D., and in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death was 25.²³ Taking this latter as that of the average number about

²²Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, "Zur Geschichte des Rheinheeres," *Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt*, 1910, on the date of the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen, *Augustus*, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above note 7.

²³Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Liebenam in *Pauly-Wiss.*, VI, 1605. We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, *op. cit.*, p. 448 ff.

the time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the legion at 6000 men²⁴, and adding in an equal number of *auxilia*, the city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached contingents²⁵, we get about 325,000. The effective force would be somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if any under 300,000 men.²⁶ Now the majority of these could have been launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions, or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 16), and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen legions and the whole of the

²⁴The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently summarized by R. Cagnat, "Legio," *Daremberg et Saglio*, III, p. 1050 f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, *Lager und Heer der Römer*, 1912, pp. 1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size, from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich's review of Stolle's work. *Berl. Philol. Wochenschr.*, 1913, 539 ff.

²⁵A list of these is given by Liebenam, *op. cit.*, p. 1607 ff

²⁶Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (*The Annals of Tacitus*, I (1884), p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (*Hermes*, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (*Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen soldiery out of Italy: in his *Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt*, 3rd ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000 to 350,000; H. Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, II, 2nd ed. (1904), p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (*Augustus*, I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18 legions were maintained. G. Boissier's number, 500,000 (*L'opposition sous les Césars*, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the *auxilia* three times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in doubling that!

otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.

On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities (Tacitus, *Germania*, 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land on the marches between hostile tribes.²⁷ Agriculture was primitive, and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in fact (Gutsche und Schultze, *Deutsche Geschichte*, I (1894), p. 236, for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than 15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a very difficult undertaking.²⁸ Fustel de Coulanges long since and H. Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the

²⁷For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.

²⁸E. M. Arndt (*Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft*, III (1845), p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile, but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000. H. Von Sybel (*Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums*, 1881, p. 80) estimates the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte* (1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte* (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose an incredibly dense population.

numerical weakness of the tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century²⁹, and Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small.³⁰

H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the calculation of the population of Germany.³¹ On the basis of Beloch's calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of 4.5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000 inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole nation.³² This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as five thousand,

²⁹*Histoire des Institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*, I (1875), "L'Invasion Germanique," p. 310 ff. For Delbrück's results see the chapter entitled "Zahlen," *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies, a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (*Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik*, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the older view, but Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.

³⁰"Observations sur l'état et le nombre des populations germaniques dans la seconde moitié du IV^e siècle, d'après Ammien Marcellin," *Mélanges Cagnat*, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.

³¹"Der urgermanische Gau und Staat," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p. 474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, *Gesch. der deutschen Stämme*, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück's calculations indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.

³²*Preuss. Jahrb.*, p. 482.

at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.

A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after Delbrück's critique.³³ Taking the results of extensive studies in the population of nations at different stages of economic development, he estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for "the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about the beginning of the Christian era" to have varied between the limits 5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results reached by these three different methods employed independently, the historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are the following.

Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included a large number of tribes (even the distant Semnones and the Longobardi) seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of 74,000 men.³⁴ This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out³⁵, bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force, twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him.³⁶ Now this is probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear arms, i. e., following the customary Roman calculations³⁷, one-fourth of the whole population. The Marcomannic

³³*Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*, I, Leipzig, 1901, p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.

³⁴Velleius, II, 109.

³⁵*Op. cit.*, I, p. 48; II, p. 209.

³⁶See Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1169 on this campaign.

³⁷This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (*Bell. Gall.*, I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf. Beloch, *Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system of

confederation at its greatest development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even terms: hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the two confederations was about equal.³⁸ Of course a large number of the tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control, but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and Schmoller.

Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members, the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as E. Levasseur, who has used this *datum* for his calculations of the population of Gaul, observes³⁹, the num-

reckoning. Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, 81, p. 480, uses the one to five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.

³⁸That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus' statement that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most improbable; see L. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 181.

³⁹*La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789*, I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (*Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for calculations. Beloch, however, (*Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), p. 414 f.) utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word *ἀνδρες* here as equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus, who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch's remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but only of the fighting men,

ber of large tribes was probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000) must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i. e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great altar at Lyons⁴⁰, existed in Posidonius' day, one would get a total population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch's own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but prefers 5,700,000.⁴¹ Now the Germans being without cities, developed agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes⁴², a maximum of 3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23 tribes⁴³, a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the population of Germany.

Finally, one might note Lamprecht's ingenious estimate of the population in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative number of place names recorded for different epochs.⁴⁴ He finds that a district which in 1800 A. D.

seems to go too far. If one number be known it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted proportion between the total population of a district and the number of fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on just such estimates.

⁴⁰Strabo, IV, 3, 2.

⁴¹*Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.

⁴²Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.

⁴³Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, p. 428, note, and *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.

⁴⁴*Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1886, I, p. 148 ff., esp. 161 ff.

had a population of about 450,000, had in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about 23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era⁴⁵, we must bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.

We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar's calculation of one man for every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people could collect from a considerable extent of territory⁴⁶, we should get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower Rhine,

⁴⁵Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa's imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 x 248 m.; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, IV, 98.

⁴⁶See Beloch, *Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his *Bevölkerung*, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.

remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and *auxilia*. Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions⁴⁷, and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than eight⁴⁸, and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of meeting his eight legions.⁴⁹

We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence, partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service, and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very important rôle in the great battles, and in the

⁴⁷Tac., *Ann.*, I, 56.

⁴⁸Tac., *Ann.*, II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.

⁴⁹Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.

one serious defeat of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned.⁵⁰ Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than that of Gaul in Caesar's time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit them at various stations inland as the armies advanced: besides, the numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army.⁵¹

This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other, or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet cooperated with the Rhine armies.

To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority⁵² in total population, size of army, general resources, equip-

⁵⁰Delbrück, *Preuss. Jahrb.*, p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.

⁵¹Velleius, II, 106.

⁵²The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, *Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, *KL. Schr.*, p. 486; von Domaszewski, *Geschichte der*

ment, tactics, strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore, did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on, the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different. We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes. To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable position.

It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat. One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself, if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above³³, "without further direct military consequences." If there was an advantage on either side it was with the Romans³⁴, for immediately the army was

römischen Kaiser, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized "dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war" (*Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).

³³See p. 37.

³⁴Cf. Koepf, *Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 35: "Kurz, als Tiberius am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer ergänzt, ja vermehrt"; Hübner, *op. cit.*, p. III: "Nach des Varus Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder"; Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, V, 53: "The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably reinforced"; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: "damals . . . wurde die Rheinarmee auf acht Legionen verstärkt." So Niese, *Röm. Gesch.*, p. 298.

increased to eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its head.⁵⁵ It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition. Tiberius' activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius (II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter's partiality and proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt that Tiberius proceeded cautiously⁵⁶ in the years 10 and 11, but in the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri⁵⁷, resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt Tiberius' assassination.⁵⁸ Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested only one more year for the completion of his work.⁵⁹ This means that Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control of

⁵⁵Vell., II, 120: "mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam . . . ultro Rhenum cum exercitu transgreditur."

⁵⁶Suet., *Tib.*, 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.

⁵⁷Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.

⁵⁸Suet., *Tib.*, 19.

⁵⁹Cf. Tac., *Ann.*, II, 26, 4: "Precante Germanico annum efficiendis coeptis." This is the basis of Mommsen's statement (*Hist. of Rome*, V, p. 59): [Germanicus] "reported to Rome that in the next campaign he should have the subjugation of Germany complete." And just preceding this the same author says: "The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe." See also p. 54 f. for further discussion of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in the record Riese explains, *Forschungen*, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed force shows beyond doubt that Rome's resources were as yet by no means exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says⁶⁰: "Nevertheless they had already once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war these results could not fail to be reached." Gardthausen⁶¹ too agrees that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had she tried.

As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops. If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia had been put down.⁶² It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany's subjugation, if he had wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat? Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus reveals preeminently in his public and private life.⁶³ Nor is

⁶⁰*Hist. of Rome*, V, p. 62.

⁶¹*I.*, p. 1201.

⁶²*Cf.* p. 36.

⁶³*Cf.* Gardthausen, I, p. 492: "Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger." These characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically embellished gossip about Augustus' discomposure after the defeat of Varus; see Suet., *Aug.*, 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest evi-

there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus' nature a desire for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable to the undertaking.⁶⁴ Meyer, after contrasting Augustus' calm and deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says⁶⁵: "In all seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art." No basis whatever exists for the reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar.⁶⁶ Considering then

dence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111,1). So there was profound alarm at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius Capitolinus, *Marcus Antoninus*, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13), while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied with fear (Sall., *Jug.*, 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt, and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.

⁶⁴Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated by Gardthausen's further statement: "Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte." These words are nothing more than an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are forced to explain, viz., Augustus' reversal of policy in "die schwere Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der fortgesetzten Eroberung."

⁶⁵*Kleine Schriften*, p. 462.

⁶⁶Meyer, *l. c.*: "Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss unbegründet."

that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation, that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery, there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome's entire previous history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been so greatly diminished.⁶⁷ That too in the face of the fact that he was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: "nulli genti bello per iniuriam lato."⁶⁸ That he was a man of peace is shown also by the statement of Suetonius;⁶⁹ and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus

⁶⁷The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I, p. 637; Furneaux, *Tacitus*, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 8: "ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte."

⁶⁸*Monumentum Ancyranum*, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., *Aug.*, 101; Tac., *Ann.*, I, 11: "quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam." The sneer, "metu an per invidiam", found in the words of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to restrict Augustus' peace policy to the period *after* Varus' defeat. But no such restriction should be made. We now know that the *Monum. Ancy.* was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus' life, but was finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9 A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.

⁶⁹*Aug.*, 21: "nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit."

laid down as his policy that "he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the former [subject territory] or that any new regions should be acquired, but deemed it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already possessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate." Similar too, we note, is the view of Gibbon:⁷⁰ "It was reserved for Augustus to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and to introduce a spirit of moderation into the public councils. Inclined to peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that Rome, in her present exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms." Finally, Augustus found no joy in war for war's sake, as did Julius Caesar.⁷¹

Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes and character would determine the policy of the empire. And, as seen above, it was contrary to Augustus' character and wishes to carry on extensive wars of conquest. Further, that peace was Rome's object at this period is universally admitted.⁷² The reason for this desire for peace Meyer sums up as follows⁷³: "weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so furchtbaren Charakter getragen hatten, weil . . . aus dem entsetzlichen Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sicherheit um jeden Preis." While it is true that this feeling and condition refer more particularly to the early part of Augustus' reign, the same policy of peace manifested itself all

⁷⁰*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. 1910, I. p. 1 i.

⁷¹Gardthausen, I, p. 317: "Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte." Tacitus' statement (*Ann.*, I, 3), that Augustus' later wars against the Germans were "abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi imperii", does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.

⁷²Vell., II, 89: "Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciiis auctoritas." This is well expressed by Botsford, *Hist. of Rome*, p. 205: "The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers, to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of peace."

⁷³*Kleine Schriften*, p. 455.

through his rule, and was continued by his successors.⁷⁴ The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since Rome's beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the first few years of Augustus' reign⁷⁵ proves that he was eager for a cessation of war.

The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus' defeat has long been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, "a wound to the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire."⁷⁶ While it was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius' legion⁷⁷, which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome's policy more than Varus' misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems highly improbable that "a wound to her pride" could have done so, when she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.

We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt was made, why

⁷⁴Gardthausen, I. p. 477: "Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt." Cf. Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 56: "Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe und Ordnung zu verschaffen."

⁷⁵Suet., *Aug.*, 22: "Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo brevioris temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit."

⁷⁶Davis, *Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire*, New York, 1907, p. 59.

⁷⁷Dio, 54, 20; Suet., *Aug.*, 23.

was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination, contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent historian who has investigated the subject⁷⁸, despite the fact that it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus' plans with respect to Germany "das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung"⁷⁹, welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man meinte, nach Osten weiter schiffend in das caspische Meer gelangen

⁷⁸See Eduard Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 230: "He [Augustus] might have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made world-conquest impossible"; *Ibid.*, p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p. 1069; Drumann, *Röm. Gesch.*, IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p. 57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf. J. Geffcken, *Kaiser Julianus*, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: "Julian zeigt . . . wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat"). In *The Caesars*, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: "For I did not give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome's] empire at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused." (Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).

⁷⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke's position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany's conquest was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results, contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his times.

zu können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde umkreise." Further, he speaks of Augustus' ambition as directed toward the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander. Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic error of Strabo.⁸⁰ And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium. And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the "Emperor of the Sahara" would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing his military renown can

⁸⁰II, 39.

be used as a valid reason for his having altered his belief in this respect.⁸¹

Kornemann⁸² indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for, such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to share his own joy and that of the prince's family in the celebration of public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added to the *Monumentum Ancyranum* (which Kornemann believes was a political document written in five distinct parts and at as many different periods⁸³), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus, forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added, about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35, in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this achievement. However, Kornemann's theory and the deduction therefrom as to Augustus' attitude toward imperial con-

⁸¹Cf. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*,² 1910, IV, p. 300: "Octavian ergriff als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrößerter Koloss in sich zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung. Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen."

⁸²"Zum Monum. Ancy." *Beiträge zur alten Gesch.*, II (1902), pp. 141-162.

⁸³This view, together with the statement that the last addition was made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann in placing the number of revisions at seven (*Klio*, IV (1904), pp. 88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D. (*Beiträge zur alten Gesch.*, III (1903), p. 74 f.).

quest find contradiction in an article by Wileken⁸⁴, who argues that while Augustus worked long over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the three parts, *honores, impensae, res gestae*, form a whole, and were written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany. Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that it was inserted after the other two.⁸⁵ For Germany could not have been called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9 B. C. Hence the first outline of the *res gestae* antedates not only the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore Augustus' warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the date claimed by Kornemann.

This conclusion Kornemann combats⁸⁶ with the assumption that while the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A. D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius' naval expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir. But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier⁸⁷, on the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates

⁸⁴"Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyrae," *Hermes*, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.

⁸⁵Vulić, "Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano," *Riv. di Storia Ant.*, XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: "Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam pacavi", i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which for the time Rome's beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word "provinciae" (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the abandonment of the geographical order.

⁸⁶"Nochmals das Monum. Ancyrae," *Klio*, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.

⁸⁷"Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti," *Mélanges Cagnat*, Paris, 1912, p. 144.

to each fragment of the *Monumentum Ancyranum* and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14 A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said is that the three parts, *honores*, *impensae*, *res gestae* were written at three different times and that they correspond to the different and successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however, that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D.⁸⁸ Kornemann's theories are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their rejection by such scholars as Wilken, Gardthousen, Koepf, Mareks, Vulić, and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus' attitude toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly, as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining Augustus' Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes their "baptism of fire", and a chance to win the military prestige, which down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of events.

More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year 16 B. C. is cited as the time which

⁸⁸Cf. Bésnier, *op. cit.*, p. 145: "nous savons en tout cas, qu' Auguste n'a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu'il a commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l'an 12 av. J.-C. et peut-être plus tôt encore, qu'en l'an 6 de notre ère il a cessé d'y travailler, et que dans l'intervalle il l'a enrichie graduellement d'additions nombreuses et significatives Le souple génie politique d'Auguste s'y manifeste tout entier et l'on y retrouve, présentées sous le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s'est inspiré tour à tour pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli."

brought a significant change in Rome's foreign policy⁸⁹, and committed Augustus to the subjugation of Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg⁹⁰ as follows: "es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben, abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege zu eröffnen." The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of Melo⁹¹, attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide⁹², cut off and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its standard.⁹³ To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon "einen Gegenstoss nach Germanien hinein und . . . ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe."⁹⁴ It is also Gardthausen's belief that by reason of Lollius' defeat Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that he finally

⁸⁹Cf. Ritterling, *op. cit.*, p. 176: "Aber eine durchgreifende Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des durch diese hervorgerufen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen Eine Eroberung des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen zur Ausführung dieses Planes."

⁹⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁹¹*Monumentum Ancyranum*, VI, 3.

⁹²Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.

⁹³Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., *Aug.*, 23.

⁹⁴Paul Meyer, *Der Triumphzug des Germanicus*, p. 85.

decided on the latter.⁹⁵ Eduard Meyer finds not only the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus' wars against Germany⁹⁶: "nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organization Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen." So Schiller urges the same reasons.⁹⁷ Likewise it is Mommsen's view⁹⁸ that Augustus' change in policy was necessary to Rome's security; that it is easy to understand how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps; that "Great Germany" (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg⁹⁹ thinks that Augustus was greatly influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the three military leaders of his household, his spirited step-sons, Tiberius and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.¹⁰⁰ Gardthausen also believes¹⁰¹

⁹⁵I, p. 1067. According to Niese, *op. cit.*, p. 295, the decision came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: "Dann erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen."

⁹⁶*Kleine Schriften*, p. 471.

⁹⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 214: "Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und . . . auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu verteidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende."

⁹⁸*Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 9.

⁹⁹*Op. cit.*, 29.

¹⁰⁰The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale, *General Hist. of Rome*, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (*Hist. of the Roman Empire*, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of "The project of extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus." Cf. Mommsen, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 10: "Ob Augustus ganz von freien Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag."

¹⁰¹I, p. 1049 f.

that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious. As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor's counsels, and no attempt was made to break away from Augustus' policy of peace. But with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero at the very beginning of his chapter on the "Conquest of Germania"¹⁰² discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects "the theory of ancient and modern historians" that Augustus' unexpected decision for expansion by conquest can be "traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will."¹⁰³ The urgency of the undertaking depended on the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the empire. "It is therefore not improbable" adds Ferrero, "that Augustus under the advice of Lici-

¹⁰²*Op. cit.*, V, p. 142.

¹⁰³Eduard Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 230, citing Augustus' decision against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and consequence of the individual action in history, says: "If we put the question, how it came to pass that the . . . Germans were not bent under the yoke of Rome . . . the only reason history can give is that it was the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own free will." On the other hand Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*², I, 1 (1912), p. 15, takes the traditional view: "nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt wert war."

nus may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul . . . as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the teeming populations of the eastern provinces." Finally we may note the view expressed by Seeck¹⁰⁴, viz., that Rome discovered from the events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit Roman territory bordering the empire's boundaries to come to quiet and fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: "so wurde denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war."

Gardthausen voices the belief¹⁰⁵ that political reasons also forced Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier's desire for his natural element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus' government were easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome's position abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of the individual diminished by

¹⁰⁴*Kaiser Augustus*, p. 111.

¹⁰⁵I, p. 1048 f.

the empire's enlargement. But of special moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions in Gaul, finds¹⁰⁶ a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus, and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus' social reforms. Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and as Egyptian influence grew stronger.

By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of opinions and explanations given above:

- (1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus' peace policy through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have been shown to have no basis in fact.
- (2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as each new province became civilized the bordering territory must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality that we

¹⁰⁶*Op. cit.*, V, p. 153 f.

must not impute to one of the most astute political geniuses of the ancient world.

(3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it is at variance with what we do know of Augustus' caution and singular independence in dealing with matters of state.

(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example, pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were not eager for war, since an emperor's conquest made him even more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the nobility. As for the *plebs urbana*, they had by this time lost practically all their political activity and influence. Neither their condition nor their temper would prompt

them to yearn for a war, which would likely result in their being called away to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and splendid than ever.

- (5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only means at Augustus' disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than Germany's subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of territory between these borders and the strongholds of the enemy. A study of Rome's several campaigns from this point of view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy. The "bufferstate" policy (see Chapter IV), once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus' military advisers was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy, in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during, and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid's writings appealed, that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation

was complete or practically complete;¹⁰⁷ that the provincial organization was just about to be put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an organization forever impossible.¹⁰⁸ Gardthausen thinks¹⁰⁹ that Drusus' death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the very heart of the land¹¹⁰; Koepf sees no reason to conclude that Germany was ever a Roman province¹¹¹; he is quite

¹⁰⁷Mommsen, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 13: "Wie Gallien durch Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt worden." In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius' time, Germany is spoken of as "almost a province" (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen says: "so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war." Niese, *Grundriss der röm. Gesch.*, 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr. Kauffman, "Deutsche Altertumskunde" (in *Matthias' Handbuch d. deutschen Unterrichts*, München, 1913, p. 317): "In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb. bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein bis zur Elbe umfasste."

¹⁰⁸But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus' own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For since no part of the *Monum. Ancy.* was written after 6 A. D., it cannot be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus' views after 9 A. D., as is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document took place in 14 A. D.

¹⁰⁹II, p. 1089.

¹¹⁰I, p. 1198: "Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben."

¹¹¹*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in *Kleine Schriften*, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: "Now the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact that Germany was not subdued by the Romans Caesar would

sure that the part on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the battle with Varus.¹¹² Zumpt¹¹³ was probably the first to deny the existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen's view became the accepted one.¹¹⁴ He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a "governor of Germany", and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as "a province, though still by no means reduced to tranquillity", a discussion on the "Organization of the province of Germany", as evidence for which he adduces the administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the "province of Germany", as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for "giving up the new German province" (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): "The original province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the Elbe, subsisted only twenty years", i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on (p. 108) we are told that "the governorship and the command were not, in a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so to speak, placed in suspense", and that out of the parts on the left of the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany¹¹⁵; that these were "in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic", but that the latter, since a separation of the military and civil administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two armies, so long as the troops were stationed there" [east of the Rhine].

have subdued Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to herself."

¹¹²*Westfalen*, p. 40: "das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht."

¹¹³*Studia Romana*, 1859, p. 130.

¹¹⁴*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 23 f.

¹¹⁵In *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct status, see Riese's view as given below, p. 73 ff.

The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld¹¹⁶, who believes that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus' time. In like manner Marquardt¹¹⁷ thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: "Wahrscheinlich nahmen später auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in Lugdunum] theil."¹¹⁸ On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year 9 B. C. as lying in "der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz Germaniae."¹¹⁹ Further on¹²⁰ we are told that after Quintilius Varus succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change in the German policy of the emperor ensued, "und die Benennung Ober-und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant, bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem Rheine am linken Ufer."¹²¹ Riese,

¹¹⁶"Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze," etc., *Commentationes philologae in honorem Th. Mommseni*, p. 434.

¹¹⁷*Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, I (1881), p. 271.

¹¹⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 212.

¹¹⁹p. 219.

¹²⁰p. 229.

¹²¹p. 233. Pelham, "The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany" (in *Essays on Roman History*, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the period after Augustus' time and specifically to the territory lying along the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus' statement (*Germ.*, 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it was in reality "debatable land" (*dubiae possessionis* of Tacitus), and had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates that, in the writer's view, Rome had never had the land organized as her own territory.

who has carefully examined all the available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made, and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul, which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.¹²² The east boundary of Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.¹²³ The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all Gaul¹²⁴, which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1): “accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus' command, in the year 12 B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more certainly

¹²²*Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit*, p. 5 f. See also Riese in *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst, Korrespondenz-Blatt*, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab es also . . . nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitigen Hülfe verbundenen Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine Germania inferior . . . Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der Herresbezirk des gallischen Provinzen.”

¹²³Plin., *N. H.*, iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.

¹²⁴Ritterling (*op. cit.*, p. 162) believes, however, that there were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning of Augustus' reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.

Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands. The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus is called by Velleius "legatus Augusti in Germania", and by Dio "τῆς Γερμανίας ἄρχων". But this does not mean that at that time there was a German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a German province, but indicates that the Gallic extended to the Elbe. Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius ("in formam provinciae redacti"), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but "sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae" (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II, 30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term *provincia* in different senses.¹²⁵ Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than "land", since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of Gaul. In answer to Mommsen's view that the establishment of a separate province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case it had been customary in every province for the emperor's worship to be observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same province¹²⁶, e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus, and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor's policy from the

¹²⁵See p. 27 and note.

¹²⁶Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*. I², 504.

beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with the emperor's house.¹²⁷ And not only are we nowhere told the contrary, but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under Varus' successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the status was not different during Varus' incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province, or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese's presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted to Riese's contention that Rome's relations with the Germans, as a part of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they were left for fifteen years after Tiberius' departure for Rhodes. This very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested as directly responsible for the catastrophe which

¹²⁷There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling, *op. cit.*, p. 187: "die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineingreifen der geplanten Operationen am Mittel-und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando notwendig."

befell Varus. So Ferrero says¹²⁸: "In Germany . . . the people, apparently subdued, were not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman conquests." Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that such an anomalous "conquest" should not long since have been recognized as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do so? Many, as shown above¹²⁹, argue that Rome was unable to accomplish her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt.¹³⁰ Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a more remote one.¹³¹ He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus to suspend or give up a

¹²⁸*Characters and Events of Roman History*, p. 165.

¹²⁹See also Sadée, *Römer und Germanen*, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter "Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius"); Wolf, *Die That des Arminius*, p. 41 f. ("Der Befreiungskampf"). Eduard Meyer's statement that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p. 38).

¹³⁰Reitzenstein, "Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus," *Hermes*, 48 (1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had no such significance; that there was no change in Rome's policy until Germanicus' time, and that Rome's contest with Germany through three decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political situation which is found at a much later time.

¹³¹Cf. also Mommsen, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 14 f.: "Die Unterwerfung Germaniens . . . stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich. Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor." As reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius' return and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1) the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of Tiberius.

plan that was well considered and already successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost, since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius¹³², and was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome's available forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.¹³³ But the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war. Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus, and the Germans remained free.¹³⁴ Koepp¹³⁵ sees the

¹³²II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, *Characters and Events*, p. 165.

¹³³*Op. cit.*, p. 117: "Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur 8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten wehren können."

¹³⁴Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns, but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well-de-

reason for Germanicus' recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius, but in the fact that Germanicus' campaigns and losses were proving too expensive.¹³⁶ Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück's view given above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus, but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus' loyalty in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany, and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of these armies to be united with that of Gaul.¹³⁷

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome's alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself

served triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest "sondern nur darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen." Hence the Roman troops were withdrawn because "die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweigungen unschädlich."

¹³⁵*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 45.

¹³⁶This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): "Allerdings bildeten diese Schädigungen . . . nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der Abberufung des Germanicus." As for the matter of the great costs of such a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while living in part from the enemy's country. As a professional standing army was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight drain on the treasury.

¹³⁷See *op. cit.*, p. 20.

is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small concern, and significant only because of chance association with other reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus' defeat is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

- (1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.
- (2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were severely defeated.
- (3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a thorough conquest had that been the desire.
- (4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the undertaking.
- (5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of Rome at this period.
- (6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on account of a single setback.
- (7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus, certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any conquest ever undertaken, and a rational crit-

icism will try to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a preconceived theory.

- (8) There was certainly no "*provincia*" to abandon, under any circumstances.
- (9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius, and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time. Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had after the defeat of Lollius.

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus' defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus' Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus' purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome's power, in order to impress the barbarians¹³⁸, and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.

¹³⁸Cf. Merivale: *History of the Romans under the Empire*, IV, p. 240: "These repeated advances . . . though far from having the character of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power."

CHAPTER IV

A NEW INTERPRETATION

Every empire of the ancient world was bordered on one or more sides, if not actually surrounded by barbarian tribes which envied its prosperity and were ever on the alert to organize a *razzia* into its prosperous domains. It was therefore a prime policy of every empire builder, not merely to mark out distinctly the limits of national authority and responsibility, and to round off the lines of dominion by the inclusion of the whole of some tribe or nation, or the complete extent of a certain well defined district possessed of a unified economic character, but beyond all else to secure an easily defensible frontier line against the aggression of his civilized rivals, and the chronic brigandage of barbarian neighbors. Certainly no civilized country of ancient times enjoyed such immunity from annoyance on the part of its neighbors as did ancient Egypt, when once the upper and the lower kingdoms had been united, for it is wholly surrounded by seas and deserts; yet even here the barbarian was an intermittent danger, the Nubian and Ethiopian in the south, against whom many a Pharaoh waged punitive campaigns; the Libyan in the west; the Bedouins at the northeast; and even the sea could not protect the Delta from the ravages of freebooters from the isles, the far spread front of the latest wave of the Hellenic invaders of Greece. And two of the barbarian nations actually invaded the country in such numbers as to set up dynasties of more than an ephemeral character, the Hyksos and the Ethiopians. Less favorably situated was the civilization in the Mesopotamian valley; Elamites, Kassites, Mitanni, Khita, Aramaeans, and the brigands of the mountains, the last and most powerful, the Medo-Persians, were ready to devastate their peaceful preserves. Persia had to contend with Massagetae and Scythians;¹ Philistia had the Hebrews, and they in turn the

¹The whole history of Iran has been dominated by the ever recurring struggle with Turan, the barbarians of the northeastern steppes and deserts, down even to the 18th century. Compare Ed. Meyer's excellent characterization of this relation, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, III, p. 103 ff.

Amalekites and other dwellers in the wastes; Carthage, the Numidians, Libyans, and Moors; the Macedonians had the Thracians and Paenians; the Greeks in Asia Minor had the Lydians, in Italy, the Sabellians, Bruttians, Lucanians, Iapygians,—in short the Greek colonies had upon every coast of the three continents a fringe of warlike and rapacious enemies with whom permanent peace was an impossibility.

Rome was, of course, no exception to the rule, and once her power had spread beyond the confines of Italy it was inevitable that her extraordinary national vitality and genius for organization must keep extending her confines until strong and satisfactory frontiers were secured. By the beginning of our era the great permanent boundaries of the empire had in the main been reached. To the west lay the Atlantic ocean; the south and southeast was covered by the deserts of Sahara, Arabia, and Syria; the north had the Black Sea² and the Danube; only two quarters were inadequately provided for, the northeast, Armenia, and the northwest, Germany. In the former case the uplands of the Taurus constitute a welter of confused peaks and ranges, whose trend is, however, in the main east and west, so that neither the crest of a long line of mountains nor the course of some large river supplies any satisfactory north and south line.³ In the latter, a relatively small river, that showed a marked tendency to flow in parallel channels, with a rather sluggish current except in a few places, and with a considerable number of islands, so that it could be crossed almost at will even by barbarian tribes, furnished inadequate protection to the rich provinces of Gaul.⁴ Had the population

²The feeble Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea, though dependent upon the Empire, were hardly an integral part thereof, and really existed more through the favor of the barbarians, for selfish personal ends, than by reason of their own strength or the protecting arm of Rome. They were little more than trading posts preserved for their mutual serviceability, not the frontiers of empire. Compare Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 277 ff., especially 286.

³See V. Chapot, *La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe*, Paris, 1907, pp. 377, 381.

⁴Upon the general inadequacy of rivers as frontier lines there are some good remarks by Lord Curzon, *The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers*, Oxford, 1908, p. 20 ff., and Miss Ellen Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, New York, 1911, p. 360 ff. It is only rarely in fact that a large river actually forms a boundary line; exceptions like the Rio

on the right bank of the Rhine been extremely thin, or sluggish, as for a long period it seems to have been on the north bank of the Danube, no great danger need have been anticipated here, but the Germans were, for barbarians, relatively numerous,² brave, and adventurous to a fault, and passionately addicted to warfare and marauding. Under these circumstances it seems clear that an ordinary frontier line would have been thoroughly insecure. No matter how many forts and trenches might be established along the Rhine it would have been impossible to hold a single line intact even with the full standing army of the Empire. If the hostile territory extended right up to the ramparts of the legionaries, the Germans, secure in the protection of their hills, forests, and swamps, could gather an overwhelming force, cross the river and break through the fortifications at any point they pleased along a line of several hundred miles in length, before an adequate force, with the slow methods of communication then available, could be gathered to resist them. And once past the defenses, either the invaders must be allowed to harry and plunder at will, while the breach

Grande, a short stretch on the upper St. Lawrence, the La Plata, the Amur, the lower Aras and the lower Danube, only emphasize the rareness of the phenomenon. Besides, rivers play a relatively slight rôle in military history; they can be crossed only too easily, if not in the direct face of the foe, as at Wagram, Fredericksburg, or the Yalu, at least at some point above or below. In the long course of the German wars the river Rhine plays a most subordinate part; battles were fought freely on one side or the other, but none, that we have noted, for its actual passage, unless an exception be made of an action of Drusus in 12 B. C., which Dio 54, 32, 1, thus describes: "Having watched for the Kelts until they were crossing the Rhine he cut them to pieces." This may have been a battle for a crossing, but it seems much more plausible that it was a mere attack from an ambuscade, the river playing merely an incidental part. Of course these remarks apply only to the period of mobile armies. In modern trench warfare, with solid lines hundreds of miles long, any ditch, even such as the trifling Yser canal, may be a formidable obstacle; but this is a wholly new phase of military tactics.

²The North American Indians were incomparably less numerous and more widely scattered than the Germans, but our Indian wars were frequent, difficult, and costly to life and property. Probably no other nations with which civilized peoples have had to deal have made such a cult of valor and of rapine as did the ancient Germans and the North American Indians.

was repaired to stop the influx of others, or else, if they were pursued and hunted down, the forts must be weakened to the imminent danger of a repetition of the same event at some other point.

There were but two ways to remedy this situation. One was to give up the Rhine as a frontier and to push on; but this would merely have transferred the scene of difficulty, not removed it, for bad as the Rhine may have been it was the best available frontier in this direction until one came to the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains;⁶ or if only the Germans were so dangerous as neighbors, the limits of the empire must have been pushed to the almost equally impossible line of the Vistula, or beyond, in order to include them all within its confines; and finally, a very material increase must have been made in the size of the standing army, because the legions on the Rhine served not only the purpose of warding off the Germans but also of keeping in restraint the restless Gauls, while, if the frontier were fixed at the Elbe or the Oder, quite as many troops would be needed to defend it there, and many additional legions for garrison service in Belgica, Gaul, and Noricum.⁷ The other way was to buttress the frontier by securing on the right bank of the Rhine a series of friendly states or tribes, whose leading men or factions were to be kept well disposed to the empire by all the expedients of force and diplomacy. In this way the danger from the barbarian would be minimized, no sudden attacks from the proximate tribes need be apprehended, and even against a great tribal movement in the remote hinterland, like that of the Basternae, the Galatians, the Cimbri and Teutones, the Helvetians, and many another even before the *Völkerwanderung*, the Romans would be amply prepared in advance. The shock could be absorbed by the launching of friendly tribes, more or less strongly supported by Roman troops, against the newcomers, and, if worst came to worst, and the foe pushed his way relentlessly onward, the issue could be decided on foreign territory beyond the frontiers, and with the assistance of tribes which otherwise would have been forced to

⁶O. Seeck (*Kaiser Augustus*, p. 110 f.) only partly recognizes the difficulties involved in the constant pushing forward of the lines of empire. It is wrong to ascribe to Augustus the absurdities which a policy of indefinite advance entails. Cf. p. 67.

⁷See p. 65.

join the invaders against Rome, or at the best, have remained neutral.⁸ Once established, such friendly relations might easily

⁸These are perhaps the "strategical considerations which tempted the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been tempted across the Indus", to which Lord Curzon (*The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers*, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f., and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon's generalization is not quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the West, where, to use his own words: "protectorates, strictly so-called, were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed" (p. 38). Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist, at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser seem to have been *socii* of Rome, and it was the case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been allies (called actually "fratres") of the Romans (at least since 121 B. C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, *Bell. Gall.*, I, 11, 3 and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of danger, had been solemnly recognized as *rex* and *amicus* in 59 B. C. That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C., is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (*Die Germanen im römischen Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I.*, Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.) has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them. A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon's statement is no doubt perfectly applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous offensive-

be maintained by the countless devices of a resourceful diplomacy, the honors and recognitions, the flattery and gifts which are so dear to the barbaric heart, and for which incalculable values have ofttimes been rashly bartered away; or, when a chief proved recalcitrant, it was easy among so ambitious and independent a nobility as was that of Germany to raise up a rival who could either compel obedience or else take his place.⁹ We can readily believe that the subtle and resourceful Tiberius accomplished during his German campaigns more by diplomacy than with the sword¹⁰, and characteristic not merely of the man but of the general situation which had been produced was his effort to console the impetuous Germanicus with the observation that the Germans could well be left to themselves now, i. e. to cutting one another's throats at the artful suggestion of Roman diplomacy.¹¹ But diplomacy alone could never have initiated such a condition in Germany; nothing less was needed than the vivid fear of the legionaries, and that too not as a static body of troops however powerful, but dreaded through bitter experience of what it meant to have the cohorts carry fire and sword to the innermost recesses of the country. Barbarian

defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might dash himself to pieces against it.

⁹A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed, is Caesar's treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the Treveri (*Bell. Gall.*, V, 3 f.).

¹⁰Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 26: "Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse".

¹¹*Ibid.*: "internis discordiis relinqui." Cf. above p. 34. An example of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1085). Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitius experienced a humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from exile in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10^a, 3), but later commanders were more successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety within the empire.

peoples are easily impressed by a portentous occurrence, but with them the effect wears rapidly away, unless by frequent repetition it be seared into their consciousness. This process of terrorization had to be kept up until the fear of Rome was so great that the mere thought of invasion would be recognized as madness. The readiness with which the tribes of Gaul and even of Germany¹² expressed their submission to Caesar, after some heavy stroke, is familiar to all readers of the *Gallic Wars*, but no less characteristic is the readiness with which they would take up arms at the least rumor of a reverse, or even without any change in the situation whatsoever, merely after the first effects of the news of disaster had worn away.¹³ For years therefore after the Rhine had been definitely determined upon as a frontier it was necessary for Roman generals to march at frequent intervals into Germany, making powerful demonstrations in force not simply among the proximate tribes, but penetrating far into the interior, so that even the remotest might trust no more to their forests and their swamps; bringing ships of war up the larger rivers not merely to support the land troops, but also to demonstrate the mastery over water as well as land, and to show how far beyond the actual frontier of the empire its outstretched arm could strike; rewarding friends and establishing them more firmly in places of authority, punishing foes individually and in small groups, beating down any armed opposition that dared to raise its head (and that was relatively seldom in the numerous campaigns that were waged), and ruthlessly devastating the territory of the intransigent, frequently in the more completely pacified districts adjusting disputes between Roman merchants and the natives, or acting as arbitrators in difficulties which had arisen between individuals and factions among the Germans themselves. Such is the picture of these German campaigns as we should draw it, filling in the meager outlines of events as given by the ancient historians. Of a similar nature are the punitive or monitory expeditions carried on by the French, the British, and the Russians, in their dealing with similar barbarous or semicivil-

¹²The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 16, 5).

¹³Compare Caesar's admirable characterization of the Gauls (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most, primitive peoples.

ized tribes upon the borders of their African or Asiatic empires. Real warfare was rare, a pitched battle seldom took place¹⁴, but the repetition of the demonstrations gradually had its effect even upon the fierce and rapacious Germans.

Let us examine from this point of view the actual conduct of the Germanic campaigns, bearing in mind the utter dissimilarity with the methods employed by Caesar for the conquest of Gaul under similar conditions. In the first place no army posts, forts, or powerful garrisons were established and maintained in Germany. Aliso was nothing more than a station for munitions of war and no doubt traders' stocks of goods¹⁵,

¹⁴Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: "fuga rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non fuisse qui vinceretur"). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—"he crossed the Rhine for the purpose of making war", says Dio (48, 49, 2), not that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare. Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle (Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54, 33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward. This was hardly a "decisive, brilliant victory" as Gardthausen (*Augustus*, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only certain "battles" that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent campaigning.

¹⁵Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire. They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. For example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the surrendering of the Aduatuci (*Bell. Gall.*, II, 33) as to purchase and take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them (*Ibid.*, III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (*Ibid.*, I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a marked influence upon the Ubii (*Ibid.*, IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar's advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany (Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus' army had a large *tross* (Dio, 56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders. A. C. Redderoth (*Der Angrivarierwall und die letzten Römerschlächten des Jahres 16 p. C.*, Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.)

and it was established so short a distance from the Rhine, only a trifle more than 30 miles from Vetera, as to have little more effect in overawing the tribes in its vicinity than did the powerful fortresses along the Rhine itself.¹⁶ The fort built by Drusus in Mt. Taunus can hardly have been much out of sight of the Rhine, and doubtless served merely to secure an easy entrance into the upland country for the garrisons farther south along the river.¹⁷ These two posts certainly could have had no direct influence upon the maintenance of authority in the remote interior. Flevum on the coast was a feeble trading post for merchants, sufficient only to hold their supplies, give a safe anchorage for their vessels, harbor an occasional Roman war vessel which would be needed to guard against the danger of piracy, and protect a few ships engaged in coast traffic towards the north and the northeast. On rare occasions it might serve as a naval base for a large fleet sent out to make a demonstration along the coast and rivers of Germany.¹⁸ None of these

is doubtless correct in emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests upon history. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

¹⁶See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

¹⁷Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 56: "positoque castello super vestigia paterni praesidii in monte Tauno." This is probably the same fort which Dio (54, 36, 3) describes as "among the Chatti beside the Rhine"; (cf. Koepf, *op. cit.*, p. 20). The location is generally thought to be not far from Höchst, only a few miles up the Main. A *castellum* here would merely command the entrance to a road into the interior; it would be no "Zwingburg."

¹⁸Kornemann (*Klio*, IX, 1909, p. 436) regards the words of Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 72: "haud spernanda illie civium sociorumque manus litora Oceani praesidebat," as proving that "das Kastell eine starke Besatzung hatte." On the other hand the inability of the garrison to do more than hold the fort against the uprising (IV, 73) would indicate that the force was rather small. A Roman fort was an easy thing to protect against the Germans; even the feeble garrison of Aliso held out easily against great numbers after the disaster to Varus (cf. Delbrück, *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, 2nd ed., 1909, II, p. 138). That Flevum was not established until the time of Germanicus, Kornemann (*loc. cit.*, p. 437) has argued, in refusing to accept the plausible identification of Drusus' naval base with Flevum, and locating Borma (Florus, II, 30, 26, a form which he very properly defends) between the Cannanefates and the Frisii (*loc. cit.*, pp. 430 ff., especially 437-8). Our argument is not seriously affected

can properly be denominated a "Zwingburg", yet how could the Romans have expected to maintain and make permanent a conquest over such fierce barbarians without overawing them in some wise with great fortresses located at strategical points in their very midst?

It is noteworthy also that no Roman army ventured to spend the winter on German soil except on one occasion, and that was in 4-5 A. D., when for some unknown cause (doubtless one of considerable importance judging from the way in which Velleius speaks of it), Tiberius was so long delayed in the north that his active campaign was not over until December, and winter must have been upon him before he could reach the Rhine.¹⁹ In this case he remained "ad caput Iuliae", as near the permanent camps doubtless as he could get.²⁰ The next summer an extensive campaign was undertaken to the north and east, and with the cooperation of the fleet even the Elbe was reached, but that this encampment in the confines of Germany the preceding winter had meant nothing singular, and established no new policy, is clear from the fact that after this summer's campaign, when, if ever, it would have been necessary to retain a powerful army in the "conquered" territory whose

thereby, for Borma must have been yet closer to the Rhine than Flevum (Kornemann, *loc. cit.*, p. 437), and neither was so situated as to be a far flung outpost designed to hold conquests fast. At the very most they were merely starting points for hostile or commercial activity. To be sure, if Borma could be identified with the modern Borkum, as has been frequently attempted (cf. Kornemann, *loc. cit.*, p. 433, n. 1), its foundation might, with a certain degree of plausibility, be regarded as a serious move looking towards conquest, but Kornemann's localization of Borma seems unassailable, the philological obstacles are great, and the military difficulty of setting a naval base at this period so far away from the Rhine quite insuperable.

¹⁹Velleius, II, 105, 3. Dio indeed (56, 18, 2) speaks of the Roman soldiers in Varus' time as "spending the winter in Germany". The tense used, however, the imperfect, at the head of a series of the same tenses which are used in the inceptive sense, shows clearly that the word means no more than: "were beginning to spend the winter." A single instance would be sufficient justification for the expression.

²⁰This is generally changed, following Lipsius, to *caput Lupiae*, and is identified with Aliso. If Aliso be at Haltern it is strange indeed that he did not move on to the Rhine; if near Paderborn there is good reason for his having remained at a depot of supplies fully 90 miles away from Vetera.

limits are supposed to have been greatly extended, Tiberius calmly led his troops back to the Rhine as usual ("in hiberna legiones reduxit", Velleius, II, 107, 3).²¹

Furthermore, there was no building of a network of great military roads to facilitate the march of the legions far into the interior, yet if such roads were anywhere needed it was surely in Germany, where the trifling commercial trade routes could not possibly have sufficed for the sure and speedy movements of the legions and their large baggage trains. There are some vague statements regarding engineering works by Drusus²², and

²¹Ritterling (*op. cit.*, p. 181) suggests the possibility that these "hiberna" are the same as those that were occupied the preceding winter, while others speak without reserve of a second winter in Germany (e. g., Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1168). But Velleius uses "reduxit", which distinctly implies that the legions were being led back across the Rhine. Besides, "in hiberna reducere" was a phrase which any one acquainted with the conduct of the German wars would at once understand as implying the recrossing of the Rhine. For "hiberna" alone as meaning the Rhine forts, see Velleius, II, 120, 3: "ad inferiora hiberna"; see also §2 of the same chapter: "in hiberna revertitur", of the campaign of Tiberius in 10 A. D., where there is no doubt that the Rhine forts are meant (see Zonaras, 10, 37 ex.). Compare also Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 38: "reduxit in hiberna"; *ibidem*, I, 51: "miles in hibernis locatur"; II, 23: "legionum aliae . . . in hibernacula remissae"; and II, 26, "reductus inde in hiberna miles"; and finally, Dio, 55, 2, 1, where Tiberius with the corpse of Drusus comes from the interior of Germany "as far as to the winter camp", i. e., across the Rhine. It is clear that "hiberna" or the equivalent, when used without a special qualifying phrase, as in Velleius II, 107, 3, means the Rhine forts and nothing else. In order to make clear that these "hiberna" were in the interior of Germany it would have been necessary to add some special note calling attention to that fact. Finally, as the spending of the preceding winter in Germany is told with such a flourish ("in cuius mediis finibus . . . princeps locaverat"), the repetition of the same deed, as enhancing its significance, could not have failed to be emphasized.

²²The most important was certainly the *fossa Drusiana* which led from the Rhine to the North Sea, through a lake, probably that of Flevum (Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 8). This may very well be identical with the *fossae Drusinae* (Suetonius, *Claud.*, 1). Drusus also did some work to regulate the course of the Rhine (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIII, 53, and *Hist.*, V, 19). Whether he built corduroy roads (*pontes longi*) over the swampy land is not so certain, though Becker, Domaszewski, and Kornemann (the references in Kornemann, *Klio*, IX, p. 432 ff.) are probably correct when they interpret *pontibus* (Florus, II, 30, 26) in this sense.

we hear likewise of certain structures of Domitius, the *pontes longi* in the northwestern swamps²³, and certain *limites* and

If this was actually a coast road connecting two naval bases, Borma, a short distance from the Rhine, with Gesoriacum-Bononia (Boulogne-sur-mer), as Kornemann very plausibly argues (p. 432, 435), then it really connected only such naval bases as were necessary to hold the mouth of the Rhine with the general military road system of Gaul. Of course both banks of a river at its mouth must be seized in order to insure certain control, but neither the establishment of Borma nor the construction of this particular bit of road can properly be regarded as measures which necessarily had the conquest of Germany in mind, nor would they have furthered very materially such a conquest, even if it had been intended. Professor Frank (*Roman Imperialism*, New York, 1914, p. 352) seems to make too much of this canal of Drusus as evidence "that serious measures were planned from the first". The Romans unquestionably made preparations to march into Germany and to support armies upon such excursions; the critical consideration, however, is what they did after entering the country, not their preliminary preparations. If they constantly marched out again every fall, it is impossible to speak of permanent occupation. Nor is it satisfactory to restrict the attempts at conquest to the campaigns of Drusus, 12-9 B. C., and of Tiberius, 4-5 A. D., alone. Domitius penetrated deeper into Germany than either of them, as he alone crossed the Elbe. If some invasions imply conquest then all should, or else Augustus was guilty of an incredibly shilly-shally policy. And if all the invasions aimed at conquest, then there is an absurd disparity between their number, scale, and extent and the utterly negligible results obtained. Kornemann's view (p. 440 ff.) that Drusus constructed a coast road as far as the mouth of the Ems can hardly be established by the evidence which he presents. It does not appear how any number of campaigns along the coast could have accomplished the conquest of the remote interior. Even if the view be accepted, however, it could only show the importance of the control of the coast, a circumstance to which we shall revert later.

²³For the literature on these see Gardthausen, *Augustus*, II, p. 763 f. Nothing definite is known about them. If very significant for the "conquest" of Germany, why was their construction deferred to the period of Domitius, years after Drusus and Tiberius had been engaged in carrying on the most extensive campaigns? The very fact that these early incursions into Germany had been repeatedly made without the erection of any elaborate network of solidly constructed roads, is the clearest evidence that no permanent occupation of the country was intended. For the purposes of the occasional demonstration mere "war-paths", supplemented here and there with some light, temporary construction were entirely adequate. It is a striking fact that of permanent road

aggeres with which Germanicus connected Aliso and the Rhine²⁴, nothing at all commensurate with the ambitious schemes which the Romans are supposed to have entertained for the conquest of the country.²⁵

Finally there was no civil administration established for any part of the country, even that which might have some appearance of being under Roman sway; no colonies were founded, either military or commercial; there was no effort to push forward, to settle, and to absorb the newly acquired "province".²⁶ Nor can shortness of time be put forward as an

construction not a trace has been found in Germany, not in the lower Lippe valley, where, if anywhere, the highways of armies must have been solidly constructed if Germany was to be held as a province, nor even before the very gates of the camp at Haltern (cf. Koepf, *Die Römer in Deutschland*, 2nd ed., p. 136). Yet along the *limes* roads were regularly constructed, and were an essential part of the system of defense. Tiberius seems to have begun a *limes* in the *silva Caesia*, but not to have completed it (Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 50: "limitemque a Tiberio coeptum"). It was obviously a slight undertaking.

²⁴Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 7. These were probably roads (Delbrück, *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, 2nd ed., p. 128 ff.). The use of "novis" indicates that such structures had been erected earlier. Their flimsy nature is to be inferred from the fact that the work had to be repeated in a few years, and the construction of Germanicus was doubtless no more lasting (see the preceding note).

²⁵As for example Agrippa's system of roads for Gaul. Yet Gaul needed them far less than Germany, for it was a relatively civilized country with means of rapid communication. Caesar seems to have been embarrassed but little in his campaigns by poor roads, in sharp contrast with the conditions prevailing in Germany.

²⁶Dio (56, 18, 2) states that "their (i. e. Roman) soldiers were beginning to winter there and were founding cities", but just what these "cities" were, he neglects to say, and they appear nowhere else either in his narrative, or in that of any other ancient writer; yet the destruction of such incipient "cities" after the defeat of Varus is just the sort of event that could not possibly have been passed over in silence by all our sources. When Dio comes to the appropriate section in his later narrative (22, 2^a=Zonaras) where these should be mentioned, he speaks of nothing but "forts" (ἐφύματα). It is perfectly clear that his sources knew nothing about real "cities", and that from his knowledge of the way in which settlements grow up about any army post however small, he is indulging in a little exaggeration in telling of the foundation of "cities" so as to give the desired background for his picture of a complete reversal of conditions in Germany.

excuse for failure to perform these characteristic features of a regular Roman conquest. Two generations had passed between Caesar's first passage of the Rhine and the defeat of Varus, forty-seven years since Agrippa had crossed the same river, or, if we consent to take the date generally set for the conquest of Germany, the last campaign of Drusus, 9 B. C., eighteen years of Roman domination had elapsed before the battle of the Teutoburg forest, yet nothing of any real importance had been done to organize the "new province". For the earlier part of this period since Caesar, one might indeed argue that Rome had been engaged in more absorbing enterprises, to wit, the civil wars, but since the battle of Actium, or at all events since the establishment of the dyarchy, Augustus had a perfectly free hand to complete any project whatsoever that he may have had in mind with regard to Germany. Drusus, Tiberius, Domitian, Vinicius, and Tiberius again had campaigned often enough beyond the Rhine, but nothing was actually done toward finishing any formal conquest. Nor will it do to ascribe to Augustus, as is generally done, the policy of turning over to Quintilius Varus the last formal act of organizing the province. What less opportune moment could possibly have been selected than just the period of the Pannonian revolt, when the Rhine armies were reduced below their normal strength, and a man placed in charge, who, whatever his other virtues may have been, was certainly not an experienced general? For it would certainly be expected that the formal establishment of complete imperial administration in Germany would have aroused what little spirit of independence yet remained (according to this theory) in German bosoms, and to have entrusted such a mission to such a man, at such a time, with such small forces, and without any of the necessary preliminary work of roadbuilding, fortress erection, stationing of garrisons and the like, would have been an act of colossal and criminal folly on the part of one of the shrewdest and most patient and calculating statesmen of the ancient world.²⁷

²⁷These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land. Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all

We must here examine the arguments of the authorities who are cited for the statement that Varus was engaged in organizing a full civil administration for the "province" when disaster overtook him. The rhetorical nature of these documents and their general untrustworthiness have already been emphasized; when we look for perfectly definite acts we find either the vaguest language, or else utterly improbable statements. Much has been said of the presence of "causarum patroni" in Varus' army, but just how much is properly to be inferred therefrom is doubtful. In the first place the evidence for their presence is the worst possible, Florus alone mentioning them (II, 30, 36 f.), and that with the most patent rhetorical purpose, and the highly colored story of how, when the tongue of one was cut out and the lips sewed together he was taunted with the remark, "Viper, you have finally ceased to hiss". But granted that some "causarum patroni" attended Varus, how much does that signify? When was the organization of a province entrusted to these men, or what official rôle would they play in such a process? Their presence is easily enough explained as an aid to the general in his semilegal activities. We have already observed that he must often have been called upon to settle disputes between the numerous rival nobles of Germany. Who indeed was better suited to act as arbitrator than a powerful and disinterested official of the great neighboring empire?²⁸ Doubtless many an appeal regarding the busi-

these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the ageing emperor and his entourage. "Il y a eu, de la part d'Auguste, de véritables aberrations militaires" (p. 117) . . . "Une puérile ignorance des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin" (p. 118) . . . "L'empereur vieillissait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât sur tout son entourage" (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but quite inadmissible. One must surely recognize in this the *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole theory of conquest.

²⁸The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans "were establishing markets and making peaceful gatherings". Dio's account is a more military and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and law suits belong to the conventional equipment

ness dealings of Roman traders with the Germans was referred likewise to him. The only regular course of procedure would have been to act in accordance with the recognized Roman legal traditions—one surely would not expect a Roman general to dispense German law or to act merely on his passing whims—and it would be perfectly natural to have on his general staff a few legal advisers. That Varus took their advice frequently, and that some persons felt that they had been injured when such advice was followed, and bore a special grudge against those men, may very well be, but that the final steps of turning a barbarian country into a province were being then and there taken surely cannot be established by the presence of a few legal advisers on Varus' staff.

More serious is the statement that tribute was being assessed and collected.²⁹ That this was literally true on any

of the forum, and must be played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in the land.

²⁹This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: "he gave them orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as from subjects." It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus ("pecuniae vero . . . non contemptor") in a short character study and sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest *argumentum ex silentio* against the correctness of Dio's statement, as far as it can be considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants: so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 30, 37); Tiberius as early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province (Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions, and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3). Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus, when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce

comprehensive scale is clearly impossible. We hear nowhere of *publicani*³⁰, or any of the paraphernalia for collecting the tribute of a conquered province.³¹ That certain things were given Varus and his army by allied and friendly chiefs and tribes there can be no doubt, and these may have been objects of high specific value, as choice pieces of amber and the like, or mere supplies of grain, meat, hides, and similar material. It was not to be expected that Roman armies should march through Germany without being amply assisted by their *socii* and *amici*. An example of what such assistance may have been is the well-known case of the Frisians, who were expected to

and warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius, II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans "as slaves" and levies tribute upon them "as subjects." Florus also (II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional tyrant (*libidinem ac superbiam . . . saevitiam*), traits about which his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite sufficiently motivated in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio's artless acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory consistency.

³⁰Certainly if the *causarum patroni* excited the peculiar animosity of the Germans the *publicani* must have done so much more, yet not even Florus mentions the latter.

³¹It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than an exchange of gifts, as little "tribute" on one side as on the other. Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains, otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship, the case of Flavius, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point (Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 9).

furnish a few oxhides annually for military uses, and who started to fight when an exacting officer modified the terms of the original understanding. That the Frisians however were really a free, though allied people, at this time, there can be no question, for there is not a hint of actual Roman administration of their affairs.³² Similar must have been the case with the Cherusceans and other tribes farther inland. A certain amount of assistance was doubtless quite properly expected, and in fact the genuineness of the friendship might well have been doubted if there were no willingness manifested to be helpful.³³ That Varus or some of his officers may occasionally have regarded a voluntary service of friendship or policy in the light of an obligation, and may have requested and even insisted upon more than friendship or policy would lead the Germans to regard as a fair offering, is quite possible, although with a weak force and while the Pannonian revolt was still unsubdued, it would indeed have been preternatural folly. But we are not justified in admitting any more, and this is all that our sources, stripped of a little rhetorical embellishment, really assert.³⁴

³²Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of the outbreak of war, "pacem exuere" (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned, only "qui tributo aderant milites." On the friendly relations with the Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the Romans, see Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1076.

³³The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid and material assistance, is very much in point.

³⁴We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus (*Ann.*, I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: "Germanos numquam satis excusaturos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam viderint, aliis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint", etc. That this is a violent *ex parte* harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling Arminius "vaecordem" at the very moment of introducing him. On the other hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally that assistance of any kind in

Finally, Dio speaks of a division of Varus' forces, whereby a large portion of his army was serving on garrison duty at one point or another in the country, and adds that after the defeat of the main body of his troops all these separate detachments were hunted down and destroyed.³⁵ This would be important if it could be used as evidence for the establishment of Roman garrisons throughout the land, but it cannot. There is no hint in any other author that a large number of forts and strongholds were captured in consequence of this defeat, yet as intensifying the importance of the reverse, that must surely have been referred to by some one. Every other authority knows merely of the annihilation of Varus and his army, not of the capture of a whole series of strongholds all over the land.³⁶ Besides, one asks in vain what these places were and when occupied. There is nothing in the accounts of earlier or of later operations which furnishes any answer to such questions, or a parallel to such a military policy on the part of Varus. And finally, what could have been more foolish than to divide a force, unusually small in itself, at a critical period, when the great revolt in Pannonia was not yet put down? That Varus might not have had every man of his three legions with him on the fatal occa-

the form of service or the furnishing of supplies may have been called "tribute" by an excited patriot need occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no better arguments than such statements as these for its support.

³⁵Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 2^a (Zonaras).

³⁶The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The seacoast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever *castella* may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast), until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 38; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years later (see references n. 17 above), and it might conceivably have been destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these rhetorical *flosculi* they are found to be either in flat contradiction to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.

sion, is quite conceivable. Some detachments might have been with convoys of provisions, others out to look for supplies, yet others engaged in hunting down some band of outlaws, or in putting into execution some decision favorable to a conspicuous supporter of Rome, and that these small bands may have fallen victims after the great disaster is perfectly possible. That is all that we are justified in inferring from Dio after the veneer of rhetoric has been removed.

For we must bear in mind the marked tendencies of our sources for the administration of Varus. Florus was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging an explanation, which should save the credit of Rome and the Roman soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius distorting everything *in maiorem gloriam* of Tiberius, for whom Varus must serve as a foil at every turn. There is therefore nothing so stupid, arrogant, or wilful that it is not cheerfully ascribed to him, while perfectly proper and natural things, like the presence of lawyers on his staff, the making of arrangements regarding the quantity and character of the assistance to be rendered by the *socii*, the dispersion of little detachments of troops upon one or another small but necessary service, are exaggerated into acts of wanton folly and oppression, and interpreted as the inauguration of a totally new policy. Yet every one of these things must inevitably have taken place on all the numerous similar demonstrations that had been made in Germany; the only reason that they are not mentioned elsewhere is that we have no accounts regarding other operations in Germany in which such details would have been in place. They were the ordinary routine of campaigning and of no interest to the average ancient historiographer, save as they served to point a lurid description of a disaster, or to supply a basis, however flimsy, for a misrepresentation.

Varus was, we may feel assured, doing no more, in all probability much less, than his predecessors had done on numerous occasions. Two years of heavy fighting had not broken the Pannonian revolt. The forces along the Rhine, if not actually weakened in order to enlarge those in Pannonia, would doubtless be so represented by hot-headed Germans of the nationalist persuasion, particularly after two years of utter inaction. It was doubtless in response to suggestions that Roman prestige needed some refurbishing in the interior, and very likely at the

express command of Augustus, that Varus undertook his fatal demonstration. The very fact that he left so large a force at the Rhine under Asprenas would indicate that he felt it safer to keep two armies in readiness for action at different points, rather than to concentrate his forces and so risk the breaking out of trouble in some quarter from which pressure had been removed. Without any open show of violence, rather with every expression of courtesy, confidence, and good will, he was engaged in the ordinary routine of a commanding officer upon such a demonstration in force, when suddenly attacked and destroyed. Graciousness and friendliness had been taken for weakness, as too often with the barbarian, and he and his men had to pay for a conciliatory attitude with their lives. All this is but the thing which we should reasonably expect under the circumstances; it is all that the sources, critically examined, will justify us in asserting. We do not possess, to be sure, the actual documents of alliance between Rome and various tribes or chieftains of Germany; we have in fact scarcely the name of any German preserved from Ariovistus to Arminius, but we can be perfectly certain that negotiations of friendship and alliance were frequently and solemnly entered upon. If Rome had made an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B. C. (see above n. 8), while as yet he was a relatively unknown force, hundreds of miles from the frontier, how much more must she have been busy in organizing friendly relations with the German tribes that were immediately contiguous to the Rhine and through whose territories her armies so often marched in peace?

Finally, we would emphasize the general defensive character of the campaigns. In the great majority of cases some disturbance in Germany is definitely given as the cause of the operations, and if our sources for the Germanic wars were not so hopelessly fragmentary we should doubtless find that in every instance the Germans were the aggressors.³⁷ Even the proposed

³⁷A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar's first campaign in Germany, in 56 B. C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and Tencteri (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to yield up the survivors (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 16). The second crossing, in 53 B. C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance from across the Rhine (*Bell. Gall.*, V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul and Germany compelled Agrippa's crossing in 37 B. C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2). In 29 B. C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by

campaign against Maroboduus we have no right to regard as an act of wanton aggression, for Maroboduus had retired sulkily into the forests of Bohemia, and there developed a formidable army, and though his overt acts were conciliatory, his very presence, considering the inflammable character of the nation to which he belonged, and in which he might incite greater disturbances than had ever yet broken out, was a cause of justifiable apprehension.³⁸ Indeed any other German than Maro-

Carinas, but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B. C. was occasioned by the maltreatment of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B. C. Gaul was disturbed by German invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B. C. was to drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The first act in Drusus' campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive. The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in 7 B. C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, "Germania . . . rebellavit" (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10^a, 2; Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 44). More troubles in Germany which required to be "pacified" in 4 A. D., inaugurated the second period of activity (Suetonius, *Tib.*, 16). Tiberius remained on the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A. D. From this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information; nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).

³⁸Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On Maroboduus see Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1152 ff.

bodinus would almost certainly have acted in an aggressive fashion, and the fact that he did not seems to have been regarded by his fellow Germans as disloyalty to the national cause. Likewise the campaigns of Germanicus in 14 A. D., while apparently at the very moment unprovoked, were in reality a bit of deferred revenge for the treacherous attack upon the legions of Varus. Is it in fact not truly singular that among so many scattered references to the Germanic wars, there is nowhere, save in Florus, who has been dealt with elsewhere, any direct assertion that the purpose was conquest, reduction to a state of subjection, or the like? (Cf. pp. 27 and note; 75). All writers represent the Romans as being compelled to send troops from time to time into Germany to preserve the peace, and to make powerful demonstrations; there are none of the characteristic marks or processes of conquest. Were it not for the all but universal preconception that conquest was intended the sources speaking for themselves would tell a very different tale. That is briefly the following: for a generation from the time of Caesar to that of Drusus, Rome had been content with merely repelling attacks and punishing the immediate offenders, together with a local demonstration of her forces. That procedure finally appeared to be ineffective, and so a vigorous policy of terrorizing the Germans from further disturbances of the peace was tried. Some canals were dug to facilitate the movements of the fleet which was greatly needed for the purpose of transporting supplies upon the marches into the remote interior; close to the Rhine some swamp road construction was undertaken, subsidiary apparently to the naval operations; a few *castella* near to the Rhine and along the highways leading into the interior were erected as munition depots, and nothing further.³⁹ Preparations were made to facilitate incursions into Germany, and these were repeatedly undertaken, but every year Drusus came back to his starting point upon the Rhine, after the most approved manoeuvres of the noble Duke of York, or of the perplexed Persian poet who tried to become a philosopher,

“but evermore

Came out by the same door where in I went.”

The campaigns of Domitius and of Tiberius are of exactly the same character, a rally, a raid, and a relapse. Regarded as

³⁹For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of *castella*, see Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16 *sub finem*.

attempts at conquest these operations represented from the political point of view sheer folly, from the military point of view a sequence of grandiose fiascos; considered as a prolonged series of demonstrations intended to establish a line of buffer states in the form of friendly, allied tribes as a further protection of a naturally weak frontier against the barbaric hordes of the remote swamps and forests, they were sagaciously conceived and to the highest degree successful.

Our argument has thus far followed the process of exclusion. The Roman operations in Germany were either those of permanent conquest or of demonstration; there is no *tertium quid*. If not conquest, and we have endeavored to refute that view at every point, it must have been demonstration. The nature of our sources does not permit a positive and detailed proof of our new interpretation; that, properly interpreted, however, they are in harmony with it, we have been at pains to show. By way of conclusion we shall undertake to strengthen our position by pointing out analogies and parallels, not merely in the general course of ancient history, but in the foreign policy of Augustus himself.

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity without any attempt whatsoever at making permanent conquest. Such were the oft repeated *razzias* into Nubia made by the Pharaohs, the countless raids of Assyrian monarchs into the mountains to the east and north, especially the great campaign of Darius among the Scythians in 512 B. C.⁴⁰ Of the same sort were the frequent campaigns of the

⁴⁰Compare A. Wittneben, "Dareios' Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des russischen Krieges von 1812", *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, LXVI (1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas. As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar's invasions of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War*, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly "that the expedition in the form it was made was not . . . an attempt at conquest", and he regards it as either "a reconnaissance in force" or "a display intended to strike awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory." J. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest was intended: "er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen die Lust zu nehmen, den Istros zu überschreiten" (p. 6). Any

Macedonian kings against the Paeonians and Thracians, though no serious attempt was made to extend their dominion greatly in this direction. A typical example of such chronic punitive campaigning was the service of Clearchus in the Chersonese, who used that peninsula as his base of operations while raiding the Thracians above the Hellespont.⁴¹ The whole history of the more powerful Greek colonies is filled with the record of such punitive expeditions intended to keep the restless barbarians at peace. Of this identical nature were Caesar's demonstrations across the Rhine in Germany, and beyond the channel in Britain. He had surely no thought of making a permanent conquest, at least at that time, but desired merely to make a display of Roman power to the barbarians who were, or might be, interfering with the security of his conquests in Gaul.⁴² It is true that the Romans were not generally in the habit of keeping a foe off at arm's length in this fashion, but preferred to close with and destroy him once for all, but the time was bound to come soon or late when even the amazing vitality of the Romans would reach its limit, and when they must content themselves with defense instead of new conquest. And this limit was first reached along the Rhine, where an effort at further advance would have involved endless difficulties.

But we are not without examples of quite the same thing from the very reign of Augustus, and that too at a period considerably prior to the disaster of Varus. Of precisely this nature was the raid into Arabia in 25-24 B. C. There is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the land was intended; but occasion was taken to demonstrate the power of Rome, and then the expedition returned. That there may have been some intention of seizing or securing fabled wealth we cannot perhaps wholly deny, although men so well informed as the Roman merchants and administrators of Egypt could hardly have been

other interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date we follow Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, III, p. 114 f.

⁴¹Xenophon, *Anab.*, I, 1, 9.

⁴²The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar himself, *Bel. Gall.*, IV, 20: "in Britanniam potius ei contendit (sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat"; and IV, 16: "cum videret (sc. Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere vultit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire."

guilty of such folly, but its main purpose seems to have been merely a demonstration of the vigor of the new Egyptian administration.⁴³ For it is significant that in the very next year began the Ethiopian wars, which lasted until 20 B. C., wherein likewise no effort was made at extending the limits of the new province, but the Ethiopians or Nubians were given a taste of Roman steel, and made to realize how serious a thing it would be to harass the new lords of Egypt.⁴⁴ Of quite the same nature was the invasion of Dacia, 12-9 B. C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolt, 6-9 A. D. Augustus had certainly no intention of adding Dacia to the Empire; he merely wished to punish the tribes north of the Danube for interfering in the affairs of the province and to give a sharp warning against a repetition of the offense.⁴⁵ That the invasions of Germany were made more frequently and probably upon a larger scale than elsewhere, there can be no denial, but that is due to the fact that the Germans were more warlike and martial than the other contiguous barbarians. We have already observed that practically every campaign in Germany was preceded by grave provocation on the part of the barbarians, while frequently the difficulties raised were settled by diplomacy without recourse to armed intervention. But the lesson that an invasion of the Empire was likely to cost far more than it was worth, while it took a long time to teach, was in the end thoroughly learned. For two hundred years after the death of Tiberius almost unbroken peace reigned along this quarter of the frontier, which had been for half a century the storm center of the empire⁴⁶, and when the northern defenses finally began to crumble, it was towards the north and northeast, not the northwest, that they first succumbed. The policy of the first

⁴³On this expedition see Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, p. 106 ff.; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 789 f.

⁴⁴See Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, p. 108 f.

⁴⁵On these see Mommsen, *Res Gestae*, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiser*, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁴⁶Cf. M. Bang, *The Cambridge Mediaeval History*, 1911, vol. I, p. 195.

two *principes* was therefore abundantly justified by its lasting success.

As regards the secondary policy, i. e., that of the upbuilding and support of friendly or buffer states immediately contiguous to the actual frontier, there is no lack of parallels from antiquity.⁴⁷ Tiglath Pileser IV in 732 B. C., after annexing certain parts of Palestine, set up such a buffer between his empire and Egypt along the marches of Philistia, in the shape of a vassal principality under a Bedouin chief called "*kipi*, (or resident) of Musri" (i. e. Egypt).⁴⁸ Similar was doubtless the purpose of Nebuchadrezzar in leaving Jehoiakim of Judah upon the throne of a subject kingdom after his conquest of Palestine in 704 B. C. Only after two revolts, both instigated apparently by Egypt, did he apparently feel compelled to give up a policy which, though it made it unnecessary to invade Egypt directly, nevertheless allowed the temptation to renew hostilities without a desperate risk.⁴⁹ Something similar, though under very different conditions was the policy of Sparta in building a ring of Perioeci about her own Helot population on every side save that of Messenia, where by the destruction of cities and the closing of harbors the Helots were likewise cut off from contact with the outside world. The Perioeci thus formed a double barrier, warding off the enemy on the outside, and helping to keep in a disaffected servile population.⁵⁰ Again, this was clearly the policy of Alexander in the East, who set the Indus as his actual frontier, but secured that by establishing two powerful protected states, the kingdoms of Porus and

⁴⁷An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.

⁴⁸See H. R. Hall, *The Ancient History of the Near East*, London, 1913, p. 466, for a brief statement of the facts. For the idea of a buffer state in this connection, compare E. Klamroth, *Die wirtschaftliche Lage und das geistige Leben der jüdischen Exulanten in Babylonien*. Diss. Königsberg, 1912, p. 20, n. 4.

⁴⁹For the events compare Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 543 ff.; for the interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, *op. cit.*, p. 20. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49.

⁵⁰We accept upon this point B. Niese's convincing arguments, "*Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons*", *Nachr. d. Götting. Ges. d. Wiss.*, 1906, p. 101 ff., esp. pp. 131-7.

of Taxiles, on the eastern bank.⁵¹ A parallel not too remote, perhaps, can be pointed out in the case of the first contact of Rome and Carthage in Spain. Here the Romans seem to have set up Saguntum as an allied state to act as a buffer or check to the advances of Hannibal to the Ebro, and towards what they chose to regard as their proper sphere of influence (or, if one prefer, that of their ancient ally Massilia). That the policy in this case failed to prevent war is of course no proper criticism of its intent. There were also the numerous but ephemeral protectorates of the eastern marches, which served for the most part the purpose of preparing the formal advance of the empire rather than actually covering a difficult frontier, and so lasted only a short time. But in Armenia we have a truly classical example of a buffer state, whose fortunes no less an authority than Lord Curzon compares directly with those of Afghanistan, similarly situated between the two great rival powers of Russia and Great Britain.⁵² One Roman general or emperor after another might have made Armenia a province, as Trajan actually did, although his successor immediately restored it to its former state of uncertainty, but for more than four centuries it was preserved as a buffer state against Parthia.⁵³

⁵¹See J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, I, 2, p. 163 ff. This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J. Kaerst (*Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters*, I, p. 369, and n. 2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts of the empire. J. B. Bury (*A History of Greece*, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807) very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.

⁵²*The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers*, Oxford, 1898, p. 38.—J. Geffcken: *Kaiser Julianus*, 1914, p. 117 uses the expression "Pufferstaat" in speaking of Armenia.

⁵³The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, "Le relazioni fra l'impero romano e l'Armenia a tempo di Augusto", *Riv. di storia antica*, VII (1903), pp. 505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903). His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, *Riv. di filol.* LIII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement, though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian's dissertation, *Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis 428 n. Chr.*, Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvres, is correct enough, but the

Less notorious but equally clear is the case of Mauretania. In 25 B. C. Augustus transferred King Juba from Numidia, which he thereupon transformed into a province, to Mauretania, which, after having been eight years a province, was once more made a kingdom. The purpose of this singular interchange of political status, must have been to protect the actual confines of the empire from direct contact with the barbarians of the south and west, who were not yet accustomed to the presence of the Romans.⁵⁴ It was not until sixty-five years afterwards, 40 A. D., when danger from this quarter might have been expected to have diminished or disappeared after two generations of a strong and peaceful government, that Mauretania was once more made into a province.⁵⁵

sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus' own inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous. Of course Rome's relations to Armenia would have been quite different had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, *La frontière de l'Euphrate* etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese's "lotta commerciale" theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen's statement (*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus' Armenian policy is admirable.

⁵⁴This has been recognized by Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 706. That this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A. D. This is R. Cagnat's certain interpretation of Dio, 55, 28 (*L'armée romaine d'Afrique et l'occupation militaire de l'Afrique sous les Empereurs*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff., esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a developed buffer state policy.

⁵⁵Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula's act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely by greed, as Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25), remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to

With this brief list of parallels and precedents to the German frontier policy which we have ascribed to Augustus, we hope to have shown that there was no striking innovation involved therein, nothing really beyond the range of the expedients and experiences of an ancient statesman. In thus attributing to Augustus in Germany a policy bearing so modern a designation as that of the "buffer state", we feel convinced that we are not modernizing the ancients, but only recognizing how very ancient some of our supposedly modern expedients of statesmanship in reality are.

another native prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, *op. cit.*, I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified; after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.), and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the circumstances.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16

Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp's remark (*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (*loc. cit.*) believes, and so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time; nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters. The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus' death from Tiberius' winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition and modification of structure? That a thing is "Augustan" may well be asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly observes, "ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem

Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält." But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus' first fort and Haltern a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p. 20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose, one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.—Delbrück's arguments against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, 2nd ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe, our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück's arguments (pp. 48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a "Zwingburg", but only a center for munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that this was never done in Germany; the few *castella* of which we hear were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army of permanent occupation.—We have hitherto paid no attention to the statement of Florus that "Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin" (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser, cf. Abraham, *Zur Gesch. d. germ. u. pannon. Kriege*, etc., p. 4) and there is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the "quinquaginta amplius castella", that Drusus is supposed to have built along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, *Römische Herrschaft*, p. 110). So much however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and control the coast, and *castella* may very well have been located at or near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, *op. cit.*, p. 51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great. Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so. A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even later. For the

Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229 ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: "Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi" (c. 26). "Pacavi" seems to be chosen in order to indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49

[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah, as a "buffer state", I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen, who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: "The two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region. Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an influence in all directions (E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It is translated by E. Schrader (*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, II, p. 21) as follows: "Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen Egypten"; similarly by A. S. Strong (*Records of the Past, New Series*, V, p. 125): "Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed." (Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, II, p. 4; cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza and other Philistine cities [i. e. as possible buffer states for Egypt against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25,

suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the nature of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in other centuries: "Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria, the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian" (*A History of Egypt*, p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah (Isa. 28-30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel (2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some of Hezekiah's territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states? (*Taylor Cylinder* 111, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, *Israel*, p. 122). The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The rapid advance of Necho against Assyria through the territory of Judah (2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile, served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: "A clash with Egypt was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely" (*Prophecy and the Prophets*, pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see E. Schrader, *Keilinschriften und das alte Testament*, dritte Auflage, p. 115; L. W. Batten, *Ezra and Nehemiah*, p. 35. A similar situation continued to exist in later ages."

ADDENDUM (p. 87)

Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is in Flavius Vopiscus, *Probus*, ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): "Omnes iam barbari vobis arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant". Though the period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus, perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler emperors.

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES

IN THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOL. 1, NOS. 3 AND 4

SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER, 1915

BOARD OF EDITORS

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PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
URBANA, ILLINOIS

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History of the Illinois Central
Railroad to 1870

HOWARD GRAY BROWNSON, Ph.D.

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INTRODUCTION.

The following study was submitted in 1909 as a thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctor's degree of the Graduate School of the University of Illinois. Since that date the "University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences" have been established as a medium of publication for monographs prepared by members of the faculty or graduate students, and it seemed desirable that Dr. Brownson's *History of the Illinois Central to 1870* should be included in this series. The study was originally planned on a more ambitious scale as a complete history of this important railroad system, and the choice now presented itself of asking the author to carry out his first intention or of printing the thesis as it was submitted. The latter alternative was preferred as the history of the first twenty years covered fully the early development of the charter lines and was of sufficient interest and value to justify publication without further delay. When the work was edited for publication, however, it was found necessary to omit some of the matter included in the thesis as originally submitted and also to make some textual changes, both of which have been approved by the author. Among the items omitted may be mentioned an elaborate series of traffic charts prepared in connection with chapter V, of financial charts and tables for chapter VI, David A. Neal's Report on Traffic, and the correspondence of Breese and Douglas relative to the claims made by each for the credit of the land grant. These may all be found in the original thesis, which is on file in the University Library.

It is believed that the monograph as printed contains a substantial contribution not merely to the history of a particular railroad system, but also to the economic history of the country. Called into existence to meet the exigent demand of the growing population of the interior sections of the state for adequate transportation to market their surplus products, the Illinois Central Railroad was built in 1850, after several

failures, to connect the rich agricultural region of central Illinois with the historic, and as it seemed the natural, market in the lower Mississippi valley. But the industrial development of Europe and of the states on the north Atlantic seaboard created a demand for agricultural products which diverted the traffic of the road from the lower South and directed it to Chicago and the East, a movement which was emphasized but not occasioned by the Civil War. How well the road met these changing demands and how it developed during these early and trying years of its history are here clearly told by Dr. Brownson.

Acknowledgments may properly be made to the officials of the Illinois Central Railroad for cooperation with the author in the preparation of this monograph, especially to Mr. Stuyvesant Fish, then president of the road, for the loan of original material and for personal assistance, and to Mr. L. C. Fritch; to the libraries mentioned in the bibliography for the use of their facilities and for various courtesies; and finally to Professor E. R. Dewsnup of the University of Illinois for his advice and assistance in the writing of the thesis.

E. L. BOGART.

University of Illinois
December 1, 1915.

CHAPTER I.

ILLINOIS IN 1850.

It has been said that a history of the Illinois Central Railroad is a history of Illinois. The project for a railroad through the center of Illinois was one of the first propositions for internal improvement in the West. Its construction between 1851 and 1857 opened up to settlers the rich interior counties of the state; and, when completed, it connected these agricultural counties with the remainder of the country, and made Illinois an essential part of the economic system of the United States.

The building of the Illinois Central Railroad and its subsequent growth was the natural result of economic and social conditions in the Middle-West which made necessary such a system of internal transportation. A glance at the map shows that, while Illinois is practically encircled by natural waterways, the interior of the state, which is by far the most fertile portion, is without natural means of transportation.¹ Such counties as Coles, McLean, Macon, and Champaign were, before the introduction of the railroad, almost entirely isolated.

In the early history of Illinois, various attempts had been made to provide a comprehensive system of internal transportation, but the results were of slight importance. The most successful of such undertakings was the Illinois and Michigan Canal from Chicago to La Salle. It was commenced about 1820, but financial difficulties prevented its completion until 1848. The canal was the most fortunate of all the enterprises started by the state, and for a number of years it was of great value. Nevertheless it served only a limited area; its capacity prevented the use of large and economical canal boats; frequent breaks in the masonry or at the locks made navigation difficult even during the summer months; and, finally, ice rendered the canal useless during the winter season.²

¹The territory tributary to parts of the Kankakee and Illinois rivers is an exception, but the size of this territory is comparatively small.

²*Chicago Daily Democrat*, 1849-1851; references in Davidson and Stuve, *A Complete History of Illinois*, under Illinois-Michigan Canal; cf. Moses, *Illinois Historical and Statistical*, references in index to Illinois-Michigan Canal.

The Legislature, as well as private citizens, had made many efforts to supplement the Canal with a system of railroads. As early as 1837, the General Assembly had planned an extensive system of internal improvements, and, without accurate surveys or estimates, ten million dollars were appropriated to build twelve hundred miles of railroad, deepen the rivers of the state, and provide numerous turnpikes. Millions were borrowed, and expended with a lavish hand, but mismanagement, corruption, and the exhaustion of public credit at a time when all financial undertakings were paralyzed by the panic of 1837, brought the state to the verge of bankruptcy. A few surveys, a hundred miles of half completed railway embankment, and one poorly constructed railroad, utterly useless for traffic, were the results of this chimerical experiment.³

Private construction of railroads was somewhat more successful. In the center of the state, the old Springfield and Meredosia Railroad, from Springfield to Jacksonville, constructed by the state in 1837, had been entirely rebuilt by private parties, under the name of the Springfield and Sangamon. In the north, the Galena and Chicago Union project had been revived, and the railroad extended to a point about twenty miles west of Chicago.⁴ These lines at their best gave service of but one freight and one passenger train a day, and the few thousand tons of wheat and merchandise carried by them was a mere bagatelle, compared with the enormous quantities of freight transported from the neighboring counties a few years later. Schedule time was slow, and actual time was even slower. Rates were too high and service too poor to satisfy the necessities of even the adjoining territory.⁵

Aside from the few rivers, the lakes, the canal, and the two short railroads, local transportation did not exist. Words are lacking to describe properly the wretched condition of Illinois highways in 1850. There were a few old corduroy roads and three or four government turnpikes, but they were short and ill-kept. Elsewhere former Indian trails or newly made section roads were the only semblances of highways that existed. In summer these roads were little better than the surrounding prairies, often worse; in winter they were mere mud holes. For-

³Newton, *Early Illinois Railway Legislation*, Chap. iv. Mr. Newton gives a bibliography on the subject, which may be used for further reading. Cf. Moses, *Illinois Historical and Statistical*, references in index to Internal Improvement Act.

⁴Newton, *Railway Legislation in Illinois, 1828 to 1870*, pp. 29 ff.

⁵*Ibid.*; cf. *Chicago Daily Democrat*, 1849, 1850.

fortunate, indeed, was the traveller who was not compelled to help pry the coach out of the deep mud or wait until morning for a yoke of oxen to pull him out of some worse than ordinary slough. Mails were often delayed, and, during the winter storms and spring rains, farm houses, and even large towns were completely isolated. Moreover, the state had shown itself utterly unable to remedy these evils. The statute books were filled with enactments declaring certain trails or mud roads public turn-pikes, but even a sovereign state cannot legislate a mud hole into a turnpike. Charters, almost without number, were granted to private corporations, but without tangible results of any importance.⁶ Local enterprise was equally fruitless, and the efforts of the counties to improve the public roads had generally failed.

The absence of good transportation facilities greatly retarded the economic development of central Illinois. The cost of carrying freight over ordinary country roads or even on well-built highways, under the most favorable circumstances, is very great.⁷ On such roads as existed in Illinois in 1850 the expense of moving heavy freight for any distance was practically prohibitive, and ten to twenty miles was as far as grain or other bulky goods could be hauled with any degree of profit. As nearly all the products of the interior counties of Illinois consisted of articles of small value compared with their bulk, an extensive network of railroads, or canals, was necessary to the proper economic development of the state. Instead of such a system of internal transportation, Illinois had less than a hundred and fifty miles of railroads and canals, and all portions of the state more than ten to twenty miles back from the railroads, the canal, the lake, and the rivers were practically isolated. A farmer living in the interior of the state could carry only a small part of his crop of wheat or corn to market to be exchanged for "store goods", and the total amount of grain received at Chicago, St. Louis, Peoria, and other centers which came from the central counties was insignificant.

The interior counties of Illinois, as stated above, were the most fertile parts of the state, and their isolation had a retarding influence on the economic development of the commonwealth.

⁶*Session Laws of Illinois, 1837-1850.*

⁷The cost of carrying a ton of freight from Buffalo to New York was \$100 by wagon, or about 20c per ton per mile. (Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, p. 191). This was over good roads and the cost per ton per mile for carrying grain in Illinois must have averaged considerably more.

The earliest settlements in Illinois were made by the French at Cahokia and Kaskaskia near the Mississippi River, and until the end of the third decade nearly all subsequent settlements were also near the banks of the Ohio, the Mississippi, and Illinois rivers, and especially in the southern counties. At that time the majority of the population were immigrants or descendants of immigrants from Kentucky, Tennessee, and other parts of the South.⁸ Then from 1830 to 1850 there occurred a heavy immigration into the northern and central counties, but most of these new settlers were from the eastern states or Europe.⁹ By 1850 Illinois had a population of eight hundred and fifty thousand, and three fourths of the inhabitants were living north of Vandalia and were of northern or European stock.¹⁰ Furthermore, despite the absence of good transportation, three hundred and seventy five thousand people were in the thirty six counties which possessed neither a canal, a river nor a railroad, and the number living more than ten miles from such means of communication must have been considerably larger.¹¹ But this population was only a fraction of what could be supported in the same counties when railroads and good turnpikes were introduced.

As the great bulk of the population in 1850 was engaged in agriculture, the inadequate system for transportation of farm products had a depressing influence on that occupation which in turn affected all other industries of the commonwealth. Farmers living near the waterways and railroads found good markets for their produce, but those not so favorably situated shipped little grain or meat outside the state. Only slight cultivation of the rich prairie soil was necessary to produce abundant crops, and the immediate needs of the farmer and his family were easily

⁸Sixth Census (1840); Greene, *Government of Illinois*, p. 26; cf. various addresses of Mr. C. W. Alvord, of the University of Illinois, on this subject in publications of the Illinois State Historical Library.

⁹Eighth Census (1860).

¹⁰Seventh Census (1850), pp. 117, 118. The thirty counties south of Vandalia had a population of 219,863; the sixty-nine counties north of Vandalia had 631,607. The foreign born population was as follows: England, 18,628; Scotland, 4,661; Wales, 572; Ireland, 27,786; British America, 10,699; Germany, 38,446; total, 110,593. Native born of foreign parentage, not given.

¹¹*Ibid.* The thirty-six counties not crossed by the Illinois-Michigan Canal, the Galena and Chicago Union and Springfield and Sangamon railroads, and the Illinois, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, had a population of 375,529 in 1850, or 44.1% of the total population.

supplied. Labor saving farm machinery was not in general use, and the work of gathering the crops had to be performed by hand; farm labor was scarce and commanded high wages. As a result, there was little incentive to raise large crops, while the large amount of physical work involved made it impossible for the farmer to plant or gather more than a moderate yield. Shiftless methods of farming were the natural consequence and only a small portion of the arable land was under cultivation. Out of a total area of thirty five million acres, slightly over three million were planted in the five staples, wheat, corn, oats, rye, and potatoes.¹² One third of the entire area, or eleven and a half million acres, was still unoccupied government land,¹³ and much of the remainder had never been broken by the plough.¹⁴ The yield per acre was much less than could be expected from the almost virgin soil of the prairies.¹⁵ Cultivation of fruit and vegetables was neglected, and three quarters of a million dollars would be an ample estimate of the value of all the orchard and market crops of the state.¹⁶ The production of the three leading grains, wheat, corn, and oats, was, of course, large, but corn and oats constituted eighty-eight per cent of the yield of these three crops, as against twelve per cent for wheat. However, they were so bulky compared with their value at market that the entire production of both corn and oats was of little importance, except for use on the farm.¹⁷ In general, prices were high, but the excessive cost of transportation and the great expense of gathering the crops, resulting from poor methods of farming, gave the farmer only a meagre profit.¹⁸

Perhaps the most profitable form of agriculture at that time was the raising of live stock, especially swine. Through stock trains and refrigerator cars did not exist, and all meat had to be salted or pickled on or near the farm. This seriously restricted the raising of cattle and sheep, but did not affect the pork business, which enjoyed a period of prosperity seldom

¹²Letter of Rantoul, *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

¹³*Ibid.*; Seventh Census (1850), p. 730.

¹⁴Seventh Census (1850), p. 730.

¹⁵Compendium U. S. Census, 1850, p. 170. Average yield in bushels per acre was: wheat, 11; rye, 14; corn, 33; oats, 29; barley, 40.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷The cost of hauling a bushel of wheat was no greater than the cost of hauling a bushel of corn, and yet the price of the former averaged about three times that of the latter.

¹⁸Cf. Chap. v.

equalled. Over two million swine were on the various farms and something like a million were slaughtered each year.¹⁹ A large part of the corn crop was used for feeding cattle or hogs, and was thus sent to the market on "the hoof".²⁰

Mining was affected by lack of cheap transportation to an even greater extent than agriculture. In 1850 coal was mined in all parts of the state, especially in the Danville, La Salle, Springfield, and Du Quoin districts. The mines at Danville, Du Quoin, and Springfield had been in operation for a comparatively short time and were of only local importance.²¹ The La Salle field, being located on the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and thus possessing comparatively good transportation facilities, was the most important district in the state. However, it was handicapped by the high cost of mining, which was about one dollar per ton more than in the Ohio mines. This prevented it from supplying the Chicago market to any considerable extent.²² The Belleville mines were the oldest in the state, and produced nearly one half the coal mined in Illinois. Their proximity to St. Louis made the mines of this district very profitable.²³ For some reason lead-mining was of less importance in 1850 than it had been fifteen or twenty years earlier. The Galena district was the only part of the state where any considerable amount of lead was mined, and even there the yield was on the decrease.²⁴ Thus, both coal and lead-mining were of comparatively little importance, and less than a thousand miners were employed in the entire state in 1850.²⁵

Illinois was primarily an agricultural state at the close of the fifth decade of the 19th century and a very small proportion of the population was engaged in other pursuits. Slightly over 3100 different establishments existed in the state, varying in size from a small village tannery or carpenter shop employing two or three men to large plants such as the McCormick Reaper Company at Chicago.²⁶ Altogether, the industries of the state

¹⁹Compendium U. S. Census, 1850, p. 170.

²⁰Cf. Chap. v.

²¹J. W. Foster, *Report on Mineral Lands on the Illinois Central Railroad*.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*; Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 17.

²⁴Wm. Spensley, *The Mines of Jo Daviess County*; Seventh Census (1850), p. 115.

²⁵J. W. Foster, *Report on Mineral Resources on the Illinois Central Railroad*; Seventh Census (1850), p. 115. Cf. Chap. v.

²⁶Seventh Census (1850), p. 115.

had a capital of six and a half million dollars, employed a force of twelve thousand hands, and produced products valued at seventeen and a quarter millions.²⁷ Packing, flouring mills, distilleries, breweries, iron and steel works, woolen mills, agricultural implement works, ship building plants, tanneries, and brick works were the leading industries.²⁸ Outside of the cities industrial conditions were backward, but not as primitive as many writers indicate. The log cabin and homespun were regarded as evidences of lack of progress, and settlers, even on the isolated farms of the interior, were supplied with many of the luxuries of civilized life.

The lack of internal transportation, with the accompanying isolation of the interior counties of the state, the backward agricultural conditions, and the unimportance of mining and manufacturing were an effective check on the trade between Illinois and the eastern and southern states. In the period before the Civil war there were three principal markets for the surplus products of the Northwest, (1) the North Atlantic seaboard, (2) the lower Mississippi valley, and (3) western Europe. In 1850 there was good connection between Chicago or St. Louis and these markets. The Great Lakes and the Erie Canal afforded western grain the cheapest means of inland transportation in the country. The Mississippi River likewise offered cheap transportation to the population along its banks. The introduction of the steamboat on both the Great Lakes and the rivers permitted extensive reductions in the cost of carrying such bulky goods as grain and lumber. Consequently, farm products could be sent east or south over the waterways at reasonable charges after they had been brought to a lake or river port.

However, as already noted, the lack of roads, canals, and railroads prevented the movement of grain and pork from the central counties of Illinois to either the lake or the Mississippi River. Only the counties directly on the banks of the waterways could take advantage of the low charges from Chicago or St. Louis to New York or New Orleans. In other words, the great agricultural resources of Illinois were unavailable. Illinois wheat, corn, oats, and live stock were shipped east or south in comparatively slight quantities. Although the state ranked first among all the states of the Union in the yield of grain, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky

²⁷Seventh Census (1850), p. 115; cf. Chap. v.

²⁸For a much more detailed description of the trade routes from Illinois east and south, cf. Chap. v.

and Tennessee each supplied a larger portion of the southern, eastern or European demand than did Illinois. Out of a total production of seventy-seven million bushels of the three staples, oats, corn and wheat, less than three million bushels were forwarded from Chicago and the amount sent from Ohio or Mississippi river towns was not much larger.²⁹ If we compare the production and shipments of grain in 1850 and 1880, for instance, the difference shows among other things the effects of poor transportation on the state. Against seven or eight million bushels shipped east and south in 1850 twenty times as much was moved in the later year.

With conditions as they were in the middle of the nineteenth century, the most important need of Illinois was some system of transportation which would connect the fertile interior counties with the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. The development of a large portion of the state depended upon the construction of such means of communication. Many schemes came before the people, but the one that had the greatest possibilities and which appealed most strongly to the imagination of the citizens of the state was a central railroad from Galena to Cairo.³⁰

²⁹*Chicago Daily Democrat*, January 23, 1850; Seventh Census (1850).

³⁰The most important references used in this and subsequent chapters are found in the footnotes at the bottom of each page. At the end of Chapter VII a critical bibliography of all authorities made use of in this monograph will be found. Many of the topics treated in Chapter I are discussed at greater length in Chapter V, and cross references are given.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAND GRANT AND CHARTER.

A great central highway connecting the northern and southern counties of Illinois had always been a favorite project with the legislatures and executives of the state. As early as 1830 Governor Coles suggested that "Lake Michigan . . . might easily be tapped and the water taken by canals not only into the Illinois, but on the dividing line between that river and the Wabash down through the center of the state."¹ Only two years later, Lieutenant Governor A. M. Jenkins proposed in the Senate that a survey be made for a central railroad from Cairo to Peru,² and, though somewhat premature, the proposal created considerable discussion, both in and out of the legislature. By 1835, the building of the "Central" had become one of the important issues in state politics. The project was ably advocated by such newspapers as the *Sangamo Journal*³ and also by a number of leading citizens, prominent among them being Sidney Breese, whose fifteen years of service in promoting the undertaking entitles him to be called the "Father of the Illinois Central Railroad".⁴

With such support it was not long before definite measures were taken, and on January 18th, 1836, the Illinois legislature incorporated the Central Railroad Company to construct a railroad from "the mouth of the Ohio to a point on the Illinois River at or near the termination of the Illinois and Michigan Canal."⁵ Fifty-nine incorporators were named, among them Governor Reynolds, Lieutenant Governors A. M. Jenkins and Pierre Menard, Judge Sidney Breese, Darius B. Holbrook and Albert K. Snyder,⁶ and a capital of two and a

¹*Illinois Monthly Magazine*, Vol. I, No. 1, October, 1830.

²Newton, *Early Railway Legislation in Illinois*, p. 7; Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, pp. 6, 7.

³*Sangamo Journal*, October 31, 1835.

⁴Cf. Appendix to *Early History of Illinois* by Sidney Breese. In this book Mr. Breese reviews his efforts in behalf of the Illinois Central Railroad.

⁵*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1835-1836, pp. 129 ff.

⁶Among the incorporators were Mr. Holbrook and several other

half million dollars was authorized. From the first, this road was regarded as a peculiar state institution, and lest its policy should be dominated by a foreign monopoly, provision was made that no person could subscribe to more than five shares of stock and that at least one fifth of the capital should be offered for sale in the state.⁷ Provision was also made that, whenever the company earned more than twelve per cent on the cost of construction for a period of ten years, the legislature could so reduce earnings and tolls for the next ten years that the earnings would not exceed that amount, reports being made to the state to show cost of construction and gross and net receipts.⁸ In return for this restriction on the powers of the company, the legislature inserted a clause in the charter agreeing not to incorporate any competitive railroad for a period of fifty years.⁹

However, the promoters of the railroad had chosen a most inopportune time for commencing this important undertaking. During the thirties the country was agitated by one of those popular movements in favor of government aid to internal improvements. In Illinois, after months of agitation, mass meetings, and conventions, the movement culminated in the celebrated internal improvement act of 1837. This act provided for an extensive network of railroads intersecting the state in all directions. The backbone of the system was to be a central railroad from Cairo northward, via Vandalia, Shelbyville, Decatur, Bloomington, and Savannah, to Galena, at that time the most important city in the state.¹⁰ In addition there were several cross lines extending from the main stem to the important cities on the eastern or western boundaries. One of these branches from Shelbyville or Decatur to the state line corresponded very closely to the Chicago branch under the act of 1851.¹¹ The entire system amounted to about twelve hundred miles, but the estimates as to cost of construction were surprisingly low. Three

gentlemen connected with him in later enterprises, but as the company never commenced active construction work, it is impossible to say whether this company was controlled by Mr. Holbrook. As he was not a resident of Illinois and otherwise would not have been among the incorporators, the presumption is that he had a very important influence in the organization of the company under this act of 1836.

⁷*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1835-1836, p. 134.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹*Ibid.*, sec. 6.

¹⁰*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1836-1837, p. 121; Newton, *Early Railway Legislation in Illinois*, pp. 21-23.

¹¹*Ibid.*

and a half million dollars was regarded as sufficient to build the four hundred and fifty miles of the main line, while the Shelbyville and Alton branches were to cost \$650,000 and \$600,000 respectively, or from seven to ten thousand dollars per mile;¹² less than one fourth what it cost the present company fifteen years later.¹³ A loan, based on the credit of the state, was to provide funds, while a board of seven commissioners was appointed to manage the enterprise during its construction and after completion.¹⁴ Immediately after the passage of the act these commissioners commenced work, and for a while it seemed as if this colossal undertaking might be finished. Grading was commenced at Cairo, Galena, and intermediate points: tens of thousands of dollars were expended on the dikes and levee at Cairo; large quantities of rails were purchased; about forty miles of embankment north of Cairo were completed; and, altogether, something like a million dollars was expended on the central route and branches, although certainly not in the most effectual manner.¹⁵ But the task was entirely beyond the ability of the state; financial difficulties prevented the floating of the necessary bonds; and extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement exhausted the money already procured. The result was that a hundred miles of grading and a few thousand tons of iron were the only tangible results of this second attempt to construct a railroad through the center of Illinois.¹⁶

Even this failure did not deter the state or its citizens from endeavoring to complete the project, and on March 6th, 1843, only six years after the passage of the Internal Improvement Act, the legislature incorporated the Great Western Railway Company, better known as the Holbrook Company.¹⁷ To under-

¹²*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1836-1837, p. 121; Newton, *Early Railway Legislation in Illinois*, pp. 21-23.

¹³Cf. Chap. vi.

¹⁴*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1836-1837, p. 121.

¹⁵*Chicago Daily Democrat*, December 24, 1849. Editorial.

¹⁶*Ibid.* It is interesting to note that the legislature which passed the Internal Improvement Act is regarded as the strongest legislature ever convened in Illinois, and contained such men as Lincoln, Logan, Douglas, Bissell, etc. The act was passed to a large extent through an arrangement with the Springfield delegation by which the state capital should go to that city in return for the passage of the act by their votes. Cf. chapters in Moses, *Illinois Historical and Statistical*, and Davidson and Stuve, *History of Illinois*, relating to the Internal Improvement Act.

¹⁷*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1843-1844, pp. 199, 200; Newton, *Early Railway Legislation in Illinois*, p. 33; Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 9.

stand this act it is necessary to go back six years to March 4th, 1837.

On that date, the Cairo City and Canal Company was incorporated with power to hold real estate in Alexander County, especially the tract of land now included in the corporate limits of Cairo, and to carry on general industrial enterprises.¹⁸ Mr. Darius B. Holbrook, of New York, one of the incorporators of the Central Railroad of 1836, was elected president, and for twenty years the enterprise was dominated by his masterful personality until the two became synonymous.¹⁹ During the prosperous period just before the panic the company borrowed between two and three million dollars, largely from English capitalists; purchased several thousand acres of land at the mouth of the Ohio River; established industries of all kinds; laid out an extensive city at what is now Cairo; protected it by embankments and levees; carried on a general mercantile business; and enacted ordinances for the government of the citizens of Cairo.²⁰ However, the resources of the company were not equal to the demands made upon it and the failure of the internal improvement policy in 1840, following closely after the severe panic of 1837, forced the enterprise into bankruptcy. English investors refused further financial support and the stoppage of work on the state railroad destroyed the undeveloped industries at Cairo. The directors neglected the undertaking; the property in and near Cairo was abandoned; and for a time the place was occupied only by squatters and disreputable characters from the river boats.²¹

The extreme depression existing in Illinois after the panic of 1837 and the failure of the state policy prevented Mr. Holbrook from doing anything with the Cairo City and Canal Company until 1843. Realizing the possibilities of the "Central" railroad, he induced the legislature to pass the Great Western Railway Act of that year. According to the charter the presi-

¹⁸*Session Laws of Illinois, 1836-1837, March 4, 1837.* The powers granted the Cairo company by the legislature were almost unlimited and the company's acts were often in opposition to the general acts of the General Assembly.

¹⁹In nearly all newspaper references to the Cairo City and Canal Company it is referred to as the Holbrook Company. Mr. Holbrook was regarded as an unscrupulous promoter and was thoroughly disliked throughout the state.

²⁰Anon., *History of Cairo, Publications of the Cairo City and Canal Company*; Henry Long, *History and Prospects of Cairo.*

²¹*Ibid.*

dent and directors of the Cairo City and Canal Company were incorporated as the Great Western Railway Company and were given authority to construct a railway from Cairo to the Illinois and Michigan Canal.²² In many ways this act was quite favorable to the state. The otherwise worthless grading done in 1837 to 1840 was to be purchased at a fair valuation: twenty-five per cent of the net receipts from operation, after a twelve per cent dividend had been paid on the stock, were to go to the state; and the legislature could alter the charter of both the Great Western Company and Cairo City and Canal Company after all the indebtedness of the former was paid. But, for half a dozen years the Cairo Company had been known as a flagrant example of speculative and corrupt corporate management, and to turn over to such a company the most important industrial enterprise within the state, without reasonable compensation or even adequate safeguards as to the completion of the work, was, to say the least, a short sighted policy. Moreover, a clause was inserted in the closing section of the act surrendering to the company any public lands which might come into the possession of the state of Illinois during the life of the charter. Not even a guarantee was demanded that such lands should be used for the construction of the railroad. This legislation shows the wretched financial condition of the state in 1843 and illustrates the lack of foresight characteristic of the General Assembly during the period.²³

For a time it seemed as if the company was seriously determined to proceed with the "Central" railroad. Large sums were borrowed and expended in finishing the original state surveys and completing the grading. Numerous buildings were erected at Cairo, and an extensive system of levees was planned and partially constructed.²⁴ But conditions were not favorable, and the company could not obtain capital to continue the work. Several millions had already been expended by the Cairo company without dividend paying results; all Illinois credit, both state and private, was under suspicion on account of the partial repudiation of the state debt; and eastern and European cap-

²²*Session Laws of Illinois, 1842-1843*, pp. 199 ff. The terms of the act are peculiar and this provision making the directors of one company directors of another is typical of the loose charters granted by state legislatures before the Civil War. Contrast this charter with the charter of February 10, 1851.

²³*Session Laws of Illinois, 1843-1844*, pp. 199 ff; p. 203, sec. 18.

²⁴Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 10.

italists refused to risk further investments in Illinois.²⁵ Lack of funds stopped all construction within a few months after the charter was secured and the directors finally gave up in despair. On March 3, 1845, with the consent of the company, the charter was repealed by special act of the legislature; all work done by the company reverted to the state;²⁶ and the third and most promising attempt to construct the "Central" railroad ended with heavy loss to the promoters and no profit to the state.

The failure of the Great Western Railway, following closely upon the disastrous Internal Improvement project of 1837-1840, made it evident to the legislature, as well as to local and eastern capitalists, that under the depressed condition of Illinois credit, the construction of this important and expensive railroad was an utter impossibility without substantial aid from the national government. As a result, the efforts of the state during the seven years from 1843 to 1850 were directed almost entirely towards obtaining such support.

Under these circumstances, the people of the state considered themselves fortunate in having elected to the Senate of the United States, in 1843, Judge Sidney Breese, who was regarded as the most enthusiastic advocate of the "Central". On December 23rd, 1843, only a few days after being sworn in as senator, he introduced into Congress a memorial of the Great Western Company praying for preemption rights to a portion of the public lands through which the proposed road would run. Although profit to the railroad could only come from selling the land at more than a dollar and a quarter an acre, the preemption price, the measure met with such indifference and opposition that the committee on public lands, to which the memorial was referred, refused to report a bill.²⁷

²⁵*Session Laws of Illinois, 1844-1845, March 3, 1845.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Sen. J., December 23, 1843; Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad, p. 10.* As Breese was elected at the session of the legislature which passed the Great Western Act of March 6, 1843, containing the provision turning over to that company any federal lands the state might receive, and immediately after taking his seat in the Senate introduced a bill granting a preemption right to that company, it looks as if there might have been some understanding between him and the Cairo Company. Breese was always a warm supporter of the Cairo Company. The Cairo City and Canal Company was very unpopular in Illinois, especially among the people. From the act of 1836 on Judge Breese was an outspoken advocate of this company and believed the

Two years later, Judge Breese was appointed chairman of the Committee on Public Lands and, with the additional prestige and influence of that position, he introduced a bill, in 1846, granting alternate sections of public land to the Northern Cross and Central railroads of Illinois.²⁸ Breese himself had little faith in a direct grant of land and did not push the project vigorously. As chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, to which all these bills were referred, he was able to make a strong report in favor of his proposal, but, for some reason, the bill was not brought up after leaving the committee.²⁹ Undismayed by his previous lack of success, he again introduced, at the second session of the twenty-ninth Congress, his favorite project of a preemption grant.³⁰ The Committee on Public Lands advocated the measure in a vigorous report, which ranks among the ablest congressional documents on the land question. The arguments advanced in favor of the bills were convincing, and Senator Breese followed up his report by active work on the floor of the Senate. His persistent and energetic support of the plan had its influence, and the Senate finally passed his measure.³¹ The bill went to the House, but none of the Illinois delegation took an active interest in it, and there is no evidence in the House records that an attempt was made to secure its passage.³²

When the condition of political affairs at the time is considered it is evident that Breese was contending against almost insurmountable difficulties, and, although his proposals met with little success, he must be given great credit for accustoming the members of Congress to the novel project of granting public land to assist, directly or indirectly, in the construction of private railroads. His reports from the Committee on Public Lands

railroad should be built by the Great Western Company. He feared a direct grant of land would be used by the legislature to renew the Internal Improvement policy of 1837, and for that reason, together with his general support of the Holbrook corporations, he endeavored to get a right of preemption for the Great Western. The Illinois members of the house desired the construction of the central railroad, but not under the direction of Mr. Holbrook. There are no grounds to question Mr. Breese's good faith in his advocacy of the Holbrook companies.

²⁸*Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 208; Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways*, p. 25.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess.; Sanborn, p. 26.

³¹*Ibid.*; Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 10.

³²*Ibid.*

were clear and logical statements of the arguments in favor of congressional aid. He lacked, however, the political prestige and aggressive personality necessary to secure the assent of his colleagues to such an unusual policy. He also failed in securing the support of the Illinois delegation in the House, and complete success was, thus, almost impossible.³³

Fortunately for the Central project, Stephen A. Douglas entered the United States Senate in 1847, and within a short time became the recognized leader of the dominant party in that body. Like Breese he was an ardent advocate of a railroad through central Illinois, and believed that the federal government should assist in its construction. But the two men differed in the methods to be adopted by the government. Breese advocated conferring the right of preemption upon a private company. Douglas favored a direct grant of land, not to a private corporation but to the state of Illinois. In this position he was ably seconded by the Illinois delegation in the House of Representatives.³⁴

At the commencement of the long session of 1847-8, each senator introduced a measure in accordance with his respective view. Breese presented his previous plan for a preemption right to the Cairo company for a railroad from Cairo to Galena.³⁵ On the other hand his colleague advocated a direct grant of land to the state of Illinois to be used in building a first class railroad from Cairo to Galena, as in Breese's plan. In addition he proposed that there be a branch from this "main" line to Chicago;³⁶ in effect this meant a trunk line from the Great Lakes at Chicago to the Mississippi River at Cairo. By his plan whatever profit would come from an increased value of the land would inure to the benefit of the state, not to the advantage of a private corporation. The whole plan was one of those shrewd schemes for which Douglas was famous. From an ill-fated and ill-managed local project of one of the less important western states the Illinois Central became a national enterprise.

In deference to his colleague, Judge Breese consented to postpone his preemption bill, though he still kept it on the calendar that, as he said, he might call it up after the failure

³³Cf. correspondence between Douglas and Breese in Appendix, *Early History of Illinois*, by Sidney Breese.

³⁴*Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 30 Cong., 1 sess.

³⁶*Ibid.*

of the land grant measure.³⁷ The bill introduced by Senator Douglas was reported favorably from the Committee on Public Lands, and was made a special order on May 3rd, 1848. From that time its passage through the Senate was comparatively easy. In general the measure was supported by members from the western states and opposed by representatives of the eastern and southern states.³⁸ Although introduced by the Democratic leader of the Senate, the land grant received much better support from the Whigs than from their opponents. As distribution of the public lands in this way was distinctly a Whig policy, it was natural that the minority should favor the bill. Moreover, most of the unoccupied government land was in the West, and representatives of states where the amount was large aided the measure on the assumption that its success might mean a similar grant to them later on. Likewise members from the eastern states opposed this new policy on the ground that the whole nation should share the benefits of the western lands. Senators and representatives from the southern and gulf states were strict constructionists and opposed Congressional action which would assist either the North or West at the expense of the South. Their position was entirely consistent with the immediate interests of their constituency. After the fashion of the time, most of the speeches defended or opposed the land grant on constitutional grounds, the main point of dispute being

³⁷Breese to Douglas, January 5, 1850, quoted in *Illinois State Journal*, February 6, 1851; Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways*, p. 26.

³⁸*Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., p. 314; Appendix, pp. 535, 536, 537; Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways*, pp. 26 ff. The vote on the measure in the House and Senate was distributed as follows:

	FOR		AGAINST	
	SENATE	HOUSE	SENATE	HOUSE
New England.....	2	10	3	5
Middle	2	25	1	22
South	2	7	3	31
Gulf	4	3	3	4
West (land).....	10	27	0	9
West (non-land).....	4	1	1	8
	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	24	73	11	79
Democrat	14	30	10	42
Whig	10	43	1	37

whether Congress had a constitutional right to give away the national lands in aid of internal improvements.³⁹

With the members of Congress divided along the lines indicated above, the success of the bill depended upon the relative strength of the West as opposed to the East and South. Although the bulk of the population was in the eastern and southern states the number of western states was as large as the number of eastern states. As all states had an equal representation in the Senate the passage of the bill was comparatively easy, the final vote standing twenty-four for, as against eleven opposed to the bill.⁴⁰ In the House, however, where representation was in proportion to population, the large middle and southern states were able to defeat the act. The vote was close, and had some of the western members supported the grant more vigorously it would probably have been passed. As it was, the majority against it was only seven.⁴¹ In accordance with a previous understanding, Judge Breese again introduced his pre-emption bill at the short session, and, though not in conformity with the views of Douglas, the latter, as a personal and political favor to his colleague, allowed it to pass the Senate, with the tacit understanding that it was to be rejected in the House of Representatives.⁴²

In the six years since Judge Breese introduced his first pre-emption bill, sentiment in both the Senate and House had become quite favorable to some kind of a land grant or pre-emption right in aid of the Illinois Central Railroad. Any measure would undoubtedly be of considerable value to the state of Illinois or to private parties who might build the road, and the Cairo City and Canal Company determined to make use of the apparently favorable conditions. Accordingly, after the failure of the first land grant bill and probably in anticipation of greater success at the next session, the Cairo City and Canal Company petitioned the legislature for a renewal of their pre-

³⁹*Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess.; Appendix. The views of the members of Congress are gathered from speeches in the *Globe*.

⁴⁰*Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., p. 314.

⁴¹Cf. p. 18, n. 38. The bill was refused a third reading by vote of 74-78 (73-79?) *Ho. J.*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., p. 1270; *Congressional Globe*, 30 Cong., 1 sess., p. 1071; Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways*, pp. 29, 30.

⁴²Douglas to Breese, letter quoted in *Illinois State Journal*, February 6, 1851. Cf. correspondence between Breese and Douglas in Appendix to Breese's *Early History of Illinois*.

vious rights, which had been repealed by the act of March 3rd, 1845. Although the Holbrook companies generally were disliked throughout the state, they represented the wealthiest aggregation of capital in Illinois, and apparently were the best able to complete the Illinois Central Railroad. In recognition of this fact the legislature on February 10th, 1849 reincorporated the Great Western Railway Company,⁴³ with all its former privileges, and, in addition, gave it outright the remains of the old state surveys, gradings, and embankments, and a right of way two hundred feet wide from Cairo to Galena.⁴⁴ The surprising feature of the act is that the legislature included in the charter the clause surrendering to the company whatever lands the federal government should grant the state. No restriction whatever was placed on the use of these lands, and, so far as the charter was concerned, these lands, once in the possession of the corporation, might have been used for the personal advantage of the president or directors. Moreover, the only condition imposed upon the company in return for the charter was that it should spend at least \$200,000 each year until the road was completed, and even this condition was vague and ill defined.⁴⁵

With this remarkable enactment of the legislature before them, it was only natural that members of Congress should hesi-

⁴³*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1849-50, February 10, 1849.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵The provision in the acts of 1843 and 1849, granting the Great Western Railroad whatever federal lands should come into the possession of the state, is one of the most peculiar ever passed by an Illinois legislature. In 1843 there was little prospect that the national government would ever turn over lands to Illinois to aid in railroad construction, but in 1849 several bills had passed the Senate and one had passed the House giving either preemption or direct grants to Illinois, and it was considered almost certain the 31st Congress would pass the desired legislation. It is very probable that the clause was inserted in both acts as a "joker" and escaped the notice of the members. At the time charters were granted giving private companies almost unlimited powers and evidently this is an example.

At the same time it is very likely that the Cairo City and Canal Company resorted to underhand methods to secure the insertion of this provision. From the bitter criticism of the provision in 1849 and 1850 after the passage of the federal act, especially in the *Springfield Register* and *Journal*, two of the leading papers in the state, it is certain this clause could not have been inserted with the open approval of the legislature. The advantage to the company from such a provision is too obvious to require further reasons in defence of the attitude of the company.

The action of the Great Western Railroad indicates that it was incor-

tate to give to Illinois public lands which might be turned over to a speculative private corporation without materially furthering the "Central" railroad. No one saw this more clearly than Senator Douglas, and, even before the first session of the thirty-first Congress opened, he made vigorous attempts to obtain a repeal of the obnoxious features of the charter. He was not at first successful, but his colleagues at Washington and prominent citizens of the state assisted him and just before Congress convened he was able to induce the president and directors of the Cairo City and Canal Company to execute a release of the charter of the Great Western Railroad Company. The surrender was only conditional, however, and the Cairo company insisted that the release should be accepted at the next session of the legislature and that another company be immediately incorporated to carry on the project.⁴⁶

The Great Western tangle having been straightened out, the Illinois delegation in Congress was in a position to renew their efforts in behalf of the Illinois Central grant. At the previous election several changes were made in the personnel of the delegation, which gave new strength to the advocates of a direct grant. In the Senate Judge Breese was succeeded by General Shields, and the new representatives were in sympathy with the plans of Douglas.⁴⁷ Judge Douglas was an able politician, as porated with the object of securing the land grant. From its incorporation until the passage of the federal land grant the company did practically nothing. Then with the passage of the Act of September 20th several thousand dollars were expended in and near Cairo, evidently to fulfill the legal requirements of the charter. For a full discussion of this matter, the reader is referred to the files of the *Journal* and *Register*, Springfield, during the Fall and Winter of 1849. (*Illinois Weekly State Journal*, October 16, 1850.)

⁴⁶*Illinois State Journal*, October 16, 1850. There was a very bitter fight in Illinois over the release of the charter of the Great Western Company. The Cairo Company was, of course, reluctant to surrender the charter, and they were supported by many political opponents of Douglas. The company obtained considerable aid from politicians in the southern part of the state, but was almost unanimously opposed by the central and northern parts of the state. The two Springfield newspapers were the most bitter opponents of the Hobbrook company. Cf. the conflict over the passage of the repeal act of February 10, 1851. In October, 1850, Mr. Holbrook, as President of the company, executed a release, but Mr. Douglas did not accept it. Cf. correspondence between Breese and Douglas, in Appendix to Breese's *Early History of Illinois*.

⁴⁷General Shields was a warm personal friend of Senator Douglas, while Senator Breese was not always on intimate terms with him. Shields

well as a statesman of national prominence, and the experience of the previous session showed the necessity of aggressive action. As a matter of course, the friends of the land grant, both in and out of Congress, secured a large number of memorials and petitions requesting definite action by the federal government.⁴⁸ In addition, Senator Douglas resorted to various political bargains to insure complete success of his policy. In the previous session he had added to his plan a branch from the proposed main line of the railroad to Chicago, and thus made the enterprise one which appealed to the interests of many eastern representatives.⁴⁹ In his plans for the thirty-first Congress he made the railroad even more comprehensive. He extended the proposed grant to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which was then endeavoring to get a foothold in southern Alabama, and to certain other southern roads. A trunk line from Chicago to Mobile was a project which appealed to the imagination of the people of the entire Mississippi valley; even the strict constructionists had to admit it was a matter of more than state importance. At the same time, the southern part of the plan removed the opposition of the gulf states and secured the active support of certain northern members who were very much interested in the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.⁵⁰ He also removed the opposition of certain New England and Pennsylvania Congressmen by a compromise on the tariff. Douglas cared very little about new

was also one of the most popular politicians in Illinois. Among the leading supporters of the measure were Representatives Bissell, Baker, and Wentworth of Illinois.

⁴⁸Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 17. Wentworth, *Congressional Reminiscences* (Fergus Historical Series).

⁴⁹The addition of the Chicago branch is interesting as showing the increased importance of northern Illinois and the district around Chicago. In the early plans the northeastern part of the state was neglected and this addition by Douglas is a recognition of the changes which took place in the previous fifteen years. Senator Douglas was accused of making the change in order to increase the value of Chicago real estate, in which he was deeply interested. There may be some truth in the statement, but it also shows that he recognized the future importance of Chicago. The entire success of the Illinois Central has depended upon the Chicago branch, and if this extension had not been made, the road would have become a merely local undertaking.

⁵⁰Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways*, p. 31; Breese to Douglas, *Illinois State Journal*, February 6, 1851; Wentworth, *Congressional Reminiscences* (Fergus Historical Series).

tariff legislation, while the eastern representatives were not interested in the land grant, but did desire a change in the tariff. A compromise was easy and the eastern Congressmen agreed to support the Illinois Central measure in return for active efforts on the part of the western members in favor of a change of tariff.⁵¹ A third agreement, though of less importance than the other two, was arranged late in the session by which Dunleith, opposite Dubuque, Iowa, instead of Galena, became the northern terminus of the proposed road.⁵² These various agreements and compromises materially strengthened the Illinois delegation and made the passage of the land grant act a practical certainty.

A few days before the second release was executed Senator Douglas introduced in the Senate a bill granting to Illinois alternate sections of public land for six miles on each side of a proposed railroad from Cairo to Galena and from Chicago to a junction with the main line.⁵³ With the consent, and probably at the suggestion of the Illinois Senators, King of Alabama added an amendment making a similar grant to the states of Mississippi and Alabama,⁵⁴ and a little later Senator Dodge of Iowa made another amendment extending the road to Dun-

⁵¹Wentworth, *Congressional Reminiscences* (Fergus Historical Series). Among the eastern members secured by this agreement were Daniel Webster and Mr. Ashmun of Massachusetts. It is very likely that the Boston and New York capitalists who built the Illinois Central were deeply interested in the success of the land grant act. Mr. Rantoul, one of the leading promoters, was a close personal friend of the two gentlemen named above, and succeeded Mr. Webster in the Senate. Mr. Ashmun was also interested in the Illinois Central, and the town of that name on the charter line is named after him.

⁵²Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 17. Senator Dodge, of Iowa, is credited with being the originator of this extension. The change was bitterly opposed by Galena and was instrumental in causing the decline of that city. Two railroads were being projected from Dubuque in 1849, one of them, the present Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad and the extension to Dunleith, made possible a through line from Chicago and Cairo to central Iowa. The change, although of great importance to the Illinois Central, attracted little attention in Congress.

⁵³*Sen. J.*, 31 Cong., 1 sess.

⁵⁴*Congressional Globe*, 31 Cong., 1 sess., p. 845. It should be noticed that the Act of September 20, 1850 makes grants of land to the three states of unoccupied government land inside the state limits to be used in building a railroad inside the state. This is due to the strict constructionist views of the Democratic majority of Congress. Cf. the Union Pacific Land Grant Act.

leith.⁵⁵ With these amendments securing the support mentioned on the previous pages the passage of the bill through the Senate was comparatively easy and the measure was approved by a vote of 26-14. The real opposition came in the House, but the Illinois delegation, under the leadership of Bissell, McClelland, and Wentworth, forced the Senate bill through the lower house. At times the opposition was extremely bitter, and it was only by the various agreements effected in the early part of the session that the act secured sufficient votes to be passed. Finally, a vote was taken, and the bill passed⁵⁶ the House of Representatives by a majority of twenty-five, the vote taking place on the 17th of September. Three days later, President Fillmore signed the bill and the construction of the Illinois Central was assured so far as the United States Congress was concerned.⁵⁷

By the terms of this act alternate sections six miles on each side of the proposed railroad were given to the states of Illinois, Mississippi and Alabama to construct a railroad from Chicago to Mobile. The act, as it related to Illinois, provided for a railroad "from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with a branch of the same to Chicago on Lake Michigan, and another, via the town of Galena, in said state, to Dubuque, in the state of Iowa."⁵⁸ The land in alternate, even numbered, sections for six miles on both sides of this road was given to the state to assist this undertaking, but with the provision that the road should be completed within ten years and that if this were not done all unsold lands should revert to the federal government and the state should pay to the United States whatever it had received for land already sold. Furthermore, the road should be a public highway, free of toll, or other charges, for the transportation of any property or troops of the United

⁵⁵Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 17.

⁵⁶The vote on the land grant bill was as follows:

	FOR		AGAINST	
	SENATE	HOUSE	SENATE	HOUSE
New England.....	1	10	4	11
Middle	2	28	4	22
South	2	8	3	23
Gulf	5	13	1	1
West (land).....	13	34	1	12
West (non-land).....	3	8	1	7
	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	26	101	14	76

⁵⁷*U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, 466.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

States; Congress was to decide what compensation should be given for carrying the mails. To compensate for the loss of land Congress ordered that the alternate, odd numbered, sections six miles on either side of the road, belonging to the government, should be sold at \$2.50 per acre, instead of \$1.25 as previously. Lands already settled were to be retained by the settlers upon payment to the state of the preemption price, or the latter could recompense itself by taking other unoccupied land within fifteen miles of the road.⁵⁹ The land could never be used for any purpose other than the construction of the road.

The passage of the land grant act of September 20th marks an epoch in the history of Illinois. At last, after years of discouragement and failure, the state had in sight the means necessary to build the Illinois Central Railroad. To even the most conservative citizen, three million acres of land seemed sufficient to guarantee the construction of the road. The more sanguine looked forward to the time when the central counties of the state would be thickly settled and the land grant had paid off all of the burdensome Internal Improvement Debt. Senator Douglas and the other representatives in Congress who had secured the grant were applauded from Cairo to Galena: mass meetings and banquets were held in their honor; and every means was taken to show the popular appreciation of their services.⁶⁰ The influence on the general credit of Illinois was great as was shown by a rise of several points in the internal improvement stock.⁶¹

The mere passage of the federal act was the least difficult of the many problems confronting the friends of the Illinois Central. For some fourteen years the questions connected with this railroad had been before the legislature and the citizens of

⁵⁹*U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, 46.

⁶⁰Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 35. On their return to Illinois at the close of the session, Mr. Douglas and Gen. Shields were tendered a public dinner by the citizens of Chicago, in consideration of their services in obtaining the passage of this act. In declining the honor, they modestly awarded to their colleagues in the house the full measure of credit for having successfully carried the bill through to completion.

⁶¹"The *New York Evening Post* of the 18th inst. says: A considerable advance has been obtained in Illinois Internal Improvement stock: 55½ was bid for it this morning and 60 asked. This is a rise of five to ten per cent and is due to the advising obtained this morning from Washington of the donation by congress of lands in Illinois in aid of the railroad constructed between Chicago and Mobile, which runs through the whole state of Illinois—also of the swamp land measure." *Illinois Daily Register*, September 30, 1850.

the state, and now that success was probable, all the previous conflicts were renewed with additional strength. The most troublesome of these involved the method of construction and the route.

There were four possible ways of utilizing the land grant, each of which had its vigorous adherents: (1) State construction of the railroad by means of the grant, along the line of the internal improvement plan of 1837; (2) Surrender of the grant to the bondholders and construction by them on terms similar to those made by the holders of canal bonds in 1840; (3) Completion by the Great Western Railway Company under its charter of 1849, including the retention of all state lands; (4) Creation of an entirely new private corporation and the transfer to it of the land grant under certain restrictions and with certain payments to the state; this company to assume entire responsibility for the completion of the road.

To many citizens state construction of the Illinois Central still seemed a feasible project. From 1831 to 1843 the various plans for the railroad depended on government support, and, despite the collapse of the Internal Improvement plan of 1837, there was considerable talk of direct construction by the legislature. The cost of building the road was underestimated, while the value of the land was overestimated. It was expected that the road could be built without recourse to bond issues and it was thought that the profits from operation would then quickly retire the old state debt.⁶² But the panic of 1840 and the depressing influence of the debt were still vivid in the minds of the citizens of Illinois, and they generally condemned any further attempt by the state. As Senator Shields said:—"capitalists will not embark in this enterprise unless they have the control of the servants, agents, etc. . . . in a word of the construction and management of the road."⁶³

Another form of semi-legislative management was contained in the so-called "bond-holders' plan", which was submitted to the legislature in January, 1851. As a result of the various attempts at internal improvement Illinois had accumulated a debt of some fifteen million dollars and was unable to meet the

⁶²For instance, Mr. John S. Wright, of Chicago, published a pamphlet in which he took the ground that the grant, being of such immense value, the State should hold the lands and again attempt the construction of the road. Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 35.

⁶³Speech of General Shields, Springfield, Ill., November 20, 1850, given in full in *Illinois Weekly Journal*, November 20, 1850.

full interest charges. In fact, the state had barely escaped repudiation or bankruptcy, and the bondholders supposed it would be utterly incapable of attracting the capital necessary to construct the Illinois Central. Under the circumstances, certain eastern bondholders suggested an arrangement somewhat similar to the one under which the Illinois and Michigan Canal was built. A company, composed largely of bondholders, was to be chartered and given power to construct the railroad. Three dollars of bonds or four dollars of stock, entitled new internal improvement stock, were to be given for each dollar of cash paid in. The state was to receive stock at par to an amount equal to the value of the lands sold, and in return pay all expenses of surveys, etc. The stock belonging to the state must be set apart to retire the state debt. The stock of the new company could also be made the basis for state banking.⁶⁴ On the whole, the terms were about as onerous as could be imposed on a bankrupt state, and they are in striking contrast to the Illinois Central charter of 1850. It is impossible to state just what men were behind the scheme, as it was disowned by many leading bondholders. The project never received serious attention from either the newspapers or the legislature.⁶⁵

The proposed construction by the Great Western Railroad, or in other words by Mr. Holbrook and the Cairo City and Canal Company, attracted much more attention than either of the other two plans. In 1849, as already mentioned, the legislature renewed the charter of the Great Western, including a grant to the company of whatever lands the state might receive from the federal government. Then, in December, 1849, the directors, under pressure from Senator Douglas, executed a release of both the charter and the grant, on condition that the legislature would accept the same at its next session and incorporate another company to carry on the enterprise. The charter of 1849 was evidently obtained with the distinct object of securing the federal land grant, and no work was done on the railroad until it was almost certain that congress would pass the act. Then, construction work was started, and it was stated that large quantities of rails were purchased in England. At the same time, active

⁶⁴A copy of the bill presented by the bondholders is given in the *Chicago Daily Democrat*, January 11, 1851, and a summary is given in the *Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 29, 1851. Cf. Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 37, n.

⁶⁵Editorial in *Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 29, 1851; *ibid.*, January 22.

efforts were made to defeat any bill repealing the charter. It is uncertain whether this company intended to carry on the undertaking, or, as Senator Douglas alleged, merely sell the charter in Europe. At any rate, the opposition to the Great Western, especially in the southern part of the state, was bitter and deep seated.⁶⁶

The last plan was to turn over the grant under proper restrictions to a private corporation, other than the Cairo City and Canal Company. The memorial of the Boston capitalists, who later built the road, was the first direct proposition of the kind, but it is probable that the memorialists had early suggested a similar plan to the leading legislators of the state. In all probability, other capitalists were also deeply interested in the railroad. However, there was no definite project of the kind before the people during November and December, 1850.⁶⁷

More troublesome than the method of construction, though of less real importance, was the matter of route. When Lieutenant Governor Jenkins made his proposal in 1832, it was for a railroad from Cairo to Peru at the junction of the canal and the Illinois river. In the internal improvement act Galena was made the northern terminus and the route was more distinctly marked; it included Vandalia, Shelbyville, Decatur, Bloomington, and Savannah. This line was retained in the charters of 1843 and 1849, and in the various bills introduced into the federal Senate by Sidney Breese. But Judge Douglas, in his bills of 1847 and 1849, radically altered the route by extending the road to Dunleith and making a branch to Chicago. As a result, the whole question of route was reopened, and every city and county of importance in the central part of the state asserted its claims. The contests over the Chicago and Dunleith branches were especially strenuous, and the continued discussion resulted in greater confusion. The decision was necessarily left to the legislature and by them transferred to the company.⁶⁸

Congress passed the land grant act in September, 1850, and the legislature was elected the following November. On account

⁶⁶This opposition to the Holbrook companies is evident in the newspaper discussion of the time.

⁶⁷None is given in any of the important state papers and if any project were before the people it would be given in the newspapers.

⁶⁸*Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 22, 1851; also numerous articles in *Chicago Daily Democrat*, *Illinois Weekly Journal*, *Illinois Daily* and *Weekly Register* during October, November, and December, 1850, and January, 1851.

of the release of the Great Western charter it was necessary to settle the matter at the first session of the General Assembly, and, consequently, the selection of proper representatives and senators was of vital importance. As soon as it became evident that the federal House of Representatives would act favorably on Senator Douglas' bill, the advocates of state construction and the friends and opponents of the Cairo City and Canal Company commenced an active campaign to secure a majority of the members of the legislature. Other state issues were consigned to the background and the question of the land grant and the acceptance of the Great Western Release were the important factors in the election of members to the sixteenth General Assembly. The newspapers of the state had numerous editorials and contributed articles defending or opposing the respective plans, or emphasizing the importance of one route over another. Mass meetings and conventions were held at various points along the line of the proposed railroad, and the excitement often was at fever heat. By November the controversy had become bitter and personal. Individual motives were impugned; the character of some of the leading newspaper editors, of Mr. Holbrook, Senator Douglas, Judge Breese, and others, was maligned; and charges of bribery and fraud were frequent. By the time the legislature convened in January, the whole discussion had degenerated into a typical Illinois political fight. On the whole, the opponents of both state ownership and of the Holbrook company had much the better of the argument. Only a few newspapers, such as the *Benton Standard* and the *Cairo Times*, and a few politicians, the most prominent of them being Sidney Breese, openly defended the Cairo City and Canal Company or its subsidiary company, the Great Western. However, the Great Western was already in possession of the desired charter and, conditionally, of the land grant. Thus, inaction on the part of the legislature meant success for the Holbrook party, and the Cairo City and Canal Company exerted every effort to block legislation and prevent the incorporation of a rival company. On account of the many minor fights it was not at such a disadvantage as was indicated by newspaper editorials.⁶⁹

⁶⁹The following are the most important references to the conflict between the two factions: *Illinois Daily Register*, October 30, 1850; *Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 22, 29, 1851; *Illinois Daily Register*, November 8, 1850; December 12, 1850; *ibid.*, October 17, 1850; *ibid.*, October 10, 1850; *ibid.*, October 9, 1850; *Illinois Weekly Journal*, November 13, 1850; *ibid.*, November 6, 1850; *ibid.*, October 30, 1850; *ibid.*, October 16, 1850;

Most of the plans had been thoroughly discussed during the campaign, and, when the legislature met the first day of January, 1851, its members were well acquainted with the main points at issue. In the organization of the House the Holbrook faction secured a temporary advantage by the election of Judge Breese as speaker, and during the first two weeks of the session they were strong enough to prevent radical action. Bills were presented in both houses repealing the charter of the Great Western, but both were strongly opposed. The senate passed a bill concerning the Illinois Central, which did not accept the release of the Holbrook company; the house passed a bill accepting the release and refused to adopt the senate measure.⁷⁰ A large majority of the members of each body favored the repeal of the Great Western charter, but until a more reasonable proposition was presented many preferred to retain the Cairo company rather than to be entirely without a means of building the road.

At this stage of the contest affairs were entirely altered by a businesslike memorial presented by Mr. Robert Rantoul of Massachusetts, acting in the interest of a group of wealthy New York and Boston capitalists. In brief, the plan of the memorialists was as follows:— The legislature should create a corporation and surrender to it the federal land grant. In return the incorporators agreed to build a railroad "equal in all respects to the railroad running between Boston and Albany, with such improvements thereon as experience has shown to be desirable

Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1851; *Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 22, 1851; *Illinois Daily Register*, October 23, 1850; *ibid.*, November 20, 1850.

As the leading advocate of the "Central" Senator Douglas had endeavored to secure an early acceptance of the release and continually urged such action from the time he received the final release of the Great Western. Even as early as October, 1849, he had attempted to obtain action by the legislature, but without success (*Illinois Daily Journal*, October 31, 1849). The matter was brought up at the special session and Representative Denny introduced a resolution "that the committee on internal improvements be instructed to inquire into the expediency of so altering and amending or repealing the charter of the Great Western Railway as in their judgment will be best calculated to promote the interests of the state. . . ." (*Illinois Daily Journal*, October 31, 1849). The discussion was at times very heated, but the policy of inaction finally prevailed, it being thought that the matter could rest until the regular session of 1851. (*Illinois Daily Journal*, October 24, 1849).

⁷⁰*Illinois Daily Register*, January 15, 1851; also *Sen. J. and Ho. J.*, January 1-15, 1851.

and expedient; to complete the road by July 4, 1854; and to pay the state per cent of the gross receipts in return for the land.⁷¹ The memorialists were men of considerable capital and experience with railroad promotion in other parts of the country. On the whole, they made a much more favorable offer than could have been expected. The Governor recommended the acceptance of their proposition in a special message, and most of the members of the legislature and friends of the Illinois Central believed that this memorial was a first class opportunity for the state. This is illustrated by the following quotation from the *Illinois Weekly Journal*, "We agree with the legislature that 'this company are seeking no advantages, and that their object is to build the road without loss to themselves and with advantage to the state.'⁷²

Coincident with the transmission of this memorial Mr. Ashael Gridley introduced in the senate a bill "for an act to incorporate the Illinois Central Railroad."⁷³ On February 5th Mr. J. L. D. Morrison offered a substitute for the original bill,⁷⁴ and on the next day it passed by a vote of 23 to 3.⁷⁵ Four days later it passed the house by an almost unanimous vote of seventy-two to two,⁷⁶ and was immediately signed by Governor French.⁷⁷

The passage of the charter through both houses was not as easy as the vote seems to indicate. Shortly after the receipt of the memorial the whole matter was referred to a committee, whose members, in connection with Mr. Rantoul and Colonel Bissell, representatives of the promoters, spent considerable time in preparing the measure. As the duration of the session was limited to forty days, the Holbrook interests made every effort to delay the bill, and during the last week of January and the first of February it looked as if their efforts would meet with

⁷¹Cf. the copy of the memorial given in the Appendix. In the original memorial the amount paid to the state was left vacant. It was proposed in the House that ten per cent be given, but the company, through the efforts of Robert Rantoul and Representative Bissell, managed to reduce the amount to seven per cent. The real reasons for the action of the legislature in this matter are not known, and in his campaign for election as governor, Colonel Bissell was accused of having obtained the reduction to the disadvantage of the state.

⁷²*Illinois Weekly Journal*, January 22, 1851.

⁷³Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 39.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵*Illinois Weekly Journal*, February 12, 1851. *Sen. J. and Ho. J.*

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

⁷⁷*Ibid.*

success. At last, as noted above, the bill was passed by both houses only a few days before the close of the session. The main difficulty came in the selection of a route, and the legislature was finally forced to leave the exact location of the road to the incorporators.⁷⁸ The other point of conflict was the percentage to be paid the state. This was finally fixed at seven per cent of the gross receipts, but the company was exempted from paying any state or local taxes.

As passed, the bill incorporated the Illinois Central Railroad company, with a perpetual charter, gave it the remains of the old state surveys and gradings, gave it the federal land grant and right of way, and exempted its property from taxation. In return, the railroad was obliged to complete the main line in four years, and the branches in six, to build the road "equal in all respects to the Great Western of Massachusetts", to hold the state free from any responsibility connected with the grant, and to pay the state seven per cent of the gross earnings.

⁷⁸*Illinois Weekly Journal*, February 5, 12, 1851.

CHAPTER III.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHARTER LINES.

Chartering a private corporation with liberal powers and granting it nearly three million acres of public land were merely a preliminary step in the building of the Illinois Central. In 1851 railroad construction was in its infancy. The largest system at that time, the New York and Erie, was only three hundred miles long, and the construction of a first class trunk line some seven hundred miles in length through the thinly settled interior counties of a western state involved engineering and administrative difficulties entirely new to the promoter of the early fifties. Never before in this country had such an enormous amount of capital been expended on a single private undertaking, and what the building of the Canadian Northern or Panama Canal is to-day, the construction of the Illinois Central was in the decade preceding the Civil War.

From the first this final attempt to build a railroad through the center of the state was supported by some of the ablest railroad magnates of the time—men who had had abundant experience in other lines of business activity and who also had the financial resources necessary to push the enterprise to a successful completion. It is doubtful whether twelve men could have been selected who, at the time, possessed the confidence of the country to a greater extent than did Robert Schuyler, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Rantoul, and the other members of the first board of directors.

In general the promoters represented successful merchants who constituted the moneyed class of the period: a class whose activities extended into politics and government, as well as into strictly commercial enterprises. Of the entire board Robert Schuyler and Robert Rantoul were probably the best known and most respected.¹

Robert Rantoul, Jr., the man most influential in securing

¹For an interesting account of the various persons connected with the early history of the Illinois Central the reader is referred to Mr. Ackerman's *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

the passage of the charter by the Illinois Legislature, was a leading lawyer of Massachusetts. He had held several high elective and appointive offices under both the federal and state governments and, in 1852, on the death of Daniel Webster, he represented his state in the federal senate during the remainder of the term. During the administration of President Fillmore he was strongly advocated as successor to Secretary of the Treasury Walker, but did not receive the nomination and died shortly afterwards. The charter of 1851 is very largely his work, and during the organization of the company he was influential in shaping its financial policy. The present city of Rantoul about one hundred miles south of Chicago, is named after him.²

Second in importance to Rantoul, was the first president, Robert Schuyler. During the first years of the company's existence he seems to have been the leading director of its work and was most active in organizing the corporation. One company after another, the New York and New Haven, Alton and Sangamon, Great Western, Boston and Albany, and Illinois Central, all came under his direction or control, and in general they were well managed. Up to 1853 his record was entirely above suspicion, but in that year he became involved in some extremely questionable proceedings in connection with the New York and New Haven Railroad by which he fraudulently issued over a million of stock to himself and friends.³

Although not one of the original directors Mr. William H. Osborn soon became interested in the Illinois Central, and from the retirement of President Schuyler in 1853 to the acquisition of the southern lines in 1882 he was the dominant figure in the history of the company. A man of great ability and strong personality, with a broad grasp of affairs, he won the absolute support of stockholders, employees, and shippers, and for over twenty years English and Dutch shareholders gave him their unqualified proxies, thus entrusting to him the complete control of the Illinois Central. So well did he execute this trust that even during the periods of deepest depression they did not condemn his management of the road. The company owes more to Mr. Osborn than to any other person connected with it.⁴

The remaining directors were prominent business men, but

²Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, pp. 27-36; *Chicago Daily Democrat*, January 16, 1851.

³Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, pp. 57-60; cf. Chap. VI.

⁴Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

they did not exert such an influence upon the management of the property, as did Rantoul, Schuyler, and Osborn. With one or two exceptions, they are practically unknown to-day.⁵ However, as has been the case with most of their successors in the directorate, they took an active interest in the affairs of the corporation, and much of the financial success of the railroad is due to their hard and consistent work in directing the construction of the road and watching over the financial operations.

With such a strong group of promoters, the active work of organization followed closely upon the chartering of the company. It is very probable that a preliminary organization had been created some months before the charter was actually secured. According to the provisions of the charter the promoters were allowed sixty days to accept it and immediately upon receipt of the act steps were taken to complete the regular organization. However, Governor French was ex-officio a director, and as there were many matters of interest to the state, action was deferred until his arrival.⁶ Finally, on March 19, 1851, the incorporators met in a little dimly lighted room at 1 Hanover Street, New York City and there formally organized the Illinois Central Railroad Company by accepting the legislative act of February 10th, by making provision for the various requirements of the charter, and by electing Robert Schuyler president.⁷

The records of the following meetings have never been made public, but from newspaper reports, it seems that active work was not long delayed. One million dollars of stock was subscribed, later another million was taken, and enough was paid in to allow Mr. Ketchum, the treasurer, to deposit the guarantee fund of \$200,000 required by the charter; officers of the company were elected; arrangements were made for active prosecution of the work in Illinois; negotiations were opened

⁵Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, pp. 21 ff. Credit for the success of the company should also be given to the English and Dutch stockholders. Up to comparatively recent date the Illinois Central was owned largely by foreign stockholders and these shareholders have always kept a close watch on the affairs of the company. At times there has been friction between the stockholders and the management in this country, but on the whole, much of the success of the railroad is due to the active cooperation of the English investors. This was especially true in the early history of the company.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 21-60.

⁷*Ibid.*; *Chicago Daily Democrat*, March 10-30, 1851.

with the federal government in regard to the land grant; and a definite financial program was prepared.⁸

The charter provided that work should commence on the main line not later than January 1, 1852, and, as the entire route of the road had to be determined long before that date, there was no time for delay. On March 22nd, or only three days after the organization of the company, Mr. Roswell B. Mason, the Engineer and General Superintendent of the New York and New Haven Railroad, better known on account of his career as mayor of Chicago, was appointed Engineer-in-Chief and given entire charge of construction work in Illinois.⁹ At that time there were few men who had had either a practical or theoretical training in railway civil engineering, and the selection of an efficient engineering staff was by no means an easy undertaking. But good pay, the importance of the new railroad, and the high reputation of Colonel Mason overcame the difficulty, and by the middle of May, a staff of about seventy engineers had been collected and were on their way to Chicago.¹⁰

The party arrived in Illinois on the 17th of May, and the work of preliminary survey was immediately started. Only five specific points were given in the charter, viz. Galena, Chicago, Cairo, southern terminus in the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and Dubuque. The only other restrictions upon the route were that the line should pass within five miles of the northeast corner of Township 21, range 2, east of the third principal meridian; should not vary more than seventeen miles either way from a straight line from Cairo to the southern terminus of the canal; and that the Chicago branch should not be north of the parallel of 39 degrees and 30 minutes.¹¹ Otherwise, the company had entire latitude in locating the route.¹² As has been the case with practically every new railroad in this country, various towns entered upon a bitter contest for the new railroad. In the present instance sectional rivalries had been fanned into a fierce flame by fifteen years of agitation. So intense was this competition that the legislature could not decide the route and left the controversy to the railroad.¹³

For the main line from Cairo to La Salle there had been

⁸Cf. Chap. vi.

⁹Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 82.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Charter of February 10, 1851, sec. 15, ¶ 3.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Cf. Chap. II.

but a single route proposed since 1835, namely the present line, passing through Du Quoin, Vandalia, Decatur, and Bloomington. The "southern terminus" of the canal was in dispute between La Salle and Peru, each claiming that it was the legal terminus and consequently the end of the railroad. From La Salle to Galena there were two possible routes, one passing through Freeport and the other through Savannah. Local committees were appointed to bring pressure on the officials; offers of free right of way and liberal city franchises were made, and even railroad bridges and short sections of track promised, if only the railroad would build through particular districts. Shelbyville was insistent upon the advantages of that place as a point on the main line, as also the junction of the Chicago branch, while the controversies between Peru and La Salle, and Savannah and Freeport became extremely bitter. Each of these places took active measures to secure the railroad and even went so far as to institute legal proceedings to force the company to choose the particular location desired by the litigant.¹⁴ In the midst of this "down state" controversy the territory around Chicago was aroused by a rumor that the "Central" was intending to pass by that city and run its line from a junction with the Michigan Central at the state line near what is now Hammond, directly southward along the state border to Jonesboro.¹⁵ But threats, bribes, and litigation alike had little influence upon the management, and it proceeded to lay out the route without heeding the demands or threats of the various rival towns along the proposed right of way.

For the purpose of surveying the various routes Colonel Mason divided the territory into seven general divisions, each with the usual surveying party, and within a few days after the engineers had reached Chicago the surveys were actually commenced.¹⁶ It was spring in Illinois and to the usual disadvantages of reconnoissance work on the frontier were added the inconvenience of Illinois mud and rain. Mr. Mason himself took an active part in the work and spent all the time he could spare from affairs at Chicago to obtain first hand information. Thus, by the middle of summer he was in a position to make a decision as to the route.¹⁷

¹⁴*Chicago Daily Democrat*, May 15, July 23, 1851.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, May 15, 1851.

¹⁶Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 82.

¹⁷*Ibid.* For an interesting description of the difficulties connected with the construction of the road, the reader is referred to Mr. Ackerman's account, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 82.

In deciding the route there were four important considerations: (1) As the company could not take land more than fifteen miles from the tracks it was not desirable to run the line through thickly settled regions where much of the land granted the company by the federal government had already been occupied. (2) The road should be so located as to build up the largest and most profitable traffic possible. (3) Wherever practicable there should be a minimum cost of operation, and all grades, curves, and sections involving heavy maintenance work, should be avoided. (4) Finally, the cost of construction should be confined to the lowest amount consistent with safety and good operating efficiency; expensive rights of way, heavy masonry work, long bridges, extensive gradings, and other costly work were decidedly undesirable.

Thus, the company selected the route entirely upon its economic and engineering merits and, with slight exceptions, the line chosen was the most direct and shortest of the possible routes. From Cairo to Freeport the railroad was as straight as practicable, only slight variations being made to include the important towns of Vandalia, Decatur, Bloomington, La Salle, and Mendota, and there is one stretch of track south of La Salle which extends sixty miles without a curve. The Chicago branch from the junction with the main line at Centralia, was also almost straight, and for the entire distance of two hundred and fifty miles only three curves, and those of large radius, were necessary. In selecting the route from Dixon to Galena, the preference was given to Freeport instead of Savannah; and the present line of the Chicago branch was decided upon in preference to the line farther east. With the various disputed points decided, the total length, according to Colonel Mason's first report, was 699 miles.¹⁸

The questions connected with the route having been settled, the engineers were free to spend their entire time in completing the surveys and preparing the preliminary estimates of cost of construction. Work progressed rapidly, and by September 1, 1851, a preliminary report covering both amount and cost of construction work was submitted to the president.¹⁹ Heavy T rails, light grades, easy curves, well built embankments and fills, ample cuts, and brick or stone buildings were to be provided,

¹⁸Report of President Schuyler to Directors, September 12, 1851, in *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

and everything was to be of the highest standard consistent with the light traffic conditions which would prevail on a western railroad.²⁰ Although built over the level prairies of Illinois, an average of thirty thousand cubic yards of earth was to be used per mile on embankments and fills.²¹ Including equipment and all construction expenditures, the total cost was estimated at \$16,537,212, or \$23,700 per mile.²² Even this liberal amount proved to be insufficient and the final cost exceeded the preliminary figures by some ten millions of dollars.²³

The surveys were hastened as much as possible, but the final results were submitted none too soon. According to the charter, the main line was to be completed within four years from February 10th, 1851, and the branches within six years, while work on the main line was to be commenced by January 1st, 1852; therefore, it was imperative that the construction should not be delayed.²⁴ Nor was the undertaking an easy one to complete within this short period. Large construction companies did not then exist; rails, chairs, fastenings, and bridge iron had to be imported from England, and other supplies carried west from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania; the amount of grading was very great; and labor was far from abundant.²⁵ Thus, even aside from any financial difficulties, the question of building the road within the time limit was very perplexing, and the directors, as well as Colonel Mason, were forced to pay close attention to construction work in Illinois.

Among the various questions which occupied the attention of the directors was the one "by whom and in what way should the road be built". As early as April 23rd, 1851, a Mr. Franklin, for several years railroad engineer for the Russian Government, offered to build the Illinois Central Railroad and take bonds in payment on very liberal terms.²⁶ Even before that date it was rumored that private corporations were willing to

²⁰Report of President Schuyler to Directors, September 12, 1851, in *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*; also charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, ¶ 3.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*; cf. Chap. vi.

²⁴Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, ¶ 3; *ibid.*, sec. 23.

²⁵Cf. Chap. II. Practically no railroad material was made in this country, and it had to be imported from Europe.

²⁶*Chicago Daily Democrat*, April 23, 1851.

undertake the construction of large portions of the road.²⁷ But the work was entirely beyond the capacity of any private construction company and the officials of the Illinois Central wisely determined either to build the road themselves or else to let the work out in small sections. This conclusion was reached early in 1851, and Colonel Mason's estimates, therefore, were made with that end in view.

Although the preliminary engineering estimates were submitted by the first of September, the final estimates were not submitted until much later, and it was impossible to start active construction work on the main line that fall. However, in accordance with the letter of the charter, the Illinois Central, on December 23rd, 1851, broke ground at both Cairo and Chicago, and amidst elaborate ceremonies, the salutes of cannon, and the ringing of bells, formally commenced the construction of this great enterprise.²⁸ During the winter contracts were made for supplies, the federal land survey was completed, arrangements were made for transfer of the land to the company, and other preliminary work was completed.

Specifications had been prepared during the winter, and on the 15th of March, 1852, the company invited bids for the construction of divisions 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, and 10. The proposals were to include grading, masonry, bridging, superstructure for the entire division or a part of the same, or merely for a single item, such as grading, if desired.²⁹ Bids could be entered with or without material. The terms were one-half cash and one-half seven per cent bonds at par, with the usual arrangement in regard to inspection, completion within a specified period, and other matters. At the time the contracts were placed the credit of the road was exceptionally strong, and there was a ready response on the part of contractors, both in Illinois and the eastern states. Men even came on from Europe and there was not a section of the line that was not bid for several times. As a

²⁷*Chicago Daily Democrat*, April 22, 1851. Cf. this method with the Credit Mobilier in the Union Pacific and the Construction company in the Iowa Falls and Sioux City, *infra* Chap. IV.

²⁸*Cairo Sun*, December 25, 1851.

²⁹*Chicago Daily Democrat*, April 23, 1851; *ibid.*, March 25, 1852. To facilitate the work of construction, the road was divided into twelve divisions, varying in length from fifty to seventy-five miles, according to the character and extent of the grading and bridging. Over each division was placed a division engineer, whose duty it was to supervise the individual contracts and direct the construction done directly by the company.

result the bids were low and the terms favorable to the company. This permitted the railroad to let the work out at reasonable figures. In many cases the division contractors sub-let part of the work. The strong competition between bidders, and the financial standing of the company, prevented letting the work at excessively high prices and the Illinois Central was built as cheaply as could have been expected under semi-frontier conditions.³⁰

Contracts for the first six divisions were let early in June, 1852, and bids for the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th, and 12th divisions were accepted later in the summer. Work was commenced immediately on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th divisions, but the 11th and 12th were not pushed until two years later.³¹ The bids included only the grading and part of the bridge construction; the company itself laid the rails and erected most of the buildings.³² Thus, by the end of October, 1852, the entire road, with the exception of 52 miles north of the Big Muddy River, where the contractors had given up their work, was under contract and active construction had been started.³³

The affairs of the Illinois Central at Chicago did not proceed as smoothly as in the southern and central parts of the state. Railroad matters in that city had been in a thoroughly demoralized condition for many months prior to the passage of the charter, and the company was forced to take a hand in local railroad controversies and also in municipal politics in order to secure adequate terminal facilities and a city franchise. The conflict between the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern (then the Southern Michigan) and the Michigan Central involved the Illinois Central in the greatest difficulties.

For several years these two railroads had been keen rivals in Michigan and northern Indiana, and during the year 1850 they had extended their tracks to within a few miles of Chicago. Each endeavored to secure an independent entrance to the city

³⁰Advertisement in railroad journals, March, 1852; also *Chicago Daily Democrat*, March 25, 1852. There was undoubtedly a small amount of mismanagement in the construction of the road, but the amount was small. Some of the directors were interested in contracts with the company, but there is no evidence to show that they used their official positions to defraud the company. For a full discussion of these points, cf. Chap. VI.

³¹*American Railroad Journal*, October 25, 1856.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

and to prevent its competitor from obtaining a similar right. The result was a bitter fight in the legislatures of Illinois, Michigan, and Indiana, in the common council of Chicago, in municipal politics of that city, and even between groups of workmen along the tracks.³⁴ The companies were of equal strength, and neither could secure a charter from the state of Illinois or a franchise from the city. Despite all their efforts the two railroads, in 1851, were halted at the Illinois state line.

The charter for the Illinois Central was before the legislature at this time, and the Michigan Central allied itself with the promoters of this road, hoping, thereby, to secure the coveted entrance to Chicago. The influence of the Michigan company was brought to bear on the legislature, and it is very probable that financial assistance was extended to the promoters of the new company. The charter was eventually passed, and the Illinois Central was allowed to make connections with other railroads.³⁵ At the time, it was commonly understood this provision applied to the Michigan Central.

Very soon after the "Central" was organized rumors began to arise that the two companies were to form some kind of a connection by which the Michigan corporation would enter Chicago over the tracks of the Illinois Central. However, these rumors were groundless and nothing more was heard until the Illinois Central itself commenced surveys southwest of the city towards the Indiana state line and the Kankakee River.³⁶

While these preliminary surveys were being completed, the company was making special efforts to secure an ordinance admitting it to the city of Chicago. Mr. Brayman, of Springfield, and Representative Bissell, of Belleville, had been appointed solicitors of the company in Illinois and on July 12, 1851, the latter, in connection with representatives of the Michigan Central Railroad, presented a petition to the city council of Chicago asking permission to lay down tracks within the city limits.³⁷ A few days later, this memorial was withdrawn for revision on account of opposition in the council.³⁸

Three months later Colonel Bissell submitted a second me-

³⁴Cf. *Chicago Daily Democrat* during the latter half of the year 1850. Mr. Wentworth, editor of the *Democrat*, took an active part in the controversy.

³⁵Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 11.

³⁶*Chicago Daily Democrat*, May 21, 1851.

³⁷*Ibid.*, July 13, 1851.

³⁸*Ibid.*, October 17, 1851.

morial.³⁹ Although the construction of the Illinois Central was regarded as one of the most important events in recent state history the city council, and to a less extent, the daily newspapers, were hostile to the company. The strife over the Southern Michigan-Michigan Central entrance had been so bitter that the supposed alliance between the Illinois Central and the Michigan Central brought upon the former suspicion and even opposition. So strong was the feeling that, upon a mere rumor that the "Central" was planning to build a cut-off to Joliet, thus establishing a rival railroad center near the Indiana line, a resolution was introduced into the city council of Chicago, disapproving such a policy and bitterly attacking the Illinois company.⁴⁰ The element opposed to the Michigan Central was strong enough to pass the resolution and, in addition, appropriate ten thousand dollars to be used in preventing the establishment of the Joliet cut-off.⁴¹ This action was commonly attributed to representatives of the Southern Michigan Railroad, and immediately after the passage of the resolution copies were printed and scattered broadcast throughout the eastern states, England, and Holland to hinder the floating of the Illinois Central loan.⁴² The city council soon found that their action was uncalled for, and a few days after the passage of the original measure it reconsidered the matter, modified the extreme statements of the first resolution,⁴³ and adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the three railroad companies.⁴⁴

Despite the distrust and hostility shown in the action of the council, Colonel Mason and Solicitor Bissell again presented their petition for an entrance to the city. After a careful consideration of the various routes the company asked for an entrance along the lake front. The railroad was to be built north-east from Lake Calumet, now Kensington, to the southern limits of the city at what is now 53rd Street. This, of course, was outside the old city boundaries. From Hyde Park to Park Row, 12th Street, the company was to have permission to place its tracks along the lake shore and could purchase what land it

³⁹*Chicago Daily Democrat*, October 17, 1851.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, October 13, 17, 1851.

⁴¹*Ibid.* The files of newspapers for the days in which this resolution was printed are unobtainable and the only information to be found in regard to the same comes from editorials of a later date.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

needed from private owners of real estate. From Park Row to the Chicago River the railroad was to receive from the city a five or six hundred foot right of way just east of Michigan Avenue. In return for this grant, the company agreed to provide permanent protection, in the form of levees and piling, against the encroachments of Lake Michigan. This protection was to extend from Hyde Park to the Chicago River.⁴⁵ When the petition of the company was presented, the city had provided practically no protection against the lake, and most of the territory north of the city limits and east of the present Illinois Central tracks was submerged land.

Sixty years ago Michigan Avenue was the aristocratic residence street of Chicago and the proposition to run a steam railroad along the avenue provoked strenuous opposition from the property owners, who believed it would destroy the value of their investments. On the other hand, the north and west wards had, for years, paid heavy taxes to protect the lake shore from encroachments of Lake Michigan, and that portion of Chicago gladly supported the Illinois Central plan. They argued that the city was poor and the assumption by the railroads of the expense of maintaining the south side levees would more than compensate for any depreciation in the value of residence property in the neighborhood.⁴⁶ Mass meetings and parades were held by each side; circulars and petitions were widely circulated; the newspapers took an active interest in the matter; and both sides threatened to resort to legal proceedings to gain their point. The fight was carried to the city council and this subject occupied the attention of the members during the entire month of December. The Illinois Central finally gained the upper hand and on December 29, they secured the passage of the ordinance by a close vote of ten to six.⁴⁷ The main features of the franchise were those embodied in the petition of the company with some minor exceptions. Among these was a reduction of the right of way from 12th Street to the river to three hundred feet. The restrictions upon the company were also made more severe.

The decision of the city council did not settle the fight. Walter Gurnee was Mayor at the time, and on account of a number of minor objections to the ordinance as passed, and also on account of his general opposition to the policy of the measure,

⁴⁵*Chicago Daily Democrat*, December 3, 1851.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, daily notices during December, 1851.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, December 30, 1851.

he vetoed the franchise.⁴⁸ The matter was again taken up in the council and that body passed the ordinance over his veto.⁴⁹ The document was immediately forwarded to the directors of the company in New York for their approval, but on the very day on which the papers left the city, the whole matter was reconsidered by the council. The two opposing parties compromised their differences and a new franchise, agreeable to the south side wards, was passed. It was signed by Mayor Gurnee and forwarded to New York three days after the first ordinance.⁵⁰

The original franchise had been duly received in New York and the directors of the company, unaware of the amending measure and well satisfied with the provisions, accepted the old franchise.⁵¹ Three days later, much to their astonishment, there appeared the second ordinance. Although similar in most ways to the petition of the company there were some new restrictions upon the company which the directors did not desire to accept, and consequently the board declined to accept it and preferred to wait for more favorable legislation.⁵²

Supposing the first measure had definitely settled the questions under dispute in regard to an entrance into Chicago the President immediately directed the engineers to commence active construction work from Chicago to the state line. When the second ordinance was not accepted, the company, of course, had no legal right to enter the city, but rather than delay matters it was determined to complete the railroad from Lake Calumet to the city limits at once. There was practically no danger of not obtaining a proper entrance to the city, and the construction of this section would provide the Michigan Central with its much desired entrance into Chicago without a protracted delay.⁵³ Much of the ground south of the city limits, especially near Lake Calumet and Woodlawn, was low and marshy, and this made it necessary to place the tracks on trestle work at considerable additional expense. Rails and ties had been ordered in the fall of 1851 and by January, 1852, the first shipments had arrived. Grading and other preliminary work was commenced in December, and the combined energies of the Michigan Central and

⁴⁸*Chicago Daily Democrat*, January 1, 1852.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, January 3, 1852.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, January 6, 1852.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, January 10, 1852.

⁵²*Ibid.*, March 12, 1852.

⁵³*Ibid.*, January 10, 1852.

Illinois Central were exerted to finish the line from the Indiana border to Lake Calumet and from there to Hyde Park.⁵⁴ Construction was continued when possible during the winter, and as soon as the weather permitted both companies placed large gangs of men at work. By May 1 the railroad was within eight miles of the city limits,⁵⁵ and three weeks later that short stretch was completed. On the twenty-first of the month, the first train, hauling gravel and construction materials, left Calumet and ran to the city limits.⁵⁶ Temporary freight and passenger stations had been established just outside the limits and on the morning of May 22 this first completed section of the Illinois Central was formally opened, and a passenger train was run from Chicago to the state line.⁵⁷ Regular freight and passenger trains were placed in service a few days later. The Michigan Central made use of the tracks of the Illinois Central from Calumet to Chicago, and this piece of roadbed became the final link by which the former company established a through line from Chicago to the East.⁵⁸

The tracks from the city limits south were not completed without several sharp fights with the Southern Michigan. That company opposed the construction of the road and endeavored to prevent the Illinois Central from crossing its tracks. It demanded that the latter company put in an overhead crossing at what is now Grand Crossing, which was refused. The difficulty could not be settled and each company refused to allow the other to put in any crossing at all. Finally the Illinois Central impatient of this delay sent laborers to build the crossing under cover of night. The Southern Michigan was taken by surprise, its watchmen were overpowered, and the grade crossing was finished before morning. The Michigan company was forced to accept the situation and the last obstacle to the completion of this section was removed.⁵⁹

This steady construction work, carried on regardless of the warring factions in the Chicago city council, exerted a strong

⁵⁴Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 82.

⁵⁵*Chicago Daily Democrat*, May 3, 1852; cf. March 25, 1852.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, May 22, 1852.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, May 23, 1852; Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 85.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*; also advertisements of train service in Chicago newspapers after June, 1852.

⁵⁹*Chicago Daily Democratic Press*, April 30, 1853. The matter of Grand Crossing was a sore point between the two roads for several years. Within a few weeks after the crossing was put in, a bad accident occurred

pressure upon that body. This influence was further strengthened by vague rumors of a cut-off from Joliet to Calumet which would divert a considerable traffic from Chicago proper.⁶⁰ No attempt was made to press the franchise question until the twentieth of April, only a month before the railroad reached the city limits. Local objections still continued, but the pressure of the Illinois Central and Michigan Central overcame this opposition, and, finally, on June 14th, 1852, the common council re-enacted the first ordinance originally passed on December 29. The railroad was admitted to the city via the lake front route and was granted a three hundred foot right of way from Hyde Park to the Chicago River. In return for this grant, the railroad assumed the responsibility of protecting the lake shore along its right of way, and agreed not to put up any permanent buildings from Park Row to Randolph Street. Certain other obligations and restrictions were imposed upon the company, but, in the main, the franchise greatly favored the railroad.⁶¹

With subsequent purchases of land between Park Row and the river, partly from private owners and partly from the federal government, the Illinois Central secured probably the finest terminal property possessed by any single railroad in the world. Its stations and shops were situated in the heart of the city and its right of way between Grand Crossing and the river was not crossed by a railroad and for most of the distance not even by a highway. From the standpoint of the railroad, the right of way along the lake front was of almost inestimable value; from the standpoint of the public, there is much to criticise in having the otherwise splendid lake front marred by smoky trains and unsightly railroad tracks, but it must not be forgotten that in the early fifties the bargain was in favor of the city. In protecting the many miles of shore line from the river to Hyde Park the railroad assumed a responsibility that was both troublesome and expensive, while the city was relieved of expenditures amounting to tens of thousands of dollars a year, not an inconsiderable item for the Chicago of 1850. Nor must it be forgotten that this easy and uninterrupted entrance to the very in which several lives were lost, and the two companies accused each other of having been to blame for not putting in an overhead crossing. However, evidence seems to show that both companies were equally to blame. Cf. articles in *Chicago Daily Democratic Press*, April 30, 1853.

⁶⁰*Chicago Daily Democrat*, May 3, 15, 1852; Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 81.

⁶¹*Chicago Daily Democrat*, May 3, 15, 1852; Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 85.

heart of the business district has been an important factor in the industrial development of the city.

Once the legal difficulties were removed, the work of construction proceeded rapidly. Rails, ties, and piles were already on hand and within a few weeks after the passage of the franchise admitting the railroad to the city, the track was extended to Twelfth Street. Temporary freight and passenger stations were built there and used until the permanent structures were finished. Much of the right of way was under water and heavy expenditures were necessary to put the tracks in a safe condition. The rails were laid on trestle work for nearly the entire distance from Hyde Park to Randolph Street and beyond the right of way a temporary breakwater of piling was erected. The pile and trestle work was to be filled in at a later time when the company's finances would justify the outlay.⁶²

The company also purchased large quantities of land in the heart of the city near Randolph Street and expended something like \$250,000 in purchasing urban property, in addition to half a million more expended on the lake shore protection, virtually purchase money for the generous right of way granted by the city.⁶³ At the foot of Randolph Street on land purchased from the federal government, the company, in 1853, commenced the erection of its famous Chicago passenger station, the total cost of which was over a quarter of a million of dollars. At the time it was the most expensive railroad station in the country. The facilities for handling passengers were excellent, and there was an abundance of room. The building was used jointly by the Illinois Central, Michigan Central, and Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroads, and the top floor of the station was used as a general office. North of the passenger station, the company erected a large in-and-out freight house, which was also the largest depot of its kind in the country, and the largest brick or stone building in the city. At Fourteenth Street, near the present Park Row passenger station, were placed the terminal shops, roundhouses, and cleaning yards. Then, in 1856, the Fourteenth Street works of the American Car Company of Chicago were purchased and after that date most of the heavy engine and car

⁶²Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*, pp. 80-85; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855; Chicago newspapers, 1852. The breakwater and trestlework were not filled in until after the Chicago fire of 1871.

⁶³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1860. *Chicago Daily Democrat*, January 1, 1852-1860. Cf. Chap. VI.

repairs on the system were handled at these shops. A number of locomotives and cars were also built by the company at the new works. By 1855, nearly a million dollars had been expended by the company for construction, right of way, lake shore protection, buildings, and other terminal improvements in the city limits. The work was continued during the following five years, in which time an additional million was spent on the Chicago terminals.

Moreover, on June 23rd, 1852, the company had secured an amendment to its charter permitting it to build a railroad from Twelfth Street to the south branch of the Chicago River.⁶⁴ This road, known as the St. Charles Air Line, served as an inner belt railroad for the Illinois Central, Michigan Central, Lake Shore, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, Galena and Chicago Union, Chicago and Rock Island, and Chicago and Northwestern railroads. It was built by the Illinois Central and was completed in 1856 at a total cost of \$50,000.⁶⁵

While these large expenditures were being made at Chicago, work on other portions of the system was not neglected. The company had little difficulty in securing the right of way and station ground needed. Nor was there much trouble in obtaining village and town franchises. The Illinois Central created a majority of the villages and towns along its tracks, and it held the grounds before there was any municipal organization. The only opposition to granting a franchise was at Galena. The railroad, under both the state and Holbrook projects, terminated at that city, and the citizens were bitterly opposed to the extension of the line to Dunleith. They realized that the construction of the "Central" to that point meant disaster to their business interests. Since the extension of the road was an essential part of the state charter and of the act of Congress conferring the land grant, there was no possibility of changing the provision. The city, however, placed numerous obstacles in the way of the railroad, and for several months refused to give the company a franchise. These tactics, of course, were childish, and the city council finally yielded. The railroad received the right to enter Galena, but only with many conditions and restrictions.⁶⁶

⁶⁴*Session Laws of Illinois, 1852-1853, June 23, 1852.*

⁶⁵*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.* The Illinois Central subsequently sold three-fourths of its interest in the St. Charles Air Line to the Michigan Central, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, and Chicago & Northwestern.

⁶⁶The following is taken from the *Chicago Daily Democratic Press*

The matter of local franchises did not interfere with the commencement of construction work, and, as noted above, contracts for the entire road were let in the spring and early summer of 1852. The Illinois Central was more fortunate than most of the roads of the time in that it had considerable resources upon which it could draw at a moment's notice. The sale of the four million loan of February, 1852, and the five million sterling loan of June, the same year, together with subscriptions by the stockholders, provided ample funds for starting the work. Part of the later loans, especially the Free Land issue of 1855-56, were placed at a considerable discount, but the money market fluctuations which brought this condition to pass, did not seriously interfere with the loans. Moreover, the capital stock of over fourteen million dollars was issued subject to assessment, and the directors always had this to fall back upon in emergency. Thus, at all times, the company had either in hand or in sight, whatever funds were necessary to carry on the enterprise in the most economical and expeditious manner. Economy and good management were always observed, but the directorate was also in a position to push the work as much as possible. Materials and labor were paid for in cash or bonds equivalent to cash and payments were met promptly. With the exception of a few weeks after the assignment of 1857, all bills, contracts, notes or other obligations were liquidated when due, and the credit of the company was always high.⁶⁷ This condition was a decided contrast to the "hand-to-mouth" policy pursued by such southern roads as the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern or by western lines like the Ohio and Mississippi, and it enabled the Illinois Central not only to finish the work within the limits set by the charter, but also to carry on the enterprise at a comparatively low cost.⁶⁸

of March 15th, 1853:—"Permission is given the Illinois Central Railroad (by the city of Galena) to lay down and operate a road through the city upon a prescribed line, by locomotive engines. Permission was given the company to bridge Galena river within the limits of the city and a portion of the levee, three hundred feet in length, was appropriated for their use. The usual regulations in regard to use of streets, etc. were inserted. The company will spend \$10,000 under the direction of the city authorities for dredging the stream in front of the depot grounds."

⁶⁷As stated in Chapter VI, the assignment did not affect the credit of the Illinois Central to any great extent. The great bulk of the construction work was finished in 1855; the floating debts that could not be met were only indirectly related to contracts for construction.

⁶⁸In Chapter VI a statement is made that the company was forced to

Nevertheless, the management in Illinois was involved in several difficulties during this period. The most important related to the contracts for material and labor. The road was let to contractors in the spring and summer of 1852, and at that time Illinois Central seven per cent bonds were selling at a slight premium. Accordingly, the directors stipulated that the terms for all work be one-half cash and one-half seven per cent bonds at par.⁶⁹ This arrangement was accepted, and the first payments were made on such a basis. The contracts were also based on the prices prevailing in 1852, and on account of the competition between bidders they were taken at low figures. During 1853 and 1854 the price of bonds, materials, and labor remained approximately the same as in 1852. But about the time of the Schuyler frauds various influences combined to depress the quotations of Illinois Central bonds, while rising prices increased the cost of railroad supplies and labor throughout the entire country. This was especially severe in Illinois on account of the large amount of railroad construction and the abundant crops, which made enormous demands for unskilled labor. Naturally, the contractors were unwilling to stand the decline in bonds and increased cost of construction, and asked for additional compensation from the company. Where definite contracts had been made the management refused to make any radical changes. Most of the contractors, however, had taken up the work in such a way that the company could not force them to continue at the old terms, or else did not feel it desirable to do so. Under the circumstances, the provision making half payment in bonds was not carried out, and the payments to the contractors were largely increased. In spite of this reasonable action by the railroad many contractors surrendered their contracts and threw the unfinished work back upon the company.⁷⁰

pursue a hand-to-mouth financial policy. This was true; at the same time there were always sufficient funds in the treasury to meet the contracts when due. The condition was similar to what occasionally exists on any large railroad when financial stringencies prevent the floating of bonds at favorable terms and the company is forced to sell short term notes at a discount. However, this lack of funds very seldom affects employees of the company or creditors, although it does make any new work more expensive on account of the difficulty of obtaining cash.

⁶⁹*Chicago Daily Democrat*, March 25, 1852; also advertisements.

⁷⁰*Cairo Mirror and City Directory*, 1864, 1865; letter of W. H. Osborn, dated, N. Y., Oct. 16, 1855, quoted in *Railway Times*, November 10, 1855; official communication from the Board of Directors, dated November 7, 1854, quoted in *Railway Times*, November 25, 1854; Satter-

In most of these cases the directors did not enter into new contracts, but carried on the work under its own division superintendents. The portions of the line surrendered were the most difficult, and the responsibility placed upon the company's engineers was large. The most important of these divisions were the ones from Cairo to Carbondale, and those near Decatur.⁷¹ But the same difficulties which enhanced the cost to the contractors made the work more expensive for the company. As most of the responsible work, such as bridges, trestles, buildings, culverts, and the heaviest pieces of grading, was performed directly by the railroad the advance in prices had an important effect. As high as \$1.50 per day was paid for ordinary section labor and proportionate wages for skilled workmen.⁷² The result of greater wages and prices on company work and larger compensation for contractors was a general advance in the cost of building the road, amounting to several millions of dollars. The estimate made by Colonel Mason was found to be much too low. At about the same time between one and two million of bonds, taken by contractors in 1852 and 1853, were returned to the company in such a way that the market for Illinois Cen-

thwaite's Report, *Railway Times*, July 22, 1854. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the division north of Cairo and near Decatur.

The Illinois Central profited by the depression and fluctuations in prices of labor and supplies. The following statements taken from the report of Mr. F. E. Satterthwaite, American correspondent of the *Railway Times*, in the number for July 22, 1854, are interesting: "The first thing done was to buy the iron for the whole road at \$45 per ton for bonds at par. In six month after the purchase the value of iron doubled, by which the company saved \$1,500,000. The high character of the company and the rapid progress of the road commanded confidence so that the company was enabled to sell the whole of the \$17,000,000 at par (sic), with the exception of the February (1854) issue. The sales were made payable in instalments which will be completed in July next. . . ." Mr. Satterthwaite undoubtedly exaggerates the profits made from buying the iron and other supplies, nevertheless the saving was considerable. For instance, the N. O. J. & G. N. paid \$85 per ton for poorer rails than those for which the Illinois Central paid \$45, but this was affected slightly by the lack of confidence in the southern road. There was also some saving made in contracts, which the contractors were forced to live up to.

⁷¹*Cairo Mirror and City Directory*, 1864, 1865; official communication from the Board of Directors, November 7, 1854, quoted in *Railway Times*, November 25, 1854.

⁷²*Ibid.*

tral securities was depressed and, consequently, it was harder to secure money.⁷³

Aside from these difficulties, the management had little to contend with beyond the general engineering problems involved in such an extensive enterprise. The prairies of Illinois offered an almost ideal location for a railroad, and except for somewhat difficult construction on three or four divisions, the building of the road proceeded without serious delays. Even in the bluffs along the Illinois and Cache rivers the engineering problem was extremely simple compared with the building of the Union Pacific or many eastern lines. The greatest trouble was found in the distance of the work from the older parts of the country and in high cost of transportation. The labor problem was solved by the employment of foreign laborers, largely Irish. In fact the road was built almost entirely by this class of workmen. At one time nearly ten thousand men were working on the road, but the need of help on the farms and demand by other railroads prevented the "Central" from keeping all the men it needed. Rails, bridge iron, equipment, and other railroad materials were carried from the eastern states and England to Cairo, Chicago, and Dunleith by water. From those places they were either hauled by wagon across the country or else carried on the rivers, the canal, and the Galena and Chicago Union railway as near the construction work as possible and then hauled by wagon. This method, at best, was slow and expensive, and resulted in considerable delay. Supplies for the men were hauled long distances by teams, as most of the country through which the road went was sparsely settled.

By the 1st of January, 1855, all the main line and over half of the Galena and Chicago branches were in operation.⁷⁴

⁷³Most of the bonds taken by contractors were returned to the company after the Schuyler frauds, when the price of seven percents had dropped to 64.

⁷⁴The following "History of Construction" is taken from the *Chicago Daily Democratic Press*, being quoted in the *American Railroad Journal*, October 25, 1856:—"Published contracts were first made in June, 1852, and the grading of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th divisions let. On the 14th of October following the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th, and 12th were put under contract. In July the first instalment of the first English loan was paid and it was not until this payment had been made that the originators of the enterprise had confidence in its success. In March, 1853, Colonel Mason was elected Superintendent. On the 16th day of May the first sixty miles of the Illinois Central from La Salle to Bloomington was

During the next six months the remainder of the Galena branch, and the Chicago branch as far south as Mattoon, were finished, leaving only the line from the St. Louis and Terre Haute Railroad to Centralia, seventy-seven miles, incomplete.⁷⁵ The financial difficulties in 1855, lack of labor, and the fact that the company already had a connection with the main line by way of the Great Western from Tolono to Decatur and by the Terre Haute road from Mattoon to Pana, made it unadvisable to finish the work before September, 1856.⁷⁶ The last rail was laid on September 26.

Although formally opened in September, 1856, the railroad was only partially completed. Many of the station buildings were not built, fencing, ballasting, construction of levees and piling at Chicago, Cairo, La Salle, and Dunleith were incomplete, and much of the bridge and culvert work was of a temporary nature. The equipment was also inadequate. Thus, the expenditures during the fall of 1856 and during 1857 were very large. By the close of the latter year everything was finished, and opened for business, and the company commenced working the road on its own account. The following are the dates of opening by sections:—

MAIN LINE, CAIRO TO LA SALLE, 308 MILES.

LaSalle to Bloomington	60 miles	May 16, 1853.
Bloomington to Clinton	23 "	March 14, 1854.
Clinton to Decatur	22 "	October 18, 1854.
Cairo to Sandoval	118 "	November 22, 1854.
Decatur to Sandoval	85 "	January 1, 1855.

GALENA BRANCH, LA SALLE TO DUNLEITH, 146 MILES.

Mendota to La Salle	16 miles	November 14, 1853.
Freeport to Warren	25 "	January 9, 1854.
Warren to Scales Mound	14 "	September 11, 1854.
Scales Mound to Galena	12 "	October 30, 1854.
Mendota to Freeport	62 "	February 1, 1855.
Galena to Dunleith	17 "	June 12, 1855.

CHICAGO BRANCH, CHICAGO TO CENTRALIA, 250 MILES.

Chicago to Calumet	14 miles	May 15, 1852.
Calumet to Kankakee	42 "	July 11, 1853.
Kankakee to Spring Creek	31 "	December 2, 1853.
Spring Creek to Pera	22 "	May 18, 1854.
Pera to Urbana	20 "	July 24, 1854.
Urbana to Mattoon	44 "	June 25, 1855.
Mattoon to Centralia	77 "	September 27, 1856."

⁷⁵*American Railroad Journal*, October 25, 1856.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

further construction work was confined to extensions and to providing for the demands of increasing traffic.⁷⁷

Compared with the present charter lines of the Illinois Central, the construction was poor and the equipment was very inadequate. Only a portion of the road was ballasted with gravel, none with stone. The embankments were narrow and the roadbed was greatly inferior to present Illinois Central standards. Bridges, culverts, and trestles were weak and unadapted to heavy loads. Freight houses were poorly arranged, and the terminal yards were mere collections of tracks, without any definite system. Locomotives, both freight and passenger, were light, the heaviest weighing only thirty tons, and all used wood instead of coal. Eight tons was the maximum load for freight cars, while the proportion of tare to net load was about one to one. In 1857 most of the coal, and some of the house cars, had only a single pair of trucks, while those possessing two trucks were classed as two cars. The passenger equipment lacked most of the conveniences now regarded as essential—steam heat, air brakes, ventilators, improved springs, automatic couplers, vestibules, good lights. No sleeping cars were included in the equipment of the road when finished.⁷⁸

However, the Illinois Central, in 1857, was the best built railroad in the West and as good as most eastern lines. The total cost of construction was \$26,568,017.61, or \$37,600 per mile, of which some twenty-one millions were expended on roadway, buildings, etc.⁷⁹ In no sense of the word could the construction work be regarded as temporary. Buildings were of a permanent character, generally stone or brick. The roadbed was well built, according to the standards of the time, and was laid with sixty pound iron T rails, placed on chairs.⁸⁰ Sidings were ample for the traffic of the period, and much of the line was adapted for double tracking. Bridges were made of iron, with stone abutments, and the culverts were generally built of stone. The line, following the original surveys, was straight and free from heavy grades or sharp curves. Terminal facilities were ample and permitted extensive additions without a large expenditure for land or right of way. The equipment was more than sufficient for the needs of the railroad when completed.

⁷⁷*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.*

⁷⁸*Ibid.*; cf. Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems in the United States.*

⁷⁹Cf. Chap. VI.

⁸⁰The rails were of exceptionally good material and according to

Both locomotives and freight and passenger cars were up to the highest standards of the period and, with slight exception, the rolling stock was entirely new. On the whole, the railroad conformed to the provisions of the charter, and "was made equal, in all respects, to the road leading from Boston to Albany, usually known as the Great Western, with such improvements as experience has shown to be expedient."⁸¹

Mr. Ackerman some of them were in use as late as 1881.

⁸¹Charter, Illinois Central Railroad, sec. 15, ¶ 3.

CHAPTER IV.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1857 TO 1870.

The construction of the roadbed and buildings and the purchase of rolling stock were merely the first step in the development of the Illinois Central System. Traffic had to be secured, markets found for the products of the territory tributary to the railroad, and the agricultural and manufacturing interests of that region stimulated; an operating organization was necessary and provision had to be made for the rapid and economical handling of both freight and passenger business. As further steps there came the formation of traffic alliances with connecting or branch railroads, trackage agreements for the use of certain desirable pieces of track, organization and maintenance of pools and similar arrangements, and finally the physical extension of the railroad through the lease of old lines or the construction of new. These were the problems before the management, in 1857, and their solution is the real history of the company.

The organization of the various departments was developed gradually. During the first three years of construction the operating side was handled by the Chief Engineer, Mr. Mason, and the net receipts from the traffic went directly into the construction account. Later Mr. Mason was made general superintendent, and a separate operating department was created.¹ In 1856 Mr. Arthur was made general superintendent, in place of Mr. Mason, who resigned,² and he, in turn, was succeeded by George B. McClellan, Commander in Chief of the federal armies during a part of the Civil War. By 1855 most of the road was completed and the traffic was large enough to make a complete operating organization necessary. Accordingly traffic, maintenance of way and equipment, operating, financial, and legal departments were established under the supervision of the general superintendent. The president did not transfer his offices to Illinois until several years after the construction of the road and the board of directors has always kept New York as its

¹Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 43.

²*Ibid.*, p. 44.

official meeting place. For that reason it was necessary to have some ranking executive officer in Chicago, and Mr. Arthur, Mr. McClellan, and their successors in the office of general superintendent had full charge of all operating matters, subject, of course, to the approval of the president and board of directors. Otherwise the organization of the railroad was similar to that of other companies doing the same kind of work.

As soon as a stretch of track was completed, freight and passenger service was commenced. In the passenger department the standard service was two trains a day in each direction over all important sections of the road. In addition such extra trains were run as the traffic demanded, but from 1857 to 1870 this standard of two trains a day in each direction was maintained.³ The freight traffic was more irregular and the service conformed to the special needs of the season.⁴ As freight traffic developed, it became necessary to increase the number of trains until by 1870 there was an average of five freight trains a day in each direction.⁵ By that time most of the mixed trains had been taken off, and the separation of the two branches was complete. In addition to the regular passenger service the company established a suburban service from Hyde Park and later from towns as far south as Kensington to Chicago.⁶ From the commencement of passenger service the trains carried both mail and express. According to the federal act of September 20th, 1850, the railroad was obliged to carry what mail the Post Office Department directed on terms prescribed by Congress.⁷ Mail was handled on all regular trains, and the Illinois Central became one of the most important arteries of the Post Office Department. The Adams Express company was given a monopoly of the express business in 1856, and a regular system was installed.⁸

Even before trains were put in operation it was necessary to issue tariffs. Rate matters, however, were in a chaotic condition and no formal tariff sheets were printed. In some respects the regulations as to the making of rates were much stricter than in later years. The number of different rates was small and it was an easy matter for the general superintendent or even the president to adjust the charges personally. Most ship-

³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

⁴*Ibid.*, 1855-1859.

⁵*Ibid.*, 1870.

⁶*Ibid.*, 1856.

⁷Act of September 20, sec. 6.

⁸*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856.

pers regarded railway rates in the same light as ordinary business transactions—a matter of individual bargaining, and tariffs were often adjusted by the local station agent.⁹

The railroad was just getting the various departments well organized when the development of the road and the country tributary to it was arrested by the panic of 1857, the assignment of that year, and a series of droughts and crop failures. The traffic of 1856 and the early part of 1857 promised a rapid development of the business of the company.¹⁰ In the last three or four months of 1857 shipments and earnings decreased considerably. The next year, 1858, a severe drought ruined much of the corn and wheat, and in 1859 prices for grain were so low that the farmers did not find it profitable to market their corn and wheat.¹¹ Instead of the income of the road increasing it actually declined in these two years, and the net revenue did not provide for a third of the interest charges accruing during the period.¹² New construction work was suspended, purchases of equipment cancelled, and maintenance work reduced as much as practicable, but even these savings did not prevent the decrease in net earnings. The shareholders were forced to pay assessments on their stock, and the railroad received a setback which was not overcome for three or four years.¹³

By 1860 conditions were again normal, and the first few months of 1861 were the most profitable the company had enjoyed to that time. But this prosperity was temporarily checked, this time by the commencement of the Civil War. State troops were rushed to Cairo the first week in May, and during the next four years the regular business of the railroad was constantly interrupted by the demands of the Government.¹⁴ The outbreak of hostilities destroyed southern shipments of grain and merchandise from Cairo and, for a time, checked the growth of Illinois. Traffic declined and the officials of the company were left without plans on account of the rapid change in affairs. At the same time the working force of the company was disorganized by the enlistment of men in the army and the sudden demands of the War Department for transportation of troops or supplies.¹⁵ Thousands of men were sent south to Cairo via the railroad, and immense quantities of grain, meat, ammuni-

⁹Statement of station agent at Calumet, 1857.

¹⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 1858, 1859.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*, 1860.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 1861-1865.

¹⁵*Ibid.*; Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, pp. 45, 46.

tion, and other materials for the armies were forwarded in the same direction. In all cases precedence was given to trains carrying troops or government supplies, and the regular working of the road was constantly delayed. Moreover, these sudden calls reduced the amount of equipment available for other uses, and the company was compelled to pay heavy damages for failure to furnish cars.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the war aided the railroad more than it damaged it. The development of manufacturing in the eastern states and the needs of the army created a demand for the products of Illinois and several times as much grain was handled during the closing years of the war as in 1857 to 1860. Furthermore, the army traffic was profitable, although the provisions of the land grant act and the charter compelled the company to carry both troops and supplies at reduced rates. From 1862 until the close of the war the railroad was utterly unable to handle the freight offered it.¹⁷ As a result both gross and net earnings increased more than two fold during the conflict, and in 1865 they were sufficient to provide for dividends on all the stock outstanding.¹⁸ The same influences which brought about the traffic development of the Civil War period produced an even greater growth in the next five years, and the earnings of 1869 and 1870 were well ahead of those of any previous years.¹⁹

On the other hand the Civil War made impossible the use of the north and south trade routes. The Illinois Central was primarily a north and south railroad and the officials of the company, in 1859 and 1860, had managed to build up a fairly lucrative trade with the southern Mississippi valley states. But during the war the grain traffic of the West was sent east to the Atlantic seaboard. When the war was over the resources of the south were gone, and the company was unable to revive its north and south business for a number of years.²⁰ The prosperity of the period under discussion was unnatural, and events occurring after 1870 inflicted serious damage upon the company.

Most of the growth of business from 1857 to 1870 occurred on the charter lines of the company, but it was aided by a number of extensions and traffic alliances made at various times. The Illinois Central was built in the shape of a Y and in fact

¹⁶*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1865.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 1862-1865.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 1865.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 1869, 1870.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 1861 ff.; *Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders*, 1877.

consisted entirely of main line, although the portion from Chicago to Centralia and from Dubuque to La Salle were then classed as branches. As a result the territory directly tributary was confined to the limited area within fifteen or twenty miles of the tracks. Moreover, there was no connection between the Chicago branch and the main line, resulting in great inconvenience to the company. As a remedy for the first of these evils the company, from 1855 to 1870, built up a system of semi-sub-sidiary branch lines. Until after 1860 the Illinois Central was the largest and strongest railroad in the central West and, therefore, was in a position to assist smaller roads. In pursuance of such a policy, the railroad, either by direct action of the directors or else through the personal efforts of individual members, helped several east and west lines. Among the most important were the Great Western (now the Wabash) from the Mississippi to Danville; the Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis (St. Louis Division of the C. C. C. & St. L.) from Alton to Terre Haute; the Ohio and Mississippi (Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern) from Illinoistown (E. St. Louis) to Cincinnati; and the Mineral Point (Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul).²¹ All of these have developed into important east and west main line roads, but from 1855 to 1865 or 1866 the cost of rail transportation made it impossible for them to carry grain from Illinois eastward. Moreover, several of the companies were without eastern connections until the early sixties.

In addition to the transverse or semi-branch roads the Illinois Central lent its aid to four other companies in an effort to establish a connection between the two arms of the system. In 1852 or 1853 an arrangement was made with the Galena and Chicago Union, by which the latter should not build its line beyond Freeport, but instead should use the tracks of the "Central", while the latter should have trackage rights over the former's line from Freeport to Chicago.²² From 1854 to 1858 or 1859 this connection proved of great service to the company. But about 1857 disputes arose between the two railroads, and the Illinois Central was able to make more advantageous arrangements with the Chicago and Northwestern at Dixon and later with the Chicago and Burlington at Mendota.²³ None of these agreements allowed the "Central" any profit on the transfer of freight between the branches, while the movement of equipment

²¹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*, 1857-1860. The cars were hauled through without breaking bulk.

was handicapped. The result was a third attempt to establish a satisfactory connection. This time it assisted the Logansport, Peoria, and Burlington, later the Peoria and Oquaka, (now the Toledo, Peoria and Western branch of the Pennsylvania system) in floating its loans, took part of the company's bonds and secured trackage rights from El Paso to Gilman. The terms were favorable to the "Central" and the arrangement was made permanent by a provision that a certain percent of the gross earnings of interchange business should be invested in Peoria and Oquaka bonds.²⁴ Through trains were run from the main line to the branch and the arrangement was so satisfactory that it was continued until the company built its own line. At various times prior to 1860 the tracks of the Great Western, Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis, and Ohio and Mississippi, were used to provide a connection between the two parts of the system, but these arrangements were merely temporary.²⁵

In addition to the agreements mentioned above, the Illinois Central had close relations with the Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis. As soon as that line was built from Alton to Pana, a trackage agreement was made by which through trains were run from Chicago to St. Louis. In fact the Terre Haute-Illinois Central line was the first through line between those cities. Solid trains were handled, besides coaches and sleepers.²⁶ The distance by this route was not much longer than over the St. Louis, Alton and Chicago and it was regarded as an important rival of the latter, especially from 1857 to 1860.²⁷ Towards the close of the period a further connection was established between the Illinois Central and St. Louis by way of the Belleville, Southern Illinois, and Du Quoin. The latter company, a lessee of the Terre Haute company, was finished in 1869, and through connections were immediately established. Three express trains a day in each direction were run from St. Louis to Cairo, and the "Cairo Short Line" as it was termed proved profitable for both companies.²⁸

While these arrangements were of great value to the Illinois Central, it made the serious mistake of pursuing a too conservative course. Several of the roads, for example, the Mineral Point, Great Western, Peoria and Oquaka, and Chicago, Fulton

²⁴*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858-1860.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 1855-1857.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 1856 ff; cf. advertisements in St. Louis newspapers.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Railroad Gazette*, II, 252.

and Iowa (Northwestern) could have been leased or purchased on favorable terms. If this had been done it would have prevented their development into rival systems, and would also have furnished the "Central" with the necessary branches. Instead, loose traffic agreements were made and all of these lines grew into strong competitors, while the Illinois Central in 1870 had practically no branches or connecting lines.²⁹

There was one exception to this statement. Of all the railroads connected with the "Central" from 1856 to 1870 only one became a permanent part of its system.³⁰ This was the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad of Iowa. Originally chartered as the Dubuque and Pacific, before the Civil War, it was finished during that period, being built westward from Dubuque.³¹ As soon as a short portion beyond Dubuque was finished a traffic agreement was made with the Illinois Central for mutual exchange of freight.³² Both roads developed rapidly, and by 1867 this interchange of freight was of considerable value, especially to the Illinois Central.³³ At first the "Central" was the only company connecting the Iowa company with Chicago or Milwaukee, but in 1866 and 1867 other railroads, principally lines now forming the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul system, made traffic agreements with the Dubuque and Sioux City, and threatened to divert its traffic to Milwaukee.³⁴ In order to prevent the loss of such a valuable feeder, the directors of the Illinois Central leased the Iowa lines for twenty years, the first ten at thirty five per cent of the gross earnings and the next ten at thirty six per cent, with the right of perpetual lease at the latter figure.³⁵

But the Dubuque and Sioux City was building branch lines by means of two subsidiary companies, the Iowa Falls and Sioux City and the Cedar Falls and Minnesota. To obtain the parent company it was necessary to lease the branch lines on the latter's own terms. The Dubuque and Sioux City was built by persons closely connected with the Credit Mobilier and the Union Pacific, and they applied similar methods to the construction of the Iowa

²⁹*Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877.*

³⁰Except Belleville and Southern.

³¹*Annual Report, Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, May 31, 1864.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Annual Report, Iowa State Agricultural Society, 1861 ff. American Railroad Journal, March 20, 1858.*

³⁴Dubuque newspapers, 1865-1867.

³⁵*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1867.*

company.³⁶ A majority of the board of directors of the Dubuque corporation organized the Iowa Falls and Sioux City Railroad Company and also a construction company, with which the railroad company made a contract to build the road in return for a certain amount of stocks and bonds per mile of line. Then as directors of the Dubuque and Sioux City they leased their own road, before it was constructed, to the Dubuque and Sioux City for a minimum annual rental of \$1500 per mile, which amount just covered the interest charges on the bonds they had agreed to turn over to the construction company.³⁷ The Iowa Falls line had no equipment, was not completed and passed through a thinly settled territory from which the traffic would, necessarily, remain small for years. While there is no direct evidence to show that fraud existed, the inference from the reports of the House Committee and the minutes of the board of directors of the Dubuque and Sioux City, is to that effect.

Despite the apparent unprofitableness of the Iowa Falls and Sioux City lines the Illinois Central was forced to include them in the lease in order to obtain the profitable Dubuque and Sioux City. Since control of these lines secured a large and profitable traffic for the Illinois lines the directors of the Illinois Central were justified in making the arrangement. It was a good business proposition despite the peculiar methods pursued in leasing the Iowa Falls to the Dubuque and Sioux City.

Aside from the lease of the Dubuque and Sioux City the only important action taken by the directors of the company occurred in the celebrated Lake Front Case.³⁸ With the development of passenger traffic taking place in the sixties the Michigan Central, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, and the Illinois Central found their Chicago station inadequate and a new building became necessary. A location on the lake front was especially fitted to the business of the three roads and, accordingly, they asked the legislature for the right to fill in certain parts of the submerged land along the lake front. The legislature was finally

³⁶Report of Credit Mobilier and Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, *House Reports*.

³⁷Official statement by solicitor of Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad in *Annual Report*, 1887. Cites proceedings of Board of Directors. As this monograph deals with the charter lines of the Illinois Central, and as the Dubuque and Sioux City was not leased until the close of the period under discussion, the above description is regarded as sufficient.

³⁸As yet the author has not been able to find sufficient material on this subject to give a thorough treatment.

induced to grant their request, and a bill giving the three companies the right to the submerged land was passed. Governor Palmer vetoed it in a vigorous message to the General Assembly which body, however, passed it over his veto. While the main features of the bill were not bad, there were several provisions which worked a gross injustice upon the city of Chicago and gave excessive rights to the company. The common council of Chicago refused to accept the provisions of the bill, public opinion was aroused by certain parts of the measure and by the way the legislature passed it over the governor's veto, and the legislature repealed the act. The case was carried to the courts and finally decided against the company. The act was commonly known as the Lake Front Steal, and by its connection with the matter the Illinois Central incurred the ill will of the public.

The physical development of the Illinois Central railroad from 1856 to 1870 was much less important than its extensions through traffic agreements or leases. The increased traffic demanded many improvements that could not be charged to maintenance of way. As a result, large expenditures were made both from capital and from income, and the condition of the property in 1870 was much better than in 1857. However, there were no radical changes. Only a few miles of steel rails were in use and the weight of rail remained the same. The entire line, except from Kensington to Chicago, was single tracked, and bridges, culverts, roadbed, sidings, ballast, buildings, and terminals were still in accordance with the general standards adopted in 1851.³⁹

On the other hand the development of the equipment was much greater than the improvement of roadbed and buildings. Forty per cent of all the money charged to capital from 1857 to 1870 was expended on new equipment, and the amount of rolling stock was over twice as great in the latter year as in the former. There was also a marked improvement in certain kinds of equipment, especially in the passenger service. Sleepers were introduced in the first part of the seventh decade and by 1870 they were in common use on all night trains on the system. Air brakes, automatic couplers, vestibules, improved seats, heavier cars with better riding qualities, steel springs, more expensive furnishings, these were the important advances made during the period. Many of these improvements would have

³⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; especially annual reports of Maintenance of Way Department; cf. Chap. vi.

been classed as curiosities a generation later, but at the time they were considered of great importance and so they were. The greatest change in locomotives was the substitution of coal for wood as fuel, the use of iron or steel boiler tubes, somewhat heavier engines, and the development of distinct freight and passenger types. The general character and size of freight cars remained about the same, although a few cars capable of carrying twenty tons were in use and the old four wheel cars had been sent to the scrap heap.⁴⁰

The conditions which confronted the management of the Illinois Central from 1857 to 1870 were peculiar. Panics, crop failures, and the Civil War prevented the natural development of the system and forced it into policies not suited to its geographical location. Moreover, the officers of the company were handicapped by its foreign control and often adopted more conservative methods than would have been followed under a different system of ownership. As a result, the company could not pursue the policy adopted by some of the more aggressive of its competitors and often lost traffic as a result. Moreover, many of the successes obtained by the Illinois Central from 1857 to 1870 were merely temporary, and they inflicted loss upon the company later on.

⁴⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870; Ringwalt, *Development of the Railway System of the United States*, various chapters; *American Railway Journal*, technical articles and advertisements, 1857-1870.

CHAPTER V.

TRAFFIC, 1857 TO 1870.

In 1851 Illinois was practically isolated from the remainder of the country. There was comparatively little trade with other portions of the nation, and intercourse even between local communities was of slight importance. Moreover, the central counties, comprising fully one-half of the arable land of the state, were thinly settled and the people living there raised only such crops as were necessary for their own immediate wants. Even along the banks of the rivers, where there was the greatest opportunity for commerce, the industrial and agricultural conditions were more backward than in Ohio or western New York.¹ The total yield of wheat, corn, and oats, according to the seventh census, was only seventy-seven million bushels, slightly over one-sixth the crop of 1879 and but little more than the amount raised in either Indiana, Ohio, or Pennsylvania. Of the amount grown less than one-tenth was shipped to markets outside the state. Fully two-thirds of such shipments were sent south by way of the Mississippi River, while less than one-third went east via the Great Lakes.² The lower Mississippi valley states, especially Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, were the chief domestic market for the agricultural products of Illinois. The exports to Europe from the central West were also handled by way of New Orleans. Thus, the trade of Illinois, as well as that of the other upper Mississippi valley states, was along north and south lines.

Consequently, from the traffic standpoint, the construction of the Illinois Central railroad involved peculiar problems. When Senator Douglas secured the land grant of 1850, it was given by Congress for the definite object of building a railroad from the Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico, with Chicago, Dubuque, and Mobile, the respective termini. The Illinois Central was only a part of a larger project, and a similar grant of land was given to the

¹Cf. Chap. I.

²*Ibid.*; *Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders*, 1877.

Mobile and Ohio and other southern railroads to complete the line from Cairo to the Gulf.³ This all-rail route from the north to the south was intended to supplement the Mississippi River and to provide an economical trade route which would retain the commerce of the Mississippi valley in existing channels.⁴

The importance of this north and south railroad was clearly understood by the promoters, and they built the road on the most direct line from Chicago and Dubuque to Cairo. The latter city, not Chicago, was expected to be the main terminus of the system, although not necessarily the larger city.⁵ So far as the company was concerned the location of the line meant that the only profitable route for the grain of central Illinois, especially that portion along the main line from Dixon to Vandalia, was south to Cairo. Otherwise, the road would get only a short haul to some junction point. From Cairo, it was thought, the Mississippi River, and the Mobile and Ohio, the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern, and the Mississippi Central railroads, with connections, would form the southern part of a through route from the Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi to Mobile and New Orleans.⁶

However, in the sixth and seventh decades of the 19th century, the old trade routes between the west and the other portions of the United States were radically altered. The development of steam navigation on the Great Lakes, the construction of a vast network of railroads, the industrial expansion of western Europe and of the north Atlantic seaboard, and the Civil

³Cf. Chap. II. Section 7 of the Act of September 20, 1850, states: "That in order to aid in the continuation of said Central Railroad from the mouth of the Ohio river to the city of Mobile, all the rights, privileges, and liabilities . . . shall be conferred on the states of Alabama and Mississippi."

⁴*Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877; Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, reports of the President and Directors, 1861-1875.*

⁵Ever since the establishment of Cairo the capitalists interested in the promotion of the city have had extremely sanguine ideas as to the future importance of the place. When the Illinois Central was incorporated Chicago had a population of only thirty thousand, and frequent prophecies were made that Cairo would soon be the metropolis of the state. Sober statements were made that the city would have a population of half a million before the end of the century.

⁶Reports of Robert Rantoul and David Neal in *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad; Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1861-1874.*

War, with the resulting prostration of the South, resulted in a readjustment of the commerce between different sections of the country. Trade was forced out of the paths it had followed prior to the war and was established on new lines. The commerce of the North and South was almost destroyed and trade was carried on along lines of latitude, not longitude.⁷

The most important influence which brought about this change was the industrial expansion of the north Atlantic states. By 1850 this portion of the country had become largely industrial in character, while agriculture was relatively of much less importance than a generation previous. Then, from 1850 on, the rapid settlement of the west, the prosperity of the southern states, abundance of capital, and various tariff measures, culminating in the highly protective Morrill act of 1861, combined to stimulate this movement. As early as the close of the fifth decade these states had reached practically their limit of agricultural production; in other words, the food supplies necessary for their rapidly growing population could no longer be furnished by the farms east of the Alleghany mountains. This condition was made more prominent by the large immigration of the period and the higher standard of living which meant larger per capita consumption of all articles. Thus, there was an enormous demand for food stuffs over and above that supplied by the agricultural population of those states, and even in 1870 considerably over one-third of the total grain used was purchased from the west.⁸

⁷The influence of the Civil War in changing the routes by which western produce was sent to market can hardly be overestimated. As stated in the text, the commerce of the upper Mississippi valley was almost entirely with the southern states. In the publications of the time, it is taken for granted that the Mississippi river is the natural outlet of this region. At the present time we are so accustomed to having western produce sent east by way of the Great Lakes that the southern route is the unnatural one. Looking at the matter purely from the standpoint of natural advantages the southern route is by all odds the most advantageous one. As shown by the correspondence between Breese and Douglas, it was clearly the purpose of Breese and Douglas to make the Illinois Central a north and south line which would develop New Orleans or Mobile in preference to New York.

⁸*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, p. 14; Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, Chaps. XI, XII.

CONSUMPTION OF WESTERN GRAIN IN NORTH ATLANTIC STATES: 1872.	
Shipments of western grain to New England states.....	41,132,225 bus.
Shipments of western grain to Atlantic states.....	63,744,897 "
TOTAL	104,877,122 "

A similarly increasing demand occurred in Great Britain, Holland, and other countries of western Europe. English and continental industries grew very rapidly during the middle of the 19th century and this movement was necessarily accompanied by a steady growth in population. In 1846 the Corn Laws of England were repealed,⁹ and the industrial population was free to purchase wheat and corn from abroad. The bulk of this supply came from the United States, and the export of grain (including flour and meal) rose from thirteen million bushels in 1850 to over fifty million in 1870.¹⁰

The third market for Illinois products was the southern Mississippi valley. The cotton states, such as Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia, although well adapted to the raising of corn and oats, found it more profitable to devote their energies to the production of cotton and sugar, and to purchase many of their food supplies from the west. The high price of cotton prior to the Rebellion made it especially profitable to pursue this policy, and in the three or four years immediately preceding the war the demands for western corn and pork were especially heavy. However, the Civil War destroyed this market and diverted the grain traffic to the eastern seaboard. After 1865 attempts were made to revive this trade, but the enormous losses of the southern planters, the emancipation of the slaves, the lack of capital, the falling price of cotton, and the destruc-

⁹In 1841 the population of the United Kingdom was 26,730,000; in 1871 this was 31,484,000, or an increase of 4,754,000 million in the thirty years. During the same time the agricultural population actually decreased. Gibbins, *Industry in England*, p. 446; Levi, *History of British Commerce*, p. 297; Seignobos, *Political History of Europe since 1814*, p. 59.

¹⁰Levi, *History of British Commerce*, p. 297; cf. Tenth Census (1880), volume on Agriculture, monograph on Cereal Production in the United States, especially p. 468.

In 1870 the United Kingdom consumed 14,100,000 quarters of wheat grown on English farms, and imported 7,950,000 quarters, or 63,600,000 bushels. The exports of the United States in 1870 were: wheat, 36,584,000 bushels; flour, 3,463,000 barrels; corn, 1,392,000 bushels; corn meal, 187,000 barrels. This was the greatest amount exported since 1863. From 1850 to 1870 the continental demand for American grain or grain products was slight. During occasional years the exports were sufficient to attract attention, but usually they were not. Until the Civil War the West Indies were an important market for grain, especially grain sent south by way of the Mississippi River. The competitors of the United States for the English market were France, Russia, and Turkey.

tion or diversion of the transportation facilities made it difficult to develop the old commerce, while the changed economic conditions forced the planters to raise more of their food supplies than before. Therefore, in 1870, the southern market for Illinois and Iowa grain was almost negligible.¹¹ Moreover, the same influences which affected the domestic market ruined the exportation of western products via New Orleans. Prior to 1850 the southern port was as important a grain center as New York, but various causes, some of them originating before the war, reduced the amount of grain exported to an insignificant figure, and in the fifteen years from 1856 to 1870 the total shipments of corn, flour, and wheat from New Orleans were less than fifteen million bushels, as against three hundred million bushels from New York City.

The industrial development of the country and the growth of a non-agricultural population were not confined to the eastern states. The northwestern and upper Mississippi valley states grew very rapidly in population from 1850 to 1870, and this growth was especially noticeable in the towns and cities. Cleveland, Indianapolis, Toledo, Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, and St. Louis became large cities, while the general urban population grew much faster than the agricultural population. This large increase of an element which did not produce its own food supplies made necessary a correspondingly larger production of grain and meat by the agricultural districts.

Thus, the combined demands of Europe, of the north Atlantic states, and of the urban population of the central west necessitated a large increase in the grain production of the country.¹² This demand could be met in only two ways: either a highly intensive system of cultivation must be adopted in such states as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, or else the uncultivated prairies of Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Iowa would have to be utilized. To depend upon highly intensive farming was uneconomical at that time and the natural alternative was the utilization of the western lands. Of this

¹¹Olmsted, *The Lower South, A Journey Through the Back Country*; Helper, *The Impending Crisis*, especially Chap. I, pp. 9, 10; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1861; Eighth Census (1860), volume on Agriculture, Introduction; *Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877*; Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, Chap. xx, p. 273.

¹²The following table shows the concentration of grain production in

territory the most available part, as well as the richest in potential agricultural resources, was the corn belt of Illinois and Iowa, particularly the region traversed by the charter lines of the Illinois Central Railroad. Because of these advantages, this section, during the period from 1850 to 1870, developed into the most important single source of grain production in the United States and the center of supply for both the eastern states and for Europe.¹³

However, as explained in Chapter I, it was this very part of Illinois, possessing as it did the greatest opportunities for exploitation, that was the largest area unprovided with adequate transportation. Accordingly, in 1850 there was a pressing need on the part of the grain consuming territory in the east and south, as well as on the part of the grain growing territory of central Illinois, for a system of transportation that would open up to development these slightly touched resources. The means for the accomplishment of this result was an adequate system of transportation, both local and external, for the interior of the state the construction of railroads such as the Illinois Central; for the country as a whole, the improvement of the existing natural waterways and the construction of new railroads, or

the central western states. The statistics in the table are obtained from the United States Census, volumes on Agriculture.

INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF CORN, WHEAT, AND OATS, 1850-1870.

	1850	1870	INCREASE	PER CENT
Group I.....	151,408,000	190,097,000	38,689,000	25.6
Group II.....	151,870,000	208,161,000	56,291,000	35.4
Group III.....	156,450,000	521,255,000	364,805,000	232.7
Group IV.....	47,000	57,799,000	57,752,000	
Group V.....	376,069,000	304,762,000	61,307,000	16.3
United States.....	624,600,000	1,408,044,000	784,044,000	125.4
Group I	Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont.			
Group II	Ohio, Indiana.			
Group III	Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Wisconsin.			
Group IV	Kansas, Minnesota.			
Group V	Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee.			

¹³Cf. tables I to V. The 20 counties directly tributary to the I. C. R. R. produced in 1870 four per cent of all the grain produced in the country and nearly eleven per cent of that produced in Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin. The proportion of corn and oats was considerably larger.

extension of old ones, from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico and to the Atlantic seaboard.

From an examination of the map one perceives that Illinois is located between the two great natural highways of North America—the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River (Erie Canal after 1825) route to the north and east, and the Mississippi River route to the south. Because of these natural connections there was a small movement of grain outward from Illinois prior to 1850, but, in the absence of railroads connecting the interior counties with either of these two routes, the amount shipped did not satisfy the growing needs of the country. Moreover, the efficiency of water transportation, as then existing, was not such as to permit an economical movement of grain, even when brought to the terminals of the waterways. Accordingly, the development of central Illinois was dependent, in the first place, upon the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad, or another railroad answering the same purpose; and, in the second place, upon the improvement of the waterways and railroads mentioned in the previous paragraph. Moreover, as is likewise evident from an examination of the map, Illinois is a watershed for both of these great waterways, so that, by only a short land haul, traffic can be diverted to one or the other of these routes. Consequently, the state can supply either or both of the great domestic markets for food stuffs: the lower south by way of the Mississippi River, and the eastern states by way of the Great Lakes. Furthermore, in these two routes and the ports of New Orleans and New York, it possesses alternative trade routes to the main European markets.¹⁴

¹⁴From the standpoint of geology, geography, history, politics, and industry Illinois is the connecting link between the eastern, the southern, the northern, and the western parts of North America east of the Rocky Mountains. By geological formation and geographical location central Illinois, as noted in the text, forms a plain tributary to both Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River. Southern Illinois was settled mainly from the southern slave states, while northern Illinois was settled by immigrants from northern Europe, New England, and New York. Politically, the state has had active and, at times, a leading place in the affairs of the parties: Whig, Democrat, Republican, Populist, Progressive, and Socialist. In industry it is not only the most important agricultural state, but, as is seen in the great industrial developments around Chicago, E. St. Louis, and in southern Illinois, it is the natural center of industrial production for the central west. (St. Louis, Gary, etc., although just outside the borders of the state are, in reality, an integral part of the greater com-

This naturally advantageous position of Illinois was improved and strengthened by the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad during the years 1851 to 1857, as told in detail in Chapters III and IV. The main line and the Dubuque branch extended in the form of a great bow from the upper waters of the Mississippi, at Dubuque, to its junction with the Ohio River, at Cairo. The Chicago branch extended from Lake Michigan, at Chicago, directly south to Centralia on the main line and from there to Cairo, thus connecting the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River at its junction with the Ohio River. Moreover, by the leases, trackage agreements, and traffic alliances mentioned in Chapter IV, the company gradually established connections from the Great Lakes, at Chicago, directly west across the state to the upper Mississippi River, at Dubuque, and the Missouri River, at Sioux City; from the Great Lakes, southwest across the state, to the Mississippi River, at St. Louis, just below its junction with the Missouri River; and between the two main terminals of the central Mississippi, i.e. Cairo and St. Louis.¹⁵ This strategic location of the railroad gave it two important advantages that have proven of vital importance in later years: first, the Illinois Central system constituted the best, and at first the only means by which the farmers of the greater part of Illinois could reach Chicago and St. Louis, the two main grain and live stock markets of the West; second, the fact that the system was tributary to both of the main natural highways of the continent permitted the railroad, acting as agent for its territory, to route traffic either to the south or to the east as proved more advantageous, or to Europe via either of the two gateways.

Of no less importance than the actual construction of the monwealth.) These facts, though only slightly understood at the time, played an important part in the early history of the Illinois Central and have influenced in a dominant way its traffic development.

¹⁵Cf. Chap. IV; viz. (1) Chicago—(a) Galena & Chicago Union R. R., or (b) Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., or (c) Peoria & Oquaka R. R. to main line of I. C. R. R. at Freeport, Mendota, and El Paso, respectively; I. C. R. R. to Dubuque; Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. (western lines) to Sioux City. (2) Chicago—Chicago Branch to (a) Sandoval: Mississippi & Ohio R. R. (now B. & O. S. W.) to St. Louis, or (b) Pana: St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R. R. (now C. C. C. & St. L. R. R.) to St. Louis. (3) Cairo—main line to Odin; M. & O. R. R. to St. Louis, or, about 1868, main line to Du Quoin; St. L. A. & T. H. R. R. (now Cairo Short Line stem of I. C. R. R.) to St. Louis.

railroad was the cost of transportation, both from the farm to Chicago, Cairo, or St. Louis, and from these terminals to the ultimate destination in the South, the East, or Europe. If the company and the territory tributary to it were to prosper it was necessary, not only that the rates from the farm to the final market be less than before the construction of the railroad, but also that they be low enough to allow Illinois grain to travel eastward or southward in competition with grain from such states as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, or Tennessee, which were much nearer the consumer. Thus, the traffic development of the Illinois Central Railroad and of its territory was determined by two factors, both of them largely beyond the control of the management: first and essential, such an improvement in the efficiency of railroad and water transportation that the cost of carrying grain from the farm to the final market, plus the cost of raising the grain in Illinois, would be less than the cost of producing and shipping it from the farms which supplied the demand in 1850; second, and incidental, such an improvement in transportation having been effected, the determination of the question whether the best market would be the existing one in the South or the newly developing one in the East. In short, therefore, the traffic history of the Illinois Central Railroad from 1857 to 1870, as discussed in the following pages, is the story of the adaptation of the railroad to the absolute and relative developments of the east and west trade route via Chicago and of the north and south route via Cairo.

Of these two routes, the one from Chicago east gained the most from improvements in transportation facilities taking place between 1850 and 1870. The water route, via the Great Lakes, the Erie Canal, and the Hudson River, had provided reasonably cheap rates for through traffic ever since 1825, but in the decades before and after the Civil War, improvements were made which reduced the charges to a basis much lower than what existed in the thirties and forties. Larger and faster lake vessels were put in service, steam generally supplanted sails, and various economies of operation were made, the result of which greatly decreased the actual cost of making a trip from Chicago to Buffalo.¹⁶ In 1862 the deepening of the Erie Canal was finished and it became possible for canal boats of 250 tons to go from

¹⁶Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems in the United States*, p. 135; Tenth Census (1880), volume on Agriculture, monograph on Cereal Production.

Buffalo to New York City, thus reducing the cost of carriage per ton.¹⁷ At the same time, the important harbors on the Great Lakes were dredged and the canals at Detroit, Sault Ste. Marie, and Niagara Falls were enlarged to accommodate large lake vessels.¹⁸ Moreover, the reduced cost of carriage was accompanied by even more important improvements in the handling of freight at Chicago, Buffalo, and other terminals, especially through the erection of elevators, the introduction of steam shovels, power conveyors and other labor saving machinery, and the better arrangement of the docks.¹⁹ The natural result of these various devices to cheapen cost of transportation was a large expansion of the lake and canal trade, which, in turn, permitted further economies and allowed still more extensive reductions in rates.

Quite as important as the improvement of water transportation was the development of all-rail connections between Chicago and New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. In 1853 the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern was finished from Buffalo to Chicago; in 1854 Cornelius Vanderbilt consolidated several disjointed lines into the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad; in 1855 the Erie was built to Buffalo; in 1856 the Baltimore and Ohio, and Ohio and Mississippi route was completed; and in 1857 the Pennsylvania Central, and Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago line was extended to Chicago. Other railroads were completed from Buffalo to the seaboard, so that in 1870 there were a number of strong, competitive lines from Lake Michigan to the Atlantic.

At first the all-rail lines were unable to compete with the water route for the low grade freight, but between 1860 and 1870 further consolidations among the railroads, and extensive reductions in cost of operation enabled the New York Central and Pennsylvania to obtain a large share of the east and west traffic. Fierce competition between the two rival lines caused temporary reductions in rates, but more permanent influences, such as consolidation of competing and connecting lines, reduction of curves and grades, technical improvements in motor power, equipment, and roadbed, better methods of organization, accounting and operation, largely increased traffic, and the adop-

¹⁷Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems in the United States*, p. 135; Tenth Census (1880), volume on Agriculture, monograph on Cereal Production.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

tion of fast freight lines, enabled the railroads to carry most of the flour and much of the wheat and other grain in competition with the lake and canal boats.²⁰

The extensive improvements in both rail and water transportation during the sixth and seventh decades of the 19th century had a direct influence on rates. Not only were there radical reductions of a temporary nature, caused by rate wars and tariff controversies, but reductions in cost of operation allowed permanent decreases hardly less important. As most of the grain traffic from 1850 to 1868 or 1869 was handled by the lake vessels the changes in lake rates were of primary importance. In the twelve years from 1858 to 1870 the average lake rates from Chicago to Buffalo decreased as follows:^{20a}

	CORN	WHEAT
1858	12.7c per bu.	15.50c per bu.
1870	6.0 " "	6.77 " "
	<hr/>	<hr/>
DECREASE	6.7 " "	8.73 " "

This reduction in lake rates was accompanied by similar reductions in freight charges on the Erie Canal and in 1870 the average rate per ton on down freight was \$3.06 as against \$4.81 in 1854, or a reduction from 14.4c per bushel to 9.2c.²¹ The through rate on wheat from Chicago to New York City, including all tolls, declined from 28.36c per bushel in 1864 to 20.24c in 1871 (11.11c in 1870), with rates on corn from 1c to 3c lower per bushel.²² As the price of corn, oats and wheat were over fifty per cent higher in 1870 than in 1855, the decline in nominal rates meant a much greater decline in absolute charges. Thus, in 1858 one bushel of wheat at Chicago paid for the transportation of two bushels to New York, while in 1871 it provided for the carriage of 6.1 bushels.²³

Although at first unimportant, all-rail shipments of grain from the west to the east had become common by 1860 and by 1870 were fully as frequent as all-water shipments. The economies mentioned above permitted even more radical reductions in rates by railroads than took place on the lake. In 1850 the

²⁰Johnson, *American Railway Transportation*, pp. 25-27; Ringwalt, *Transportation Systems in the United States*, pp. 140-209.

^{20a}*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.

²¹*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, in Sen. Rep., 43 Cong., 1 sess., Appendix, p. 168.

²²*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.

²³Aldrich Report, II, pp. 7, 8, 60, 61.

usual charge for grain traffic was 4c per ton per mile, or occasionally 3c, irrespective of distance.²⁴ By 1870 the New York Central had reduced the general average rate per ton per mile to 1.9 cents, as against 2.5c in the earlier year, 1856. On the Erie there was a further reduction from 2.5c in the earlier period to 1.4c in the later.²⁵ Moreover, during the summer months wheat was carried by rail from Chicago to New York for 27c a bushel, or 93c per ton per mile.²⁶ At times, on account of rate wars, the tariff charges were reduced to an even lower figure per ton per mile. However, the average rates for all-rail shipments from Lake Michigan to the Atlantic seaboard declined from 36.19c per bushel in 1858 to 28c in 1870 for corn, and from 38.61c to 30c for wheat.²⁷ Moreover, the railroads from Buffalo to New York, especially the New York Central and Erie, made special efforts to handle grain between these points in competition with the Erie Canal. As a result the average rail rate in 1871 was 18.3c for wheat and 17.0c for corn, as against 13.1c and 11.3c respectively on the canal. The average lake and rail rate, i.e. via lake to Buffalo and from there to New York by rail, was 22.2c per bushel on corn and 22.5c on wheat.²⁸

Conditions existing in the east and west traffic did not hold good for shipments from Chicago south. The actual cost of handling freight from Cairo or St. Louis to New Orleans had not materially decreased from 1850 to 1870, and, as a result, rates between those points declined much more slowly than the rates on east and west lines of transportation, so that in the latter year charges from central Illinois to the Gulf were only slightly less than the lake and canal tariffs to New York. The barge rates from St. Louis were exceedingly low, but the general introduction of this system of carriage did not take place much before 1870 and, consequently, exerted only a slight influence on rates from 1850 to 1870.²⁹ The steamboat charges were nearly twice those made by the barge lines, but quicker time and less danger to the freight compensated the shipper for the difference.³⁰ Considering merely the tariff rates, there was a

²⁴*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, p. 61.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁷*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1905, p. 108.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, I, 24, 52; *ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 19, 20, 53, 96, 167, 168; *ibid.*, II, 897-900.

³⁰*Ibid.*

difference of about $\frac{1}{2}c$ per hundred on fourth class shipments and from 10c to 12c per bushel on grain from central Illinois to market in favor of New Orleans.³¹ However, service and other conditions reversed this advantage. (1) The lowest north and south rates were for shipment in bulk by barges and this service was not in general use before 1866. Moreover, most of the lines stopped at St. Louis, not Cairo, and the Illinois Central received no advantage in sending grain to St. Louis in preference to Chicago, as the rates from central Illinois to the two cities were practically the same. (2) Shipments of grain by steamboat from Cairo south had to be sacked and the cost of sacking averaged several cents per bushel. (3) On account of the longer route and the semi-tropical climate, loss from shrinkage via the north and south route was much greater than via the east and west one. This loss would run from ten to twenty per cent of the weight of corn shipments. (4) Terminal, storage, and transfer facilities were much poorer at New Orleans than at New York. (5) The local southern demand for grain was small, and Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri were in a better position than Illinois to compete for the traffic.

Moreover, through export traffic was practically prevented by the higher steamer rates from New Orleans to Liverpool than from New York to Liverpool. In 1870 there were no quotations for the transportation of corn via steamer from New Orleans to Liverpool and in only five months were there any quotations for shipment by sailing vessels. In 1872, the only year for which there is a good basis for comparison, the difference was as follows:—(quotations in pence per bushel, corn)

	STEAM	SAIL
New York to Liverpool.....	7 $\frac{1}{2}d$	6 $\frac{11}{12}d$
New Orleans to Liverpool.....	11 $\frac{1}{4}d$	10 $\frac{3}{4}d$
Difference in favor of New York	4d(8c)	4d(8c) ³²

This difference of nearly eight cents per bushel in favor of New York offset most of the advantages received by New Orleans from lower domestic rates. Higher insurance, higher elevator and wharfage charges, longer time en route, with increased interest on the shipment, eliminated the remaining advantages New Orleans possessed over New York and placed the two ports

³¹*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, I, 24, 52; *ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 19, 20, 53, 96, 167, 168; *ibid.*, II, 897-900.

³²*Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 20, 54. It should be noted that the comparison of rates is based on a single year and is liable to error, but it was the best that could be secured.

on an equality so far as transportation charges were concerned. But even had equal rates existed the disadvantages of the southern route were too great to permit any important export of grain by way of New Orleans or Mobile.³³

The second important item affecting the movement of grain from Illinois to the East was the local transportation charge, that is, the rate from the local station to Chicago or Cairo. In Chapter I it was shown that the cost of handling grain over Illinois roads was so high that territory more than ten to fifteen miles from railroad or river transportation could not send its produce to outside markets, and that the Illinois Central Railroad was necessary to remedy this trouble. On the macadamized turnpikes of the eastern states the cost of carrying grain by wagon was about ten cents per ton per mile, but over the Illinois roads this cost must have been increased fifty to one hundred per cent.³⁴ With the completion of the railroad this charge was reduced materially. Moreover, there was a slight reduction in rates from 1856 to 1870, primarily in bulky articles such as grain, lumber, coal, and salt. The higher class goods had practically the same rates in 1870 as in 1856, although some difference must be made for inflation of the currency. As early as 1856 a rate of 1.75c per ton per mile was made on coal³⁵ and in the next fourteen years this charge was reduced to less than 1c.³⁶ Grain from local stations was carried to Cairo in 1858 for 2.2c per ton per mile and for about 1.5c in 1870. On through grain shipments to New Orleans the Illinois Central received a rate of 1.3c per ton per mile in 1870.³⁷ A somewhat

³³*Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, Appendix, pp. 20, 54. Prior to 1861 a few stretches of railroad were constructed parallel to the Mississippi River, (mainly, what is now the Mobile & Ohio R. R., built under the Land Grant Act of 1850, the Mississippi Central R. R. and the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern R. R., now the southern lines of the I. C. R. R.) and, though incomplete, they were just beginning to form a southern connection for the Illinois Central Railroad when the Civil War paralyzed all communication with the South. Following the war efforts were made to rehabilitate and complete these southern lines, but with little success until after 1870. Accordingly, during the period covered in this monograph, railroad communication between Illinois and the Gulf of Mexico was almost non existent.

³⁴Ringwalt, *Transportation Systems in the United States*.

³⁵J. W. Foster, *Mineral Resources of the Illinois Central Railroad*, p. 10.

³⁶*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.

³⁷*Cairo Times*, February 17, 1858; cf. pp. 115-117; also, *Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, II, 897-900.

better basis of comparison is the average rate on different classes of traffic. The per ton per mile rates on local and through traffic in 1859 and 1870 were as follows:—

	1859	1870				
Local freight north.....	2.19c	2.44c	per ton per mile.			
Local freight south.....	2.06	2.35	"	"	"	"
Through " north.....	1.70	1.12	"	"	"	"
" " south.....	1.86	1.55	"	"	"	"
" " n. & s.....	1.80	1.36	"	"	"	"
All " n. & s.....	2.14	2.31	"	"	"	"

Nearly all of the local traffic moving south consisted of lumber, coal, and a little grain; three-fourths of the local traffic north was grain, so that the rates on north and south local traffic give an approximate idea of the rates charged for lumber, coal, and grain. However, the true standard by which local rates must be judged, is whether they permitted grain from central Illinois to be carried east or south, in competition with grain from other parts of the state, and from Missouri, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana. Up to about 1868 the farmer along the Illinois Central competed on favorable terms with the farmers of the states farther east and south, but this was due to the high price of wheat and corn and the richness of the soil, rather than to favorable railway rates.³⁹

Reduced local and through rates on agricultural products made it possible for farmers to take up the millions of acres of vacant land in the northwestern and upper Mississippi valley states and produce grain for eastern and European markets. As a result, the two decades from 1850 to 1870 witnessed an unprecedented immigration into Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Minnesota, and Kansas, and by 1870 the population of this territory was nearly four times what it was in 1850.⁴⁰ This is shown in the following table:

I.				
SETTLEMENT OF THE CENTRAL WEST.				PER
GROUP	1850	1870	INCREASE	CENT
Illinois & Iowa.....	1,043,000	3,733,000	2,710,000	259
Mich., Wis. & Mo.....	1,384,000	3,959,000	2,575,000	186
Minn. & Kansas.....	6,000	803,000		
TOTAL	2,433,000	8,496,000	6,063,000	249

³⁸*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1859, 1870. Cf. Chap. VI.

³⁹Eighth Census (1860), volume on Agriculture, Introduction; cf. Martin, *The Granger Agitation*.

⁴⁰Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).

The immigrants may be divided into groups according to the relation to the Illinois Central of the territory settled by them: (1) those settling in Illinois and Iowa tributary to the railroad; (2) those taking up land in parts of Illinois and Iowa in direct competition with the Illinois Central territory in Wisconsin, Michigan and Missouri; (3) Those going to Minnesota and Kansas, where they did not compete actively with central Illinois until about 1870. The two latter groups are outside the field of this history, but it may be said that their growth was much slower than that of Illinois and Iowa directly tributary to the Illinois Central and subsidiary lines.

While this immigration went into every portion of the state, the central counties along the Illinois Central Railroad, and especially those between La Salle and Shelby counties, were the least settled in 1850 and, consequently, offered the greatest opportunity to farmers. In the twenty years from 1850 to 1870 out of a total increase of population of 1,688,000, 981,292 occurred in the belt of counties near the "Central", and in the latter year slightly over one half of the inhabitants of the state lived in the forty four counties tributary to this railroad.⁴¹ In 1850 the central counties were thinly settled, and what is now called the "corn belt" was almost entirely unoccupied government land, but by 1870 this portion of Illinois had been transformed into

II.

SETTLEMENT OF THE FORTY FOUR COUNTIES IN ILLINOIS TRIBUTARY TO THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD.

	1850	PER CENT	1860	PER CENT	1870	PER CENT
Group I.....	115,113	12.4	261,829	17.0	495,253	19.5
Group II.....	248,868	30.2	585,548	34.3	923,579	36.6
Cook Co.....	43,385	4.2	144,954	8.4	349,966	13.8
TOTAL	292,253	34.4	730,502	42.7	1,273,545	50.4
State	851,000	100.0	1,711,000	100.0	2,539,000	100.0

Group I consists of the following agricultural counties in the central part of the state:—Bureau, Champaign, Coles, De Witt, Douglas, Ford, Iriquois, Cumberland, Kankakee, La Salle, Livingstone, Logan, McLean, Macon, Marshall, Moultrie, Putnam, Shelby, Woodford, Piatt.

Group II consists of the above counties and Alexander, Bond, Clay, Clinton, Effingham, Franklin, Fayette, Jackson, Johnson, Jefferson, Jo Daviess, Lee, Marion, Montgomery, Ogle, Perry, Pulaski, Stephenson, Union, Will, Williamson, Washington. All of these counties are within fifteen miles of the Illinois Central Railroad and are tributary to it.

⁴¹Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).

a well settled farming community. With the growth of population the area not under cultivation steadily declined, and by 1870 practically all the land surface of the state, especially in the central part, was either under crop or else used for meadow or woodland.⁴² Early in the sixth decade the federal land was sold and the railroad grant, with the exception of less than three hundred thousand acres, was disposed of by 1870.⁴³

The rapid settlement of Illinois and Iowa was accompanied, it might almost be said, was caused by important improvements in agriculture. Improved plows and harrows, seeders, cultivators, binders, reapers, threshers, corn shellers and other implements were introduced and it became possible for one farmer with the aid of farm machinery to raise several times as much grain as under the old hand method, and, that too, with much less physical exertion. Naturally, this decreased the cost of raising a crop and prevented any considerable increase in the price of food stuffs. Accordingly, it was possible for the farmers tributary to the Illinois Central Railroad, despite the large enlistment in the federal armies during the Civil War and the growth of the industries of the state, to increase their production of food stuffs sufficiently to meet the enormously increased demand of the eastern states during the decade from 1861 to 1870, and at a cost of production low enough to permit good profits to themselves and high rates to the railroad.⁴⁴

Coincident with the development in the sources of demand and supply outlined so far, viz., increased eastern and European consumption of grain, and improved rail and water connections, on the one hand, and settlement of the interior counties of Illinois, together with improved farming practice, on the other hand, came the development of the traffic organization of the Illinois Central Railroad as the connecting link between the two. The railroad was built to connect these sources of demand and supply in food stuffs and, until long after 1870, it was primarily a carrier of agricultural products. Therefore the prosperity of the company was dependent upon the ability of the adjacent territory to raise and ship large quantities of grain and of live stock.

⁴²Seventh and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1870).

⁴³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.

⁴⁴Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, pp. 228-303; Quintance, *The Influence of Farm Machinery on Crop Production and Labor*; Fite, *The Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War*, *Quar. Jour. Econ.*, XX, 259-278. Cf. *Transactions of Illinois State Agricultural Society* during this period.

Prior to 1870 the Illinois Central Railroad was the vital factor in developing central and southern Illinois, and this influence commenced as soon the first piece of track was laid in May, 1852. Of course, the amount of traffic handled during the construction of the road was small and consisted largely of local freight, principally immigrant's goods, but even in this way it was of great assistance in settling the interior counties. At first, work trains, and then regular freight and passenger trains were operated on sections of track as soon as completed, and in this way it became much easier for settlers to reach either the government or railroad lands which were on the market. However, the real traffic history of the company does not commence until 1855, at which time all the railroad, with the exception of seventy-seven miles from Mattoon to Centralia, was in use.⁴⁵

From 1857 to 1870 all of the charter lines, together with such connections as were added from time to time, were open for traffic. As stated in Chapter IV, a regular freight and passenger service was established, tariffs were promulgated, connections were secured, aid was extended to farmers along the line; in a word, everything was done to build up the traffic of the road, especially that of grain and live stock. That the railroad, next to the federal government, was the largest single land owner in the country naturally stimulated its interest in agricultural production, even beyond that of the other granger railroads.

Moreover, the traffic policy of the Illinois Central Railroad was greatly influenced by the fact that it was tributary to the Great Lakes as well as to the Mississippi River. The Civil War and other causes beyond the control of the management almost destroyed the historical southern market of Illinois and had the railroad been constructed as originally planned its traffic would have been insignificant. Having been built tributary to Chicago as well as to Cairo it was, however, in a position to divert business northward when its natural connections with the South were prostrate and Chicago became its main terminal. For that reason prices and facilities there were the determining factor

⁴⁵*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857. The net earnings to January 1, 1855, amounted to \$276,540.59. Estimates of the gross earnings are given, but they are so incorrect, it is not worth while to repeat them. However, the approximate gross earnings are supposed to have been about three quarters of a million dollars in the period prior to the first annual report in 1855.

in the growth of the railroad and of that part of Illinois and, later, of Iowa dependent upon it.⁴⁶

As Illinois was primarily an agricultural state the movement of its crops, especially corn and wheat, depended upon demands outside the state, in other words upon the needs of the industrial population of the East and South. But whether the farmer in McLean or Macon county would ship his grain at all—the vital problem for the railroad—was decided by the price of grain at Chicago. Unless the New York price, less the cost of transportation, in other words the Chicago price, would yield a profit on a bushel of corn or wheat, the farmer would not ship it, at least he would not produce and ship it for any length of time. Fortunately for the Illinois Central, the price of all farm products was high from 1861 to 1870, and was excessively low in only one or two years before that period. These high prices were accompanied by large demands from other parts of the country, as mentioned above, especially in the period from 1861 to 1870, and, at times, the supply of grain was insufficient to meet all the necessary demands of the north Atlantic states and Europe. On account of the inflation of the currency the increase in currency prices was very great, but there was a fair advance in gold prices, while the expenses of the farmer for labor and supplies did not increase as rapidly as the receipts from his grain or cattle.⁴⁷ Of the different grains corn had the greatest rise in price⁴⁸ and wheat the least,⁴⁹ but as the territory dependent on the Illinois Central was largely corn country this proved of advantage to both the farmer and the railroad. There was also a large increase in the price of cattle; again favoring the central counties of the state.⁵⁰

The general adoption of labor saving machinery, combined with high Chicago prices for grain and a large demand for food stuffs, had a very strong influence on the production of grain in the territory along the Illinois Central Railroad. Vacant gov-

⁴⁶The rise of Chicago as the leading grain and live stock market of the world was coincident with the developments in the traffic of the Illinois Central Railroad mentioned in the text and was of great importance to its territory in affording a convenient market for grain and live stock.

⁴⁷Fite, *The Agricultural Development of the West During the Civil War*, *Quar. Jour. Econ.*, XX, 259-278. Cf. Mitchell, *History of the Greenbacks*.

⁴⁸Aldrich Report, II, pp. 7, 8.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 60, 61.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 26.

ernment and railroad land was occupied and the acreage under cultivation increased rapidly from census period to census period. The growth in some of the interior counties was remarkable. Champaign county increased its area under cultivation from twenty two thousand acres in 1850 to four hundred and nineteen thousand in 1870; Livingstone from thirteen thousand to three hundred and seventy seven thousand, and Iroquois from thirty thousand to three hundred and twenty two thousand.⁵¹ The twenty one typically agricultural counties had more than seven times as many acres under cultivation in 1870 as in 1850, as is shown in the following table:—

III.

ACRES UNDER CULTIVATION, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I.....	744,000	14.8	2,902,000	22.2	5,337,000	27.6
Group II.....	1,590,000	31.6	5,101,000	38.3	8,839,000	43.2
Cook Co.	154,000	3.1	267,000	2.4	348,000	1.8
<hr/>						
TOTAL	1,744,000	34.7	5,368,000	40.7	9,187,000	45.0
State	5,039,000	100.0	13,066,000	100.0	19,329,000	100.0 ⁵²

The larger area in farms was accompanied by a greater yield of farm products, especially corn, wheat and oats. It was also accompanied by a greater diversity of farming, and the total production of the three staples, consequently, did not increase as rapidly as the acreage did.⁵³ At the same time the growth of the grain crops was large enough to attract attention. This was especially true of the central agricultural counties. The following tables show the increased yield of the three staples, but the figures for 1869 (census of 1870) were unduly small, owing to droughts, and to obtain a correct estimate of the increase during the decade the total should be considered about twenty-five per cent larger.⁵⁴

⁵¹Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on Agriculture.

⁵²*Ibid.*; for the counties comprised in each group, see Table II; per cent refers to per cent of total acreage contained in each county or group of counties. Group II includes Group I.

⁵³Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on Agriculture, Introduction.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 1870.

IV.

PRODUCTION OF CORN, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I.....	9,985,000	17.7	29,613,000	25.8	39,265,000	30.2
Group II.....	16,890,000	29.3	44,302,000	38.6	59,257,000	45.6
⁵⁵ Cook Co.....	429,000	.7	877,000	.7	770,000	.5
TOTAL	17,319,000	30.0	45,179,000	39.3	60,827,000	46.1
State	57,646,000	100.0	115,174,000	100.0	129,921,000	100.0

V.

PRODUCTION OF WHEAT, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I.....	949,000	10.1	4,105,000	17.6	4,043,000	12.8
Group II.....	2,171,000	25.1	8,870,000	37.2	10,625,000	35.4
Cook Co.	238,000	2.7	299,000	1.3	149,000	.5
TOTAL	2,409,000	25.8	9,169,000	38.5	10,774,000	35.9
State	9,414,000	100.0	23,837,000	100.0	30,128,000	100.0 ⁵⁶

VI.

PRODUCTION OF OATS, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I.....	1,275,000	12.0	2,330,000	15.4	10,619,000	24.8
Group II.....	3,174,000	30.2	5,865,000	38.8	20,421,000	47.7
Cook Co.	403,000	4.0	1,092,000	7.2	1,584,000	2.8
TOTAL	3,577,000	34.2	6,957,000	46.0	22,005,000	50.5
State	10,087,000	100.0	15,220,000	100.0	42,780,000	100.0 ⁵⁷

These tables show not only a large increase in all crops, but also an especial emphasis, particularly in the corn belt, on the production of oats and corn instead of wheat. The increase in the production of wheat in the state between 1850 and 1860 amounted to 35.9 per cent, of corn 46 per cent, and of oats 50.5 per cent. At the same time the total amount of grain produced in the forty three counties along the Illinois Central (excluding Cook county) increased from 21,200,000 bushels in 1850 to 80,500,000 bushels

⁵⁵Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Censuses (1850, 1860, 1870), volumes on Agriculture.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

in 1870, or 369%. The number of sheep, cattle and swine on the farms will be taken up later on in this chapter.

Having seen the growth of grain production in the territory tributary to the Illinois Central it is possible to ascertain what influence these large crops had upon the railroad. In the preceding pages it was shown that the Illinois Central was placed in a very disadvantageous position in 1856 to 1870 in regard to shipping grain south to New Orleans and that economic conditions diverted western grain to Chicago and the east and west trade route. Although not to its interests, the "Central" was forced to yield to outside forces and make Chicago, not Cairo, its principal terminus for the handling of grain. The phenomenal rise of the former city as a grain center is a familiar story, and in the period under discussion the Illinois Central did as much as any other road to build up the interests of this city. It accomplished this result despite its unfavorable location. In studying the map of the Illinois Central one is impressed by its poor arrangement so far as shipments to Chicago are concerned. It is better situated than any other Illinois road for the handling of corn and oats from a large portion of the corn belt, but is in a weak position so far as wheat from the northern counties is concerned. To carry wheat from, say, La Salle county over its own rails it must send the grain south to Centralia and then north again to Chicago, or about three times as great a distance as that of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific route.⁵⁸ The same condition existed in the handling of grain from many of the counties on the main line north of Vandalia. This was obviated by traffic and trackage agreements, but not in a manner profitable to the "Central." Up to 1860, the Galena and Chicago Union line from Freeport to Chicago had an agreement with the "Central" by which the latter's business from points north and south of Freeport was sent to Chicago over the rails of the Galena road in the "Central's" cars.⁵⁹ Later a similar agreement was made with the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy from Dixon, but on somewhat less favorable terms. However, on most of the grain originating north of the Illinois river the Illinois Central obtained only the short haul to Freeport or Dixon, while the other railroad received liberal returns for carrying the cars to Chicago. Relations with the Galena or Burlington lines were not always friendly, and from 1858 to 1870 another means of uniting the main line and the Chicago branch was obtained. The Illinois Central assisted

⁵⁸Cf. Chap. iv.

⁵⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1859.

in the construction of the Peoria and Oquaka, now the Toledo, Peoria and Western branch of the Pennsylvania system, and made a trackage agreement with that company by which its trains could run from El Paso to Gilman over the latter's tracks. By this connection the two arms of the system were united one hundred and sixty miles above Centralia and the company was in a position to get the long haul on shipments to Chicago.⁶⁰

Other traffic agreements were made with roads intersecting the Central by which the latter got the haul to Chicago. Important among these alliances was one with the Great Western, now the Wabash, at Tolono and Decatur, the Ohio and Mississippi at Odin and Sandoval, the Alton and Terre Haute, now the St. Louis Division of the Big Four, at Pana and Mattoon, and the Mineral Point railroads.⁶¹ By far the most permanent alliance was the one with the Dubuque and Sioux City, which, as described above, was leased by the Illinois Central in 1867. By this arrangement all grain originating on the leased lines could be carried by the Illinois Central over the charter lines. Iowa, at this time, was a very important wheat growing district and most of the grain transferred at Dubuque was wheat. Naturally, this extension of the system had an important influence on the Illinois portion, and during the first few years of the lease control of the Dubuque and Sioux City was profitable to the Illinois Central.⁶²

During the time these various traffic and trackage agreements were being completed, the receipts of wheat, corn, and oats at Chicago over the tracks of the Illinois Central grew very rapidly. In 1855 only a part of the road was in operation and in 1856, 1857, and 1858 there were poor crops, while most of the land near the railroad had not yet been settled. As a result the receipts of grain at Chicago from this territory were small. In 1859, 1860, and 1861, and most of the remaining years of the decade crops were good and the shipments by the railroad increased to considerable proportions. Had it not been for the exceedingly low prices prevailing during much of the period from 1857 to 1862 and the large shipments south to Cairo from 1860 to the close of the war, the movement would undoubtedly have been much greater. The largest amount of any one grain con-

⁶⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1860. The Illinois Central had merely a trackage agreement with this company and in later years allowed other and rival railroads to control this company.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 1855-1870.

⁶²Cf. Chap. VI, for statements as to net profits accruing to the Illinois Central from this lease.

sisted of corn, which increased from 758,901 bushels in 1858 to 6,903,430 bushels in 1867 and 10,475,680 bushels in 1871.⁶³ Wheat shipments grew at a somewhat slower rate, from 1,100,482 bushels in the earlier year to 5,244,540 bushels in the latter.⁶⁴ The amount of oats handled remained under half a million bushels a year up to 1865, when it jumped to 1,678,087 bushels and to 4,258,340 bushels in 1870. This rapid increase was brought about by the more general cultivation of this grain after 1860.⁶⁵

Compared with other railroads and the Illinois and Michigan Canal the Illinois Central was always one of the leading grain lines, and during the Civil War period it handled more grain than any other road, with the possible exception of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy. In 1858 the Central was third in its receipts of corn at Chicago, being surpassed by the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy and the Illinois and Michigan Canal, with the Chicago and Northwestern only a few thousand bushels behind. In 1871 the Illinois Central handled more corn than any other line entering Chicago, and during the thirteen years increased its proportion of the total receipts from 8.1% to 24.8%.⁶⁶ In 1858 the "Central" was second in the receipts of wheat, which position it held in 1870, being led in both years by the Chicago and Northwestern. Its proportion of the total number of bushels reported, however, increased from 11.5% to 30.2%.⁶⁷ The growth in the handling of oats was even larger. From third place in 1858 the Illinois Central advanced to first place in 1870 and led its nearest competitor by two and a half million bushels. In the latter year it delivered 40.9% of all the oats received, as against only 4.9% in the former year.⁶⁸ Moreover, these figures do not include grain handled by the Galena or Chicago, Burlington and Quincy or Northwestern railroads for the Illinois Central on trackage agreements. Had this been included

⁶³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858, 1867, 1871: Itemized figures are not given before 1858.

⁶⁴*Ibid.* There is a slight difference between the figures given by the Chicago Board of Trade and the railroad due to different fiscal years.

⁶⁵*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858-1870. Cf. Ninth Census (1870), volume on Agriculture, Introduction, under heading, Oats.

⁶⁶*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1870.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Ibid.* From 1867 to 1870 there is a discrepancy in the reports of the Illinois Central, and the figures given by the company cannot be given for the period.

the proportion belonging to the latter road would have been much larger. As it was, 27.2% of all the grain received at Chicago came in over the tracks of the Illinois Central, although the Burlington, Northwestern, and Rock Island systems had each a much larger mileage.⁶⁹

While the great bulk of the grain handled by the company, despite its efforts to divert the traffic southward, was forwarded to Chicago, the receipts at Cairo showed a healthy growth during the period, and for occasional years were almost as large as the receipts at the northern end of the road. Prior to 1860 the amount of wheat, corn and oats handled at Cairo was only nominal, but in that year, and the first few months of 1861, the southern movement assumed considerable importance as the result of energetic efforts on the part of the traffic department. River and railroad connections to Mobile and New Orleans were improving and the company believed this growth was permanent.⁷⁰ These prospects were rudely shattered by the outbreak of the Civil War and the occupation of Cairo by the federal troops entirely destroyed the southern grain trade. During the struggle a large proportion of the supplies furnished the Union armies in Kentucky and Tennessee were forwarded by way of Cairo, and the receipts at that city were larger from 1861 to 1867 than ever before. The demand for oats was especially large, and from 49,068 bushels in 1855 the movement increased to 4,629,408 bushels in 1864.⁷¹ The demands of the army for corn, although not as large as the demands for oats, were considerable and were supplemented by the requirements of the civil population of the South. Thus, the maximum receipts occurred in 1866, just after the close of the war, and amounted to 2,350,841 bushels, as against only 6,873 bushels in 1855.⁷² The war had practically no influence on the receipts of wheat and the tonnage of both wheat and flour increased until after the war. After the resumption of peace the receipts of all grains at Cairo continued large, but the amount received from year to year varied consid-

⁶⁹*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1870; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1870, showing number of bushels of grain turned over to the respective connecting lines.

⁷⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1860, 1861.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 1861-1870. Most of the grain was destined, directly or indirectly, for the army.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 1855-1870.

erably.⁷³ Corn more than held its own in 1865, 1866, and 1867, but dropped to only 109,370 bushels in 1868. 23,460 bushels in

⁷³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870. The following tables show the proportion of grain received at Chicago and Cairo from 1855 to 1870, being taken from the *Annual Reports*, Illinois Central Railroad.

VII.

COMPARATIVE RECEIPTS OF CORN AT CHICAGO AND CAIRO, 1855 TO 1870.

	TOTAL	CHICAGO	PERCENT	CAIRO	PERCENT	MISCELLANEOUS PERCENT
1855	902,600	402,105	44.5	6,873	.7	54.8
1857	679,843	242,115	36.7	6,116	.9	62.4
1858	993,571	758,921	76.3	4,187	.4	23.3
1859	943,967	780,943	82.7	22,823	2.4	14.9
1860	3,691,777	2,839,659	77.0	727,880	19.7	3.3
1861	7,724,399	5,341,303	69.1	2,119,320	27.5	3.4
1862	6,024,156	4,346,301	72.1	166,536	2.8	25.1
1863	4,149,999	3,597,331	86.5	17,863	.4	13.1
1864	2,339,653	1,721,749	73.5	228,508	9.3	17.2
1865	6,203,513	4,433,270	71.5	1,133,220	17.9	10.6
1866	8,024,035	5,443,824	67.8	2,350,841	29.4	2.8
1867	7,820,560	5,970,519	76.4	1,678,090	21.4	1.2
1868	5,844,930	5,844,930		109,370		
1869	5,717,890	5,334,260		23,460		
1870	5,114,130	3,533,310		287,880		

For some reason, the total number of bushels of oats, corn and wheat handled in 1868, 1869, and 1870, does not correspond with the statistics before 1868 and no percentages can be obtained for those three years.

The Miscellaneous item includes shipments turned over to connecting roads, such as the Ohio and Mississippi and the Galena and Chicago Union, or delivered at local stations. The large percentage in this column before 1860 shows the importance of the Galena and Chicago Union connection. In 1863, 1864, and 1865 considerable quantities of grain were turned over to the O. & M. for the use of the army.

VIII.

COMPARATIVE RECEIPTS OF OATS AT CHICAGO AND CAIRO, 1855 TO 1870.

	TOTAL	CHICAGO	PERCENT	CAIRO	PERCENT	MISCELLANEOUS PERCENT
1855	461,000	209,600	44.5	49,068	10.6	44.1
1857	670,424	160,265	36.7	95,881	14.3	61.8
1858	409,325	141,334	76.3	17,551	42.9	22.5
1859	622,449	137,596	82.7	294,595	47.3	30.7

1869 and 287,880 bushels in 1870, as against an average of over sixteen hundred bushels in the three preceding years. Oats decreased in a similar way in 1868 and 1869, but recovered in 1870. Wheat actually increased after the war. These fluctuations were much greater than at Chicago and indicate the lack of strength in the southern movement of cereals. In the aggregate the total number of bushels forwarded to Cairo as compared with Chicago was small, except during the six years from 1861 to 1867.⁷⁴

Next to grain the most important agricultural commodity carried by the Illinois Central was live stock—sheep, hogs and cattle. Conditions in the packing industry from 1856 to 1870 were radically different from what they are now and there were serious restrictions upon the development of the industry. Refrigerator cars were not in general use and the transportation of fresh meat was not possible. This prevented the centralization of meat packing in the West, which took place a few years later, and the shipment of pork, beef and mutton to the eastern states. Instead, most of the meat used in that territory was packed in local establishments from homebred live stock, or animals sent from the West on the hoof. Even the shipment of western live stock for slaughter in eastern cities was handicapped by the high cost of railroad transportation—shipment by lake being out of the question—and by the difficulty of carrying the animals long distances without great depreciation in value. Moreover, the number of small, local packing houses was large in the West as well as in the East. On the other hand great quantities of pork and beef were salted or pickled and in that condition could be carried long distances. Thus, the market for meat products was not confined entirely to the territory within a few miles of the packing house.

1860	1,320,108	202,967	77.0	934,007	71.1	13.1
1861	793,244	262,209	69.1	457,398	59.2	7.8
1862	1,760,066	534,659	72.1	427,693	24.2	45.4
1863	4,581,731	605,040	86.5	2,083,639	43.3	43.3
1864	7,794,095	214,158	73.5	4,629,408	59.5	13.0
1865	4,518,731	1,605,443	71.5	2,141,806	46.4	18.2
1866	4,002,825	2,358,285	67.8	836,115	20.4	20.9
1867	4,863,110	3,302,140	76.4	1,136,530	23.4	8.1
1868	5,082,090	5,082,090		350,900		
1869	3,830,620	4,015,590		522,340		
1870	5,641,870	4,258,340		1,414,180		

⁷⁴*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; cf. Report of the Delegates Appointed by the English and Dutch Shareholders, 1877.*

The conditions outlined above affected the Illinois Central in two ways. The high cost of transporting live stock prevented the use of the territory beyond the Mississippi until after the close of the Civil War, and made Illinois the natural center of the industry. Moreover, from 1856 to about 1863 or 1864 only that portion of the state within a hundred and fifty miles of Chicago, which even then was the center of live stock shipment, could send its sheep, hogs or cattle to market. But while this gave the central counties of the state an advantage over their competitors it limited the number of animals which could be slaughtered at Chicago or sent east from there to the packing houses on the Atlantic coast. As the number of farmers was comparatively small at this time, it was profitable for them to raise live stock, but restricted the number of cattle carried on the railroad. After the Civil War railway rates were reduced and the trans-Mississippi territory became a strong competitor of central Illinois.

There were other influences of a somewhat local nature which affected the industry in the counties along the Illinois Central. One of the most important of these was the cost of corn. Prior to 1860 corn on the farm was of little value and it was usually cheaper to feed it to swine or cattle than to attempt to ship it. Thus, the amount of grain forwarded from local stations along the railroad was much smaller than the large crops would have permitted. During the Civil War period the price of corn was high and the farmers found it more profitable to ship it in bulk than "on the hoof". After the war there was a decline in the price of corn, and the high prices of meat induced the farmers to raise a much larger number of animals than before.

As would be expected from these changing conditions, the number of live stock on the farms of the state fluctuated, although the general tendency was upwards. The central counties profited the most by this increase. Evidently the growers of the period did not find it profitable to fatten hogs and cattle entirely on corn, for the census returns show that the counties raising the largest amount of grain did not have the largest number of meat cattle. For some reason or other, possibly the high price of cotton which stimulated the production of wool as a substitute for cotton in the making of clothing, the number of sheep much more than doubled in the decade from 1860 to 1870 and nearly tripled

in the central agricultural counties along the Illinois Central Railroad.⁷⁵

In the decade from 1860 to 1870 Chicago became the leading packing center of the country, and, thus, afforded a market for the growing number of live stock in the state and especially in that portion near the Illinois Central. Prior to the war the Illinois Central ranked second among the railroads entering Chicago in the number of hogs and cattle received, being preceded by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy and closely followed by the Northwestern, the Rock Island and the Alton.⁷⁶ During the war the high price of corn and other unfavorable conditions affected the Illinois Central more than the other roads, and it

⁷⁵The growth of the live stock industry in the state is shown by the following tables, which are taken from the census reports:

IX.

NUMBER OF SWINE ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I	251,187	13.1	449,079	17.9	581,178	21.5
Group II	620,536	32.6	1,110,097	44.3	1,074,946	39.8
Cook Co.	9,398	.5	13,587	.5	15,552	.6
TOTAL	630,934	33.1	1,113,684	44.8	1,094,467	40.4
State	1,915,907	100.00	2,502,308	100.0	2,703,343	100.0

X.

NUMBER OF CATTLE ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I	90,332	16.7	166,615	17.2	265,683	25.1
Group II	187,954	34.6	436,096	45.1	454,495	43.0
Cook Co.	11,155	2.6	14,432	2.00	14,431	1.4
TOTAL	199,109	37.2	455,408	47.1	468,926	44.4
State	541,209	100.0	970,799	100.0	1,055,499	100.0

XI.

NUMBER OF SHEEP ON FARMS, 1850 TO 1870.

	1850	PERCENT	1860	PERCENT	1870	PERCENT
Group I	138,403	15.5	111,669	14.5	292,605	18.6
Group II	285,064	32.0	163,514	21.2	593,368	37.8
Cook Co.	13,496	1.5	8,653	1.1	10,622	.6
TOTAL	299,460	33.5	172,167	22.3	603,990	38.4
State	894,043	100.0	769,735	100.0	1,568,286	100.0

⁷⁶*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858-1861.

brought in the smallest number of any of the large systems.⁷⁷ Beginning with 1866 the territory tributary to the "Central" was better situated than its competitors, and the railroad again assumed second position, with the Burlington still ahead.⁷⁸ The other three important roads were not far behind, and excepting the Burlington, there was not a great difference between the number handled by each.

The shipments of live stock constituted an appreciable part of the traffic of the road. There were over four times as many hogs and cattle shipped to Chicago in 1870 as the average from 1858 to 1860. For instance, in 1870, the Chicago Board of Trade credits the railroad with receipts of 379,513 hogs, 87,915 cattle, and 89,597 sheep, equivalent to about eighty eight thousand tons.⁷⁹ This was equivalent to 6.5% of the total tonnage handled by the system in that year.⁸⁰ As the rates and the average haul of this class of freight were considerably greater than the average the business must have amounted to at least ten per cent of the gross earnings.⁸¹ The company endeavored to encourage live stock shipments, though entirely as an addition to the regular movement of grain, and the results, judging from the above, were satisfactory.

Nearly all the live stock handled by the company was sent to Chicago, and, in 1867, the last year for which complete data is available, 82.5% of the cattle, 85.8% of the sheep and 82.5% of the hogs were forwarded to that city. The demands of the local butchers were undoubtedly satisfied by animals driven into town on the hoof. Moreover, from a comparison of tables IX, X, and XI, it is evident that the shipments over the Illinois Central constituted a large proportion of the number of animals on the farms immediately contiguous to the railroad. Thus, from the rapid increase in the shipments to Chicago and the correspondingly rapid growth after 1860 on the farms, it is safe to assume that the live stock industry was a reasonably profitable one.

The minor lines of agriculture, such as truck farming, fruit growing, dairying, the production of hay, vegetables, etc., were

⁷⁷*Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade, 1861-1866.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 1866-1870.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 1870. The figures are not given by the railroad company. Sheep and hogs are estimated at 200 pounds each, cattle at 1000.

⁸⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1870.

⁸¹*Ibid.*

comparatively unimportant. Except for a small territory adjacent to Chicago there was little demand for truck or dairy products. Small quantities of butter, eggs, cheese, and vegetables were carried on the railroad, but the aggregate tonnage or earnings were insignificant, never exceeding one per cent of the gross tonnage.⁸² As the territory adjacent to the Illinois Central, except a few counties in the northern part of the state, is not adapted to either truck farming or dairying this is not surprising. The amount of hay handled was also small and constituted a little more than one per cent of the gross tonnage and about the same proportion of earnings.⁸³

Fruit growing was more important. Southern Illinois between Cairo and Centralia was well adapted to fruit raising and by the close of the Civil War this region was sending considerable quantities of apples, peaches, strawberries, and other small fruit to the Chicago market. During the height of the season special trains were run from Cairo to Chicago on passenger schedule and the fruit was placed in the city in time for the morning markets. The railroad encouraged the development of this traffic by special service and reduced rates, and a large proportion of the perishable fruit supply of Chicago came from southern Illinois. Express rates were charged for the freight—not unreasonable considering the service and character of the commodity—but the total revenue was small. As late as 1870 only ten thousand tons of both vegetables and fruit were handled by the railroad.⁸⁴

On the whole, the Illinois Central developed the agricultural resources of the territory dependent upon it as much as could reasonably have been expected. While rates on grain, live stock, and other farm products were high and prevented a larger movement than took place, the railroad established as low charges as would yield it a good profit. Methods of operation common to all railroads of the period, the lack of a large tonnage, the geographical location of the line, the direction of traffic, all combined to make low charges impracticable. The Illinois Central was not the only railroad handicapped by these difficulties and, taking everything into consideration, it did as much to build up the portion of the state through which it passed as the Northwestern, Burlington, Rock Island, or Alton did to assist the counties of Illinois, Wisconsin or Iowa through which they ran. On the other hand, the farms of the state developed the railroad as much

⁸²*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

as the railroad developed their interests. The over sanguine prophecies of vice president Neal were not fulfilled until after the Civil War, but after the central part of the state once commenced to grow it turned over to the railroad all the grain and live stock it could handle.

Next to agricultural products lumber was the most important commodity handled by the railroad. Except along the streams central Illinois between Kankakee and Effingham was very sparsely wooded, and what timber was found was poorly adapted for fuel or building purposes. Necessarily, most of the lumber and wood used in this region had to be brought from places where timber was more abundant. In 1856 to 1870 there were three sources from which the supply came: (1) southern Illinois; (2) northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin; (3) the timber regions of the Northwest (handled by way of Chicago). As the amount of building going on during the settlement of the state was large in proportion to the population and as wood was the common fuel until long after 1870 the demands for lumber and wood were large.⁸⁵

Places along the main line and the Chicago branch as far north as Vandalia and Mattoon were supplied from the forests of southern Illinois. A small territory just south of the Illinois river depended on northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin. The remainder of the supply came from Chicago. Practically all the lumber that left the city by railroad was sent south over the tracks of the Illinois Central, and this one item amounted to over half of the total tonnage forwarded from Chicago by the company. At first the rates on lumber were placed so high it could not be transported more than a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles and the poorer wood from the southern part of the state was used in considerable quantities. Later improved methods of operation and the presence of a large number of empty cars in Chicago, arising from the excess of northbound over southbound shipments, enabled the company to reduce its charges. These reductions stimulated the growth of shipments from Chicago, and by the close of the decade from 1860 to 1870 nearly ninety per cent of the lumber handled by the railroad originated in Chicago.⁸⁶ At the same time the absolute tonnage forwarded steadily increased, though much more slowly than the general traffic of

⁸⁵Letters of David Neal and Robert Rantoul on resources of Illinois, in *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

⁸⁶*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1867.

the system. As the heavy movement of grain and live stock to Chicago greatly exceeded the return shipments of merchandise and miscellanies, the growth of the lumber traffic provided south-bound loads for a large proportion of the equipment. By this arrangement the cost of carriage of both grain and lumber could be reduced and lower rates established. The result was beneficial to the agricultural districts of the state in that it increased the price of their corn or wheat and decreased the cost of lumber and fuel.⁸⁷

The third largest single article of freight handled by the railroad was coal. As stated in Chapter I, there were three important coal fields near the Illinois Central: the Danville, Du Quoin, and La Salle mines. A few scattered mines were in existence, but their output was of slight importance. When the railroad was built it was supposed that the mines near Danville would ship large quantities of coal to Chicago by way of the Great Western, now the Wabash, to Tolono, and by the Illinois Central from there north.⁸⁸ The company was disappointed in this expectation and for various reasons, principally the competition of the Ohio coal, the tonnage handled was negligible.⁸⁹ The other two fields were of more importance. At first the mines at both places were handicapped by a high cost of operation, but as the country became more thickly settled and the mines larger this difficulty was removed. Their usefulness, however, was limited by the high railway charges in effect. In 1856 to 1870 the small amount of tonnage handled, the poor methods of operation, and other causes, made it absolutely impossible for the railroad to make low rates on such bulky goods as coal. From a cent to a cent and a half a ton-mile was the lowest charge the Illinois Central made under the most favorable conditions. As the coal fields were from two hundred to two hundred and fifty miles from a large market the high tariff prevented the transportation of coal to those markets. Under ordinary circumstances a hundred miles was about as far as the coal could be carried and the

⁸⁷The fact that the Illinois Central had a large return tonnage from Chicago was an important factor in keeping the rates on grain and live stock from advancing. Instead of the northbound freight having to stand the cost of carriage both ways, loaded up and empty down, it had to provide for only the upbound expenses.

⁸⁸Letter of D. Neal, *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

⁸⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1860.

production of the mines was limited to the demands of such a territory.⁹⁰

Moreover, coal, as a fuel, was forced to compete with wood. When the Illinois Central was built, wood was the universal fuel, and even the company's locomotives were wood burners. After a series of tests, the railroad began to use coal instead of wood on its engines, and, to increase its traffic, endeavored to stimulate the demand for "stone coal" as it was termed.⁹¹ For a long time the prejudice in favor of wood, supplemented by an abundance in districts near the mines, prevented its general use, and it was not until after the Civil War that coal was burnt to any considerable extent. Furthermore, Ohio or Pennsylvania coal, owing to the all water route, was much cheaper at Chicago than Illinois coal. Only a few mines on the Chicago and Alton, and Rock Island were in a position to compete with the eastern product.⁹² Under the circumstances, the market for coal mined on the Illinois Central was not great.

Nevertheless, there was a steady increase in product. Slightly over two hundred thousand tons, in addition to that used by the company, was forwarded from the mines in 1870. This was something over three times as much as was shipped in 1857, and thirteen times as much as in 1855.⁹³ From 1857 to 1864 the amount mined remained nearly stationary, but in the next seven years it increased to over two hundred thousand tons.⁹⁴ This was caused by the exhaustion of the forests, the growing demands for industrial purposes and the decline of the prejudice against coal. In 1870 it amounted to 14.9% of all the tonnage handled by the railroad. Both the rates and the length of haul were less than the average and the total gross receipts must have formed a much smaller percentage of the total earnings. Taking into consideration earnings and cost of service, coal was of less importance to the railroad than the live stock traffic if the two are compared on the basis of gross and net earnings. The chief value of the coal traffic was in its indirect benefits to the manufacturing and commercial interests of the state.

The least prominent of the industries of Illinois affecting the

⁹⁰J. W. Foster, *Mineral Resources of the Illinois Central Railroad*.

⁹¹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858.

⁹²The Chicago & Alton was the only railroad which brought any considerable amount of coal into Chicago. *Annual Report*, Chicago Board of Trade.

⁹³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 1870.

Illinois Central was manufacturing. As has been stated, Illinois was primarily an agricultural commonwealth in 1870, and the territory tributary to the "Central", aside from Chicago, was the distinctly farming portion. From Kensington to Cairo, and from Centralia to Dunleith there were only three cities that were manufacturing centers of any prominence—Galena, Decatur, and Bloomington, and none of these places had any large industries. Even Chicago was not an industrial center of the first rank. Its commercial interests, such as shipping, the handling of lumber, live stock and grain and the transfer of freight between east and west lines, were very large, but it did not manufacture many kinds of merchandise which were consumed by the agricultural population of the state. Farm machinery and such goods formed the great bulk of the merchandise or miscellaneous shipments originating there.⁹⁵ In the remainder of the territory tributary to the Illinois Central manufacturing was confined to the production of simple articles for local use, the important lines being the making of boots and shoes, clothing, woodenware and other articles of wood, some farm machinery, whiskey and other alcoholic liquors. In 1860 less than one per cent of the total population of the counties between Shelby and La Salle were engaged in manufacturing, and the proportion in 1870 was not much larger.⁹⁶

Moreover, the products made in these village or city plants were those used in the immediate locality. With the exception of a few factories in Chicago and a much smaller number in the remainder of the Illinois Central territory the manufacturing establishments enumerated in the censuses did not send freight over the railroad. Nor did they bring in large quantities of raw material, since most of the goods they manufactured were made from materials raised locally or else were of comparatively small value. Thus, the total amount of freight handled to or from the manufacturies of the state was of much less importance than the products of mines, farms or forests.

However, there was a large tonnage of merchandise and sundries either brought from the east for domestic consumption or sent over the railroad for points beyond its rails. Including domestic manufactures, the absolute amount and relative proportion of this high class freight steadily increased from 1857 to

⁹⁵Eighth and Ninth Censuses (1860, 1870), volumes on Manufactures.

⁹⁶Eighth Census (1860), volumes on Manufactures and Agriculture.

1870. In the former year it formed 14.5% of the total traffic and 21.1% in 1870.⁹⁷ During this time the absolute tonnage increased from 64,298 tons to 283,756 tons, or 342%.⁹⁸ As most of the freight classed as merchandise or sundry was carried at rates higher than the average and for longer distances, the gross receipts in 1870 must have amounted to nearly a quarter of the total earnings of the road, while the net results from this traffic, presumably, were even more satisfactory. However, it is uncertain just what items are included in sundries, and, for that reason, the above proportion may be too large. Furthermore, much of the merchandise was carried at through rates which were very much lower than the local charges. This, again, may be a cause of error. At any rate, the tonnage and gross earnings of the two items make them second only to agriculture in importance.

The traffic of the railroad, viewed as a unit, increased quite as rapidly as did the special lines mentioned above. In 1855 the central part of the state was thinly settled, there was not a large amount of surplus product to be shipped, nor were the settlers able to purchase any considerable quantity of merchandise, lumber, salt, or other necessities or luxuries. But as the railroad became better established, the number of people in the tributary territory larger, and their purchasing power greater, there was a rapid development of the traffic of the road. In the sixteen years from 1855 to 1870 the number of tons of freight handled by the road as a whole, including the leased lines, grew nearly six fold and the number of ton miles nearly nine fold.⁹⁹ On the charter lines alone over five times as much tonnage was handled in 1870 as in 1855.¹⁰⁰ As the average rates remained about constant during the period gross earnings increased in about the same proportion as the number of ton miles.¹⁰¹ By 1870 the traffic on the Illinois lines was about all that the company was able to handle with its equipment and the

⁹⁷*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.*

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

poor operating methods then in use, and this condition had existed since the commencement of the war.¹⁰²

The great bulk of the freight handled by the railroad was classed as local, that is, it both originated and terminated at the company's stations. In 1868 over ninety six per cent was local, and only four per cent through. In no year was the proportion of the latter to total traffic more than fifteen per cent, and usually it was less than ten.¹⁰³ Moreover, the local traffic increased more rapidly than the through traffic, despite the efforts of the company to increase its interchange business and to develop through connections. As the railroad reached the important distributing and receiving centers of the state over its own rails, through busi-

¹⁰²*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870; see following table:

XII.

INCREASE IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC; SYSTEM.

	TONS OF FREIGHT		NUMBER OF TON MILES		AVERAGE HAUL, MILES
1855	241,704				
1859	422,433		51,650,364		122
1870	1,623,944		265,409,371		163.43
INCREASE	1,401,511	333%	213,759,007	413%	41.43 34.8%

¹⁰³*Ibid.*; see following table:

XIII.

CHARTER LINES.

PROPORTION OF GRAIN, LIVE STOCK, LUMBER, COAL AND MERCHANDISE TONNAGE TO WHOLE TRAFFIC, 1850 TO 1870.

	GRAIN PERCENT	LIVE STOCK PERCENT	LUMBER PERCENT	COAL PERCENT	MERCHANDISE PERCENT	TOTAL PERCENT
1857	29	6.8	24.2	13.4	14.6	100.0
1858	30.8	6.3	23.6	15.1	14.6	100.0
1859	23.7	4.5	19.4	17.1	16.2	100.0
1860	44.0	4.2	15.3	10.3	14.5	100.0
1861	53.2	4.5	11.4	6.8	10.0	100.0
1862	48.2	5.8	9.9	7.5	13.8	100.0
1863	41.5	6.9	11.9	7.2	19.0	100.0
1864	39.8	6.9	13.4	10.0	18.0	100.0
1865	38.8	4.8	17.3	10.0	18.0	100.0
1866	43.1	5.2	14.3	13.1	16.5	100.0
1867	40.9	5.1	7.9	11.3	18.2	100.0
1868	35.3	6.3	16.4	15.2	20.3	100.0
1869	29.3	6.1	15.7	16.8	21.9	100.0
1870	30.6	5.9	15.2	14.9	21.0	100.0

ness was necessarily confined to shipments of merchandise and small quantities of miscellaneous articles. After the lease of the Dubuque and Sioux City the company had only one valuable traffic connection over which freight was sent on through billing—the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute, which included the Belleville and Southern Illinois, which crossed the lines of the Illinois Central at Pana, Mattoon, and Du Quoin. By means of this system through trains were run from St. Louis to Chicago, via Mattoon, and to Cairo, via Du Quoin. The line from Chicago to St. Louis handled a large share of the freight between those two cities and on the whole was very important. At the same time, the tonnage routed over this connection was only a small fraction of the total traffic of the system.

While local freight, in the technical meaning of the word, was much more important than through business, local traffic, in the common usage, referring to freight handled between local stations, was unimportant. Grain, lumber, merchandise, and live stock, the leading articles forwarded or received, originated at or were destined to the three main termini of the road, Chicago, Dunleith or Dubuque, and Cairo. Shipments between local stations were confined to coal, certain kinds of merchandise, and a few miscellaneous goods. At the most, less than thirty per cent of all the traffic on the road was carried between local stations.

As indicated in the previous pages the bulk of the traffic was seasonal, that is, most of the shipments were made in a few months of the year. In the fall grain was shipped north to Chicago and during the remainder of the year this kind of traffic was not of great importance. The same condition existed in the handling of coal, live stock, and, to a less extent, lumber. Moreover, the preponderance of agricultural shipments over merchandise and lumber meant that the inbound tonnage at Chicago and Cairo greatly exceeded the outbound.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, except during the Civil War period, the bulk of the agricultural shipments were forwarded to Chicago, while the receipts at Cairo were slight.¹⁰⁵ However, the northbound and southbound traffic during the period from 1858 to 1870, inclusively, taken as a whole, was evenly balanced.¹⁰⁶

The large increase in traffic which commenced with 1860 was brought about by the general development of the country,

¹⁰⁴*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

and not by any marked reduction of rates. The tariffs on through freight were considerably lower in 1870, but, as stated above, local rates were higher during the latter year than when the railroad was put in operation.¹⁰⁷ However, the rates seem to have been as low as was necessary to move the traffic. Lower charges on certain articles such as coal and possibly lumber might have increased the tonnage turned over to the railroad, but it is almost certain that a reduction on the tariffs for grain and live stock would not have attracted a much larger traffic. As it was, the territory immediately adjacent to the Illinois Central increased its production of agricultural products at a much faster rate than the state as a whole and it is difficult to see how the country could have grown much faster than it did. In the few years immediately after the war, conditions were somewhat different, but the statements made above still hold good for that period.

Thus, it is safe to say that the Illinois Central Railroad, so far as freight traffic was concerned, fulfilled the object for which it was built. Compared with the results accomplished by other railroads in the central West, the achievements of the Illinois Central were as satisfactory as could reasonably have been demanded. The territory tributary to it made gigantic strides in agriculture, stock raising, mining, and manufacturing. The country was well settled and the population, as a whole, was prosperous and contented.¹⁰⁸

In the first few years in which the railroad was in operation the passenger business was of more importance than the transportation of freight. Before the war there was a large immigration into all parts of Illinois and a large proportion of these settlers used the Illinois Central railroad. Other reasons induced a large passenger traffic and during 1856 and 1857 there was a larger number of passengers carried on the railroad than in the years immediately following the war. The Civil War also had an important influence on travel over the railroad through the

¹⁰⁷Cf. Chap. vi.

¹⁰⁸These remarks do not apply to the years after 1868. After the war there were important changes in economic conditions in the central west. It became less and less profitable for the farmers to ship grain and the agriculture communities suffered severely. This dissatisfaction led to the Granger agitation of the early Seventies. However, these influences had just begun to affect central Illinois and the results were not sufficient to change the statement made in the text.

transportation of troops and the movement of persons to and from the armies south of Cairo. With the removal of the temporary stimuli to passenger traffic this part of the railroad's business became of less relative importance than in the period from 1855 to 1865.¹⁰⁹

The large traffic during the construction of the road and the Civil War was accompanied by extremely low rates. In order to induce settlers to come to Illinois and to develop the resources of the state the tariffs from 1856 to 1860 were very low. In 1857, the year of greatest travel, the average rate per passenger was only two cents a mile. Local tariffs were placed at four cents a mile, but most of the people using the road travelled for much less, and the charges for immigrant and excursion traffic were considerably below the average. During the war large numbers of troops were carried at approximately half rates and this made the charges appear lower than they really were. After 1865 conditions were normal and the local fare of four cents a mile seems to have been the universal charge.

The bulk of the passenger business, as of the freight, was local, but the proportion of through to local was much greater, as the number of passenger connections was larger than the number of freight connections. In 1860 fourteen railroads, besides those at Chicago, connected the Illinois Central with points east or west, and this number had increased to twenty ten years later. The most valuable of these connections were the eastern lines at Chicago: the Toledo, Peoria, and Western at El Paso and Gilman; the Toledo, Wabash, and Western at Decatur and Tolono; the St. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute and the Terre Haute and Indianapolis at Vandalia and Effingham; the Chicago and Northwestern at Freeport; the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy at Mendota; and the Ohio and Mississippi at Odin and Sandoval. Taking the through passenger business as a whole the Illinois Central received about as many persons from other lines as it turned over to them, and the business was quite profitable.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.* The number of persons received from and delivered to each of the connections of the railroad is given in the annual reports. The summarized totals are as follows:

	1860	1870
Received	66,127	95,046
Delivered	73,686	102,286

Although the Illinois Central Railroad was built to fit into economic conditions in the upper Mississippi valley in which the important lines of trade were north and south, not east and west, it adapted itself, in the years from 1856 to 1870, to an east and west movement of western produce. Had the original plans of its promoters been carried out to their full extent, the Illinois Central would, probably, have built up the territory dependent on it to an even greater extent than it did. At the same time the profits to its owners and promoters would have been greater. As it was, economic conditions in the central West and upper Mississippi valley were such that the peculiar location of the railroad did not interfere with its usefulness. The Illinois Central was more influential than some of the distinctly east and west roads, such as the Northwestern or Rock Island, in building up the commercial interests of Chicago. Thus, the traffic history of this railroad from 1856 to 1870 presents the curious instance of a road built to develop one line of commerce, in the particular case, trade along north and south lines, actually doing more than any other company to build up trade on a competitive route.

Much of this success was due to an unusually fortunate combination of circumstances. The favorable location of the railroad, making it tributary both to the Great Lakes and to the Mississippi River; the phenomenal industrial development of the United States and of England, together with a considerable increase in the price of farm products; the exploitation of a rich and virgin agricultural territory at a time when the revolution in farming practice of the middle of the 19th century tremendously stimulated grain production; and the absence of all competition—in fact, practically every railroad touching the Illinois Central Railroad was tributary to it—all of these factors combined to make the period from 1861 to 1870 the most prosperous one in the history of the railroad.

However, most of these favorable influences were temporary in their effect. The agricultural resources of Illinois were limited and after 1870 most of the causes which had worked for the prosperity of the road before that time were to work for its impoverishment for several years afterward. The most important single influence, and one which was becoming influential even before 1870, was the extension of the trunk lines, i.e. Wabash, Pennsylvania, New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio, and Erie railroads, with their connections, directly into the territory of the Illinois Central Railroad. With these extensions

there followed a period of radical rate reductions which made it possible for these roads to divert grain from central Illinois directly east over their own rails, thus eliminating Chicago as a terminal for this territory and giving the Illinois Central Railroad only a short haul to junction points. While these events belong to the period after 1870 their influence commenced soon after the Civil War and made clear to careful observers even then the temporary nature of the railroad's prosperity during this period.

On the whole, however, notwithstanding these accidental influences, the period from 1857 to 1870 was one of solid traffic development. Central Illinois was settled; a prosperous agricultural population was made tributary to the railroad; numerous towns and cities were established; industries in these places and at Chicago were well under way; a number of coal mines had been opened and the coal introduced both for domestic and industrial purposes. These results constituted the outward achievements of the company. Supplementing them was the internal development of the railroad in the way of traffic organization and connections, the establishment of policies, and the perfection of the machinery of operation and management. Most important of all was the fact that the Illinois Central Railroad had built itself firmly into the very center of the economic organization of Illinois. Other systems might be stronger or larger, but no system has ever been able to supplant the "Central" in its hold on the industries of the state. What the Pennsylvania Railroad is to Pennsylvania, the New Haven to southern New England, and the Southern Pacific to California, that, though perhaps to a slightly less extent, the Illinois Central Railroad is to Illinois. Whatever else was won or lost during the period to 1870, the fact remains that during this time solid foundations were laid for the industries of central Illinois as well as for the traffic of the company. These results, moreover, were secured by a service more valuable than that rendered by any other railroad of the period. Thus, in 1870, the Illinois Central Railroad was established as the keystone in the economic organization of Illinois; for that purpose it was planned; for that purpose it was constructed; and the years from 1857 to 1870 were the years during which that purpose was fulfilled.

CHAPTER VI.

FINANCES OF CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION, 1851 TO 1870.

As already indicated, financial difficulties connected with building a railroad through the center of Illinois prevented its construction before 1850. Three successive private companies and the state itself failed to secure the financial support necessary to complete the enterprise and it must have been with many misgivings that Robert Schuyler and his associates assumed responsibility for this previously illfated project.

Before 1851, the fiscal operations connected with the road were neglected. As far as can be found from the records of the Cairo City and Canal Company and of the state of Illinois, no definite estimates of cost of construction were ever made. In the Internal Improvement Act of 1837 a gross appropriation of \$3,500,000, only \$10,000 per mile, was made, and the Cairo companies evidently regarded this sum as sufficient.¹ Thus, one of the first duties of the promoters of the new company was to secure an approximate statement of the cost of the railroad. To make a regular survey was too expensive, and, as a substitute, Mr. Rantoul, late in 1850, through certain friends in the East, secured the cost of the Alton and Sangamon and seven leading eastern railroads. Upon these figures he prepared a preliminary estimate, which became the basis of the fiscal program of the memorialists. According to this statement, the total cost would vary from \$14,950,000 (\$23,000 per mile) to \$32,078,843 (\$41,681.81 per mile), depending upon length of line and character of construction.²

In financing the enterprise the promoters had three methods open to them. The one most common at that time, especially in the East and South, was to sell sufficient stock to provide for

¹*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1836-1837, p. 121; cf. Chap. II; also records of the various Cairo companies in the office of the Cairo Title and Trust Company, Cairo, Ill.

²*Illinois State Journal* (Springfield), February 12, 1851. The estimate was forwarded to Representative U. F. Lender.

most of the expenditures, this being supplemented, if necessary, by the issue of mortgage or income bonds. The second and less conservative method, nevertheless rapidly growing in favor, was to build the railroad by selling mortgage bonds, usually at a heavy sacrifice, and distribute the stock as a bonus to the promoters.³ With the Illinois Central there was a third possibility. The company had a federal land grant of from two and a half to three million acres of farming land and this allowed the company to pursue a policy entirely different from what would otherwise have been possible.

To the eastern capitalists the land grant was considered the most valuable part of the undertaking, and a few years later Mr. Richard Cobden expressed the opinion of these men very clearly when he said "It is not as a railroad investment that I regard so favorably this undertaking, but its value in my eyes depends on the landed estate. . . ."⁴ However, the value of even three million acres of rich prairie land, hundreds of miles from good transportation, was not great. Between every section of railroad land the federal government held another section, equally fertile, which it was willing to sell as low as two dollars and a half an acre. Six miles back from the tracks lay a vast, practically unoccupied stretch of government land, the maximum price for which was a dollar and a quarter an acre. At immediate sale, this enormous domain belonging to the "Central" would not yield over eight or ten millions of dollars, less than half the total cost of the railroad, and to supply the remaining millions themselves was not an inviting prospect to the promoters. To avoid this difficulty the directors adopted a plan by which the grant could be held until a large return would be received and yet the land remain the basis of all fiscal operations.

This policy was worked out in detail in the report made by President Schuyler to the board on April 23rd, 1851, the main features of which are as follows. The land grant was to be the basis of all financial operations, but to secure money for immediate expenditures, mortgage bonds would be issued. (1) All the railroad track, right of way, stations, etc., and two million acres of land, were to be mortgaged to the extent of \$21,400,000, which was then considered the approximate cost of

³Cf. Thompson, *Cost and Capitalization of American Railroads*.

⁴Mss. letter from Richard Cobden to Sir Joshua Walmsley, written from Midhurst, England, September 18, 1857. Original in office of the President, Illinois Central Railroad.

construction.⁵ These two million acres would be held for ten or fifteen years, and then sold at such prices that the cash realized would equal the total amount of bonds issued. The entire issue would be retired not later than the year 1875. (2) Two hundred and fifty thousand acres were set apart as a guarantee of interest on the mortgage bonds and could be sold at the discretion of the directors. (3) The remainder of the land amounting to something between one quarter and three quarters of a million acres, according to the exact route selected, was to be free land, that is available for any contingency. (4) The stock, equal in amount to the cash expenditures, was to be distributed as a bonus to purchasers of bonds, promoters, directors, or sold to outside parties, a moderate payment of \$5 to \$10 per share being made to meet incidental and extraordinary expenses.⁶

Thus, in return for an investment of a million or two dollars, the stockholders were to receive, free of debt by 1875, a first class trunk line, seven hundred miles in length, and five or six hundred thousand acres of rich Illinois prairie land, worth altogether eighteen to twenty million dollars. It was a business-like proposition to secure to the promoters of the Illinois Central the greatest profits ever realized to that time by a group of American capitalists. Had it not been for a serious underestimation of the cost of construction by Colonel Mason; the panic of 1857; and the Civil War—events entirely unforeseen in 1851—these prospects would undoubtedly have been realized.

President Schuyler's plan of April 23rd was based on Rantoul's statement, and definite action was necessarily deferred until Colonel Mason submitted his preliminary estimate in September, 1851. According to his report, the railroad would be 699 miles in length and for that distance the cost of roadway, buildings, equipment, and incidentals was placed at \$16,537,212, or \$23,600 per mile, as against \$21,400,000 allowed by Rantoul.⁷

⁵The lands were divided as follows:—

400,000	acres	inferior	agricultural	land	at	\$	6	acre	\$	2,400,000
1,200,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	10	"	"	12,000,000
300,000	"	superior	"	"	"	"	15	"	"	4,500,000
100,000	"	especially	valuable	"	"	"	25	"	"	2,500,000

TOTAL

\$21,400,000

⁶Letter of Robert Schuyler to Board of Directors, April 23, 1851, in *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad*; cf. mortgage of September 13, 1851, in same pamphlet.

⁷Report of President Schuyler to Board of Directors, September 12, 1851.

The schedules were prepared with great care and represented a reliable estimate of the cost according to prices current in the summer of 1851. At the same time, either through errors in the surveys, wrong estimates of bridge work, grading, and buildings, or else through a desire to present to the outside world as favorable a showing as possible, the report greatly underestimated the cost of construction. The seriousness of this error is shown by a difference of \$10,030,805.61 between the estimate of September, 1851, and the actual cost to December 31st, 1857.⁸ For an engineer of Mason's standing this difference of 60.5% was inexcusable, and many subsequent financial difficulties were caused by this mistake.

With the estimated cost of construction decreased from \$21,400,000 to \$16,500,000, the directors deemed it wise to decrease the amount of money to be borrowed to \$17,000,000. Accordingly, on September 13, 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad Company mortgaged its right of way, track, buildings, and two million acres of land, but not the rolling stock or remaining five hundred thousand acres of land, as security for \$13,000,000 seven per cent, and \$4,000,000 six per cent, coupon bonds, due in 1875, with interest payable semi-annually in gold. The main features of the mortgage were the same as outlined in the president's report of April 23, 1851, with the exception of the size of the mortgage.⁹ Three trustees were appointed to handle matters relating to the mortgage. Two of these were appointed by the Governor of Illinois and the third by the company.¹⁰

In the charter the amount of capital stock was fixed at one million dollars and could be "increased . . . to any sum not exceeding the entire amount expended on account of said road."¹¹

No restriction, other than the above, was placed on the issuing of stock, and the directors had entire power to fix the terms of sale. Accordingly, in line with the letter, and perhaps with the spirit, of the charter, the directors determined to keep the stock at an amount equal to the total cost of the railroad, irre-

Construction expenditures to December 31, 1857,	\$26,568,017.61
Estimate of September 12, 1851,	16,537,212.00

DIFFERENCE

\$10,030,805.61

⁹Mortgage of September 13, 1851. *Documents Relating to the Organization of the Illinois Central Railroad.*

¹⁰John C. Moore and Samuel C. Lockwood were appointed by Governor French, and Morris Ketchum represented the railroad.

¹¹Act of February 10, 1851 (Illinois Central Charter), sec. 4.

spective of the cash paid in by the shareholders. Originally this amount was fixed at \$17,000,000, but later was increased to \$25,500,000.¹² Under the president's plan, the bonds, and ultimately the land grant, were intended to provide funds for construction, and the stock was to be assessed only a nominal amount, say \$10 to \$20 per share.¹³

The charter provided that \$200,000 should be deposited with the state treasurer as a guarantee of good faith and that \$20 per share should be paid on the first one million of stock. Immediately after the company was organized one million dollars was subscribed by the incorporators and \$50,000, or \$5 per share, paid in to provide for the various expenses of organization.¹⁴ Shortly afterwards this first assessment was increased to \$20 per share and another million dollars subscribed. A payment of \$10 per share was asked on the second issue. This gave a total of \$300,000 received from the first two issues of stock (\$200,000 from the first issue and \$100,000 from the second). As a guarantee that the road would be built two hundred thousand dollars was deposited with the banking firm of Ketchum, Rogers, and Bement and with Mr. John Griswold, of New York, subject to the order of the state of Illinois.¹⁵

The receipts from the sale of the first two million of stock paid the expenses of organization, but by winter it became necessary to secure adequate funds for construction, and, in accordance with President Schuyler's plan, mortgage bonds were issued. In 1851, after several years of depression, the country entered upon a period of great financial prosperity during which there was a heavy demand in the United States and Europe for good investment securities and the directors of the Illinois Central were able to take immediate advantage of the favorable financial situation.

¹²*Chicago Daily Democrat*, August 17, 1853; also *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855, 1870.

¹³Report of President Schuyler, September 12, April 23, 1851.

¹⁴*Chicago Daily Democrat*, August 17, 1853.

¹⁵At this time Mr. Moore was severely criticized for depositing the money with men connected with the Illinois Central, but there is no ground for believing that he was influenced by other than business motives. Messrs. Griswold, Ketchum, Rogers, and Bement paid the state interest at five per cent and gave as security additional certificates of deposit more than covering the money borrowed. See letter of John Moore, dated Springfield, January 24, 1852, quoted in *Chicago Daily Democrat*, February 6, 1852.

According to newspaper reports, one banking firm had already agreed to take the entire \$17,000,000 at par or over, when a slight stock market flurry occurred, preventing completion of the arrangements.¹⁶ Probably the real reason was that investors hesitated to advance such a large amount before a shovelful of earth had been removed.¹⁷ This made it necessary to reduce the issue to four or five millions, and numerous offers were made for the smaller amount, including, it is said, a very flattering proposition from the Rothschilds.¹⁸ The success of the smaller loan was immediate. By December, 1851, bankers in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia had promised to take \$4,000,000 seven per cent bonds at par, and in February, 1852, the negotiations were completed.¹⁹ The sale at once placed the credit of the Illinois Central on a sound basis, and showed that it could borrow money on as good terms as well established roads like the Hudson River and the New York and New Haven railroads. It also enabled the company to pay cash for all construction work.²⁰ The success of the undertaking was thus assured.

Even before the mortgage had been signed, plans were made to place part of the loan in Great Britain, and in August, 1851, ex-secretary of the treasury Robert J. Walker and vice-president David A. Neal were appointed as agents to visit Europe. They reached London in November and before selling any bonds they spent several months disseminating information in regard to the "Central"; consulting bankers, brokers, and investors; and making arrangements with manufacturers of railroad materials.²¹ The results were entirely satisfactory. Before the formal announcement on June 12th, 1852, a large number of investors and manufacturers had promised to take bonds, and within a few weeks after the bids were asked for, the entire amount was disposed of at a small premium.²² The strength of the company's credit was illustrated in a striking way when a number of large rail makers took bonds rather than cash in payment of materials purchased. It was also emphasized by the fact that the whole

¹⁶*Chicago Daily Democrat*, November 5, 1851.

¹⁷See editorials in *American Railway Journal*, December, 1851. Mr. Poor was editor of the *Journal* and my conclusions are based very largely on his editorials.

¹⁸*Chicago Daily Democrat*, November 5, December 15, 1851.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, February 16, 1852.

²⁰*Ibid.*, February 15, 1852.

²¹*Ibid.*, September 8, 1851.

²²*Railway Times* (editorial), June 12, 1852; *ibid.*, advertisement.

loan of £1,000,000 sterling, or five millions of dollars, although most of it²³ was bearing only six per cent interest—one per cent less than the New York issue—was over subscribed at a small premium.²⁴ However, the British purchasers were allowed to subscribe to five shares of stock for every \$1000 bond and as Illinois stock, subject to possible assessments of \$80 per share, was selling at or near par, many investors bought high grade bonds to secure such valuable stock.²⁵ Thus, by August 1st, 1852, \$9,000,000 of six and seven per cent bonds had been sold at par.²⁶ On the other hand, the shareholders had contributed only \$300,000.

From June, 1852, to June, 1853, there was a small increase in the amount of stocks and bonds outstanding. No new bond issues were sold, but a number of contractors and manufacturers agreed to take bonds instead of cash in settlement of contracts. Likewise, subscriptions from contractors and manufacturers, stock subscriptions by purchasers of six per cent bonds, and purchases by investors generally increased the amount of stock outstanding.²⁷ Furthermore, on June 15th, 1853, seven per cent bonds to the amount of three million dollars were disposed of at par, although it is probable that nearly all of this loan had been unofficially promised several months prior to that time.²⁸ Thus, by August 1st, 1853, 109,293 shares of stock had been subscribed. Payments from \$5 to \$20 per share were made, and the total amount received was \$746,465, while \$13,086,000 of bonds had been sold or contracted for, of which \$6,195,117.66 had been paid.²⁹ All of the bonds had been disposed of, at or above par, and, including differences in exchange and discount, there was a premium of \$84,014.27. Miscellaneous accounts, principally bills payable, brought the total cash receipts to \$7,840,525.68. Construction and general office expenses, interest charges, and the cost of organization took \$6,558,216.45, leaving a nominal bal-

²³Of the \$5,000,000, \$1,000,000 bore seven per cent interest, and the remainder, \$4,000,000, bore six per cent.

²⁴*American Railway Journal*, May 14, 1853; also official statement of *Daily Democrat*, August 17, 1853.

²⁵*Railway Times*, June 12, 1852; also miscellaneous editorials, advertisements and notices during July, 1852.

²⁶Statement of the treasurer, *Chicago Daily Democrat*, August 17, 1853.

²⁷*Ibid.*; also *Railway Times*, June 12, 1852.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*

ance of \$1,382,309.23. After deducting current liabilities, however, this was reduced to \$370,232.45.³⁰

This is a favorable report, and had the financial situation remained the same in 1854 as in 1852 and 1853 there would have been no danger from the small cash balance. However, these years had been times of tremendous expansion in all lines of business and the demand for new capital was so great that it was soon impossible to borrow on anything like reasonable terms. When ten per cent bonds of reputable companies such as the Ohio and Mississippi were selling at sixty or seventy, it was out of the question to dispose of six and seven per cent Illinois Central bonds at par. The money market was also affected by the outbreak of the Crimean war which created large additional demands for money, especially in England and prevented free investment in industrial and railroad securities. By the middle of October, 1853, the six per cent bonds, which only a few months before had been eagerly sought for at a premium, were selling for 95,³¹ and by the last of April a further drop of fifteen points had taken place.³² This rapid decline was accentuated by the actions of President Schuyler. He was president of the New York and New Haven Railroad, as well as of the Illinois Central, and in the name of the former company he had fraudulently issued a million of stock, selling the same for the personal profit of himself and friends. The leading railroad magnate of his time and a prominent stock exchange broker, his defalcation had a disastrous influence on the stock market. A Wall Street panic commenced on the 24th of July, the day his embezzlement became known, and securities dropped rapidly in price.³³ The effect on the Illinois Central was especially damaging. Robert Schuyler, its president, was a fugitive in Canada and Gouverneur Morris, one of the leading directors, was a bankrupt. The stock declined over forty points in a few days and seven per cent bonds became a drug on the market at 63.³⁴ With its treasury depleted and payments on

³⁰Statement of the treasurer, I. C. R. R., *Chicago Daily Democrat*, August 17, 1853.

³¹*Railway Times*, October 24, 1853.

³²*Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1854; seven per cent bonds sold at 81½ to 81¾; *ibid.*, July 22, November 24, 1854.

³³*Railway Times*, November 14, 1854; editorial references in each number July 24 to November 11, 1854; cf. New York and Chicago newspapers of the same dates.

³⁴*Ibid.*

millions of dollars worth of construction work due within the year, the situation was critical.

Fortunately at this time Mr. W. H. Osborn, who, more than any other person connected with the road, had helped to place its finances on the substantial basis of today, assumed complete control of the financial affairs of the company. From August 1st, 1853, to December 31st, 1857, not quite four and a half years, a total of \$23,339,722.76 was expended on construction work and interest payments. After deducting bills and accounts payable, the company, at the commencement of this period, had only \$370,232.45 in cash, leaving some twenty-three million dollars to be raised within this short period. Against these expenditures, the company had potential assets to the extent of eight millions in the form of unpaid installments on bonds already subscribed. However, a large proportion had been taken by contractors or manufacturers in payment of work or supplies, and when the bonds dropped below par they refused to accept anything but cash in settlement of their contracts. Thus, less than six million dollars was actually received in cash from these unpaid installments.³⁵ At the same time rapid increases in the price of raw material and the wages of laborers forced the contractors to demand a larger compensation for work already commenced. These demands the company was bound to respect, in order to prevent a complete demoralization of the work through contractors giving up their contracts.³⁶ Under the circumstances the directors were forced to sell construction bonds at a discount. The charter prohibited this, but by the act of February 27, 1854, this restriction was removed.³⁷ As early as February, 1854, the company sold bonds at a small discount, and in spite of the low quotations for Illinois Central securities further issues were sold at current market rates, sometimes as low as only \$600 per bond.³⁸ Thus, by the 31st of December, 1857, the management had disposed of approximately four and a half millions of seven per cent bonds at 65, as against par for six per cent issues sold in 1852 and 1853.³⁹ Including instalments on loans made prior to 1854, i.e. the four and five million loans of 1852 and the three million loan of 1853, the company realized \$9,192,784.38 in cash from con-

³⁵*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.

³⁶*Railway Times*, May 5, 1855 (Satterthwaite's Report).

³⁷*Session Laws of Illinois*, 1853-1854, February 27, 1854, secs. 2, 3.

³⁸*Railway Times*, May 5, 1855.

³⁹*Ibid.*

struction bonds from August 1st, 1853, to December 31st, 1857.⁴⁰ For the four and a half million sold in this period the company received only \$2,900,000, or \$650 per bond.

By selling these four and a half million dollars of bonds at 65 instead of par, the company decreased its receipts by approximately sixteen hundred thousand dollars, while, from various causes, cost of construction was increased by several millions. To meet this deficit in receipts the management resorted to the three hundred thousand acres of free land reserved by the mortgage of 1851, and in 1855 an additional mortgage, covering \$3,000,000 seven per cent Free Land bonds of 1860, was placed on the railroad and on the free lands.⁴¹ The change that had come over the financial position of the Illinois Central is strikingly illustrated by the results of this loan. Only \$2,079,876.61, or \$694 per bond, were received. Including the discount, this was equivalent to about fifteen per cent for the five years the bonds ran, as against slightly under six per cent for the London loan of 1852.⁴²

Even the Free Land Loan of 1853 was not sufficient to meet construction expenditures and finally, in 1856, the company resorted to what was virtually a debenture note. In that year there was issued \$900,000 of eight per cent optional right bonds, payable at any time after 1858.⁴³ To make the notes more inviting to investors, holders of these securities were given an option on stock equal to the face value of the bonds.⁴⁴ This issue was disposed of at a higher average price than the Free Land bonds, as it realized \$945 per bond, equivalent, including discount, to about eleven per cent interest.⁴⁵ However, borrowing money on short time notes at eleven per cent to finance a partially constructed railway was a dangerous as well as expensive piece of financiering.

These loans did not provide the necessary capital, and to tide the company over the period of construction floating obligations in the form of bills and accounts payable were allowed

⁴⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, August 1, 1853, 1855-1857.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 1855, 1856.

⁴²*Ibid.* The interest on the money actually received (\$694 per bond at 7%) was 10.1%. In addition, the company had to pay \$1000 per bond in 1860, although it received only \$694. As the company had the use of the money for between five and six years this was equivalent to about five per cent more, making a total of fifteen per cent.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 1856.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

to accumulate—a makeshift which eventually inflicted great mortification as well as financial loss upon the company. Accordingly, miscellaneous obligations were increased from \$812,076.78, on August 1st, 1853, to \$3,700,551 on October 20th, 1857. Against this liability the company carried in New York less than a hundred thousand dollars in cash or cash assets.⁴⁶

While pursuing these expensive, though perhaps necessary, expedients of selling bonds and notes at a heavy discount, the company continued its weak policy in regard to assessments on the capital stock. Prior to 1854, calls for only a nominal amount had been made upon the stockholders, and, on August 1, 1853, only \$746.465 had been paid, an average of \$6.80 per share.⁴⁷ In 1854 two assessments of \$10 and \$5 respectively were made⁴⁸ and this was followed the next year by two small calls of \$5 per share on the entire capital.⁴⁹ \$1,000,000 of new stock was also sold at \$25 per share. In the middle of 1857 another call of \$10 was made, but only partial payments were made during the summer.⁵⁰ By December 31, 1855, there had been received in cash \$2,571,050, or an average of \$19.93 on the \$12,925,600 outstanding. The next year this was increased to \$3,558,615,⁵¹ or \$25.20 per share on \$14,034,700.

Two additional sources were utilized during the period from 1853 to 1857, viz. net receipts from operation and sales of interest and free lands. Early in 1853 short portions of the road were put in operation, and the net receipts began to constitute an appreciable amount. From 1853 to 1855, inclusive, \$1,281,305.02 was received in this way.⁵² In 1856 cash sales of free and interest lands were important, the combined receipts to 1857 being as follows:

Net receipts from Operation.....	\$2,134,403.78
Net receipts Free & Interest Lds.....	1,148,049.22
<hr/>	
Total net receipts.....	\$3,282,453.00
Interest to Dec. 31, 1857.....	5,897,644.18
<hr/>	
Net deficit.....	\$2,615,191.18 ⁵³

⁴⁶Statement of the treasurer, August 1, 1853; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, June 19, 1858.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸Viz. \$10 on 90,000 shares; \$5 on 129,346 shares; making a total of \$20 per share.

⁴⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1857.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 1855, 1856.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 1855.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 1855, 1857.

Thus the net receipts from operation and land sales failed to meet the interest payments in this period by two million six hundred thousand dollars and the deficit had to be made good by assessments on the stock and by sale of bonds. In fact it was not until the year 1861 that receipts from free lands and the operation of the railroad paid all interest charges.⁵⁴

The various issues of short term notes and the accumulation of unpaid bills meant that from 1853 to 1857 the directors were forced into a hand-to-mouth financial policy, offset to only a partial degree by subscriptions to stock or sale of long time bonds. The result of this policy is shown by the condition of the treasury in 1857. Over three million dollars of bills and accounts payable were still outstanding, while the amount of cash actually on hand in New York did not exceed a few thousand dollars. The company had a large amount of bills and accounts receivable, time loans and other slow assets, and uncollected instalments on stock, but these assets were not available in case of a sudden market stringency.⁵⁵ Steps had been taken to remove these difficulties, but before they could be carried out there occurred the panic of 1857. The directors of the Illinois Central were unprepared for such a catastrophe; Mr. Osborn was in Europe at the time. Notes were presented for payment; the funds in the treasury at New York were very low, and though the company had eleven hundred thousand dollars to its credit in England and over a hundred thousand more in Chicago, it was impossible to draw bills of exchange at any reasonable discount. For the first and only time in its history the company was forced to suspend payment; the creditors, under stress of general financial failure, became urgent for their money; and, in the absence of the President, the Secretary made a temporary assignment of the property in order to prevent seizure of valuable assets by creditors.⁵⁶

On his return to this country, Mr. Osborn commenced energetic measures to restore the property to the stockholders. Funds were rushed from England; arrangements were made with creditors for extension of notes; and the directors used their personal credit to put the company on its feet. Mr. Osborn, himself, en-

⁵⁴*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1861.

⁵⁵*American Railway Journal*, quoted in *Railway Times*, November 7, 1857; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, June 19, 1858.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

dorsed notes to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars.⁵⁷ Unpaid assessments were immediately collected; a call, payable September 25th, of \$10 per share, was made; and a further assessment of \$10 ordered early in 1858.⁵⁸ In the emergency, the stockholders supported the company loyally, and made prompt payment of the additional calls, often at great personal inconvenience. The crisis showed the danger of large balances of unpaid bills and to eliminate this evil the directors issued sufficient short term notes to pay off all such bills. Previously, they had found that the optional right bonds had been very successful, and the \$900,000 outstanding was now increased to \$3,200,000. Optional rights on 83,000 shares of stock were to expire between the first of June and the first of July and this formed the basis of the loan. The bonds were convertible into stock prior to February 20th, 1860, on the basis of twenty five shares of stock with \$40 paid in, for each \$1000 bond, and were to be redeemed on or before the 20th of February, 1868.⁵⁹ Although the interest rate was only seven per cent, the convertible feature was so attractive that something like \$2,558,000 were subscribed by the 1st of May, 1858.⁶⁰

These energetic measures accomplished their object, and by the close of the year 1858 the company was again on a sound financial basis. All the floating debt was either paid or otherwise provided for and the assignment was removed. During the fifteen months from October, 1857, to December 31st, 1858, between seven and eight million dollars were paid into the treasury of the company in cash or in various Illinois Central bonds in payment of stock, allowing the directors to retire the entire floating debt, with the exception of \$396,167.53, and to pay all construction and interest charges in full.⁶¹ Thus, through the efforts of Mr. Osborn and his associates, the company passed through the assignment with an untarnished record, and, in 1858, its credit was higher than it had been for six years. Though somewhat expen-

⁵⁷A number of the English investors accused Mr. Osborn of taking advantage of the company's condition to fill his own pockets, but this resulted from the strong feeling over increased stock assessments, and Mr. Osborn's long connection with the company, during which he was ably supported by these very same men, amply refutes this assertion. What compensation he received was by regular vote of the directors.

⁵⁸*Railway Times*, June 19, 1858; November 7, 1857; August 7, 1858; January 1, 1858.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, January 1, 1858; August 7, 1858.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, August 7, 1858.

⁶¹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1858.

sive, on account of the various financial expedients which had to be adopted, the crisis of 1857 taught the company a valuable lesson.

By 1859 all danger from the floating indebtedness had been removed but there still remained the Optional Right bonds of 1868 and the Free Land bonds of 1860. Under the mortgages these bonds could be retired in 1859 and 1860, and in those two years all notes and floating liabilities in excess of those included in strictly operating accounts, and the Free Land and Optional Right bonds, were cancelled, leaving the construction bond mortgage of 1875 as the only lien upon the property. Thus, at a late date, the company adopted a policy that should have been pursued from the commencement of the undertaking.

During the years 1857 and 1858 the shareholders had paid in an average of \$35 per share on stock which they supposed would cost them practically nothing, and judging from comments in the English press British investors in the Illinois Central were thoroughly indignant at the American directors. Meetings of shareholders were held, two special committees were sent to the United States, and the English stockholders and bondholders formed a permanent organization to supervise the affairs of the corporation.⁶² The continued assessments, stimulated by a strong bear movement on the exchange, forced down the price of both stocks and bonds and for a time many of the small shareholders were thoroughly frightened. The company was not yet in a position to ignore the stock market and accordingly, as a peace offering, the directors adopted two very important measures, both of considerable financial benefit to the shareholders.

The first of these was the Cancelled Bond Scrip Dividend. By 1856 the sales of land had been sufficient to cancel about \$600,-

⁶²Cf. *Railway Times*, November, 1857 to December, 1858.

The attitude of the more conservative investors is shown by the following letter written by Richard Cobden: "I do not change in the slightest degree my opinion in consequence of the fall in the Illinois.— That the stock will go up again to its former level I have no doubt. It is not as a railroad investment that I regard so favorably this undertaking, but its value in my eyes depends on the landed estate which is the noblest domain ever transferred in one conveyance. Nothing but an earthquake or some other convulsion of nature can impair the value of 2,600,000 acres of the richest soil in the world, situated in the midst of the most industrious & intelligent population.— The Wall Street 'bulls' and 'bears' will make no durable impression on such a property." Mss. letter to Sir Joshua Walmsley, Midhurst, September 18, 1857. Original in office of President, Illinois Central Railroad.

000 of the construction bonds and on July 12, 1858, as the result of strong pressure from the English shareholders, the management ordered that "whenever the amount of construction bonds cancelled in a year should amount to five per cent on the share capital of the company, certificates setting forth the amount so cancelled should be distributed pro rata among the shareholders and this scrip should be entitled to the same dividends as regular stock."⁶³ These dividends were continued until 1863, by which time the amount so distributed was \$1,772,270. After 1863 the profits from the land sales were divided among the shareholders in other ways.⁶⁴

The second was dated from May 27th, 1859, and entitled any stockholder who had paid up the full par value of his stock to receive four per cent interest per annum on the same until a regular cash dividend of at least four per cent had been declared. There had been previous interest dividends paid in cash, but they were sporadic, and this measure now offered an inducement to the shareholders to pay up their stock in full.⁶⁵

These measures had a very important influence on the stock account and encouraged the shareholders to pay up all unpaid calls and assessments. As a result the number of full paid shares increased from none in 1858 to 97,821 in 1863, and the cash received from all shares from \$3,558,615 in the spring of 1857 to \$15,654,980 in 1860 and \$17,543,700 in 1863.⁶⁶

During the three years ending December 31, 1860, expenditures for construction amounted to \$1,080,237.86 and the deficit in net earnings over interest charges to \$2,095,408.08, thus leaving \$5,622,899.06 to cancel bonds and miscellaneous obligations.⁶⁷ The Free Land bonds were paid off at maturity in 1860, and the optional right bonds were either redeemed by cash payments or converted into stock. This left the construction bonds of 1875 as the only funded debt. Moreover, receipts from land sales had reduced the amount outstanding in 1860 to approximately fifteen millions, as against a share capital of \$17,945,400, of which \$15,654,980 had been paid in cash.⁶⁸ This was a decided contrast to

⁶³Resolution of the Board of Directors, July 12, 1858, quoted in *Railway Times*, August 7, 1858.

⁶⁴*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 1855-1865; Resolution of Board of Directors, quoted in *Railway Times*, June 18, 1858.

⁶⁶*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1864.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 1858-1860.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, report of the Land Department, 1860.

conditions in 1853 when less than eight hundred thousand dollars had been paid by the shareholders.

The methods used to obtain money for construction purposes having been reviewed it is important to see where these millions of dollars went. To December 31st, 1857, when the railroad was in full operation, the expenditures for equipment and construction amounted to a total of \$23,436,668.32, or \$33.198 per mile, to which should be added interest during the period of construction. Including all proper construction charges, the total expenditures for permanent improvements chargeable to capital were as follows:—

Construction charges to December 31st, 1857	\$23,436,668.32
Interest charges to Dec. 31, 1856.....	\$4,874,279.59
Less net repts. from operation.....	1,742,930.30 3,131,349.29

TOTAL COST OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL.....\$26,568,017.61⁶⁹

While the aggregate cost is high there seems to be no reason to question the correctness of the accounts. In 1857 the Illinois Central Railroad was undoubtedly the best built road in the West; ample terminal and yard facilities existed; right of way and station grounds were more than sufficient for the existing business; bridges and culverts were usually of stone or iron and always substantial; grades were light, curves were of large radius, and tangents constituted about ninety per cent of the line; the equipment was up-to-date in every particular, ample in amount, and well built; on the whole roadbed and equipment were sufficient to provide for traffic several times that of 1857. There were occasional misappropriations of funds, poor contract work, and speculations, but there was not that organized corruption and mismanagement characteristic of many of the land grant roads. The company itself did most of the construction work and all contracts were satisfied in cash or bonds at par. Moreover, the officials of the company were able to secure supplies and labor at low prices. The average wages of employees did not exceed those paid in the eastern states; nearly all of the iron was pur-

⁶⁹*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1857.*

The interest charge is based on the following assumptions: (1) the road was not in completed condition until December 31, 1857; (2) interest, less net receipts from operation, should be allowed from the time individual sections were opened until the whole was in complete operation. These assumptions are not absolutely correct, but the above plan seems to be the best basis for determining interest during construction.

chased in England at very low prices; and the right of way, which to-day is worth a fabulous amount, was secured at a nominal cost. Three times the English shareholders sent a special committee to this country to audit the construction accounts of the Illinois Central; they were given complete access to all vouchers and original records; and in their published reports the three committees state emphatically that, so far as they could discover, the accounts were honestly kept, and no fraud or speculation of any extent was found.⁷⁰ Moreover, from a comparison of detailed expenditures of the Illinois Central with those of several other roads⁷¹ it appears that, in the majority of cases, the Illinois corporation paid lower unit prices for material than any of these companies. The amount of interest seems somewhat excessive, but this was made necessary by the size of the railroad, which prevented efficient operation of the road until the whole was completed in 1856. Therefore, it is safe to say that the \$26,568,017.61 given above is a reasonable and bona fide statement of the actual expenditures and is a proper charge to capital.⁷²

It is not possible to make so favorable a statement in regard to the wisdom with which part of this money was spent. Throughout the early history of the company the directors held rather exaggerated views of the traffic possibilities of the road. They also adhered to the English system of building a railroad in a thoroughly substantial manner. It goes without question that the heavy initial expenditures materially reduced operating expenses, but it is also true that a much lighter construction would have answered the needs of that period just as well, and the company would have been saved interest charges on expenditures, which were useless for many years. For instance wooden trestles would have answered as well as stone culverts; frame stations might have been used instead of brick; and similar inexpensive, but serviceable, equipment could have been used to advantage in many places.

⁷⁰Ackerman, *Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad*. Viz. *Railway Times*, November 27, 1858; *ibid.*, June 19, 1858; *Report of the Committee of Dutch and English Stockholders*, 1876.

⁷¹Viz. New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern; Mississippi Central; Mississippi & Tennessee; Ohio & Mississippi; Michigan Central.

⁷²With different methods of accounting used in the fifties it is impossible to obtain an absolutely accurate statement of expenditure at that time. However, the figures may be regarded as absolutely correct for the first two places. The smaller amounts are retained to conform to the figures of the company.

The period from 1850 to 1857 was a time of construction; the years from 1857 to 1870 were years of enormous traffic development which necessitated large additions to capital. Gross earnings rose from \$2,300,000 in 1857 to \$8,700,000 in 1870, or an increase of 266%, while the number of tons of freight moved one mile increased from fifty million to two hundred and sixty five million, or 430%.⁷³ At any period of railroad history, such an enormous development would have demanded heavy capital expenditures, but with the poor operating methods then in vogue the amount of equipment had to increase in almost direct proportion to the growth of tonnage. The greater number and weight of trains also necessitated many improvements of the property. In the thirteen years ending December 31st, 1870, the charges to capital amounted to \$7,084,421.10, bringing the total cost in 1870 to \$33,653,339.71, or \$47.710 per mile. This amount was distributed as follows:—

Construction	\$4,317,169.05
Equipment	2,767,252.05
TOTAL	\$7,084,421.10⁷⁴

In addition to the money expended on the Illinois Central proper, a few thousand dollars were applied to capital account on the Iowa leased lines, but this is not included in the total.⁷⁵

⁷³*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870*; the last three years include earnings of 200 to 402 miles in Iowa, amounting to between a million and a million and a half a year.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵*Ibid.* The expenditures for Permanent Improvements were distributed as follows:

Bridging	\$ 496,016.59
Ballasting	401,865.55
Sidings	495,624.06
Lake shore Protection	292,416.23
Real estate	163,115.91
Rails	49,223.60
Ties
Fencing	74,815.79
Telegraph	36,674.16
Engineering	40,953.92
Gen'l Expense	420,360.65
Buildings	951,108.45
Masonry	119,172.83
Roadway	261,237.54
Miscellaneous
	\$4,317,169.05

Statements have been made that in the Civil War period and the years immediately thereafter the permanent improvement account of the Illinois Central was unduly increased at the expense of operating charges.⁷⁶ There is just enough truth in the statement to make necessary a somewhat thorough explanation. Prior to about 1872 or 1873 maintenance expenditures were very high even when compared with present expenses on the system,⁷⁷ and it is improbable that with such liberal appropriations the property would run down. The company also had a very good system of accounting and the accounts were as accurately distributed as on any railroad of the time. The following statement of the Board of Directors approved by them on February 6th, 1874, shows the attitude of the company towards this matter:—

“It should be noted that upon the plan of making up the construction account followed by most railways, our charge to construction expenditures would be considerably increased, owing to the fact that, during the last ten years, extensive improvements and additions have been made to your property, which might have been charged to capital account, but have been included in working expenses.”⁷⁸ Moreover, with the exception of the years 1865 and 1866, the net receipts from operation greatly exceeded the fixed charges and dividends, and consequently, there was no motive to increase the capital account at the expense of operating charges.⁷⁹ Thus, it seems entirely reasonable to accept

Locomotives	\$1,071,944.08	
Freight cars	1,389,385.64	
Coal cars	10,985.22	
Passenger cars	140,151.49	
Shop machinery, etc.	141,963.31	2,767,252.05
<hr/>		
TOTAL		\$7,084,421.10

⁷⁶In the report of the English and Dutch Committee of 1876 it was claimed that up to that time many items, properly chargeable to operation, were included in capital accounts.

⁷⁷For instance, in 1867, the year the Iowa lines were taken over, but before the lease had affected conditions in Illinois, the expenditures for maintenance were:—

Bridges, \$123; buildings, \$135; labor, \$1,672; total maintenance of way, \$2,080 per mile; repairs, locomotives, \$3,060 per locomotive; repairs, passenger cars, \$1,378 per passenger car; repairs, freight cars, \$87 per car; total maintenance of equipment, \$1,470 per mile. *Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1867.*

⁷⁸Quoted in *Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1874.*

⁷⁹*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870.*

the company's statement of permanent improvements for this period. As the greater proportion of the permanent improvements were paid for out of surplus receipts—in other words, at the expense of possible dividends—it may be taken for granted that reasonable economy was exercised. However, as explained at greater length on page 18, the Illinois Central diverted a part of the receipts of the Land Department from the purposes outlined in the mortgage of September 12th, 1851, and had this not been done there would have been a deficit in some of the years. In no year did the net earnings and "proper" receipts from the Land Department equal the interest and dividend payments. As a result the company virtually paid dividends out of capital. While this policy disregarded the spirit of the mortgage of 1851 and was not as conservative as might have been desired, it is unreasonable to accuse the company of a serious error in accounting.

In the period before 1857, practically all the expenditures for permanent improvements or construction, came from the sale of bonds; after 1857 net receipts from operation and sale of lands, and assessments on stock, paid the major portion of such charges. From 1861 to 1870, net receipts from sales of free and interest land and from operation exceeded dividends and fixed charges by \$2,381,203, however, the fixed charges and interest dividends from 1857 to 1860 exceeded the net earnings by \$1,809,613.13, leaving a net surplus for the thirteen years of only \$285,794.95.⁸⁰ The deficit of interest and dividend payments over net receipts from operation alone amounted to several million dollars.⁸¹

In President Schuyler's financial plan of 1851, the funded

⁸⁰*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1857-1870.

⁸¹From 1857 to 1870 there were received in cash from the shareholders \$12,880,265, to which should be added the net surplus of \$285,794.95, making a total of \$13,166,059.95. During this period various expenditures not chargeable to operation were as follows:—

Permanent Improvements	\$ 7,084,421.10
Redemption Free Land Bonds, Optional Right Scrip, current liabilities, etc. (approximately).....	6,500,000.00
<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$13,584,421.10
Received from stockholders and net surplus from operation	13,166,059.95
<hr/>	<hr/>
DIFFERENCE	\$ 418,361.15

This difference would be accounted for by the surplus in 1870, and miscellaneous investments during the period.

debt, then represented by the \$17,000,000 construction bonds of 1875, was a temporary expedient. Under the terms of the mortgage two million acres of land were set apart as security for the loan, and the instrument was so worded that on the completion of each sale, bonds, equal in value to the land disposed of, would be cancelled. Thus, through the operations of the Land Department, the entire loan was to be paid off not later than 1875. Various difficulties delayed the sale of the construction lands. Except in a few favored regions, transportation facilities were still poor and several million acres of government land, selling as low as \$2.50 an acre, were also on the market. By the mortgage \$8 was the lowest price for any of these lands and the company found it necessary to wait until most of the government domain had been disposed of before placing its own land on the market. The construction of the railroad in 1856 made settlement of the interior counties of Illinois much easier and by that year practically all of the government land had been sold. Tens of thousands of settlers were seeking farms near the railroad, and the company was thus in a position to demand reasonably high prices for its land. However, through legal restraints and the good judgment of the directors, the company pursued a very liberal policy. Cash payments were not required, as was the case with the federal land office. Instead, the settler could purchase his farm on credit by giving a note for the amount, the principal to be paid in five equal instalments, with interest at six per cent, the company, of course, retaining title until all payments were completed.⁸²

In 1856 active efforts were made to sell the land and nearly five hundred thousand acres were sold for upwards of four and a half million dollars. The sales in 1857 were almost as large.⁸³ Most of the sales were made to actual settlers in small holdings of one hundred to a hundred and twenty five acres, although at first a considerable quantity was disposed of to speculators. In the panic of 1857 the company experienced much difficulty with this class of purchasers, and from 1857 on it refused to sell except to *bona fide* settlers.

Up to the summer of 1857, sales were all that the company could have desired, and everything indicated a continuation of

⁸²*Land Office Pamphlets*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1870. The interest per annum varied from two to six per cent, but most of the land was sold on the basis of six per cent.

⁸³Reports of the Land Office. *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856, 1857.

the purchases on the same extensive scale. But just at the height of the sales, there occurred the panic of 1857 and the assignment, which, of course, put a sudden stop to immigration into the state and to further sales. Purchases dropped from \$4,500,000 in 1856 to less than \$500,000 in 1858 and to still smaller proportions in 1859.⁸⁴ More important, still, many of the farmers along the road had purchased land on credit and the panic left them unable to market their corn, wheat, and pork, or else they had no crops to market on account of repeated droughts. In many cases settlers were unable to make any payment whatever. Over a million dollars was due in both 1858 and 1859 and the purchasers had no cash to meet the instalments. To foreclose the mortgages or notes meant distress to tens of thousands of farmers and a serious impairment of revenue, through reduced acreage, to say nothing of universal ill-will. In this emergency the company followed a wise and conciliatory policy. Farms purchased by speculators or those too shiftless to succeed, were foreclosed. Where crop failures and the panic prevented payment of the instalments by *bona fide* settlers, payment in kind was allowed, generally corn. Where even this could be done, notes were extended and in other ways the farmers were encouraged to remain. Most of the settlers along the railroad took advantage of this generosity, and a large proportion of the payments due in 1858 and 1859 were extended. Altogether, over two million bushels of corn were received in payment of land notes and the officers of the company found themselves engaged in the grain business on an extensive scale. Miles of cribs were erected along the tracks and corn was held there for several months. In the end the company lost quite a large amount by handling this grain, though it was much more than compensated by the increased good will of the people along the line and by the prosperity of the farmers.⁸⁵ Its liberal policy secured it the support of the entire rural population of Illinois, and for a decade the Illinois Central Railroad was the most popular corporation in the state. It must be admitted, however, that the English shareholders viewed this generous policy with many misgivings and severely criticised the management for its liberality.⁸⁶

⁸⁴Reports of the Land Department. *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1858, 1859.

⁸⁵*Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders*, 1877; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, November 27, 1858; *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1856-1861. This loss was borne by the Land Department.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

Following the droughts, crop failures, and panics of 1857, 1858, and 1859, came the good times of 1860, and the sales of land again reached the proportions of 1856. The respite was only temporary, and in the spring of 1861 the great struggle between the North and South commenced. The Illinois farmer was cut off from his southern market; thousands of men entered the federal armies; and lack of a market and scarcity of labor made the year 1861 notable for its severity upon the farmers.⁸⁷ But the war created a demand for vast quantities of corn, wheat, oats and meat for the army; the eastern and New England states increased their manufacturing industries enormously, and the West was called upon to supply a part of the raw materials for these new industries and food for the men supported by them.⁸⁸ Several hundred thousand settlers took up claims or purchased farms in the western states and a considerable proportion of this immigration remained in Illinois. The demand for railroad lands grew with the immigration and in 1863 the sales of the Land Department surpassed all previous records, and, that too, at increased prices.⁸⁹ By 1864 the farmers were again in a position to pay their notes, and in that year the cash receipts of the Land Department reached the high water mark of \$1,440,000.⁹⁰

The remainder of the decade continued to be a period of unabated prosperity in which the agricultural interests of Illinois were especially favored, and the demand for farms remained good. By 1870 practically all the land north of Vandalia, and much south of that town, had been disposed of at good prices, while instalments on previous purchases had been paid promptly and in full.⁹¹ Thus, by December 31, 1870, \$13,641,616.40 had been received from construction land and \$8,800,000 more from free and interest lands, while upwards of four millions was still due the company on notes, making a grand total of considerably over \$26,000,000 received from the land grant prior to 1870.⁹²

From 1870 to 1875 the sales of new land were very small. Less than two hundred thousand acres of inferior land was sold,

⁸⁷Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, Chap. xx. Cf. Chap. iv, where these points are taken up at much greater length.

⁸⁸Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, Chap. xxv. Cf. Chap. iv.

⁸⁹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1860-1863.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 1865.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 1870.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 1870, report of the Land Department.

as compared with five times as much in the previous half decade. However, it was a period in which practically all the outstanding notes were paid off, with the result that cash receipts were large. From 1871 to 1874 \$2,304,649.87 was received in cash for sales of new land and nearly all of the unpaid notes of 1870 were liquidated.⁹³ At the close of 1874 the mortgage of September 13, 1851, was cancelled and the land grant was freed from all restrictions. The following table shows the total receipts from the land office from 1851 to 1874, inclusive:—

Construction Bond Fund.....	\$15,946,272.27	
Interest Fund	6,051,856.85	
Free Land Fund.....	3,508,488.51	\$25,506,627.63
<hr/>		
Expenses Land Office to 1873.....	1,383,644.04	
Paid Traffic Department.....	297,589.59	
Bills receivable, etc. (1874).....	75,369.90	1,754,603.53
<hr/>		
TOTAL		\$27,261,231.16
Net receipts Land Office, 1875 to 1907.....		2,219,061.66
<hr/>		
GRAND TOTAL.....		\$29,480,292.82 ⁹⁴

By 1874 approximately two million two hundred thousand acres had been sold, which made an average receipt per acre of a little over twelve dollars, including expenses, or eleven dollars net re-

⁹³Report of the Land Department. *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1874.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 1855-1907; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, November 27, 1858; *Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders*, 1877; cf. special reports of the president, Illinois Central Railroad, 1890, 1897, 1906. In 1851 President Schuyler predicted that the land grant would be sufficient to pay the entire cost of the railroad and if the receipts of the Land Department had been applied to the capital account that prophecy would have been fulfilled.

Cost of Railroad to Dec. 31st, 1857.....	\$26,568,017.61
Receipts Land Department to 1874—net.....	25,506,627.63

DIFFERENCE\$ 1,061,389.98

The value of unsold lands in 1874 was much larger than this difference. If the spirit of the mortgage of 1851 had been rigidly followed and deficit in earnings before 1863 had been made up out of surplus receipts from 1864 to 1870, the receipts of the Land Department would have sufficed to have paid back the cost of construction to 1857. However, a large part of the receipts from the land grant went directly into the treasury of the company.

ceipts. This grant of two and a half million acres of land has been a source of great profit to the company. At the same time it has been managed well, and sold to the best advantage of the community as a whole, as well as of the company.

Of the total receipts of the land office, \$11,779,407.02 to 1907, or \$9,560,355.36 to 1874, was used for the payment of interest and dividends; the cancellation of floating indebtedness, free land bonds and optional right notes; for permanent improvements defrayed from income; to purchase securities of other companies, especially the lines south of Cairo; in a word to the same purposes as the ordinary receipts from operation.⁹⁵ The remainder, amounting to \$15,946,272.27, was applied towards cancelling, in part, the construction bonds of 1875, in accordance with the mortgage of 1851. It will be seen from the report of the land department for 1872, the last full report, that \$15,103,178.59, received to that date, paid off construction bonds to the value of \$13,609,500, allowing a premium of eleven per cent, or \$1,493,678.59. In 1873 and 1874 \$657,856.47 was received, and the proportion of premium to par value was presumably about the same.⁹⁶

Since the mortgage covered \$17,000,000 and only \$14,200,000 was received from the sale of land there was a balance of approximately \$2,900,000, which came from other sources, mainly the Sterling and Currency Redemption loans. These bonds had three uses (1) to provide construction bonds for the Land Department; (2) to pay for permanent improvement chargeable to capital; (3) to substitute new bonds for the construction bonds, and to allow the sales of construction land to be used for interest and dividends.

By the terms of the construction bond mortgage, bonds had to be cancelled on the completion of every sale of land. Prior to 1861 the cash receipts from construction land were less than two and a half million dollars and sufficient bonds could be obtained in the open market on reasonable terms. So long as this condition continued the terms of the mortgage inflicted no hardship upon purchasers of land. The prosperity resulting from the Civil War allowed settlers along the railroad to pay for their farms, and, in both 1862 and 1863, there were large demands for the bonds, which naturally advanced the price of these securities. Many

⁹⁵*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1906.*

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 1855-1875; *Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877.*

holders saw a chance to make a profit by retaining the bonds and forcing the company to recall them at the twenty per cent advance specified in the mortgage, which again tended to advance the price. The bonds were gilt edge securities with interest payable in gold and with the general advance in prices during the period they increased in value from this cause also. To compel the settlers or the Land Department to purchase the bonds at an advance of fifteen to twenty per cent was an injustice and to remove the difficulty the directors, in 1863, issued \$2,500,000 six per cent 1st lien currency redemption bonds of 1870, with the object of purchasing construction bonds. These new bonds could be exchanged for the old on the basis of \$100 currency bonds for an equal amount of six per cent construction bonds, or \$115 of the new for \$100 seven per cent construction bonds.⁹⁷

This absorption of construction bonds in 1863 and 1864 temporarily satisfied the needs of the Land Department, but, by 1867, some \$6,441,145.37 had been received from purchasers of land and conditions were as bad as in 1863. The same remedy was applied. In 1867, sterling six per cent redemption bonds of 1875 to the amount of £500,000, or \$2,500,000, were issued and exchanged for construction bonds on about the same terms as the currency redemption bonds.⁹⁸ Both issues were easily disposed of, and, by 1870, the entire loan of \$5,000,000 had been sold for cash at par or above, or exchanged for construction bonds on the terms specified above.⁹⁹ Of the combined total approximately \$4,000,000 was used to purchase construction bonds, and, of this amount, perhaps \$750,000 was used in strict accordance with the terms of the mortgage of 1851.

When the two loans were placed it was understood that a part of the proceeds should be used to defray the cost of new equipment and improvement of the property. No figures are given by the company as to just how much was spent for this purpose, but, as shown on page 186 the approximate amount expended in this way was a million and a half. Of this perhaps a half was received from the sale of bonds for cash and the remainder by exchanging redemption bonds for construction bonds

⁹⁷*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.* The six per cent currency bonds were a first class security and the few bonds sold on the open market brought \$1000 per bond. However, nearly all of the issue was exchanged for the construction bonds on the agreed terms.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 1867.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 1863-1870.

and transferring the proceeds from the Land Department to permanent improvements.

However, the greater portion of the receipts from these two issues was used in a way entirely contrary to the spirit of the construction bond mortgage. When that instrument was made in 1851, it was understood that the two million acres set apart would be sufficient to cancel the entire loan and that all the proceeds from the land would be used to retire the construction bonds. If the construction bonds were purchased through the issue of other bonds it would not be necessary to apply the receipts from the sales of land to that purpose and the money so received could be turned into the general treasury to be used for interest and dividend payments. About \$3,500,000 of the redemption bonds were used to purchase construction bonds and instead of an equal amount of receipts from the land department being credited to the Permanent Improvement account, as an offset to the new bonds, the money was turned into the Free and Interest Land account and made available for interest and dividend payments. In this way the net earnings from operation were greatly increased and the company was able to pay ten per cent dividends. Had the \$3,500,000 been applied in strict accordance with the mortgage there would have been a deficit in net earnings for the period from 1857 to 1870 of approximately \$3,250,000, instead of a surplus of \$250,000. Under the changed conditions the company could not consistently have paid the dividends it did. In other words, following a strict construction of the mortgage of 1851, the company from 1863 to 1870 was paying part of its dividends out of capital. Except for a very few years the net earnings from operation alone were never sufficient to provide for both interest and dividends. Moreover, for the thirteen years, the net earnings from operation and the receipts from the free and interest lands as originally created, were less, by some two and a quarter million dollars, than the disbursements for interest and dividends, to say nothing of expenditures for permanent improvements.¹⁰⁰

However, the course pursued was not without justification.

¹⁰⁰Reports of Land Department, *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1872, 1873, 1874; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, November 7, 1858; *Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders*, 1877. Neither the company itself nor the various investigating committees make any definite statement as to where the receipts from the six per cent redemption bond issues went and for that reason the figures given above are only approximate.

Strict adherence to the mortgage would have necessitated a reduction of dividends by about two per cent a year. After the railroad was built there were no legal restrictions upon the company's use of the land grant, except those provided in the mortgage of September 13th. The other restraints were those of the company's own making and so long as the security of the bondholders was not impaired it had a perfect right to abolish such self imposed obligations. Moreover, under the circumstances, it would have been foolish for the management to have pursued an ultra-conservative policy, detrimental to the immediate interests of the shareholders, when a more liberal construction of the mortgage and the president's plan of 1851 was very profitable to the owners of the road, and did not impair the value of the property.

Aside from the objections noted above, the construction bond account was well managed, and, on the whole, was of real benefit to the railroad. At the same time, it was a rather expensive loan. For the \$17,000,000 of bonds issued there was received in cash only \$15,387,902.06 while \$18,493,678.59 was spent to retire them, allowing a difference of \$3,105,776.53, or 20.2%.¹⁰¹ Practically all the loss fell upon the seven per cent issues, and by some strange movement of chance the six per cents netted the company nearly fifty per cent more per bond than the seven per cents, although the latter were equally well secured and bore one per cent additional interest. On the other hand, the construction bond loan of the Illinois Central was far more profitable to the company than were the results of similar loans for construction purposes of such companies as the Ohio and Mississippi, St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute, and Great Western of Illinois.

Closely connected with the operations of the Land Department and the issue of the two redemption loans was the action of the company in regard to the stock account. Prior to the assignment of 1857, as already stated, only nominal assessments were made on the share capital, most of the funds for construction coming from the sale of bonds. Then from 1858 to 1863 this policy was reversed and heavy calls were made upon the stockholders, with the result that from 1857 to 1870 \$12,880,265 was received in cash from stock assessments. This, of course, was a favorable showing. Beginning as early as 1860 the receipts from construction lands had decreased the funded debt and during the same period payments on the capital stock

¹⁰¹*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1875. Cf. Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877.*

allowed an increased investment in the property, without a corresponding increase in liabilities. By 1865 these two parallel movements brought the cost of the railroad to something like three million dollars more than the sum of all liabilities; in other words there was a surplus of that amount.¹⁰² This was a condition directly opposed to the original plan of the promoters, by which the bonds were to pay for the road and the stock was to be largely "water", and to conform to the plan of 1851 the directors from 1858 to 1863 issued \$1,772,270 of Cancelled Bond Scrip Dividends, referred to above.¹⁰³ Further reduction of the funded debt continued to take place and in 1865 a stock dividend of ten per cent. or \$2,119,930, was declared, followed in 1868 by another of eight per cent, or \$1,881,100.¹⁰⁴ According to the common meaning of the term these stock distributions constituted stock watering, because in no case did the shareholders contribute a penny directly to the company in return. Nevertheless, this action was justified from the standpoint of the shareholders and the company.

The reasons advanced for these stock dividends were as follows: (1) This \$5,764,600 was represented by an actual cash investment in the property, though received through operations of the Land Department. (2) From 1856 to 1867, the shareholders had made up annual deficits in operation, not chargeable to capital, to the extent of \$1,506,285.55, and the stock was considered a repayment of these advances. (3) Some of the shareholders for as long as twelve years and others for shorter periods, had invested money in the stock of the company, for which they had received practically no remuneration and naturally, they desired some compensation for this lost interest.¹⁰⁵ While the last two items were important, they were more than compensated for by later indirect rewards. In 1864 the stock was placed on a ten per cent basis and dividends continued at that rate for ten years. Furthermore, the stock dividends were enormously valuable. In 1863, 1865, and 1868, the lowest prices reached in August, the month in which the stock was received, were \$100, \$123, and \$143, respectively.¹⁰⁶ For the shareholder of 1862, this

¹⁰²*Annual Report, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.*

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 1855-1863.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 1865, 1868.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 1855-1867; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, November 7, 1858; *Report of the Committee of English and Dutch Stockholders, 1877.*

¹⁰⁶Compare quotations on Illinois Central securities, 1860 ff.

represented a bonus of 29.6% of stock, worth \$36.30 per share at current market quotations. For all the stockholders the value of the stock dividends amounted to \$7,069,756.90, as against an alleged loss of interest of \$1,506,285.55. Further dividends and stock rights on this additional stock may be ignored as they would have accrued anyway, and the same dividend would have been distributed over a smaller number of shares. There was nothing wrong in the stock distributions, the amounts were comparatively small, and a cash equivalent had been received in each case in an indirect way, but, nevertheless, these three dividends must be regarded as contrary to the conservative policy ordinarily pursued by the Illinois Central.

The paramount purpose of the undertaking, to which stock dividends, price of stocks, or profits from the sale of the land grant were incidental, was its efficient operation as a railroad. Upon the basic fact of earnings rested the permanent financial success of the company. For the purpose of this study, the operating accounts of the railroad may be divided into seven successive classes, viz. gross earnings from operation, expenses of operation, taxes, fixed charges, net income applicable to dividends (including miscellaneous income), dividends, and surplus. Of these accounts that of gross earnings was determined mainly by the general prosperity of Illinois, that of taxes by the provisions of the charter, that of fixed charges by the original investment in the railroad, thus leaving the item of expense of operation to indicate the efficiency of management, and the items of dividends and surplus to indicate the financial wisdom of the board of directors.¹⁰⁷

The first of these accounts, i.e. gross earnings from operation, as the product of traffic carried and rates charged, was determined by the traffic conditions outlined in Chapter V, most of which were beyond the control of the management.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the period from 1855 to 1870 was quite abnormal on account of the panic of 1857, the Civil War, the prostration of the South, the feverish industrial activity of the East, and the fact that the territory tributary to the road was just being settled.¹⁰⁹ In

¹⁰⁷Operating accounts for the period ending 1870 have been rearranged somewhat so as to conform to recent practice. No attempt, however, has been made to have them conform to the latest rulings of the I. C. C.

¹⁰⁸Cf. particularly the concluding paragraphs.

¹⁰⁹A very good present comparison is the traffic on the newly completed Canadian Northern.

the earlier part of the period, or from 1855 to about 1861, the railroad was just being put in shape for operation, and the earnings were much below normal.¹¹⁰

Commencing with the Civil War, gross earnings increased at a phenomenal rate. Not until 1871 was the company able to handle the enormous business forced upon it, and although the larger traffic necessitated increased expenses, the margin between the two grew larger instead of smaller from year to year. From a million and a half in 1855 the gross earnings from operations steadily advanced until the maximum of eight million, six hundred thousand dollars was reached in 1870. Part of this was due to increased mileage, but the receipts on the charter lines alone were seven million two hundred thousand in the final year.¹¹¹ In the first five years in which the road was in operation, the total earnings increased by approximately six hundred thousand dollars, about twenty-five per cent. This slow growth was caused by the panic of 1857 and the crop failures in succeeding years. During this time passenger earnings actually decreased.¹¹² Then, beginning with the second year of the war, and continuing until the close of the decade, there took place a remarkable traffic development, with a corresponding growth of revenue.¹¹³ In the eight years from 1862 to 1869 freight earnings grew from one million, nine hundred thousand dollars to five millions, six hundred thousand, or one hundred and ninety per cent. On the other hand, the receipts of the passenger department increased only sixty-one per cent.¹¹⁴ As a result, freight was responsible for two-thirds of the revenue in 1870, as against less than half in 1855.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰This condition is made clear by the fact that quite a large proportion of the equipment purchased up to 1857 was not used until about 1862. Cf. *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1862.

¹¹¹*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 1855-1862.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 1862-1870.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 1855-1870.

¹¹⁵The following table shows the proportion of freight, passenger, and miscellaneous revenue in years indicated:

	PERCENT 1855	PERCENT 1862	PERCENT 1870
Freight	40	54	65
Passenger	47	37	24
Miscellaneous	13	9	11

As noted in Chapter V,¹¹⁶ average rates per ton- and passenger-mile were actually higher in 1870 than in the period immediately preceding the Civil War. Passenger rates were the most peculiar in this respect and were practically twice as great in the last year of the decade as in 1857.¹¹⁷ The average freight charge on all goods was three mills per ton-mile higher in the later year than in 1859. In general, through rates declined during the period, and local rates increased, but there were important fluctuations caused by special conditions.¹¹⁸ While rates were well maintained the total number of ton- and passenger-miles more than doubled, permitting the rapid increase in revenue noted above.¹¹⁹ However, the currency inflation of the Civil War period brought about such a change in the value of money that a comparison of the years from 1862 to 1867 is almost worthless.¹²⁰ Moreover, the character of tonnage and length of haul changed from year to year, and this cause alone prevented a correct estimate of actual rate movement.¹²¹

As a result of the heavy increase in traffic during the period expenses of operation also increased, although at a somewhat slower rate than gross earnings, or from \$1,453,000 in 1856 to \$4,801,000 in 1870. (\$2200 to \$4300 per mile). However, the operating ratio, i.e. the proportion of expenses of operation to gross earnings, fluctuated greatly. Commencing at 58.9% in 1856, it rose, with the panic of the following year, to a maxi-

¹¹⁶Chap. v; see also *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*; cf. Chap. v.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰Cf. Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, Chap. xxiv, especially pp. 339, 340, 341; Mitchell, *History of the Greenbacks*; Fite, *Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War*, *Quar. Jour. Econ.*, XX, 259-278; Chap. v.

¹²¹Statement of tonnage given in *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870. Only isolated tariffs and the average rate per ton or passenger mile are available for comparison. The influence of the inflation of the currency during the period from 1862 to 1870 is quite important. An examination of the charts in this chapter and Chapter v shows a rapid increase in all prices and charges given there, the rise being especially marked in 1864 and 1865. However, it would be unfair to assume that revenues and expenditures rose in direct proportion to the inflation of the currency in these years. Many payments were made on long term agreements, and others, such as wages, cost of fuel, etc., did not rise with the general rise of gold.

num of 77.2%, from which point there was a gradual decline, due to increased traffic, to a minimum of 46.8% in 1862. The Civil War caused an increase to 62.9% in 1865, from which level there was another decline to 54% in 1870. On the whole the ratio of expense to earnings was less than is now considered good practice, but operating conditions at that time were so different that this low ratio was then consistent with good management. The more prominent of these differences are: (1) The volume of traffic, due largely to high rates, was only a fraction of what is now carried. This resulted in less wear and tear on equipment and roadway. (2) Wages, the most important single item in operation, were considerably lower than at present. (3) The freight and passenger service was much poorer. (4) On account of the light volume of traffic and the higher return on capital, fixed charges and dividends took a much larger proportion of earnings.¹²²

As might be expected from the light traffic of the period maintenance of way expenditures represented a much larger proportion of the total than in recent years. The total for this account rose steadily, with the exception of the years 1861 and 1862, from \$323,000 in 1856 to a maximum of \$1,632,000 in 1869 (\$1,495,000 in 1870), or from \$450 per mile in the earlier year to \$1500 per mile in 1870, with a maximum of over \$2200 in 1865. This expenditure was for a railroad that was almost entirely single track and was well built and maintained from the first. The proportion of maintenance of way to expense of operation gradually increased from 22.3% in 1856 to 36.5% in 1865, with an average of over 30%. The question of whether these expenditures did keep the roadway in good shape is discussed in a later paragraph.¹²³

Expenditures for maintenance of equipment, in marked contrast to present practice, due in part to the heavy charges for renewals and depreciation now insisted on by the Interstate Commerce Commission, were much smaller than for maintenance of way, increasing from \$278,000 in 1856 to a maximum of \$1,211,000 in 1870, or from \$442 per mile in 1857 to \$1093 in 1870. The proportion of maintenance of equipment to ex-

¹²²In reviewing expenses of operation prior to 1870 the fact must be kept constantly in mind that it was not until a much later date that modern methods of operation, with their tremendously efficient handling of traffic, were introduced.

¹²³Cf. n. 134.

penses of operation varied from a minimum of 16.5% in 1859 to a maximum of 23.9% in 1868. As might be expected, the maintenance per locomotive or car, particularly since most of the equipment was still new and much of it purchased in 1855-1857 was not used until after 1861, was much less than at present. Locomotive repairs per locomotive increased from \$800 in 1855 to \$2800 in 1870, with maximum of \$4000 in 1865; in the same years passenger car repairs per car increased from \$250 to \$900, with maximum of \$1650, and repairs to freight cars per car increased from \$35 to \$75, with maximum of \$100.¹²⁴

Expenditures for conducting transportation increased more slowly than either gross earnings or maintenance expenditures, and formed a considerably smaller proportion of expenses of operation in 1870 than in 1856. The actual expenditures increased from \$768,000 in 1856 to a maximum of \$2,038,000 in 1870, or from \$1240 per mile in 1857 to \$1840 in 1870. The proportion of conducting transportation to expenses of operation, however, decreased from 53% to 41.9% during the same years.¹²⁵ Of these totals slightly over half went for train operation, one fourth for station expenses, and the remaining fourth was divided among the other charges, including part of the traffic expense. These results, taken in connection with the large increase in traffic mentioned in Chapter V, would seem to indicate a considerable increase in operating efficiency. However, an examination of the detailed statements given in the annual reports, which lack of space prevents being printed here, shows that this is not the case.¹²⁶ Three reasons may be given to explain this apparent discrepancy: (1) Since the years from 1855 to 1862 were years of abnormally light traffic the cost of handling it was heavy in proportion to the actual amount carried. Consequently decreased costs later indicate merely a normal operating efficiency.¹²⁷ (2) Few important improvements

¹²⁴It must be remembered that these expenditures were for the very much smaller, lighter, and cheaper equipment then used.

¹²⁵This ratio is generally regarded as representing the actual efficiency of management, since maintenance expenditures are determined quite largely by external conditions.

¹²⁶According to the report of the company, although the figures for the earlier years are probably less inclusive than for the later one, the cost of train operation increased from 3.7 mills in 1859 to 9.9 mills in 1870 per passenger mile, and from 1.3 mills to 2.6 mills per ton mile.

¹²⁷As stated in Chap. IV, it was necessary to establish complete train service during the years before 1861, even though the traffic did not justify so extensive schedules.

in operating methods were introduced during the period, while from 1863 to 1870 there was a congestion of traffic not favorable to efficient operation. (3) Wages and the cost of materials advanced considerably, especially during the closing years of the Civil War. In summing up the efficiency of conducting transportation during the period it may be said that, conducting transportation took a smaller proportion of the gross earnings than at present, due, largely, to a higher class of freight; the cost of operations, per unit, i.e. train ton, or passenger mile, was also very much higher than at present; improvements in operating methods were slight and insufficient to overcome increased expenses.¹²⁸

The last item in expense of operation, i.e. general expense, varied quite decidedly from year to year, both in actual amount and in proportion to the total cost of operation.¹²⁹ The total increased from \$84,000 in 1856 to a maximum of \$257,000 in 1870, with a proportion of 5.5% and 5.9%, respectively. However, in 1861 general expenses consumed eleven per cent of operating expenses, while in 1867 it fell to only four per cent. Since this account included many miscellaneous items this wide variation is to be expected.¹³⁰

The question naturally arises, in an analysis of the various items in expense of operation, whether the expenditures were sufficient to properly maintain the railroad and to provide an adequate service. To answer these questions completely would require a presentation beyond the possibilities of this chapter, but, in general, an affirmative answer may be given to both. The matter of maintenance charges is discussed in the two following paragraphs and for the matter of service it may be said that both an analysis of the reports of the company and an examination of the publications of the time indicate that the train service, both freight and passenger, considering the railway development of the period, was reasonably adequate. From a little before 1870 until several years later, there was much

¹²⁸Cf. statements in regard to operating efficiency in the annual reports of the president, *Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870.

¹²⁹The main items in general expense were: salaries general officers, salaries clerks, general office expense, insurance, legal expense, miscellaneous.

¹³⁰In 1861 there is an item of \$81,822 for miscellaneous, in 1868 insurance was \$48,513, and in 1869 general office expense and salaries totaled \$137,586.

complaint about the service, but this belongs to another period.¹³¹

Up to 1862 both maintenance of equipment and roadway charges were low, but this did not result in depreciation of the property. This conclusion is borne out by the following considerations: (1) Most of the equipment was from one to five years old and heavy repairs were not as necessary as later. (2) The roadway was also new and the small number of trains passing over the tracks did not wear out the rails or affect the condition of the superstructure. During these years rails, ties or bridge materials did not need replacement and labor on track was almost the only charge. Wages for efficient trackmen were low, and moderate expenditures kept the permanent way in excellent condition. (3) The traffic was abnormally light and the cars and locomotives were worked only a part of the time. In fact, a considerable proportion of the equipment purchased in 1856 and 1857 was not used until 1862 and did not require extensive repairs.¹³² Thus, the locomotive and freight car repair charges were distributed over a smaller number of units than the reports would indicate, and repairs on locomotives in actual use, considering the light service and their recent purchase, were fully as heavy as after the Civil War.¹³³

From 1863 to 1870, the road was taxed to its utmost capacity and both roadbed and equipment depreciated rapidly. The demands upon the rolling stock were so great that proper attention to repairs was impossible, and consequently, much larger expenditures were necessary when shopped. This condition was aggravated by high cost of labor and supplies. The hard service had a similar effect on superstructure, rails and ties. Moreover, beginning with the Civil War, an increasing amount of tie and rail replacement was necessary on account of a larger number of trains and natural deterioration. Despite this large in-

¹³¹From about 1871 until after 1880 the railroad was forced to retrench heavily and it is probable that conditions during that period are confused with conditions before 1870 when there was no financial necessity for curtailment in service or insufficient maintenance charges.

¹³²With the light traffic the average life of the ties, iron rails, and bridge materials used on the Illinois Central was at least ten years. As most of the track was not laid before 1854, no important replacements were necessary until about 1864 or 1865. Moreover the quality of all materials put in the road was first class and repairs were not as common as on other roads which were built with cheaper materials. Cf. Ackerman, *Early Illinois Railroads*, p. 42.

¹³³*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1870. The cost of repairs to each locomotive is given in the annual reports.

crease in the necessary maintenance charges the expenditures were more than sufficient to keep the property in first-class condition, and the railroad was in much better working condition in 1870 than thirteen or fourteen years earlier. It is also reasonably certain that a considerable amount of money was expended on maintenance which a more conservative system of accounting would have charged to capital.¹³⁴

Taxes, with the two minor exceptions mentioned below, were confined to the payment of seven per cent of the gross earnings, as provided for in the charter. By interpretations of the courts and of the state auditor this amount was fixed as both maximum and minimum after the full payment became due with the completion of the railroad. No other taxes of any kind were assessed in Illinois. In addition, however, there was a slight federal tax on earnings and dividends under the war legislation of the government. In Iowa, the leased lines were subject to the usual state taxes, which were quite light. Up to about 1863 the seven per cent tax was a heavy burden on the company, but with increased revenues later it ceased to be burdensome.

Net earnings, over and above expenses of operation and taxes, increased rapidly with the growth of earnings. From \$424,613 in 1858 (the net income previous to that year being carried as a capital account in this monograph) the amount rose to a maximum of \$3,429,838 in 1870. To this strictly operating income should be added miscellaneous receipts, mainly from the sale of lands. This total of gross income increased from \$581,-

¹³⁴*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1862-1870.

This matter of maintenance of the property is one which is involved in considerable dispute. In the report of the Delegates appointed by the committee of English and Dutch stockholders, made in 1877, and in the President's special report of 1897, it is asserted that the property was allowed to deteriorate after the Civil War. The investigating committee undoubtedly viewed the property from the English standpoint and naturally expected to have the railroad kept in better condition than it was. The report of 1897 made a contrast of conditions in the latter year with earlier periods and there was an unintentional bias against reporting the property in as good condition as it really was. Moreover, the standards of maintenance have advanced very rapidly and the property has been built up to a large extent out of maintenance expenses. Furthermore, as stated in the text, the maintenance of way and equipment charges were very heavy, considering the amount of traffic, and it is difficult to see how the property could depreciate, provided reasonable care was exercised in the disbursement of the money.

732 in the earlier year to \$4,043,705 in the later (a maximum of \$4,184,661 in 1869).

Against this gross income there was a charge for the fixed items of expenditure, i.e. interest on funded and floating debt, miscellaneous fixed charges on the bond account, and rental of leased lines. With the reduction of the funded debt interest charges steadily decreased from \$1,340,997 in 1858 to only \$622,053, in 1870, or only 18% of the gross income of the charter lines. Including rentals, the item of fixed charges amounted to \$1,194,570 in 1870, or not quite 30% of the gross income. Since nearly \$500,000 of this amount, representing the lease of the Iowa lines, was only incidental to the financial operations of the Illinois Central proper, the company was in a very strong position so far as income account was concerned. Moreover, since the bonds were bearing only six and seven per cent, while dividends were ten per cent, the fixed interest charge was in the nature of an asset, rather than a drain upon net revenues applicable to dividends.¹³⁵

The amount available for dividends and surplus, after all charges for operation, taxes, interest, and rentals had been provided for, varied from a deficit of \$759,265 in 1858 to a surplus of \$2,849,135 in 1870. In 1869, the maximum, it was \$3,997,070. From 1861 on, the income was sufficient to provide for dividend payments, with a small surplus during most of the years. However, if the dividends be set off against the net income from operation, less fixed charges, i.e. omitting payments from the land account, there would have been a heavy deficit in every year. In fact, there was a deficit of \$1,908,717 in dividend payments over

¹³⁵The operation of the Iowa leased lines from 1867 to 1870 yielded a slight profit to the Illinois Central and, therefore, the rentals paid were not a liability upon the finances of the company. Aside from these rentals, the fixed liabilities of the company towards the close of the period were, as the text indicates, unimportant. They were amply covered by the receipts from the Land Department and, therefore, left the railroad practically an unencumbered asset of the stockholders. With this high security for any funded debt it became possible for the company to borrow at interest rates lower than the dividends, and from this period dates the policy of the Illinois Central of carrying a large funded debt bearing an interest rate lower than the average returns on the investment, thus permitting the payment of dividends higher than this average return. The financial strength of the company rests on its wise application of this policy.

income applicable to dividends for the period, and, had the net income from land sales not been included, as they should have been according to a strict interpretation of the mortgage, there would have been an additional deficit of over seven million dollars.¹³⁶

After 1861 there was a surplus of net earnings above fixed charges and by 1863 the amount was large enough to justify the directors in declaring a regular semi-annual, four per cent cash dividend, instead of the four per cent interest on full paid stock given before that date.¹³⁷ In 1865 the annual dividend rate was increased to ten per cent and was made payable on all stock outstanding, including the scrip distributed prior to that time.¹³⁸ This rate was continued until 1874 and was equivalent to 10.8% in 1864 and 1865; to 12% from 1866 to 1868, and to 13% from 1869 to 1874, on the actual cash invested by the shareholders.¹³⁹ During the period, the Illinois Central stock was distinctly a good investment, as evidenced by the stock quotations, which, in July, 1868, reached a high mark of 159.¹⁴⁰ Including cash and stock dividends and rights, the shareholder received from 1863 to 1870, on an investment of \$100, a return of \$106.30, equivalent to 15.18 per cent a year. Moreover, at the end of this time his stock was worth forty dollars a share more than in 1860.¹⁴¹ This certainly was a handsome return on such a safe investment.

Nor, as seen above, was there any question about the justification of these dividends from the standpoint of net

¹³⁶These statistics bring out forcefully the statement of Richard Cobden that the strength of the railroad lay in the land grant. However, the directors of the company must be criticised for their lavish use of this reserve during the years from 1863 to 1870. In the language of Wall street they were simply "cutting a melon" when a much more conservative use of the reserve formed by the land grant would have saved the company much difficulty later on. In this connection it is interesting to compare the policy of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in the use of funds obtained from its land grants.

¹³⁷*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1863.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, 1865; i.e., eight per cent in 1864 and ten per cent in 1865.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 1863-1870; i.e., if the stockholder of record of 1862 had kept all stock distributions this would have been his return per \$100 share.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, VIII, 9 (Jan. 2, 1869). This includes "rights".

¹⁴¹*Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, X, 9 (January 7, 1871).

earnings, other than distribution of land office receipts. In only one year, viz. 1866, did the dividends exceed the revenue applicable to dividends and then to only a slight extent.¹⁴² In the other years, there was no question about the ability of the company to maintain the dividend. However, the directors did not always pursue a conservative course and expenditures from 1863 to 1870 were almost too near receipts for perfect safety. In 1870, the year when net earnings were the most satisfactory, the fund applicable to dividends amounted to only 11.4% against requirements of 10.4%.¹⁴³ Omitting receipts from the land department, necessarily only a temporary source of income, the net earnings applicable to dividends ranged from 5.4% in 1866 to 8.6% in 1870.¹⁴⁴ According to the company's books, the high dividend rate was guaranteed by a large surplus, but this was merely a bookkeeping account and was not represented by available assets.¹⁴⁵ By paying, say nine per cent instead of ten per cent, a large cash surplus could have been accumulated which would have allowed a continuance of eight or nine per cent dividends over a much longer period.¹⁴⁶

Prior to 1870 the company pursued a conservative policy in regard to extensions involving any financial risk. From the completion of the road to the Civil War several traffic arrangements with connecting or branch lines were made, but in no case was the financial responsibility large. Bonds of the Ohio and Mississippi and the Peoria and Oquaka, to the extent of approximately \$100,000 each, were purchased, but were not retained for any length of time.¹⁴⁷ No other important agreements were made except with the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company. As stated in Chapter IV, the Illinois Central, in 1867,

¹⁴²*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1866.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, i.e., ten per cent cash dividend and about .4 per cent federal war tax. In other years the dividend and war tax were barely earned.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, i.e., excluding receipts from the land department and miscellaneous sources of income.

¹⁴⁵The surplus was obtained by adding all interest payments to cost of construction and depreciation on construction and free land bonds and deducting from it net receipts to 1863. This account was not only not represented by cash assets, but was incorrect.

¹⁴⁶From 1874 to 1905 the dividends were reduced to a four to six per cent basis and the accumulation of a large surplus in 1870 might have improved this condition.

¹⁴⁷*Annual Report*, Illinois Central Railroad, 1855-1862; Fisher Report, *Railway Times*, June 19, 1858.

leased the property of the Dubuque and Sioux City and its subsidiary lines, the Iowa Falls and Sioux City and the Cedar Falls and Minnesota, for a period of twenty years.

The calendar year 1870 was the most successful year for the Illinois Central railroad to that time. Gross revenue was large, and the net earnings were sufficient to pay all fixed charges, a ten per cent dividend and provide a surplus of a quarter of a million dollars. The financial policy pursued by the company in the construction and operation of the railroad had proved entirely satisfactory to the promoters and owners of the stock. The construction work was carried on without serious financial difficulty, and after the first few years of operation the net earnings were all that could have been reasonably desired. The land grant was managed well and by 1870 had paid off most of the indebtedness. While the sanguine prospects of the promoters were not completely fulfilled, the investors in the property were amply rewarded, as illustrated by the following table:

Total cost of construction, equipment, net cash assets and supplies, Dec. 31, 1870.....		\$36,242,203.82
Funded debt (net)	\$ 6,869,500.00	
Cash paid on stock (net).....	19,726,700.00	26,596,200.00
<hr/>		<hr/>
NET SURPLUS		\$ 9,646,003.82

At the same time the affairs of the company were handled in a conservative manner, and only a part of this surplus, not quite six million dollars, was distributed to the shareholders in stock dividends. The remainder was invested in the railroad and added to the real value of the property.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

The Illinois Central Railroad has always occupied a unique position among the railroads of the country. From the inception of the project it had been primarily a government enterprise. It was the first important railway project in Illinois, and for twenty years its construction was the ambition of the state and its citizens. Moreover, it was also fostered by the federal government. The first land grant ever given by Congress to assist in the construction of a railroad was given to the state of Illinois to complete this undertaking. The legislature turned over the grant to a private corporation and the Illinois Central Railroad became the first important land grant railroad. Finally, the Illinois Central was the only company of any size in the Northwest, or upper Mississippi valley that followed the lines of longitude instead of latitude. The other great transportation systems of the country, the New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio, Pennsylvania, Erie, Northwestern, Burlington, and Rock Island, extended west from the Atlantic seaboard or east from the Mississippi River. The "Central", on the other hand, was built to retain the commerce of the Mississippi valley along north and south lines.

At the same time, though in this respect the railroad was similar to most of the large roads of the West, the Illinois Central was built through territory very thinly settled and was created with the definite object of developing the otherwise dormant resources of such region. In 1850 the central counties of Illinois were undeveloped, and the railroad was constructed through that part of the state in order to provide cheap transportation for their grain and live stock. The land grant and special privileges given the company were merely the necessary inducement to private capital to take up the undertaking.

From any view point, the construction of the Illinois Central must be regarded as a success. After four successive fail-

ures by the state itself and private individuals a group of Boston and New York capitalists built the road without receiving one cent of help from the state, other than the land grant and privileges granted in the charter, and without throwing any financial liability upon the government. The financial problems connected with construction were met, and the enterprise was carried through in a more economical manner than was any other similar undertaking of the period. At the same time the promoters constructed the railroad according to the best standards of the period. When finished it was the best built road of its size in the central West. Its operation, after the first four years, was also successful and accomplished what the early advocates of the scheme desired.

This success was accompanied by direct financial benefit to the federal and state governments. By the terms of the land grant act the alternate odd numbered sections not turned over to the state were sold for not less than \$2.50 an acre, double the former price, and the government lost nothing by giving half the land away. In fact, the construction of the railroad materially hastened the sale of all lands in central Illinois. Furthermore, the Illinois Central was of almost incalculable value to the country during the Civil War. The least important service was the reduced rates for troops and army supplies. Of far greater influence was the fact that such troops and supplies could be transported at all. The railroad provided an easily guarded connection between the federal armies in the West, and the loyal states of the union. Hundreds of thousands of men and tens of thousands of tons of supplies were carried over the line and placed quickly and safely near the base of active military operations. Had it not been for the Illinois Central the vast resources of the central West could not have been placed at the disposal of the government as easily as they were, the operations of the army would have been hampered and restricted, and the ultimate success of the national cause delayed that much.

The direct influence of the railroad on the state of Illinois was also of great importance. In the charter the state wisely exacted from the company a consideration of seven per cent of the gross earnings in return for the land grant. This is almost the only instance where either the state or national governments received any immediate compensation for lands surrendered to a private corporation. The development of a system of internal transportation was the primary cause of the state debt, and, by

the foresight of the legislature, the land grant was made the means of paying off the indebtedness, but without further risk on the part of the state. It might almost be said the present Illinois Central corporation was created for the purpose of increasing state taxes.¹ The results were all that the public could have asked. Including the year 1870, the seven per cent tax on the gross earnings of the company amounted to a total of four million six hundred thousand dollars, or nearly a third of the obligations of the state when the charter was granted. The large annual receipts permitted the prompt payment of the interest and the retirement of a portion of the principal of the state debt without the imposition of heavy taxes upon the industries of the state. Moreover, the building of the road opened up to settlement thousands of farms, and the increased taxes were also an important consideration in placing the state on a good financial standing. Through the cash payments into the state treasury and the increased valuation given the property of the citizens the Illinois Central placed the state of Illinois upon a firm financial basis and made its credit as good as that of any commonwealth.

The construction of the Central meant more to Illinois than the payment of half a million dollars of taxes a year. When Lieutenant Governor Jenkins and Sidney Breese first suggested a central railway, the interior of the state from Chicago to Du Quoin and from Danville to Springfield was an unoccupied wilderness. When Colonel Mason and his engineers surveyed the route of the railroad most of this territory was still unsettled and its resources practically untouched. The important influence of the Illinois Central came in the development of this part of the state.

Twenty years later there had taken place a transformation in the interior counties of Illinois. One-fifth of the entire population of the state was living in these counties, and their products formed one-fourth of all those raised by Illinois. Slightly more than one-half the people of the state were within twenty miles of the Illinois Central, and their wealth and prosperity was equal to that of any portion of the commonwealth. Early travellers declared the prairies could never be anything but a desert, but in 1870 they were the granary of the north Atlantic states. Nor was the development of the territory tributary to

¹Personal Statement of Mr. Head, clerk of the House during the passage of the charter.

the railroad confined to material things. Towns and cities were numerous; churches, schools, and colleges were as common as in other parts of the state; and the people were prosperous and contented.²

This development of central Illinois was brought about, almost entirely, through the efforts of the Illinois Central. There were other roads through the region, but until after the close of the war their influence was slight compared with that of the "Central". Not another railroad crossed its line from Cairo to Centralia, and there were only five from La Salle south.³ Moreover, during the first ten years of the company's history the transverse lines were merely feeders for the north and south road, so far as local territory was concerned. Thus, the full credit for the development of the central counties of Illinois must be given to the Illinois Central Railroad.

Furthermore, the construction of the Illinois Central had a far-reaching influence on the growth of the country. In the sixth and seventh decades of the nineteenth century there took place an important expansion in the production of food stuffs due to the increasing demands of Europe and the eastern states. Most of this development, as shown in the preceding pages, occurred in the central West, and the Illinois Central Railroad and the country dependent upon it were the most prominent single factor in increasing the movement of western grain to the north Atlantic seaboard. Next to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad the Illinois Central handled more wheat and corn than any other road in the West and, if the total tonnage of all grains is considered, it surpassed even that road. In the four years of the Civil War there was no other portion of the country which increased its production of grain to as great an extent as did the central counties of Illinois. By 1870 the agricultural territory directly dependent on the "Central", including the Iowa leased lines, supplied a larger share of the western grain forwarded to the Atlantic coast than any other area of similar size in the United States.

The Illinois Central was built with the definite object of building up the interior of Illinois and the results amply justified all the efforts expended in securing the road. Instead of being isolated from the leading markets and forced to be largely

²Cf. Chap. v.

³Viz., Ohio and Mississippi, Terre Haute, Alton & St. Louis, Great Western, St. Louis, Alton & Chicago and Peoria & Oquaka. Cf. Chap. iv.

self sufficing, the people in that part of the state had become an essential factor in the economic organization of the country. They were no longer self sufficient, but produced commodities, principally grain, needed by the eastern States and, in turn, consumed the manufactured goods of that section. Instead of being a drawback to the other portions of the state they occupied a leading position in its economic, as well as political and social advancement.

Thus, the construction of the Illinois Central may be regarded as the most important industrial undertaking ever commenced in the state of Illinois. The promoters of the enterprise, the investors in the securities of the company, and the men who managed its financial, traffic, and operating affairs after completion, deserve great credit for their efforts in making it an actual reality, even though they did so with the purpose of making handsome profits for themselves. At the same time, the real success of the railroad was based on the federal land grant. It was not the capital behind Robert Schuyler and the other promoters that gave the company its standing, nor was it the business ability of the directors that induced capitalists to purchase the stock and bonds of the corporation. The enormous extent of the land grant was the primary cause of the financial stability of the company. Had it not been for the land, the promoters could never have obtained the funds to build the road.

Moreover, after the enterprise was completed, it was the receipts from the land grant which kept the corporation from going into insolvency. From 1855 to 1861 there was not a year in which the net earnings from the operation of the railroad paid even the fixed interest charges. Without the receipts from the land department the railroad would have been foreclosed before it was finished. Even after 1862 the operation of the lines did not give sufficient profit to pay a regular eight per cent dividend on the actual cash invested in the stock. As a matter of fact, the average dividend for this period would have amounted to six per cent, instead of twelve, had it not been for the earnings of the land department, and there would have been no stock distributions nor surplus at the end of the period. Investors in other corporations which were managed as well as the Illinois Central were making ten and twelve per cent or even more on their actual investment, and the actual returns to the owners of the Illinois Central, so far as the operating accounts were concerned, were below a reasonable standard. In other words the land grant subsidized the railroad. It was an arrangement which

benefited both parties, and while the promoters of the Illinois Central made handsome profits on the operation of the road, the state of Illinois, its citizens, and the people of the country as a whole received equal advantages through the development of the territory near the railroad.

It is one of the ironies of the economic history of the United States that the Illinois Central Railroad, which was constructed to develop traffic along north and south lines, should be the foremost influence in changing the commerce of Illinois into east and west lines. The Civil War and the changed economic conditions following the struggle forced the company to send the grain of central Illinois to Chicago, and prevented its developing a profitable market in the south, although the former policy was clearly against its best permanent interests. As a result, the people were accustomed to ship their grain, live stock and raw materials east to the Atlantic seaboard and after the Civil War the company was unable to bring about any change. So long as the cost of carrying freight by railroad was high, and there were no strong east and west lines entering the state below Chicago, the Illinois Central did not lose much by this diversion of traffic. It obtained almost as long a haul from the central part of the state to Chicago as it would have to Cairo and the return freight was greater. Up until 1870 the east and west lines were not powerful enough to interfere with the business of the north and south trunk line and the grain traffic of the latter was reasonably profitable.

However, in the closing years of the seventh decade the trunk lines, especially the Pennsylvania, New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio, and Wabash, extended their tracks into central Illinois, and one by one they gained complete possession of the connecting and feeder lines which formerly had turned their freight to the Illinois Central. The latter company, instead of seeking to retain them even to the extent of purchase or lease, pursued the ultra-conservative course of neglecting them entirely. Thus, the company was practically isolated in 1870 and did not have an important connecting or branch line directly under its control.

As a result of the changed conditions in the movement of grain and the expansion of the east and west railroads the Illinois Central was gradually being forced into an awkward position. Its natural business along north and south lines was hampered and almost destroyed by the prostration of the South. The traffic which it had built up from central Illinois to Chicago was being

cut into by east and west railroads, which were each year becoming better able to compete with their rivals. Finally, the branch and connecting lines dependent upon it were now being purchased or leased by strong companies whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of the Illinois corporation. By 1870 these forces opposed to the Illinois Central had not made themselves evident, but they were steadily gaining strength and placing themselves in a better position for the conflict. On the other hand, the Illinois Central neglected to better its position and allowed important connections to slip from its control. When the conflict did break out the latter company was unprepared and suffered accordingly. Thus, the year 1870 represents the high tide of prosperity for the Illinois Central Railroad, and not again for some thirty-five years did it hold as strong a position from the financial and traffic standpoint.

APPENDIX.

LAND GRANT ACT OF SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1850.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled :

That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the State of Illinois for the construction of a railroad from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with a branch of the same to Chicago, on Lake Michigan, and another via the town of Galena, in said State, to Dubuque, in the state of Iowa, with the right also to take necessary materials of earth, stones, timber, etc., for the construction thereof: Provided, that the right of way shall not exceed 100 feet on each side of the length thereof, and a copy of the survey of said road and branches made under the direction of the Legislature, shall be forwarded to the proper local land officers, respectively, and to the general land office at Washington city, within ninety days after the completion of the same.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That there be, and is here granted to the State of Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches aforesaid, every alternate section of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches; but in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line or route of said road and branches is definitely located by the authority aforesaid, sold any part of any section hereby granted, or that the right of preemption has attached to the same, then it shall be lawful for any agent or agents to be appointed by the Governor of said State, to select, subject to the approval aforesaid, from the lands of the United States most contiguous to the tier of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sections, or parts of sections, as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, or to which the right of preemption has attached as aforesaid, which lands being equal in quantity to one-half of six sections in width on each side of said road and branches, the

State of Illinois shall have and hold to and for the use and purposes aforesaid: Provided, that the lands to be so located shall in no case be further than fifteen miles from the line of the road: And, further provided, the construction of said road shall be commenced at its southern terminus, at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and its northern terminus upon the Illinois and Michigan Canal, simultaneously, and continued from each of said points until completed, when said branch roads shall be constructed, according to the survey and location thereof: Provided further, that the lands here granted shall be applied to the construction of said road and branches, respectively, in quantities corresponding with the grant for each, and shall be disposed of only as the work progresses, and shall be applied to no other purpose whatsoever: And provided, further, that any and all lands reserved to the United States by the Act entitled "An Act to grant a quantity of land to the State of Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in opening a canal to connect the waters of the Illinois river with those of Lake Michigan" approved March second, eighteen hundred and twenty-seven, be, and the same are hereby reserved to the United States from the operation of this Act.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the sections and parts of sections of land which, by such grant, shall remain to the United States within six miles on each side of said road and branches, shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands when sold.

Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the said lands hereby granted to the said State shall be subject to the disposal of the Legislature thereof, for the purposes aforesaid and no other; and the said railroad and branches shall be and remain a public highway, for the use of the Government of the United States, free from toll or other charge upon the transportation of any property or troops of the United States.

Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That if the railroad shall not be completed within ten years, the said State of Illinois shall be bound to pay to the United States the amount which may be received upon the sale of any part of said lands by said State, the title to the residue of said lands shall reinvest in the United States, to have and hold the same in the same manner as if this Act had not been passed.

Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the United States mail shall at all times be transported on the said railroad under

the direction of the Post Office Department, at such price as the Congress may by law direct.

Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That in order to aid in the continuation of said Central Railroad from the mouth of the Ohio river to the city of Mobile, all the rights, privileges, and liabilities hereinbefore conferred on the State of Illinois shall be granted to the states of Alabama and Mississippi respectively, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from said city of Mobile to a point near the mouth of the Ohio River, and that public lands of the United States, to the same extent, in proportion to the length of the road, on the same terms, limitations, and restrictions in every respect, shall be, and is hereby, granted to said states of Alabama and Mississippi respectively.

MEMORIAL OF DECEMBER 28TH, 1850.

To the honorable the Senators and Representatives of the people of Illinois in General Assembly convened:

The memorial of Robert Schuyler, George Griswold, Gouverneur Morris, Jonathan Surges, Thomas W. Ludlow, and John F. A. Sandford of the City of New York; and David A. Neal, Franklin Haven and Robert Rantoul, Junr., of the City of Boston and vicinity, respectfully represents:

That having examined and considered an act of Congress of the United States, whereby land is donated by the United States for the purpose of insuring the construction of a railroad from Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio River, to Galena and the north-western angle of the State of Illinois, with a branch extending to Chicago on Lake Michigan, on certain conditions, therein expressed; and having also examined the resources of the tract of country through which it is proposed that the said railroad shall pass, and the amount of cost, and the space of time necessary for constructing the same, the subscribers propose to form a company, with such others as they may associate with them, including among their number persons of large experience in the construction of several of the principal railroads of the United States, and of means and credit sufficient to place beyond doubt their ability to perform what they hereinafter propose, make the following offer to the State of Illinois for their consideration:

The company so formed by the subscribers will, under the authority and direction of the State of Illinois, fully and faithfully perform the several conditions, and execute the trusts, in the said act of Congress contained. And will build a railroad

with branches between the termini set forth in said act, with a single track, and complete the same, ready for the transportation of merchandise and passengers, on or before the fourth day of July, which will be in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-four. And the said railroad shall be, in all respects, as well and thoroughly built as the railroad running from Boston to Albany, with such improvements thereon as experience has shown to be desirable and expedient, and shall be equipped in a manner suitable to the business to be accommodated thereby. And the said company, from and after the completion of the said road, will pay to the State of Illinois, annually — per cent of the gross earnings of the said railroad, without deduction or charge for expenses, or for any other matter or cause; provided, that the State of Illinois will grant to the subscribers a charter of incorporation, with terms mutually advantageous with powers and limitations, as they, in their wisdom, may think fit, as shall be accepted by said company, and as will sufficiently remunerate the subscribers for their care, labor, and expenditure in that behalf incurred, and will enable them to avail themselves of the lands donated by the said act to raise the funds, or some portion of the funds, necessary for the construction and equipment of said railroad.

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Abbreviations:— C H, Chicago Historical Library; I C, Illinois Central Library, Chicago, Ill.; U I, University of Illinois Library; W H, Wisconsin State Historical Library; U C, University of Chicago Library; C P, Chicago Public Library; I H, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Ill.

SOURCES

PUBLICATIONS OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.

Annual Report of the President to the Directors for the year ending December 31, 1855. Gives itemized cost of construction to date. [U.I., C.H.]

Annual Report of the Directors and President to the stockholders for calendar years, 1856 to 1870, inclusive. These reports are very full and contain a great mass of detailed information relating to the traffic and financial history of the company. Except for occasional misprints and certain mistakes in accounting the statements are entirely correct. [C.H., I.C.]

Annual Report of the Directors to the stockholders for calendar and fiscal years, 1871 to 1907, inclusive. Contain considerable detailed material, but not as much as in the earlier reports. With a few exceptions statements and statistics are perfectly correct and no attempt is made to misrepresent affairs. [U.C., I.C.]

Special Reports of the President to the Directors and Stockholders, 1890, 1897, 1906, October 30, 1895, December 19, 1895, January 11, 1896. Contain considerable miscellaneous information. The report for 1897 is especially valuable as it contains resumés of operating conditions, etc., before 1887. [Reports of 1897, U.C.; Reports of 1895, 1896, W.H.; all, I.C.]

Land Pamphlets, 1855 to 1870 (two or three missing). These are pamphlets issued by the Land Department soliciting immigration into the state of Illinois. There is some important information, but most of the statistics are worthless. [C.H.]

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Documents relating to the Lake Front Cases. Collection of court decisions, briefs, etc., relating to the suits brought by the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois against the Illinois Central. [C.P.]

Miscellaneous official and semi-official statements and reports, including reports of meetings of the Board of Directors, statements of the treasurer, proceedings of English stockholders, etc., published in *Railway Times* (London), *American Railway Journal*, and the *Chicago Daily Democrat*.

PUBLICATIONS OF MISCELLANEOUS RAILROAD COMPANIES.

Report of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railway Company, May 31, 1864. Gives statements as to cost of construction, capitalization, etc. of the company. [W.H.]

Report of the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R. R. (Terre Haute and Alton), 1854, 1855. [W.H.]

Report of the Dubuque and Sioux City R. R., December 31, 1887. Contains references to organization of the Dubuque & Sioux City and lease of the Iowa Falls & Sioux City. [I.C.]

PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

Journal of the Senate, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 31st Congresses).

Journal of the House of Representatives, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 31st Congresses).

Congressional Globe, 1843 to 1850 (28th to 31st Congresses). Contains speeches in Congress in regard to the various grants proposed for the Illinois Central, votes on bills, etc.

Seventh, eighth, and ninth censuses, 1850, 1860, 1870; also 10th census, volume on Agriculture; *ibid.*, volume on Transportation; 11th census, volume on Land Transportation. Contain detailed information in regard to crop production, population, manufacturing, and social conditions in various counties of Illinois; also information in regard to agricultural conditions in 1850 to 1870; also rates of transportation on products from West to Atlantic coast.

Transportation Routes to the Seaboard. 1st sess. 43rd Cong. Senate Reports, serial numbers 1588 and 1589. Report of Senate committee on rates from the West to the seaboard; also rates on grain from various local points to distributing centers; also movement of crops, prices, cost of transportation, testimony of railroad men and grain merchants, etc. It is almost invaluable in the treatment of the traffic of the Illinois Central.

Report on Wholesale Wages, Prices, and Transportation. Report by N. W. Aldrich from the Senate Committee on Finance, March 3, 1893 (Senate Report No. 1394, Finance Committee, 2 sess., 52 Cong.) 4 vols. Washington, 1894. Used for prices on wheat, corn, oats, and meat at Chicago and New York from 1840 to 1870 inclusive.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Journal of the Senate, 1830 to 1851.

Journal of the House of Representatives, 1830 to 1852. (State Printer, Springfield, 1830 to 1852.)

Session Laws of Illinois, 1837 to 1851 inclusive. (State Printer, Springfield, 1837 to 1851 inclusive.)

The State of Illinois vs. The Illinois Central Railroad, W. H. Stead, Attorney General, In the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, February term, A. D. 1907. (State Printer, Springfield, Ill., 1907.) Contains charter of the Illinois Central Railroad, all amendments thereto, and gross earnings of the charter lines from 1870 to 1906, with other miscellaneous information in regard to suit for back taxes.)

Report of the Illinois Railway and Warehouse Commission, 1871, 1872, 1873. Statistics of the Illinois Central and remarks of the commissioners. (State Printer, Springfield, 1871, 1872, 1873.)

Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1869. Remarks of members and action of the Convention in regard to the Illinois Central and the railroads of the state. (State Printer, Springfield, 1870.)

NEWSPAPERS.

Chicago Daily Democrat, January 1st, 1849 to December 31st, 1853. Contains numerous articles in regard to the charter and construction of the road. [C.H.]

Illinois State Journal, January 1st, 1849 to December 31st, 1851. Contains a large number of letters, speeches, etc., in regard to the Hol-

brook companies, the passage of the charter, and the character of the incorporators. [I.H.]

Illinois Daily State Register, January 1st, 1849 to December 31st, 1851. Supplements the Illinois State Journal. [I.H.]

Egyptian Republican, July 30, 1859 to July 6, 1861. (Centralia Daily Sentinel—Office Centralia Daily Sentinel, Centralia, Ill.)

Mound City Journal, 1859 to 1861—calendar years. (Cairo Arfgus—Office of the Cairo Argus, Cairo, Ill.)

Cairo Delta, April 13, 1848 to September 20, 1849. (Office of the Cairo Trust Company, Cairo, Ill.)

Cairo Sun, April 10, 1851 to April 10, 1852. (Office of the Cairo Trust Company, Cairo, Ill.)

Cairo Times, May 31st, 1854 to April, 1859. (Office of the Cairo Trust Company, Cairo, Ill.)

Urbana Union, September 21st, 1853 to July, 1855. (Urbana. In possession of Mr. J. O. Cunningham, Urbana, Ill.)

Belleville Advocate, September, 1849 to September, 1869. (Belleville Public Library, Belleville, Ill.)

Cairo Mirror and City Directory, 1864, 1865. (Cairo Public Library, Cairo, Ill.)

The above newspapers contain information in regard to the construction and operation of the Illinois Central, 1851 to 1870. Most of the material is fragmentary and is of little historical value.

RAILWAY AND FINANCIAL PERIODICALS.

Hunt's Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review, New York, 1850 to 1870. Of comparatively little value, especially after 1855.

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York, 1865 to 1870. Contains abstracts of annual reports, miscellaneous items, editorials, statistics of stock and bond quotations, and resumé of crop and financial conditions.

Railway Times, 1850 to 1870. (London, Eng.) Contains extracts from proceedings of the Board of Directors, etc., of the English stockholders, etc. Practically all letters or statements published by the company from 1851 to 1870 are contained in this series. It is the most important single reference used for the period from 1851 to 1858. Practically all statements are official or semi-official. (John Crerar Library, Marshall Field Building, Chicago, Ill. The set is complete.)

Railway Journal, 1854. (Philadelphia, John Crerar Library, Marshall Field Building, Chicago, Ill.) Of very little importance.

American Railway Journal, 1850 to 1860. (New York, 1850 to 1860.) Contains a great many statements, notices, advertisements, reports, editorials, etc. in regard to the Illinois Central. The references to the Dubuque and Sioux City Railway are especially important. A large number of official statements of this company are included. (James Hill Railway Collection, University of Wisconsin Library, Madison, Wis.)

Railroad Record, 1849 to 1853. (Cincinnati, 1849 to 1853.) Duplicates material in American Railway Journal and adds some additional information of slight importance. (Mercantile Library, St. Louis, Mo.)

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS.*

Illinois Monthly Magazine, complete. (Vandalia, Ill., 1830.) Contains some interesting information in regard to early plans for building a railroad or canal through the state. [C.H.]

Fergus Historical Series, Nos. 17 and 24. (Publications of the Chicago Historical Society.) Personal reminiscences, etc.

Regan, Wilds of America. [C.H.]

J. M. Peck, Gazeteer of Illinois, 1837. [C.H.]

H. S. Tanner, Views of the Valley of the Mississippi River. [C.H.]

Publications of the Cairo City and Property Company. [I.H.]

Anon., The Past, Present and Future of the City of Cairo. [I.H.]

Henry Long, Report on the Condition and Prospect of Cairo. [I.H.]

Annual Reports, Chicago Board of Trade, 1858 to 1870. (Chicago, 1858 to 1870.) Give statistics of the city of Chicago, including receipts over various railroads, the canal, and the lake. Of special importance in traffic chapter. [U.I.]

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.**

W. K. Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads. (Fergus Historical Series No. 23, Fergus Printing Co., Chicago, 1884.) Contains some valuable information, but on the whole is of little historical importance.

Davidson and Stuve, A Complete History of Illinois from 1673 to 1884. (2nd Edition, Springfield, W. H. Rokker, 1884.) Treats the Illinois Central from a biased point of view.

J. Moses, Illinois Historical and Statistical (Fergus Print, Chicago, 1889-1892.) Gives some interesting information, but not of great historical value.

Hinsdale, The Old Northwest. (New York, 1888—T. MacCoun.)

A. T. Andreas, History of Chicago. (A. T. Andreas, Chicago, 1884-1886—3 v.) Fairly accurate and contains some valuable information on the relations of the city of Chicago and the Illinois Central.

Sidney Breese, The Early History of Illinois. (E. B. Myers & Co., Chicago, 1884.) The Appendix contains correspondence between Sidney Breese and Senator Douglas in regard to their respective influence in securing the federal land grant act.

Helper, The Impending Crisis of the South. (A. B. Burdick, New

*The above miscellaneous pamphlets were used in chapters I and II. Specific references are not given to any of them in the text, but the writer's views are based very largely on material found in these publications. They are all rare books without dates in many cases, but they can be obtained at the libraries referred to by use of the author and title only.

**Aside from the books and articles by Fite, Sanborn, and Ackerman, the secondary material relating to the Illinois Central is practically worthless. With slight exception all published material relating to the history of the company is based on Mr. W. K. Ackerman's paper on Early Illinois Railroads, read before the Illinois Historical Society. The paper is excellent so far as it treats of events coming under Mr. Ackerman's personal observation, but the remainder is merely a collection of interesting incidents. Very little secondary material is absolutely inaccurate, but at the same time, an equally small portion is of real historical value.

York, 1860.) Treats of conditions in the South at the commencement of the Civil War and shows the relation between the West and South. (Cf. Olmsted's various travels in the South.)

G. Gale, *Upper Mississippi*. Clark & Co., Chicago, 1867.) Refers to early history of Galena, but is of little value.

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Newton, *Railway Legislation in Illinois, 1828 to 1870*. (Mss. thesis in University of Illinois Library.) Gives a summary of legislation by Illinois on railroads and canals from 1828 to 1870. Of fair historical value.

H. W. Quaintance, *The Influence of Farm Machinery on Production and Labor*. (University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., 1904.)

Fite, *The Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War*. (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XX, 259-278.) Treats of prices of western produce in relation to freight rates and the inflation of the currency. (Cf. Mitchell, *History of the Greenbacks*.)

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